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ABSTRACT
THE MAKING AND THE CRISIS OF TURKISH SOCIAL DEMOCRACY 
ROOTS, DISCOURSES AND STRATEGIES
Hasan Biilenl Kahrainan
Department of Politieal Scienee and Publie Administration 
Supervisor: Assoc. Prof. Dr. E. Fuat Keyman
February 1999
The making and the crisis of social democracy in Turkey has a structural and historical 
context. It is also an agent of Turkish political modernisation which is an authoritarian 
one. In this sense it is interrelated with the eonstitutive ideology and the parameters of 
Turkey's hegemonic state discourse, namely Kemalism. The condition faced by Turkish 
social deiiKx^racy is an outcome of the crisis of modernity started in the 1980s and in the 
1990s, under such influences as postmodernism and globalisation. In order to reach the 
deep causes ol the crisis the analysis develops both on the vertical and horizontal axis, the 
f irst encompassing the internal and the latter encircling the external conditions. As the 
main cause of the crisis is assumed to be the nationalist, parochial character of Turkish 
s(x:ial dcimx:racy, and its inability in getting adopted to the new emerging conditions, the 
thesis, as a conclusion, develops a prospective approach drawing on the recent theories 
that has helped the upheaval of this political ideology in West-European countries.
Keywords: duikish social democracy. Republican People's Party, Turkish Political 
Modelni/ution, Kcmalism, Globali.sation, Third Way.
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ÖZET
TÜRK SOSYAL DEMOKRASİSİNİN OLUŞUMU VE KRİZİ 
KÖKENLER, SÖYLEMLER VE STRATLIİLER
Haşan Bülent Kahraman 
Siyaset Bilimi ve Kamu Yönetimi Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticisi; Doç. Dr. E. Fuat Keyman
Şubat 1999
Bu çalışma, Türk sosyal demokrasisinin oluşumunu ve özellikle 1980'lerden bu yana 
yaşadığı krizi tarihsel bir bağlamda ele almaktadır. İncelenen siyasal ideoloji, Türk siya.sal 
m(Kİcrni/asy(MHiıuın bir bileşeni olarak ele alınmıştır. Bu yanıyla Türk sosyal demokrasisi 
ulusçu vc yerel kimliği içinde kurucu devlet ideolojisiyle, Kemalizmle, sarmal ilişkisi 
yönünden degerlendirilmiştir.Bu bağlamda, kriz, anılan dönemlerde gelişen modernité 
krizinin bir uzantısı olarak çözümlenmiş, bu yanıyla da yapısal olarak nitelendirilmiştir. 
Tartışmanın yöntemsel uzantısı olarak Türk sosyal demokrasisi, dışsal ve içsel olmak 
üzere, iki temel aks üzerinde irdelenmiştir. Post-modernite ve küreselleşme tezin ayrıca 
irdelediği süreçler olarak belirirken, sonuç olarak, çalışma. Batı Avrupa'da sosyal 
demokrasinin yükselişini doğuran koşulların ve kuramsal yönelimleri çözümleyerek Türk 
sosyal demokrasisi için belli bir gelecek tasarımı sunmaktadır.
Anahtar kelimeler: Türk sosyal demokrasisi, CHP, SODEP, SHP, Kemalizm, 
küreselleşme,Üçüncü Yol
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One of the most complicated issues one could ever found in the realm of political 
ideologies and theory, is the history and the problematics of the social democracy. Even 
though the political history and practice of the twentieth century is, to a large extent, 
demarcated by this concept, in the West European countries, however, it has never been 
immune to harsh criticism and controversial approaches. As a double-feeding system, 
this might be due to the deep transformations social democracy has undergone since its 
birth. But, on the other hand, this very condition can be taken as one of the most 
important reasons provoking the continuous process of change and enabling it to come 
out oi the paralysing crisis it has faced. If the landmarks of this history arc victories and 
defeats, then the basic idiosyncracy of social democracy could easily be put as its 
piagmalism and piaclicalily.
Iti compari.son to its 'genuine' history, in Turkey, social democracy has a rather 
strange position. First of all, when certain parameters are taken into consideration, the 
existence of such an ideology is well a matter of di.scussion. Even if it is used as a generic 
name for a certain political attitude, the 1980s and late 1990s have witnessed how this 
concept is ambiguous and vague in Turkey. The whole debate of social dcmcx^racy in this 
country is devoted, both on the political-practical and ideological-theoretical realms, to the
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effort of proving how much it is compatible with and a part and parcel of the founding 
ideology of the state. Namely, social democracy, rather than resting on the universal 
social democratic norms, is accepted and expected to be a comjxment of Kemalisin in 
'I’mkcy. In this sense, 'I’urkish social dcmwracy has two distinctive characteristics, f'irst, 
it is parochial and has strictly been wanted to be parochial, second, the importance of it 
comes i'rom its resistance to change, differentiation and transformation.
In this regard, it would not be a astonishing to identify Turkish .sœial demcx:ratic 
practice with Republican Peoples' Party (RPP), which has never defined itself as 'sociaf 
democratic', if the last pericxl is omitted. It is interesting that, on the other hand, the 
history of the other political parties, such as Social Democratic Party (SDP) and Social 
Democratic Populist Party (SDPP), which were formed as social democratic parties, are 
omitted and not remembered. This very distinctive symptom might bo taken as the most 
distinguishing structural peculiarity of social democracy in Turkey and of its 
epistemological rœts. In a period when universal-European social democracy is in the 
effort of adopting itself to the new political trends and concepts, and having another 
transformative period, as a consequence of the radicalisation of dcmœracy, to use the 
term in its broadest meaning, Turkish social democracy's problematic position is akso 
widening.
This thesis has intended to be an attempt to capture the social democratic 'reality' 
in Turkey from a political science view point. In this context, its chief and leading aim 
has been to sei/e its epistemological and ideological origins and roots, as well as its 
political strategics. To construct an articulative structure and to show the basic constraints 
ol rurkish social democracy, the 'history' of RPP is analy.scd, with a keen interest in its 
ideological repercussions, referring to its ruptures and turning points. On top of the lack
oi' documents, tlie scarcity of the resources, the absence of archives, the insufficiency of 
the works conceiving both the early republican pericxl and later developments has been 
the basic difficulties that the thesis has faeed. The monumental and unsurpassable book 
by Mete Tun<;ay is the only work that deals directly with the early RPP having a plethora 
of inspirations for both historians and political scientists. The standard work by Suna 
Kili, although brings the history to the 1970s and is written with a political science 
orientation, yet is lacking of a critical approach. Hikmet Dila's book, although connects 
the history to early 1980s is totally a journalistic book, even though it is widely referred. 
In this framework, only the recent analysis concerning the early ideological formation 
period is worth to mention, like those of Taha Parla.
In this regard, the analysis of the 1980s and 1990s is, for the first time, attempted 
to be conceived from a social democratic angle in this thesis. Once more it should be 
emphasised that the political science approach has forced me to take into considemtion not 
only the history and practice, and its 'events', but more their reflections on the concepts 
and the concepts preparing them. Not only the history and the |X)litics of Rf’P but the 
whole attempt for the construction and the implementation of .social democracy is 
analysed in the thesis. The aim immediately carries the scope of the work to the realm of 
ideologies. In this scn.se, through Turkish scx^ ial dcm(x:racy's interaction and coalescence 
with the state ideology, which is referred in the thesis as the symbiotic relationship 
between Turkish social democracy and the state, the discourse, epistemology and 
ideological standing of the origins of Turkish political modernity is discussed. Whereas 
Turkish political modernity is identified with Turkish scx^ ial democracy, the crisis of the 
latter is taken as the crisis of the former in the late modern times.
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In realify the history o f the country for the last ten years is the history o f 
Republican Peoples' Party from the view point o f politics.
Recep Peker
To write the history of a party is to write the general 
history o f a country from a monographic point o f view
Anthony dramsci
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
If ihcre is a subject-matter within Turkish political life, on which one could 
witness a consensus among different and various academic and public discourses about 
the changing nature of Turkish politics, it is the crisis of Turkish social democracy as a 
political ideology, as a political party and as a political movement.. Since the 1980s, and 
especially during the 1990s, social democracy in Turkey has been facing a serious crisis 
in terms of its legitimacy in the eyes of the voters, thereby loosing constantly its popular 
support. As a political ideology, social democracy has been unable to create convincing 
economic, political and social policies to cope with the problems and the demands of 
societal affairs in Turkey, which has resulted in its 'legitimacy crisis.' As a political 
party, it is faced with 'representation crisis', as a drastic decline in its popular support as 
the 1994 national election indicates. As a political movement, it has lost its attachments 
with Turkish society, acted as a state ideology, and thus began to become a marginal 
movement in Turkish political life, whose activities are limited to its internal 
organisational and leadership problems. In a time when Europe is welcoming a 
movement of social dcmwratic upheaval, as in the case of England and Germany, as well 
as France, and when the discourses of 'new left' and 'third way' are gaining ideological 
and political currency, 'I'lirkish social democracy and its bearer, the Republican Peoples
Party (RPP), is increasingly becoming a small actor of political life, to the extent that it is 
now living with the possibility that it might not have enough popular support to form a 
group in the new parliament after the national election of 1999/April.
The overall aim of this thesis is to explore the various ways in which the crisis of 
scx^ ial ilcnux;racy has cx^curred and become increixsingly apparent in Turkish political life, 
especially during the 199()s. In doing so, the thesis will ana.lyse in a detailed fashion the 
conditions under which Turkish social democracy has entered a serious crisis, 
ideologically, organisationally, and as a political movement. The crisis occurs both as a 
legitimacy crisis and a representation crisis. It is a legitimacy crisis to the extent that as a 
political ideology I'urkish social democracy has been viewed and treated by different 
social groups and fx:>litical actors as an ideology incapable of responding the needs of and 
demands of Turkish swiety. It is also a representation crisis to the degree that as a 
political pai ty and political movement social dcmœracy has lost its popular support. The 
thesis, in this sense, aims at exploring and analysing the causes, in fact the multi­
dimensional causes, that have brought about the legitimacy and representation crisis of 
Turkish .social democracy, which has become evident during the 1990s.
The thesis argues that the crisis of Turkish social democracy should be seen as a 
'structural crisis', the causes of which cannot be reduced to one determining factor or a 
prime mover. The crisis of Turkish social democracy is not a crisis which can be 
explained only by pointing out the constant declines in the amount of popular support for 
social democratic parties since the 1980s. Moreover, it is not a crisis which can be solved 
by short-term changes in party politics and programs. Instead, as the thesis argues and 
attempts to elaborate in a comprehensive manner, is a structural crisis whose conditions 
of existence arc historically, discursively and organisationally constructed. It is a crisis
which has œciin cd as a result of articulation of internal and external factors, all of which 
have created a discursive gap between Turkish social democracy and the needs and 
demands of the rapidly changing societal affairs in Turkey. It is for this reason that the 
thesis suggests that a comprehensive account of the crisis of Turkish social democracy 
should be constructed by taking into consideration both historical and discursive changes 
that have liamed the changing nature of politics to which scx:ial democracy as a political 
movement seems to be unable to adopt itself.
These historical and discursive changes appear to have been stemmed from two 
interrelated processes; namely, those of the 'crisis of modernity' and what has come to be 
known as ’gl<)l)ali/.alion'. While the crisis of modernity brings about radical changes in 
the epistemological and discursive foundation of politics, the processes of 
globali/iilion(s) have played historically constitutive role in the emergence of new actors, 
new demands and new grammar of politics. As has been argued, 'the nature of the 
present', in this sense, can be seen as a historical epoch, characterised by a dialectic 
relationship between the certainties of modernity that are dismantling and the new that 
cannot be born yet. The crisis of Turkish social democracy is not immune from these 
changes, in fact it is embedded in them and appears to be multi-dimensional in terms of 
its causes and roots. In this thesis, these rcx)ts and causes will be explored and it will be 
attempted to demonstrate that a full account of the crisis of Turkish social democracy 
should entail analysing both its internal relation with Kemalism as the hegemonic 
discourse of Turkish modernity, and its connection with and determination by global 
changes that have an important impact on societal affairs.
In this sense the thesis provides a two-fold analysis of the structural crisis of 
'rurkish social democracy: first, by arguing that Turkish social democracy has always
acted as a nationalist and parochial political ideology, not much influenced by universal 
norms of social democracy in the world, the thesis attempts to provide a detailed analysis 
of Kemalism which has been the foundational ground for the epistemological and 
normative characteristics of social democratic ideology in Turkey. Second, by pointing 
out the importance of the proccs.scs of globalization that have created radical changes in 
political life, the thesis will provide an in-depth analysis of the changing nature of politics 
in last two decades to which social democracy have been unable to adopt itself, and as a 
result remained detached from the needs and demands of societal affairs. This two-fold 
analysis, the thesis suggests, is necessary not only to understand the way in which 
Turkish social democracy is faced with a structural crisis, but also to construct a set of 
plausible strategies to cope with this crisis, which will be delineated in the last chapter of 
the thesis.
In a sense, the history of social democracy in Turkey has always been the history 
of the Republican Peoples Party to the extent that Kemalism has always acted as 
constitutive of Turkish social democratic ideology. Calls for the need for a 'genuine left' 
or an appeal to a 'national left' have always been prior to and assumed primacy over the 
universal principles of social democracy. Turkish social democracy chose to be a 
parochial ideology corresponding to Turkish reality', as if that reality is immune from 
global affairs. This parochiality and the nationalist /statist discourse it has produced is to a 
large degree framed by Turkish modernity in which Kemalism operates as the constitutive 
ideology of the state. It is Kemalism that gives meaning to the ideological formation of 
Turkish social democracy and its attempt to bring to the fore the statist reading of Turkish 
society, to act as an ideology of the state, and thereby to make a pre-determined public 
good (that is, what is good for society) a primary point of reference for politics, rather 
than taking into account societal and group demands in doing politics.
Modcrnily, in Turkey, through Kcmalism, directly attributes to the 
implementation of 'rational thinking', which is a deep devotion to positivism, the 
construction of the citizen, and the accomplishment of secularism. In this process, state 
has played the leading and the major role. Statism has not only been a concept perUiining 
to a sfxîcii ic economic approach but having a wider connotation, stretching over the social 
and political. This implies that, the modernity process in Turkey, depends, structurally, 
on a 'from the above' type regulation and, the realisation of the project has been achieved 
by the coalition of the party, the state, with which it has united in the 1930s, and the 
elites. In other words, social democracy in Turkey has its roots in a para-militarist 
grassroots organisation, the centralist approach, and the authoritarian notion of 
dcvclopmentalism, inclusive of the particularly defined citizenship, taken as a subject 
obeying the state and accepting the two basic tenets of the ideology, i.e. nationalism and 
secularism.
This symbiotic relation between Kemalism and Turkish social democracy, as the 
thesis will analyse in-depth, constitutes one of the causes of the structural crisis that the 
latter faces today. As Kemalism, that is, modernity, faces a legitimacy crisis, and looses 
its hegemony over the formation of Turkish modernity, as a result of postmodern 
developments and globalization proeesses, and as alternative modernities begin to 
challenge Kemalism and play a role in political life, foundational ground on which social 
democracy rests becomes shaky and slippery. Nevertheless, Turkish social democracy, 
in every step of its development, including the latest formations in the late twentieth 
century, namely in the 1990s, preferred to approximate itself to Kemalism rather than to 
the norms of universal social democratic ideology.
In this regard, two major transformation opportunities have been missed by 
Turkish social democracy. The first one is the new openings created in the political realm 
in llic l‘)(')Os. by (lie initiative taken by Western European socialist and social dcnKx iatic 
parties. In coalescence with the epistemological characteristic of West European social 
democracy, which is qualified as 'revisionism', and its ability to transform itself, this 
political ideology, has renovated itself in the 1960s after the monumental Bad Godesberg 
movement. The very well known notion of 'new left' is based on the assessments 
concerning the self and individual with \he. force majöre of the new social and political 
movements, which are developed on the basis of changes observed on the technological 
level.
The second threshold consists of the movements developed in the post-1980 
period. 'I'his time period, as long as the political agenda is eoneerned, has developed on 
two major axis. On the one hand, the decade has witnessed the development of the neo- 
liberal, new rightist policies with a call for the minimal state and absolutely free market 
economy. On the other hand, the 1980s is demarcated by the culmination of New Social 
and Political Movements carving out a new space in the society and proposing and 
configuring a new understanding of the social and the political. Nevertheless, the period 
starting by 1960s and reaching the edge of 2000, has been, largely, a critic of modernity. 
From this reassessment of modernity, comes out a new understanding of democracy. 
Incorporating a new notion of self, i.e. individual and, trying to delineate a new social 
and political structure, new democracy models, largely, depend on the demise of the 
hegemonic discourse and location of the state. This is rather due to the recognition of the 
differences, a new conceptualisation of the notion of tolerance, ethics, and indispensable 
importance of pluralism. In this sense, pluralism goes out for the multicultural formations
atiti, cs|)ccially Ihc 1990s is demarcated by the dismantling of the nation slate. The new 
condition of the nation-state, shaded by the upsurge of the civil movements, the 
restructuring ol the civil society also denotes the end of the authoritarian notion of 
modernity, by the Fall of the Berlin Wall.
Turkish social democracy, contrary to the developments achieved in the West- 
Europcan models, has stayed immune to these movements. Whereas the social 
democratic parties of West European countries have attuned themselves to the new 
formations, even accepting the basic tenets of the neo liberal movement, Turkish social 
democracy, emanating totally from a different epistemology, has never perceived and 
conceptualised the new developments. Not having taken 'revisionism' as a basis of 
political and ideological formation, Turkish social democracy, has rather run into a 
contradiction with the post-modern developments, in the sense that, in a period of post­
nation-slate period, it has been for the rejuvenation of the nationalism and the appraisal of 
a centralist, aulhoriUirian, regulationist model of economic development. This conveys to 
the incori^oiation of the contradictions between the state and society in Turkey by social 
democracy, as seen in the I99()s, due to its coalescence with the nationalist, republican 
epistemology. The rejection of genuine social democratic ideology, doubtless, has played 
a major role in this formation. As a consequence, Turkish social democracy has become, 
as empirical studies have shown, a marginal ideology, with its political parties being 
exposed to patronage relations and depending on a clientalist structure.
In this context, the thesis will expand both on the horizontal and vertical levels. 
On the vertical axis it will focus on the procedural issues of Turkish social democracy, 
more emphasising the historical thresholds, taken as decades. In this regard the thesis 
concentrates on four significant decades; the 1923 and 1930; 1930-1960; 1960 and 1970
and, the post 1980 period. In the first period the formation of the RPP is analysed with 
ils political and ideological background; in the second period an insight is given (o the 
state-party merger and, the basis of an authoritarian model of modernisation and its 
ideology is analysed. 'I’hc third period is reserved to the formation of left of centre and 
democratic left politics. The post 1980 period is discussed by focusing on the 1980s and 
1990s respectively. In this framework, the thesis largely depends on the original 
resources and documents.
On the hoii/,ontal axis, the thesis will accentuate the ideological and mote implicit 
variables of the Turkish social democracy. In this context, the thesis will rely on various 
different bill major arguments. The main argument of the thesis is the symbiotic 
relationship between the state, the constitutive ideology and the Turkish social 
democracy. The thesis will show how this structure is eonstriictcd. Nevertheless, this 
docs not need to take an cssentialist position as well as it does not bring out a causality 
between the vai iabics. Secondly, the thesis argues that Turkish social democracy is a part 
and parcel of Turkish political modernisation and, unless the links between Kemalisin 
and modernity are analysed, and the critics of modernity is discussed, the existing 
situation of this ideology is unachievable. Thirdly, it is debated that, Turkish social 
democracy, as a consequence of the all above mentioned issues, has developed more a 
political culture than a political ideology. The lack of a genuine ideology is replaced 
by the hegemonic discourse of the state. In the background of this idiosyncrasy lies the 
solidarist, corporatist, organic society understanding. Lastly, beyond the aforementioned 
elements, a certain formation, which have come out in the globalisation period, the rise 
of political Islam, has played a certain role in the réévaluation of both social dcmociacy 
and Kemalisin; for in the thesis it will be argued that, these two concepts, Kemalism and 
Islam arc the 'constitutive outside' of each other. In the last part of the thesis, in search of
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a prospect I or the Turkish social democracy, by referring mainly to the recent 
developments observed in the British Labour Party, the possibilities of a new opening is 
discussed. In short, the thesis argues that, Turkish social democracy, although has been 
successful in the achievement of the first-wave modernity, is unsuccessful in getting 
adopted to (he second phase, which has started in the 1980s. In (his scn.se, (he (hesis 
aims to be a political analysis of the formation and the crisis of Turkish social democracy, 
trying to cxploic the roots, discourses and the strategies. The subject-matters and the 
concerns of the chapters are as below.
I ’hc second chapter analysis the early formation phase of RPP. It concentrates on 
the period of 1919 and 1930. In this section the political background of the events is 
dissected, while some methodological questions are discussed. In the same line, it is 
argued that, this phase might be conceptualised as a 'party-led state' period. The chapter 
ibeuses on the political and social events of the period, referring to the ideological 
background. The transition from the Ottoman empire to a republican system is analysed 
in this chapter. The chapter focuses on the roots of the epistemology of the republican 
understanding in Turkey.
In the third chapter, the thesis argues that, as the conditions arc radically changed, 
RPP becomes rather a 'state-led party' in the time period of 1930 and 1946 and it is again 
in this period that, single-party model is accepted and the ideological indcx;trination of the 
society, by way of newly established institutions, is realised. This is analysed in the 
chapter as the ideology of culture and the culture of ideology. The party and the state 
unification continues up until the formation of the Democrat Party. The state/party/clites 
coalition, which will be the peer of the later debates and a constitutive model for Turkish
(political) modernity is achieved mostly in this period. Nevertheless, the development of 
the DP, it is argued that, is a reaction of the periphery against the centre and it is also the 
urge of the bourgeoisie to grasp the political power, through a unification with peasantry, 
which was left to state elites, i.e. bureaucracy and the military. The solidarist and 
corporatist society model is another characteristic of this pericxl. Nevertheless, the chapter 
also analysis and concentrates on the conditions and the outcomes of the transformation 
that RPP has undergone in the late 1950s.
In the formation process of Turkish social democracy, the first, seemingly radical, 
break with the traditional past occurs in the 1960s and 1970s, by the declaration of 'left 
of ccntic' politics. Nevertheless, the thesis, in the fourth chapter, wilt argue that, this 
move is another but revised version of statism, in corporation with the elites. It is a 
consequence of the leftist movements which have developed outside Turkey. The chapter 
argues that, as Turkey faced the radical leftist upheavals in the 1960s and 1970s, the left 
of centre politics, contrary to the accepted assumption, intended to be a barrier for those 
political and social movements. In this sense, the left of centre, according to the 
arguments of the chapter is a new version of the statist-elitist understanding. That is why 
the left of centre politics will be qualified as a long transition period. The 1970s, on the 
other hand, as will also be discussed in the fourth chapter, is the transition to 'democratic 
left' politics and this brings the irreversible parochial, local character pf Turkish social 
democracy.
One of the main radical ruptures in the history of Turkish modernity, although is a 
matter of debate, has been the rise of the Motherland Parly in the post-1980 military coup 
period. This period, in this thesis and in the fifth chapter, is qualified as a new search for 
modernity. In Turkey, under the influence of the neo-liberal, new rightist economic and
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social policies in America and England, as well as the display of the post-modern social 
formations, the foundational ideology of the republican period, for the first time, has 
been opened to criticism. Doubtless, the period is also backed by the glasnosi and 
perestroika which, in a sense, perceived as a demise of the left. In this sense, the 1980s 
in rurkey, in the fifth chapter is analysed from the view point of nco-libcral politics, as 
the latter is analysed in-depth as the formation of a new hegemonic discourse in the post- 
Fordist era in the West.
The condition of the Turkish social democracy in the 1980s is the subject-matter 
and the concern of the sixth chapter. The social democracy, showing ups and downs in 
the decade, is more attuned, for the first time, to the implementation of the concept of 
's(x:ial dcm(x:racy' through newly formed ptilitical parties. This is qualified in the chapter 
as a 'reconstruction' period, creating much of a dispute within the left wing politics. In 
this decade, there occurs not only two different political parties. Social Democratic 
Populist Party (SDPP)and Democratic Left Party (DLP), but also, as a consequence of 
the early and hidden criticism directed to the foundational ideology, the social democratic 
wing, which is SDPP, is split into two parts. The long-time perpetuated debates are 
analysed in-depth in this chapter, referring to the original dex^uments.
The seventh chapter is reserved to the arguments concerning globalisiition. A wide 
analysis of this foundational concept is given in this chapter and, its reflections on the 
s(x;ial dcmcx^ratic politics in Turkey is analysed. Social democracy, in the 1990s, not only 
in Turkey, but also in Europe is deeply affected by this movement and, above all, 
globalisation is the basis in the process of a search for a new understanding of 
democracy. In this chapter, the new formations within SDPP is analysed, referring to the 
manifestations and the arguments and debates of the intra-party factions. The re­
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establishment of the RPP is also discussed in this chapter. The chapter focuses on the 
first hall of the 1990s, taking the years 1990 and 1994 into account.
In the eight chapter, the 1994 and 1998 part of the 1990s is analysed. The merger 
of the two parties, SDPP and RPP, the rise of the nationalist rhetoric of the latter, the 
conditions of returning to the foundational ideology is the concern of this chapter. The 
rise of the political Islam, the upsurge of the militant approach to secularism, as a 
coimtci-balancing issue, and, above all, the drastic and dramatic loss of the 1995 general 
elections, just after the merger, is discussed in this chapter. One of the main contributions 
of the chapter to the thesis is the argument that, there is a radical change on the grassroots 
and in the structural aspects of Turkish social democracy. It is argued that, this condition 
is a consequence o( the serial, economic and cultural changes and, the traditional support 
groups and the cleavage does not run anymore for the RPP. The fragmentation, 
|x>larisation and volatility in the politituil scenery has also contributed to this development.
In the ninth chapter, starting from the 1995 elections, the ideological background 
ol Turkish social dcmcx^racy is analysed in- depth. In the chapter, not only the aspects of 
globalization is debated further but, apart from that, the ideological structure of Turkish 
social democracy, with its symbiotic relationship with the slate and its inherited 
epistemologically genetic modernist characteristics are diseussed. In this sense, the 
Kemalism debates of the late 1990s are reviewed and the rise of the Islam is dissected by 
referring to its epistemological components. In this regard the Welfare Party effeet on the 
political agenda is debated with its implicit relation to Kemalism and modernity. In this 
sense, the chapter focuses on the 'hidden' interaction between Kemalism and radical 
Islam, with a reference to their epistemological origins. This framework incorporates and 
tries to display the ineptness of Turkish social democracy in getting adopted to the new
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formations and, it is argued in the chapter that, this deteriorating idiosyncracy is an 
outcome of what has been argued in the previous chapter; the loss of support groups and 
the probicmalic |X)sition of Turkish, from-thc-above modernisation. Nevertheless, it is 
argued that social demtx^racy has fallen into a loop, i.e. a vicious circle, in this period 
because ideological insufficiency and alienation destroys the grassroi)ts and, due to its 
parochial characteristic it cannot formulate an alternative to its existing political and 
structural idiosyncracy.
In the last. Conclusion, chapter of the thesis, while a prospective projection is 
directed to Turkish social democracy, it is, more, an attempt to display how the European 
social democracy has overcome the crisis it has faced. On the other hand, it also shows 
the new ideological concerns of the West European social democracy, especially relying 
on the debate on the basic concept of the 1990s, which is the Third Way. In this context, 
the chapici adjaccnlly shows the split of the European social democratic parlies in (heir 
approach to the Third Way and, argues, whether this concept can be taken as a new 
undcrslanding of politics or not. Doubtless the main concern of the chapter is trying to 
understand if Turkish social democracy is able to grasp this new formation with its 
existing structural and ideological properties. As a conclusion, in this context, the thesis 
argues that Tuikish social democracy is more a metaphysical ncumcn, to say it with a 
Kantian notion, than a physical phenomenon.
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CHAPTER II
THE SHORT TRANSITION TO REPUBLIC 
EARLY REPUBLICAN PEOPLES' PARTY: 1919-1930
2.1. Some Methodological Concerns
21.1. The Periodization of Republican People's Party
The iormalion of RPP is r(X)led in a long process. This prcx;ess consists of five 
main steps. 1) The first one is the establishment of the idea of nationality with the 
national independence. This pericxl is rellectcd through the Amasya Decree, Erzurum 
and Sivas Congresses. 2) The second step is the two motions proposed by Mustafa 
Kcmal, on April 24 and July 12, 1920 later known as the 'i’opulism Program' in the 
related litcraluic. The latter constituted both the basis for the 1921 Constitution and the 
early ideological framework for RPP. 3) The third step is the formation of the First 
Group in the National Assembly on May 10, 1921. 4) The fourth step is the 
declaration of Nine Principles on April 8, 1923 and finally, 5) the fifth step is the 
(brmation of the People's Party in 1923 and its subsequent merge with Society for the 
Defence of Rights of Anatolia and Rumclia. This framework signifies a two-tier 
programme. The first one is more practical (items 1, 3, 5), whereas the second one 
(items 2, 4) encompasses the RPP's ideological basis and background. In this ca.se.
14
RPP, wilh ils later policies through these issues, played the leading role in both the 
modernisation o( Turkey and in the formation of the political traditions.
RPP should be considered not only as a political party but also as an entity 
rooted in a process which includes different issues, anticipating different facts that 
played an important role in the early republican period. Again the idiosyncrasies of this 
period do not only establish the complicated political life of the early 1920s but they 
have also given birth to different developments further in the social and political 
climate ol Turkey. In this chapter first the more practical side of the problem (items 1, 
3 and 5), will be discussed. The ideological issues (2 and 4) will be analysed later, 
with references to the ideological components of the problematics, categorised in the 
first group.
It should here be noted that the studies concerning RPP have not yet been 
based on a settled periodization of this party. On the other hand, the only likewise 
work is related with the different time fractures of the Kemalist regime. Rustow, in 
this endeavour has analysed the development of the Kemalist regime in three periods; 
as the War of Independence, the second period, lying between the years 1923-1927, 
and the third mostly related with the period pertinent to the 1930s.· Rustow, in 
another article written after the mentioned one, has changed his approach.^ He, again.
lOankwart A.Rustow, "Atatürk as Founder of a State," in Prof. Dr. Yavuz 
Abadan'a Armağan (Ankara: A.Ü.Siyasal Bilgiler FakUlte,si Yayını, 1969), 
532. For a di.soussion of this approach .see, Frgun Özbudun, "'I hc Nature of 
the Kemalist Follllcal Regime" in Atatürk: Pounder o f a Modern State, ed. 
A.Kazancigil and EÖzbudun (London:Hurst and Company, 1997), 79-102.
^Dunkwarl A. Rustow, "Atatürk as an Institution Builder" in Kazancigil and 
Özbudun, eds., Atatürk, 57-77.
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concentrating not on RPP, but mainly on "Kemal Alatiirk's record as an institution 
builder'', starts this history in the year 1920 and ends it with the year 1926, in which 
various dilTerent codes of law, which were already in use in some European 
countries, are adopted.^ Still, Rustow, believing that this development is based on 
gradualism, prefers to describe this process and transition in four phases:"(1) a 
prc|)aialory phase (ca. 1915-May 1919); (2) an cx|x;rimcnlal phase (November 1918- 
March 1924); (3) a decisional or institutional phase (September 1919-26); and (4) a 
consolidation phase (1923-38).'"* Might be due to the implementation of the concept 
on the basis of Mustafa Kemal himself, his personal career and as Kemalism, lacking 
is the specificity of RPP in these periods. With this viewpoint, as a party founded in 
1923, RPP might understandably be excluded from this process. Nevertheless, unless 
the interaction between first the Society for the Defence of Rights of Anatolia and 
Rumelia and, second, the First Group in the First National Assembly, not only the 
history of RPP but also (he specific analysis of Kcmalism is objective enough. As 
there has always been an unbreakable link between Mustafa Kemal himself and the 
political life of Turkey beginning in 1919 RPP's history should have necessarily been 
started with this year. The history of RPP, in this context, should first be elaborated 
between the years 1919, when Turkish Independence War started together with the 
other local initiatives and organisations and 1923, the very year the party was formed, 
as the first period of development.
■^ Ibicl., 60. 
^Ibid., 61.
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Mele Tunçay, taking the year 1923 as an initial year and terminating it in 1931, 
dei ines the phase as The Establishment of a One-Parly Government'^. In this regard, 
according to Tunçay, tacitly, the second phase of RPP might be considered embedded 
within these years. Tunçay, himself explains, why he preferred. The main point is 
that, Tunçay does not see the period between 1923 and 1931 as the only crucial time 
limitation; for, he rather insists on the exigency of the whole one-party period, which 
covers, bearing the Progressive Republican Party and Free Party endeavours in mind, 
the period between 1923 and 1946. Second, for Tunçay the more significant moment 
in this elTort is llie year Atatürk died, namely 1938. But since time intervals are too 
long to study, he decides to stay on the period between 1923 and 1931, and takes the 
year 1931 as a icniarkable milestone, because of the Parly Congress which was held 
then and which brought a structural renovation to the party.^
On the other hand, the emergence of a one-parly-slate concept has also been 
analysed by Zürcher."^ However, Zürcher is prone to make a distinction within the 
concept, for he underlines the difference between the notion of 'emergence', in other 
words, the preparation years and 'the Kemalist one-party state.' The latter conceals the 
years 1925-45, whereas the first period is settled, according to Zürcher, between 
1923-27.^ Here two points need attention. First, Zürcher, closes the first period by 
refen ing to Mustafa Kemal's reading his 'Speech' in National Assembly in the 1927
l'unçay, Türkiye Cum buriyeti’nde Tek-Parti Yönetiminin Kurulması 
(1923-1931) (Ankara: Yurt Yayınları, 1981).
f>lbicl., 3.
^lirich Züreher, Turkey: A Modern History (London, New York: I.B. l'auris 
&Co Ltd Publishers, 1993), 173.
»Ibid., 173-184, 185-215.
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Congress of PP, which is described by Zürcher as 'the end of an era.' Second, the 
(ollovving jici iod did not start in 1927 but in 1925. Here, Zllrchcr's point of dcparlurc 
is tire Law on the Maintenance of Order, issued in March 1925. Despite this, the 
acceptability o( the argument, as the same fact is accentuated also by Tun9ay, is 
dependent if a more historically-prone approach is preferred more than a political 
science view point, for the argument rests on the historical mile-stones or turning 
points. A similar point might be observed in Weiker, for he seizes RPP in three 
conccnliic |)criods. First he deliberates on "parly politics during the war of 
independence^." Then, he concretises the party politics as 'from organisation to 
parly.' Under the shelter of the same argument, the author also takes the years 1923- 
25 as the "elimination of the conservative opposition'*^ The last period, for Weiker 
is the 1920-30 pliasc, which he characterises as "tlie period of RPI  ^mono|X)ly."''
A more politically established comprehension of the matter is proposed by 
Tunaya. In the first look, Tunaya, in a manner not different from Tun9ay or Zürcher, 
also underlines the prominent power of the historical events, as he starts with the 
'Societies period.' But Tunaya shows a significant will in studying RPP depending 
on the party congresses. Tunaya, after starting his analysis again by the 'Societies 
period', immediately continues by dividing the history into two parts ,as the "years of 
power" and "the years of opposition.''*^ In this resolving issue is the importance he
^Walter F. Weiker, Political Tutelage and Democracy in Turkey: Free Party 
and Its Aftermath  (Leiden: E.J.Brill, 1973).
AOlbid., 187-190.
11 Ibid., 190-194.
1  ^l ank  Zafer I'unaya, Türkiye'de Siyasal Partiler: 1850-1952, (İstanbul: 
Arba Yayınları, tıpkıbasım, 1995), 559-567.
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attributes to party congresses by saying, "the evolution attained by the party have 
always been officially realised by way of Congresses."
The difficulty,of separating the realms of history and the political might be 
observed in Kili's book, devoted to RPP. "^  ^ It is not a matter of speculation or 
ambiguity to place Kili's book on this fault line for, she herself describes her book as 
an 'Analysis From the Angle of Political Science.' Though at the beginning. Kili 
tackles with the question of modernism and the relationship between political parties 
iind modernity, beginning her specific analysis of RPP, she goes back in history and 
refers to early years of National Resistance. This is again taking the 1919-1923 as the 
first period and Kili puts the second period directly related with Atatürk, which takes 
the end year of the second period as 1938^^, with special emphasis on the 
development of the ideological dimension of PP, staying on the reality of congresses 
and namely the implementation of Six Arrows. It is interesting that Kili docs not mix 
the years 1938-45 with the years of the single-party period, taking the latter as 
compact and uniform period but detaches it as the 'Period of National Leader.'^^ The 
same understanding is clear both in Tunçay's elaborations, mentioned above, and 
might also be followed through Koçak's book.i"^ Giritlioglu also takes a similar 
position. Although he is distinct in the first period of his understanding when he refers
1-^lbid., 567.
l^Suna Kili, 1960-1975 Döneminde Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi'nde Gelişmeler: 
Siyaset Pilimi Açısından Bir İnceleme (Istanbul: Boğaziçi Üniversitesi 
Yayınlan, 1976).
İSibid., 49-77.
li’lbid., 85-91.
l^Cemil Koçak, Türkiye'de Milli Şef Dönemi (1938-1945) (Ankara: Yurt 
Yayınları, 1986).
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to it as "The Birth Phase of RPP"i^, his significant approach appears when he makes 
a distinction between "Single-Party Dominance Era"^^ and "RPP Government in the 
Single-Party Life."20 Here, it should be noted that, Giritlioglu, without giving, 
mentioning or referring to any concrete date, rather specifies the political dimensions 
of (he subject matter. On the other hand, in an official publication of the RPP, history 
is divided into three main phases as, "1. The National Independence War and National 
Sovereignty Period, From the Sivas Congress to 9.9.1923. 2. The government 
period, between 9.9.1923 and 14.5.1950. 3. Opposition years 14.5.1950 and 
27.5.1960"21
'rhrough these it is possible to say that, the .second period of PP could be 
framed, if a more political scientific approach is accepted and foreseen, between 1923 
and 1931. Nevertheless, this periodization should be divided into various different 
phases in itself. First of all, the major and alleged determinant of this long era is the 
second National Assembly years, 1923-1927, on condition that the year 1923 should 
be started by the proclamation of the republic. This is the second time period in which 
historical and political is coincided, for there arc many different issues at stake as well 
as many other reasons enabling us for such a categorisation. The first one is, above 
all, within thc.se years the basic and the most radical changes which arc usually 
referred as 'cievriinler’ which might be translated into English as either revolutions or
ISpahir Giritlioglu, Türk Siyasi Hayatında Cumhuriyet Halk Partisinin 
Mevkii (Ankara: Ayyıldız Matbaası, 1965), 11-42.
19ibid., 55-169.
20|bid., 181-256.
 ^k;:umhuriyet Halk Partisi İstanbul İl İdare Kurulu, Cum huriyet Halk 
Partisi'nin Tarihçesi (İstanbul: Şevket Ünal Matbaası, 1962), 10.
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rcCornKilions^^ have been implemented, the most eminent one, the abolishing of the 
caliphate. This is supported by the unification of the education. Second, the 1924 
Constitution has been developed and issued by the National Assembly^^ jh e  
constitutional process.should be thought together with the abolishing of the religious 
courts and the implementation of the Civil Code. Third, the early oppe^sition attempt 
against the PP, has been both transformed into a political party under the name of 
Progressive Republican Party which is dissolved in the same period^^. This is backed 
by Law on the Maintenance of Order, 1925, and the Izmir trials, which is the 
reckoning with the late opposition groups of both CUP and PRP. Fourth, in W ll  the 
Second Congress of PP is held^^ and in this meeting, to say it with Zürcher, the 
period is closed by Mustafa Kemal, reading his Spcech^^’. Also the elections of 1927
Ozbudun, "'t he Nature", 91.
2'^Marcie J.Patton, "Constitutionalism and Political Culture in Turkey," in 
PoUticcil Culture and Constitutionalism, ed. D.P.Franklin, M.J.Baun 
(Arnionk, New York: M.ESharpe, 1995) , 138-158; Bülent Tanör, Osmanit 
-Türk Anayasal Gelişmeleri (İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 1998); Parık 
Zafer I'unaya, "1924 Anayasasının İdeolojik Karakteri" in Devrim  
Hareketleri İçinde Atatürk ve Atatürkçülük, (Ankara: Turhan Kitabevi, 
genişletilmiş 2. Basım, 1981).
Z4i;ri(:h Züreher, Political Opposition in the Parly Turkish Republic:'The 
Progressive Republican Party, 1924-1925 (Leiden, New York, KObenhavn, 
Köln: EJ.Brill, 1991).
25 Punaya, Siyasi Partilerj 568-569; Hikmet Bila, Sosyal Demokrat Süreç 
İçinde CHP ve Sonrası (İstanbul: Milliyet Yayınları, 1987), 69-72.
26Kemal Atatürk, Nutuk, Cilt 1: 1919-1920 (İstanbul: Milli liğitim Basımevi, 
Altıncı Baskı, 1963); Nutuk, Ciltli: 1920-1927 (İstanbul: Milli Eğitim 
Basımevi, Beşinci Baskı, 1962); Nutuk, Cilt 111: Vesikalar ('İstanbul: Milli 
Eğilim Basımevi, Yedinci Baskı, 1963). Taha Parla, Türkiye’de Siyasal 
Kültürün Resmi Kaynakları: Cilt 1: Atatürk'ün N utuk’u (İstanbul: İletişim 
Yayınları, 1991).
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marks Ihc ciid of this period.27 This period, as has been aforementioned, even though 
is enshrined by specific but strictly political developments, is, however, a period in 
which the state is formed and founded rather than a political ideology implemented.
Following this first era of the second period comes the second era in which an 
ideology is implemented and the steps put forward are more political. Nevertheless, in 
this period, one of the most drastic changes has appeared; which is the Alphabet 
change of 1927. This change, more radically than the other reformations, has played a 
(.lual lolc in (ho foi inalion of a new epoch. It is, no doubt that, an ideological decision 
but, it could also be taken as the basis for the political-ideological changes whose 
repercussions are still debated in Turkey. This period can be stretched up until the 
death of Kemal Atatürk in 1938. The crucial point is that during this period it is more 
reasonable to dwell on the political issues, which are the adjacent issues to the 
ideological expansion of the state and state-led ideology. The only historio-political 
demarcation of the period is the culmination of Free Republican Party^s in 1930 and 
its abolishing within six months. Apart from this, all other factors affecting the period 
are the decisions reached and the model set in the RPP congresses of 193 and
27por the first general elections of the Republic see, Tevfik Çavdar, 
Miinlchib-i Scwi'dcn Seçmene (Ankara: V Yayınları, 1987), 77-79.
28'rank Zafer I'unaya, Siyasi Partiler, 622-635, Kemal H, Karpat, Turkey’s 
Politics: The Transition to a Multi-Party System  (Princeton, New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 1959), 64-68. (Karpat translates the name of 
the party  as 'Liberal Party.') ; Ahmet Ağaoğlu, Serbest Fırka Hatıraları 
(İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1997); Walter F. Weiker, Political Tutelage and  
Democracy in Turkey.Free Party and its Aftermath U-^ i^den: E.J.Brill, 1973) 
(Weiker, insists on translating the name of the party as 'Free Party.') ; 
Walter Weiker, "I'he Free Party, 1930" in Political Parties and Democracy in 
Turkey, ed. M.lleper and J.M .landau (London, New York: I.B.Tauris&Co 
Ltd), 83-99.
2^Suna Kili: CHP’de, 57-77; Hikmet Bila: CIIP, 84-91; Tank Zafer Tunaya: 
Siyasi Partiler, 569-570; Fahir Giritlioğlu: Türk, 89-100.
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I935^ *^ \ The extraordinary eongress of 1938 starts a new period, namely the years of 
İsmet İnönü both as president of Turkey and RPP which wouid iast up untii the İ950 
elections, when the government is rendered to Democrat Party after the elections. Even 
(hough (luTc are five more congress between 1939 and 19.50 (inclusive), following 
Kili, it is putative mentioning that in this period there is no radical political change 
observed and, the path followed is again the reinforcement of the established model of 
republic.^' Slaying in this framework it is possible to say that the periodization, after 
1923-1927, conliiuics with the period of 1927-1950 with specific emphasis on 1931 
and 1935 congresses, staying on the political discussion, which is strictly related with 
the ideological background of the state founded. But this approach needs a further 
thcoietical analysis which is below.
2.1.2. Political Science or History
Under these assumptions, PP can further be analysed on the basis of political 
science, which is a trial to situate the party politics and its epistemology in an 
ideologiail framework^^. To accomplish this, it is necessary to divide the party history 
into two parts, depending on two different epistemological analysis. In the first part.
Dördüncü Büyük Kurultay Görüşmeleri Tutalgası (Ankara: Ulus 
Matbaası, 1935); Hikmet Bila: CHP, 91-106; Fahir Giritlioğlu,Türk, 100-113; 
Suna Kili: CHP'de, 76-79; Tarık Zafer Tunaya: Siyasi Partiler, 570-72.
'^İAccording to Kili who has concentrated on the party politics up until 
1974, between 1931 and 1974 there are 20 regular, 5 extraordinary 
congresses, 1 chairman election congress and 1 Statute Congress held.
Bila, who brings the party history up to the dissolving of the party  in 1981 
by the National Security Council, emphasises that there are two more 
congresses. After the reestablishment of the RPP in 1992 the party  has 
continued to held congresses with subsequent numbers.
32por a deliberation on the intersection as well as interaction between 
ideology and political scence see,: Michael Freeden, Ideologies and Political 
iheory.A  Conceptual Approach (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), 97-131.
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between 1919 and 1923, a more historieal account seems more suitable, for the 
appearance and development of the facts are less 'constructive' and intentional33. To 
put it in another way, it is possible to say that, before the establishment of the party, 
historical events and practical positions determine the political situation and the whole 
prcKcss is aimed at the making of a political party. On the contrary, after the formation 
of the party, historical events and even the social conditions are regulated by an a 
priori political decision and this is the making of history through politics.34 This 
pushes forward (he requirement of sticking to a specific analysis of the party which 
rests on a more abstract basis and more relying on the analysis of the constructed 
values, system and structure, usually embedded in the party programs. As party 
programs or statutes are issued in the party congresses, the deliberation of the party 
and its reflections and repercussions could better be comprehended by referring to 
thc.se political events. It is to say that following the second period ol' PP in which still 
the historical events help to shape the political situation rather than political decisions 
influence the former, it will be relevant to assign some of them whereas, in the 
consecutive periods, up until the 1960s, the history will be seen through more 
concepts than events. Here the periods can be categorised on a concept-base model. 
The 1923-1927 is the preparation and transition period of the republic which is not a 
consequence of already planned and decided model but rather staying alert to the 
pragmatic and practical events and issues. The 1923-1931 pericxl is the formation of 
the state together with the proclamation of the republic. This period can also be
-^ ■^ For a discu.ssion of this understanding of the relation between history 
and ideology sec, Conal Condren, "Political I'heory and the Problem of 
Anachronism" in Political Theory: Tradition and Diversity, ed. Andrew 
Vincent (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 45-64.
'^ ‘^ For a discussion to understand how ideologies construct the history see, 
R.Boudon, The Analysis o f  Ideology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1989), 37 and 117.
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cliaiaclcriscd as 'state-led parly.' The last phase of the construction period is the 1931- 
1950 years which is the construction of a cultural ideology and which could also be 
qualified as 'party-led stale.' The implementation of the Six Arrows, the political 
symbol of RPP, to Constitution and the denouneement of parly-state togetherness are 
the crux of this symbiotic relationship.
2.2. Foundation of People's Party as a Political Process
2.2.1 Erzurum and Sivas Congress
The r(X)ts of Republican People's Party, as have been indicated by various 
scholars, arc found in the years encompassing the National Independence War. 
Atatürk, himself, as the first leader of RPP, has declared the relationship between the 
cadres organising the Independence War and RPP. According to him, the first 
c(Migrcss of RPP should be taken as the Sivas Congress which was held on September 
the 4, 1919.
Sivas Congress is the first political organisation aiming to control the different 
political and military organisations developed to a certain extent spontaneously in 
different parts of the country under the name Miidafaa-i Hukuk Cemiyeti, beginning as 
early as late 1918 just after the Armistice of Mudros. The first societies have been 
organised in Kars, Erzurum, Izmir and Edirne; a good selection pointing the wide 
range the organisations formed. The unification of these groups and the construction 
ol’ a control mechanism concerning them has been the basic interest of the core military 
group planning the Independence War which, in time, would turn out to be the kernel 
of the RPP. Even though Sivas Congress is the hearth of this procedure as the process 
started in Erzurum Congress and, as the latter is the extent of the former, in order to
25
understand the climate and the basic issues elaborated, Erzurum Congress should be 
analysed in brief.
After Alattirk's landing in Samsun, according to Zürcher, he was forced to join 
the meeting held in Erzurum. Erzurum Congress which was held in 23 July, 1919 and 
continued up until 17 August, was more a local idea developed by the Erzurum 
MUdafaa-i Hukuk Cemiyeti, and supported by the idea of the former Committee for 
Union and Progress (CUP) cadres, rather than Mustafa Kemal Paşa himself. The left 
over group of this party, which did abolish itself on November 5, 1918 has already 
passed to Anatolia and started the early endeavours for a resistance movement. The 
core group might be divided into two sub groups. The first one is the civil cadres of 
CUP, active in the political life and usually the former members of the Ottoman 
Parliament,^·'’ whereas the second group includes the generals who have decided and 
proposed Mustafa Kemal Paşa to direct the movement. Thcic was a close relationship 
between the groups.
The basic expectation of a congress that would be held in Erzurum was the 
unification of the local, scattered and disorganised resistance groups of the Eastern 
towns. In fact, in the days preceding this mission, there was already an attempt 
initiated by Atatürk when he was in Amasya, suggesting that the disorganised and 
spontaneously formed defence and resistance groups should come together. As a
■^^The first official resistance organisation established in Kars is after the 
attem pts of Cihangiroğlu Ibrahim, the former CUP chairman in Kars. 
Founders of Vilayet-i Şarkiye Müdafaa-i Hukuk-u Milliye are Süleyman 
Nazif, the poet and the former mayor in the CUP era. Hoca Raif (Dinç), a 
former Frzurum deputy. The Erzurum branch of this organization was 
founded by both I loca Raif and Dursunbeyzade Ceval (Dursunoglu) an 
Erzurum lawyer having close affiliation to CUP. See, Züreher, Opposition 
164-65.
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proof of this he had already send a message to Karabekir asking the necessary 
information about the local resistance movement. But the local Congress of Erzurum 
Town was already under decision and Mustafa Kemal, more for tactical reasons had to 
allcnd i(.^ ‘^ 'I’he basic reasons can be analysed as
i) After Mustafa Kemal's transferring to Anatolia, there occurs a contradiction 
between the General Staff in Istanbul and Mustafa Kemal. The clash was more attuned 
(o (he diverse approaches to the existing condition. Because the Minister of War, Fev/i 
Paşa, believed in the diplomatic solutions, the official Army perceived not only 
Mustafa Kemal himself as a danger but also his actions a rebellion agitating the Allied 
Forces to an armed struggle.3738 jj) Even though the official army found the assembly 
of the Parliament in Istanbul after 1919 elections acceptable, Mustafa Kemal was 
insistent on its convention in Anatolia^^. iii) Istanbul, was keen enough to see the 
nK)vcment as a Uk)1 to protect and save the Palace whereas, its countei part, Mustafa
3^The first date for the Congress was July 10; however because some of the 
representatives could not arrive the date postponed to July the 23 which 
was the eleventh anniversary of the 1908 'Revolution. See, Mazhar Müfit 
Kansu, hrz.urum'dan Ölümüne Kadar Atatürk'le Beraber, 1. c/7f (Ankara: 
Fürk 7'arih Kurumu Basımevi, 1988), s.47. Even, the leader of the resistance 
organization in 'I'rabzon has clearly indicated that the members were 
selected among the well known CUP cadres." 'I’unaya, Siyasi Partiler, 507.
37zürcher, Unionist, 184.
'^^Still this point needs further clarification. For the initiation of 
Anatolian Resistance Movement there are two basic explanations. The first 
one occurs from Atatürk's own approach putting himself and his decision 
first. I'he second opinion dwells on the role of the former CUP and related 
organizations and the other high rank generals. It could be deduced that 
Generals decided both for an armed struggle and compromised on Mustafa 
KemaPs name as the head of the movement. In this respect the Generals' 
will to overthrow him out seems a vague point or a point more related with 
a fear towards the political ambition and methods of Mustafa Kemal.
Atatürk, Nutuk, vol.l, 270-273.
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Kemal was more inelined to see the military forees in Istanbul and, especially the 
Karakol group, as the tool of the Anatolian forces.^ The delicate struggle between the 
sides is related with the Karakol group, a semi-military organisation founded after the 
1918 armistice as the main structure for the resistance movement. Karakol, always 
believed that it is alter the organisation's help that the cadres of Anatolia have been 
established. Depending on these issues it was clear that Istanbul and Fevzi Paşa, with 
his close friends, thought to replace Mustafa Kemal with Kazım Karabekir.^^i
Erzurum Congress was, in a sense, the imposition of these Principles on 
Mustafa Kemal and, to a certain extent, the accentuation of the Istanbul through Kazım 
Karabekir, even though with face value, everything seems to be controlled by Mustafa 
Kemal. Nevertheless, Mustafa Kemal as a general resigned from the Ottoman army, 
and continuing his career by the clear support of Kazım Karabekir, was able to 
surpass the situation with distinct tactics and forcing the congress to decide the 
convention of a new one in Sivas.
Sivas Congress, started on September 4, 1919, is later defined by Atatürk 
himself, as the first congress of Republican People's Party. The striking events of the 
congress could be analysed as the clash between the Istanbul CUP group and Mustafa 
Kemal Paşa, the unification of Societies for the Defence of the Rights of Anatolia and 
Rumelia and decisions reached for the rejection of the idea of mandate and of 
resistance against the invaders. The most beneficial issue achieved through Sivas 
Congress decisions for Mustafa Kemal was that he started to sec the opposition
•^ ‘^V.iiiThcr, Unionist, 185.
41 Karabekir, İstiklal Harbimiz (Istanbul: Türkiye Basımevi, 1960) 391.
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developing jigainsl him. Definitely, the CUP residues and Karakol group, through a 
complicated web of relations, first tried to obstruct the presidency of Mustafa Kemal. 
Apart from that what is worth indicating is that some of Mustafa Kemal's most close 
friends clearly proposed the American mandate. Even though they were active for the 
independency they also urged for the preservation of the basic institutions of the 
Ottoman Empire, as the Sultanate, Caliphate and Istanbul as the capital of the Empire. 
This very condition, is usually and for a long time believed to signify the 
differentiation and separation between the later First and the Second Group in the 
National Assembly, as well as paving the way to the formation of an organised 
opposition against Mustafa Kemal and Republican Peoples Party under the name of 
Progressive Republican Party.
The last important decision reached in the Sivas Congress is the unification of 
.separate and independent societies usually referring and defining themselves as a 
'Society for the Defence of Rights' established both in the Western and Eastern parts 
of (he country. In the final decree announced by the Sivas Congress this is certified 
under the name of 'Society for the Defence of Rights of Anatolia and Rumelia- 
SDRAR' Not less important than this, the other move, related with the philosophy 
backing this development, which is the centralisation of the Independence movement, 
is the new role given to Committee of Representatives (Heyet-i Temsiliye). This 
organisation, first founded in the Erzurum Congress, was the representative of all of 
the S(x;icUcs for the Defence of Rights of Eastern Anatolia. In this case its function is 
enlarged to represent all of the societies found all around the Anatolia as a consequence 
of the unification of them.
2.2.2 Foundation of the 'First Group'
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Foundation of the First Group, usually referred as Miidafaai Hukuk Grubu ( 
Defence of Rights Group-DRG ) is the major practical step taken in the formation of 
Republican Peoples Party. The First Group is formed by Mustafa Kemal himself in 
the Grand National Assembly on May the 10, 1921. The group consisted of some of 
the deputies already existing in the parliamentary.
In Speech, Mustafa Kemal explains the necessity for such an approach by 
referring to a certain issue: according to him, before the formation of the First Group, 
there were already a number of 'groups' appearing in the Assembly. These groups 
were Solidarity Group {Tesanüt Grubu), Independence Group {İstiklal Grubu), 
Defence of Rights Faction {Miidafaai Hukuk Zümresi), Peoples' Faction {Halk 
Züm resi), Reform Group {Islahat Grubu). The problem is that there were 
contradictions and clashes but no compromise among these groups. Mustafa Kemal 
complains on this issue saying that it was difficult to rciich a decision in the As.scmbly 
due to the tense and long lasting debates.^2 the end he decides to organise a group 
by talking to deputies belonging to different groups and convinces them to get united 
as a group to follow certain principles. These principles are set and defined as the 
'Regulations of Defence of Rights G ro u p .T h e  importance of the organisation of 
this group is larger than the reason put forward by Atatllrk himself. As Tunçay points 
out, there are early indicators showing that Mustafa Kemal was already in search of 
such a move. Tunçay draws the attention to a circular signed and sent to various 
different cities and towns by Mustafa Kemal Paşa, in Februaiy 1921 asking the names 
of the members of the central committees of DRAR.
■^^Kemal Atatürk; Nutuk, vol.2, 594.
though in various different sources this Regulation is found the 
most complete and reliable one is in Tungay Тек Parti, 347-348.
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This circular has two important points. First one is that, DRG is founded on 
the basis of SARDR. Second, it is the second attempt in the centralisation and the 
ccnlral control of organisations. Not less important than this, it should be pointed out 
that Atatürk never refers any one of the groups formed in the Assembly as 'factions' 
or with any other possible name. They were only the 'groups', but he refers to his 
organisation in the Speech as 'political group' and by saying "as there was SARDR in 
the country there occurred the political group of it in the Assembly", he shows that 
this new group did not only come out as a possibility to eradicate the clashes among 
different groups, enabling the Assembly to operate but as a more coherent body.'*'* 
One another tacit point which determines that this group is mainly a party, in AtatUrk's 
words, is when he identifies this group with the one which he wanted to form in the 
last Ottoman Parliament, but has never achieved
The organisation of the group, at the first instance, seems to be related with the 
goal of achieving majority in the Assembly to help decisions to be reached more 
swiftly and with less conflict. This very condition is based on the certain assumption
'^'^funçay also lakes this point into consideration in two ways, hirst, he 
explains the linguistic meaning of the word (parliam entary) 'group ' in 
the political jargon of those days. Second, going back to the historical 
development path of the Western political parties, he signifies that the 
development trajectory have always been from groups to parties. TUnçay, 
Tek-Pcirti, , 42.
^^Atatürk, after Mudros Armistice insisted his friends that after the 
abolishing of Community for Union and Progress in the Ottoman 
Parliment should there be a group supporting the ideas later defended by 
SDRAR. Rauf Bey responsible for this task when intended to organise such 
a group, he ended up with what is known as Recovery of the Country 
Group {Vehih-i Vatan Grubu) both a loose and disorganised league as well 
as ambigious in its views. For an analysis of this group see, Tunaya, Siyasi 
Partner, 519.
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that the raison d'être of the Assembly is to save the country from the invasion and to 
ic-cslablisli tlic power of the Sultanate and Caliphate. At the beginning, as is 
understood (rom Mustafa Kcmal's Speech, only a few deputies did not enter the 
group. But it is apparent that those "who did not enter the group as they wanted to be
wcic those who were left out. HUscyin Avni (Ulaş), later, in his talk in the 
Assembly, rejected the argument that he wanted to stay out and, declared that not only 
liimsolf but all members of the A.sscmbly arc natiiml members of the group.
This very argument that every member of the Assembly is a natural member of 
the Group seems not true. Because if the truth of this approach is accepted than it is 
not easy to understand the existence of different groups in the Assembly. At this point 
another speculation might be made by saying that Mustafa Kemal, by forming a 
group, not only fortified his leadership and developed further his plans towards a 
more radical leadership, but also forced the opposition in the Assembly to bccotnc 
more distinct. He would also assume that to tackle with the opposition would be much 
more easier if he had dependent on a certain group which would in the eliminate the 
others. Nevertheless, this milestone clarifies two points. First, Mustafa Kemal, 
definitely left some deputies out and, secondly, wanted to have an organisation 
supporting his leadership and dominance and continuing under his personal and strict 
control. On the other hand, the real differentiation in the Assembly started after the 
proclamation of the Regulations of the Defence of Rights Group. The initiative for this 
process is the second article of the Regulation.
Atatürk, Nutuk, v .l, 186.
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The Regulation for the First Group consists of two parts. The first part
has Ihice paragraphs and is named as the Basic Article (Madde-i Fsasiye). '  ^ In the 
introductory paragraph the reason of being of the group is stated as the achievement of 
the independency of the country and nation. It should be stated here that there is no 
indication signifying that the Group is a new formed body. On the contrary, with 
relcrcnccs to Erzurum and Sivas congresses and to the National Assembly, the group 
is defined as that the whole body of the Assembly. Here, in other words, the Group 
is conceived as the National Assembly itself and where 'group' is mentioned it 
signifies the SARDR.
The second paragraph is rCvServed to the specification of the mission. Here, the 
group, to be able to operate, is permitted to use all the physical and moral values and 
possibilities of the nation. Further, in the second sentence of the second paragraph, 
which cicated discomfort among different circles and groups, is argued that the group 
will try to force all public and private physical and moral organisations to achieve its 
goal. This is a critical clau.se because, for the first time, it is mentioned that the private 
and state organisations are or will be put under the control of the group whereas, in the 
following article, this is extended to and related with Constitution known as Law on 
Fundamental Organisation {Te^kilat-i Esasiye Kammn). Here, it is stated that although 
the Group would be working primarily to the accomplishment of the determined
'*  ^riic Kcgulalion.s is later amended in 1922 after the establishment of the 
Second Group declaring its own Regulations.
run<;ay, Tek-Parti, 347.
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nalional purpose, slill, beginning right now, it would also try to (re)arrange the 
organisations of the nation and country according to Constitutional Act.'*^,^
In various sources, it is argued that the groups, either already existing or 
established after the proclamation of Regulation, never argued the first purpose stated 
in the first and second paragraph. But, the third one, related with the reorganisation of 
the state according to Law of Constitution, 1876, created an irreversible 
dillcicntiation, bringing an end to the solidarity and homogeneity of the Assembly. 
This point is also stressed by Mustafa Kemal in the Speechß^ To understand this 
argument, it is nece.ssary to analyse the structure and nature of the Constitution. 
Though a critical as.scssmcnt, regarding the Constitution will be given in the following 
section, here suffice is to say that the Constitution was depending on the tension 
between the protection and sustaining of the Caliphate and Sultanate and accepting that 
"sovereignty belonged unconditionally to the nation and the National Assembly is the 
expression of national will and the source of authority.
These contradictory issues held in the Constitution were controllable with a 
reference to the goal of the Assembly as the salvation of the nation. When analysed in 
detail, it is dear that in the Constitutional Act of 1921, the sovereignty issue is always
'^ ‘'^Karpat translates this verdict as ""to reorganize the stale and nation 
within the framework of the Constitutional Act." Kemal Karpat, "The 
Republican People's Party" in Heper and Landau, Political, 46.
-‘>9 Atatürk, in his Speech, talks about the second issue of the Bill which is 
the third paragraph of the original text. This also shows that among the 
deputies there was not any contradiction regarding the basic reason of 
being of the Group.
•‘’ 'Atatürk, NuWk, v.2, 596.
52Karpat,"The Republican", 48-49.
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expressed as an act left to the practicality of the National Assembly. In other words, it 
is a natural legitimacy basis for the formation of the Assembly hindering the necessity 
of emphasising any ideological approach or choice. It is also interesting that this 
principle is never mentioned in the text other than the paragraph regarding the state 
(rc)organisation. As has been mentioned above, after the declaration of the 
Regulations, the unity among the Assembly shattered and the so called unified group 
began to differentiate arguing that third paragraph would be the main initiation for the 
establishment of Republic.
Mustafa Kemal, in Speech publishes the telegraphs exchanged between him 
and Ka/,im Karabckir. Karabekir objects the foundation of the Group, mainly relying 
on the mentioned article. Mustafa Kemal also mentions the formation of different 
organisations in various parts of the country which were against this very article. The 
names of those organisations arc sufficiently expressive: 'Si)cicty for the Protection of 
Sacred Values (Muhafaza-i Mukaddesat Cemiycti).
At this point it could be argued that the notion of Republic encompasses the 
frame of the first ideological split. This is also related with the other ideological 
argumcnis hidden in the Constitutional keipar excellence and, more, in the process of 
preparing it. Before moving to the analysis of that issue, here it should be noted that 
not by (he establishment of the SARDR but, mainly, the establishment of the First 
Group, RPP's ideological and practical basis is constructed. The political charactciistic 
of (his party is also embedded in this prcKC.ss, for the FG resembles the other factors.
Phis is an interesting issue which needs further elaboration. It shows 
that already there was an idea of republic in the society even though this, 
in those years, was something very similar, and to a certain extent 
identical, with Bolshevism.
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such as unification of the executive and legislative, which could easily be conducive to
the hegemony of the personal will of the leader over the parliamentary. This 
ideological debates further will be analysed in the related sections below. Now, it is 
necessary to discuss the foundation of the RPP or the transformation of the FG to 
RPP.
2.2.3. Formation of RPP
RPP was founded in the year 1923. This was the end of a long proeess 
earefully eontrolled and manipulated by Mustafa Kemal. In the development of the 
process there found a set of different motivations sometimes related with the 
eonjtinctoral politieal life. Approaehing the matter from this view point someone 
should di.s.scct the historieal background and try to see the other factors affecting the 
decision of Mustafa Kemal to form a politieal party named, since the very first day as 
People's Party. Erich Zürcher, in his lxx)k, succinctly shows that the basic factor 
forcing Mustafa Kemal to end up with a deeision eoncerning the formation of a 
politieal party is the movements made by the former eadres of CUP. This needs a 
quick and chronological survey of the time period between late 1922 and 23 
November 1923, the ol fieial date for the registration of the founded party.
In about ten days, between August 30, 1922 and September 9, 1922, with a 
counter move of the Turkish Army, known as Great Offensive, the Greek trrxips were 
thrown out of central Anatolia and National Independence War was finished. 
Following the Great Victory, in November 1, 1922 Sultanate was abolished. In the 
following days Mustafa Kemal announced his intention to form a political party for the 
first time in an intei^view with the representatives oi Haldmiyet-i Milliye, Yeni gün and
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öğüt newspapers on the December 6, 1922^ : "following the stabilisation of the 
peace'’'’ 1 am intending to organise a political party under the name of People's Party 
on the Principle of populism."^
'I’he group of deputies in the National Assembly, known as the Second Group, 
tried to renew the elections to obstruct the further developments but their proposal was 
overruled in the Assembly with Mustafa Kemal's majority.^^ In the following period 
Mustafa Kemal embarked a campaign in the Western Anatolia and began expressing 
his thoughts related with the near future. In January 16, 1923 he made a press 
conf erence in Izmir and invited the representatives of newspapers Tevhidiejkar, Vakit, 
Akkanı, ¡teri, İkdam, Tania, 'rhcıc, he, again, announced his decision by saying; "to 
achieve the common gocxl, happiness and well-being of our people it is intended to 
foi m a party under the name of People's Party. ·
· 11ns dale is given wrongly as September 7, 1922 in Girillioglu,7'iirA;, 26.
5-‘’Wilh 'peace' he is strictly referring to laUvSanne Treaty negotiations 
which was proceeding those days.
56 A tatürk 'ün Söylev ve Demeçleri haz., Nermin Unan, ikinci baskı 
(Ankara: fürk înkilap Tarihi Enstitüsü Yayınlan: 1, 1959, 46-48. (From 
now on ASI),II). For the interpretations of this interview and references 
to it see, funçay, Tek-Parti, p. 47; Kili, CHP'de, s.47; Bila, CUP, 45.
57/,(ir< her, Opposition 23.
58 a SD II, 60. Atatürk's press conference, known as Izmit Press 
Conference, has a long and interesting history. Atatürk meets the 
journalists by January 16, 1922 first time. The interview continues for 
more than six hours. The exact minutes of the meeting are captured by 
four stenographs of the National Assembly. But later it is decided not to 
publish these minutes. J'he following days, journalists subm itted their 
articles to the newspapers staying confident to the decision they should 
not give any detail. They only appreciated Mustafa Kemal and reflected 
their impressions that Turkey was about to start a new period of reforms 
and transformations. By January 20, 1922, in the newspapers appeared a 
kind of declaration-information under the heading as :''An Im portant 
Declaration of Mustafa Kemal Paşa to İstanbul Press." It was sure that this 
was a text published after control and consent of Mustafa Kemal. I'he ASD
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I’o ııiKİcısUınd belter the urgency of Mustafa Kemal to form a party, it is 
necessary to know two more points. The first one is, again according to Zürcher, with 
reference to Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, Mustafa Kemal, during his stay in İzmit, must have 
seen Kara Kemal, one of the prominent leaders of CUP, who had returned to the 
country from his Malta exile, and did two things. First, he told the representatives 
from Istanbul that "there was room for only one political organisation and that they 
(the remaining of CUP and the Second Group in the National A.ssembly) should unite 
under the banner of the ADNR."^^ Second, he asked Kara Kemal "about the plans of 
the Unionists now that the war was over. (Kara) Kemal said that, since the Unionists 
were dispersed over Anatolia and in Europe he could not answer that question 
immediately, so Mustafa Kemal suggested that he bring together the most prominent 
Unionists and sec how they fclt."^’^
The 'real' answer given to this question and proposal was the last meeting of 
CUP, held on April 12-13, 1923.^' The importance of this meeting lies on two
7/, text referred here is strictly the mentioned one taken from Gün 
newspaper of January 20, 1922. Later, the minutes, again after Mustafa 
Kemal's consent and approval, was published in Milliyet between 
November 26, 1929 to February 7, 1930. la ter this text is published by 
İsmail Arar, referring to this history in the 'Forword'. See, Ismail Arar, 
Atatürk'ün İzm it Basın Toplantısı (İstanbul: Burçak yayınları, 1969), 5-7. 
The further and 'deveoped' pubication of this text is found in An İnan, 
Gazi Mustafa Kemal Atatürk'ün 1923 llskişchir-îzmit Konuşmaları (Ankara: 
I ürk farih Kurumu Yayınları, 1982) and in Atatürk'ün Izm it-cskişchir 
Konuşması (İstanbul: kaynak Yayınları, 1988).
‘’‘^ /.üreher, Opposition 25. ADNR is initials of Züreher's translation of 
Association for the Defence of the National Rights of Anatolia and 
Rumelia.
i'dibid., 25. 
bllbid., 27.
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points. 'I'hc first is that at the end of the meeting "it accepted Mustafa Kemal's 
leadership and of fered to support the candidates selected by him in the elections. 
This was a critical development for, tacitly, in the meantime, it proposed the 
resurrection of the GUP which had dissolved itself in the last congress of 1918.^’^  
After the decision of dissolving, a new party was founded under the name of 
Renovation real ty (Teceddiit I'lrkasi) which did not participate in the 1918 eleclions^ *^ '. 
Mustafa Kemal, after the congress, immediately reacted that he has no involvement in 
the procedure also accentuating that not only CUP was transformed into Renovation 
Patty but also its members were the members of the SARDR^’-'’. 'I’his was a clear 
proclamation that his political program and movements would be detached from CUP. 
The second important point related with the last congress of CUP could not be 
imdcrst(X)d unless the political formations between April 12-13 arc analysed.
The first one of this set of political developments is the decision of April 1, 
192366 (t), iiie renewal of the elections. Mustafa Kemal, after the above mentioned 
declarations, showing his intention to organise a political party, in the April 8 , 1923 
released a nine points declaration known as Nine P rincip les.T his declaration has 
been signed by Mustafa Kemal as the leader of SARDR. Elasieally it is the political
b^ibid., 27.
’^'^'funaya, Siyasi Partiler, 407-410.
’^^ I'or the cliscuvssion of this party sec, Tunaya, Siyasi Partiler, 412-414.
’^-'’llakimiyct-i Milliye 15 April 1923 in 3’unaya, Siyasi Partiler, 559-560.
f’f’l'or his speech in the National Assembly for the renewal of the elections 
see, A ta türk’ün Söylev ve Demeçleri I: TBMM ve CHP Kurultaylarında 
( 1919-1938) (Ankara: 1urk Inkilap 'farihi linstitüsü Yayınlan:!), 310-311. 
(Iroın now on ASI) I).
’^^ For a translation of this declaration see, Züreher, Opposition, 118-122.
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manifesto of SARDR for the coming elections. In this declaration, apart from the 
details concerning the political program, the main point was the definitive decision 
(orwarded by the society and Mustafa Kemal that after the elections. People's Party 
would be founded and the SARDR Group in the Assembly would be transformed into 
People's Party.*^ ®
Giritlioglu, elaborating on this point, concludes that the 'ofiicial' declaration 
that People's Party would be founded was to help the SARDR candidates to be elected 
as the deputies in all constituencies. In the program, it is also declared that the new 
party would be formed to accomplish the economic development, to complete the state 
orgatiisalion and to cany (he nation to well b e i n g . I n  other words, (he Nine 
Principles were both the political manifestation of the People's Party to the electorate 
for the coming elections which was not yet founded and also the political program of 
this party. Giritlioglu also stresses this point saying that it has been the basic program 
of the party until the first program approved in the 1931 Congress of PP^o Besides, 
Giritlioglu points out that the reason, why not first the party formed but left after the 
elections, is that Mustafa Kcmal wanted the members of the party themselves to 
prepare the program.^*
There is not any evidence found to support this democratic will. On the 
contrary Nine Principles were already the framework of a party program which was
<>H|bid, 118.
b9(;iritlioglu, 'I (irk, 30.
79|bid., 31.
71 Ibid., 30.
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nearly impossible to be surpassed if Mustafa Kemal's personal prestige in those days 
is considered. Also it is clear that the Regulations which was approved by September 
9, 1923 was prepared by Mustafa Kemal himselP^ instead, it seems more relevant to 
think that Mustafa Kemal, through this process wanted to get rid of the Second 
Group'^3 Qf iiic National Assembly and also to transfer the prestige of SARDR to
1>1> 7-1
Fhc elections were realised in the June and July of 1923 and first meeting of 
NA has been held in August 11, 1923.’^  ^But before the NA meeting, in August 7, 
deputies gathered as the DR Group to approve the already prepared Regulation of PP 
and the tiansformation of SARDR into PP.^ '^ The Bill of Statutes {Nizatmwme) was 
approved finally, after the meeting of August 19^ ,^ in September 9. On the September 
11, following the elections Mustafa Kemal elected as the chairman of PP. The
^'^(iumluiriyct llalk I’artisi, On ücştnci Yil Kitnbi, 4.
I'his point is clearly discussed in both Ziircher, Opposition, 29-30 and 
l'unçay, I'ck-Parii, 53-57.
^^For the details of the Second Group and its condition in the second NA 
see, Ahmet Demirel, Birinci Meclis’te Mulmlcfet: İkinci Grup (İstanbul: 
heli.-jim Ya3unlan, 2. baskt 1995) 571-598.
rhis date is given in Ziircher as August 9, 1923 Ziircher , Opposition,, 30 
but it is again August 11, in Demirel, Birinci, 598.
^^ ’’I his date is given as August 8, 1923 in Kili, CHP'de, 44; but it is again 
August 7 both in Giritlioğîu, Türk, 37 and August 7 in Cumhuriyet Ilalk 
Partisi Istanbul ll İdare Kurulu, Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi'nin Tarihçesi 
(îstanbulrŞevket Ünal Matbaası, 1962), 9.
riıough in some sources, i.e. On Beşinci Yıl Kitabı it is said that the 
prepared Bill was open to hard debates this is the only known meeting 
(probably) concerned with this process. Giritlioğîu, Türk, 37.
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secretary general was Recep Peker. The official approval date for the party is October 
23, 1923 due to a petition submitted to Ministry of Interior.^^
In the next period of PP, the most prominent event is the proclamation of 
republic. The republic is established October 29, 1923 after a long lasting cabinet 
crises which seems to be a manoeuvre of Mustafa Kemal. After the announcement of 
the Republic, Mustafa Kemal is elected president of Turkey. As has been argued by 
Tanor, the valid 1921 Constitution was enabling the president to be active in the 
politics. '^-  ^But
"as he is expected to have a regulatory role in the political life of the 
country his involvement in the party politics was not approved. 
Under these conditions İsmet İnönü was nominated as the Acting 
Chairman {Umumi Reis Vekili), seemingly practical duties were left 
to him. Nevertheless, Mustafa Kemal's title as Chairman has been 
left to him up until his death.
The critical point here is that even though at the beginning, tiamely, after the 
Independence War, when he was asked to stay in distance to political life and continue 
as a founding figure above the daily politics^^ he himself furiously rejected this idea, 
saying that he should devote his life to his country^^. Remembering this approach, it 
is not clear who has convinced him to transfer his responsibilities to Acting Chairman,
■78lbid., 39.
^^^Bülent fanör, Osmanh-Türk, 252. 
8ö(',iriıli()ğlu, '¡'ürk, 40.
8İ Karabekir, Paşaların Kavgası:Atatürk-Karabekir (İstanbul: Pmre 
Yayınlan, 1991), 138; Ali Fuat Cebesoy, General Ali Puat Cehesoy'ıın Siyasi 
Hatıraları (İstanbul: Vatan Neşriyatı, 1957), 311-312.
8^A,S7) II, 98.
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lor, again, Girillioğlu continues, saying that despite 1924 Constitution, which bans 
political activity to the President, he did not only continue with his present condition 
but also has been the chairman of 1927, 1931 and 1935 Party Congresses.®-'^
After his election as the Acting Chairman of the PP, İsmet İnönü sent a 
Circular to SARDR Centres all over the country. This brings out one of the most 
important developments in the formation of the party and its becoming a para-military 
organisation.®^ In the Circular dated November 20, 1923®·''it is said "SARDR, 
l)cginning loday(...) will be transformed into PP and all board of governors, will 
continue working as PP Board of Governors this time for the developments in the 
peace period."® ’^This is the end of a long process transforming military cadres into a 
political party. On behalf of the party, later, in the Party Group General Committee 
meeting, held in November 10, 1924, due to a proposal olTcred by Recep (Peker), the 
word Republican is added and this amendment is registered by the Regulations 
accepted in the Congress of 1935.®"^
2.3. Ideological Foundations of PP in The 
Period
2.3.1. Party or Program?
Foundation
^'^Giritlioğlu,7’ürk, 40.
^^'fhe structural specifications and characteristic of DRS is analysed at 
length in l'unçay, lek-Parti, 28-42 and Tunaya Siya.si Partiler, 478-526. 
rhey both analyse the military basis of this political organisation.
8-5'rhis date is given as November 19, 1923 in Giritlioglu, Türk., 41.
I'unaya, Siyasi Partiler, 582-583.
87ibid., 560.
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The early definitions of RPP is given by Mustafa Kemal in his spccclies in 
wliicli lie accentuated the early idea of founding a political party under this name. The 
preliminary explanations are concentrated on three points. First, the notitni and the 
function of 'party' is stressed, second, the importance of a program which is usually 
thought as the functioning bcxly of party is accentuated and, third, the understanding 
of 'people' and 'populism' is delivered.
In his vciy much refereed speeches Mustafa Kcmal, strictly dciincs a concept 
ol 'party.' In his fiist speech in which he exclaims his prospective idea of founding a 
party, he immediately refers to the parties and party programs of 'the other countries' 
and says "1 have not iound them to satisfy the real needs ol’ our people and 
c o u n try .W ith  his this very specific approach he once more comes to a conclusion 
that Turkey is different than the other, foreign, countries having specific conditions. 
I'his appioach has Ix'cn critical for Mustafa Kcmal since the beginning for, even in his 
speech, dated, December, 1, 1921 about the Proposed Law Concerning the Function 
and the Authority of the Cabinet of Ministers, he emphasises this point and, referring 
to the specificity of the Law under the discussion and, he stresses its immunity to any 
one of the existing systems such as democracy or s(x;ialism and says, "we should be 
proud of not resembling and not trying to be like (any existing system) because we arc 
like us."«9
««AS'D//, 47.
^‘^ İbid., 197 and Mahmut Goloğlu, Üçüncü Meşrutiyet (Ankara: lîaşnur 
Matbaası, 1970), 244, Yücekök, 100 Soruda Türk Devrim Tan/j/(İstanbul: 
(îerçek Yayınevi, 1984), .S9.
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Musíala Kcinal, with this consideration, again in his interview with the 
representatives of Istanbul press, has an interesting debate with one of the journalists, 
namely, Ahmet Emin Bey. Saying that, "the program of the party will be devoted to 
the well being and happiness of the whole nation"^^ and, stressing that "if the nation is 
left to itself no further step would be taken (...) and the whole nation should be 
interested in a positive work program"^i he is asked a question by the mentioned 
journalist about the party, stressing the importance of the party above the program, 
Mustafa Kcmal answers argues that "the question is the program. We can not cheat 
anybody with name changes. What we offer should be a program for the nalion."^^
I’lu' K'iison why Musíala Kcmal insists on (he imporlancc of program has also 
been explained by himself. In the .same interview he clearly makes Ihe distinction 
between the parly and the program by saying: "If the program of the party is 
determined and certified it is not important the party memlxïrs to follow it or not."93 
Not only this explanation but also another one, in the same interview, is given by him 
which also indicates the basic clue why Mustafa Kcmal has seen the program more 
important than the party itself: "The party will be founded on this program (...) We 
can not leave the nation without any goal and organisation. Otherwise we loose the 
nation."^'·
^^Ismail Arar, ízmit, 53. 
‘^ •ibici., 53 
‘í2[bid., 54 
'^-^Ibitl., 56.
‘^ ^Ibid., 60.
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Telken together with the above explanations, it might be assumed that program 
is lallicr an ideological and structural framework intended to be put before the nation'^ ·'' 
rather than a political program. This could be seen more clearly in a late speech he 
dclivcicd by defining PP as a 'school to give the nation a political education ("siyasi 
terhiye”) " A t  this point, as has been stressed by Dodd'"' ,^ he has been open to a 
spccilic contiadiction and tension arising from the clash between the components of 
his dispersed ideas. Dodd, explains this contradiction by saying: "Atatürk might be 
seen urging two contradictory lines here. One is that the party must lead, since the 
people arc not trusted. The other is that the party must respond to the people."'^
2.3.2 Between Program, Pragmatism and Elites
Merc, evidently, the problematic concept is the notion of 'people.' Dodd, 
makes a distinction at this point and .says.
"what he probably has in mind is a distinction, not always clearly 
made, between the people in their raw state, so to speak, before they 
have been liberated by the revolution and the people, really citizens, as 
they wilt have become after the revolution."'*9
'^ ■‘'Por a discussion of the concept and notion of 'fırka' (Party) at length on 
this basis see, I'unçay, Tek-Parti, 42.
98.
II.Dodd, "Atatürk and Political Parties" in Political Parties and  
Democracy in Turkey, ed. Ileper and J.M.Landau (London, New York:
1.8. fauris and Co Ltd, 1991), 24-41.
'^«Ibid., 36. 
'>'>lhid., 29.
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As Dodd continues, he delineates the mutual relationship between the party and 
the citizen, putting eitizen before the masses: "These latter are the patriotic citizens, 
those whose aspirations for reform are in line with those of the party, not just the 
m a s s e s .H e r e ,  again comes another eontradiction for, it is ambiguous either the 
|)ai ty, through its program, will create the 'citizen' or the citizens will direct the party. 
To answer this question it is necessary to look the definition brought by Dodd to the
idea of masses. According to Dodd, "the masses are not despised, sinee in them lies 
(lie virtue which (lie revolution is releasing."’ ”^ 'I’he.se appioachcs might be taken as 
the early configuration of the party relying on a basis of more eclectic ideology and 
stiuctuie as Karpat observes.N evertheless, the same understanding of the party 
concept has placed the PP on a more pragmatic level. This pragmatism has been 
understood as the 'reality.'
'Reality', in Mustafa Kemal's words are the necessities o( the people and the 
society: "A program should not be a program of any kind or of somebody but, it can 
only gain its value and respect by containing the ideas and measures which are able to 
answer (he expectations and necessities of the nation and country."'® Later on, still in 
1937, he continues to stress the same issue by, first, putting the (Republican) PP 
progiam as the kisic state program then, stressing that "the Principles (of the program) 
should hot be seen as one and the same thing with the dogmas of the sacred books, 
believed that have been disseminated by revelations."'"'^ He clears the probable
lOOlbid., 29.
I Ibid., 29.
Id^K^eniai Karpat, " fhe Republican", 15. 
103sD IV, 95.
'd^'ASD I, 405.
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intersections by saying: "we have derived our inspirations not from the heaven or void 
l)ul very cliicclly (lom the
The clash between the citizen and the raw people is another subject open to 
debate through the notion of party, introducing the concept of elites. The role and the 
function of the elites in the foundation of PP and, later in the implementation of the 
piogram ol the party, has been vital in this period, in line with the framework 
dclincalcd above and, to the function of party described and attributed by Mustafa 
Kemal. The elitist structure and the organisation of the PP, let alone the theoretical 
aigumcntation, at the initial level, is related with 'from the above' understanding of 
political and social transformations. In an early speech, Mustafa Kemal clearly 
configures the trajectory of the social developments as 'from the above."i06 in this 
respect, "certain initiators are providing guidance in giving the nations the directions 
they need to be given. In this way organisation can be built from above 
downward.
Rostow, referring to this argumentation, first of all, replaces Mustafa Kemal as 
an "elitist by training and often by bearing" but he also describes him as "a populist by 
political necessity and by ideological conviction."!®^This contradiction is clear in the *
lO'^lbid., 405 
lObASDII, 1959, 11.
l!^^Ibid. 11. 'Hie translation is taken from, Dankwart A.Rustow, "Atatürk as 
an Institution Builder" in Atatürk: rounder o f a Modern State , ed. 
A.Kazancigil and KÖzbudun (London: Hurst & Company, 1997), 74. Гог an 
analysis of the speech, see, p.77, footnote 17.
*98|bid. 12.
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romiation of PP as well as in his definitions for intelleeluals. In one of his speeches he 
coiTclalcs the inlcllccluals with the saviours of the nation: "After the dark, painful 
days, the saving of the nation from the death pit has been only possible by the effort of 
the intellectuals of the nation {mUleiin münevverleri) by enlightening and guiding the 
people, by directing the people towards the goal."^®  ^This jxjint is in accordance and 
icconcilialioii with his understanding of the party and party programme. For, first, as 
has been mentioned above, he puts the party as the organ "which is responsible for 
enlightening and guiding (ienvir ve delalet) the whole n a tio n " 'a n d , second, party 
progiam as "incoiporating and including the reform will of a powerful mass of 
patriots."'" Emanating from this framework is the priority and the privilege of the 
iiilt-IIccHials alK)vc the people, as has been slated by Ka/aneigil.'
The question of elites in the making of PP is a crucial one as has provoked a 
many of argumentation among the students of both Kemalist period politics and the 
structure of PP. Ka/aneigil, tacitly, tackles with the issue by referring to 'from the 
above' approach: "the process from the above -be it in the form of the Tanzimat 
reforms, the Young Ottomans of the 1860s and 1870s, the Young Turks of 1908, or 
Kemalisin- was the hallmark of political change in T u r k e y .T h is  'from the above' 
structure of the Turkish modernising movements, for Kazancigil, arc all a
11, 155.
 ^ "^Ibid., 224 and Dodd, "Atatürk", 28. 
i 'llb id ., 47.
1 '^Ali Kazancigil, "The Ottomaii-Turkish State and Kemalism" in Atatürk, 
Kazancıgil-Özbudun, eds., 72, 37-57.
l'3[bid., 46. Italics original.
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consc(|ucncc of llic lack of inlcrcsl in the economic approach when the transformalion 
process is designed. Instead, Kazancigil continues.
The 'inconvertibility' of the economic positions into |X)liticaI power 
was the basis of the institutionalisation of the Ottoman state. Therefore 
the strategy, as well as the ideological stances, of every elite group 
contending for power had to concentrate on the state, neglecting the 
economy and market forces, which in any case went under almost 
complete foreign control by the end of the nineteenth centuiy.
Acciuding to Kazancigil, this complete but structuial alxsence of articulation 
between the economic and market forces and the reformation processes, first, 
surpassed in the early twentieth century by the efforts of Committee of Union and 
Progress to create a kind of peripheral bourgeoisie which ended up by a certain kind of 
|X)lilical participation.
'file new period starts by a tension between the |xnipheral elites and the ruling 
elites which brings not only significant changes amongst the ruling elites but "these 
changes had a crucial bearing on the emergence of modern Turkish state, for 'in a 
sense the Kemalist Republic was the culmination of a long process, whereby the 
Turkish governing elite transformed itself, the state and finally the country.'"’i-** 
Kazancigil, accordingly, suggests that the new peripheral elites, as they were able to 
take part in the centre in various different ways, first of all, started to ii.se the 
intermediary institutions, basically the school system, not only to create their 
secondary and educated literati, in Kazancigil's words, "the new generation elites", 
but also, by way of them, to control the political structure
• ’^Ibid., d().
H 5Ibid., 47.
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"The new generation of elites, trained in the military academy, the 
school of medicine, the school of administration {Mülkiye) and tlie 
secular law school, were not exclusively the offspring of the ruling 
elite. They increasingly came from provincial towns and more modest 
circles."'
This 'new generation of elites' al.so included such professions as lawyers and 
journalists and, in a sense, from the administrative ranks to newspapers there was a 
wide range of people, "dissatisfied with the inner circles of power, mostly staffed with 
traditional Ottoman state elites""’^ , taking an initiative in reforming and restructuring 
the state. Here, it should be noted that, as has been noted by Şerif Mardin, with 
reference to Poggi, the Journals and journalists have been functional in the formation 
of a new stratification in the society by founding a structure which plays a role of 
uniting people which gives birth to an embryonic civil society."^ This might be taken 
as the (irs( separation between the centre and periphery and reconstitution of a new 
circle within the centre."'^ The second, but which might be considered as playing •
• lf>lbid., 4 7 .
4 7 .
1 ^^Şerif Mardin, "vSivil Toplum", Türkiye’de Toplum ve S iyaset,
Dcr.;M. l urkönc-T.Önder (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınlan, 1990), 15. I'hc role of 
mass media in the 1930s is analysed in Waller R Weiker, Political riitelagc 
and Democracy in Turkey (Leiden: llj.Brill, 1973), 30-32.
‘^ Nevertheless, the provinces were also under the influence of these 
new elites even if they were the natives of the specific region. In this 
context I'aik Ahmet Barutçu might be mentioned. As a son of a well known 
family in I'rabzon, which was effective in the regional politics and in the 
formation of the first Society for the Defence of Right in Trabzon, has 
been send to Istanbul to study law. Coming back to Trabzon, after 
completing his education, he has founded the regional newspaper,İstikbal 
(Future) and become the fervent supporter of the Independence 
Movement, even though appeared occasionally as one of the most 
controversial critics of Mustafa Kemal. Ibr details see,: Ural Armay, "Faik 
Ahmet Barutçu Kimdir?", Faik Ahmet Barutçu, Siyasi Anılar 1939-1954 
(İstanbul: Milliyet Yayınları, 1977). (Ural Armay is the pseudonym of his
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relatively a major role pragmalieally, issue is that, as has been observed by a number 
of scholars, the Young Turk groups were recruited among these new elites. 
According to Ka/nncigil "most of Kemalist revolutionaries, including Mustafa Kcmal 
himself, belonged to this category of somewhat marginal state elites."*^!
This specificity of Kernalist regime and its ties with the early cadres of Young 
Turks is reflected in the early PP, for, it has been suggested both by Ka/ancigil and 
0/,budun, that this party neither needed a mass mobilisation, because of taking 'from 
the above' model as its pillar’22 and, nor it took initiative "to broaden the party's 
popular base."'23 /\j5 a con.sequenee, 0/,budun defines RPP as "largely a cadre party, 
an elite organisation, dominated by the official elite and kx;al notables."'24 pp  ^having 
such a significant characteristic, further, determined the transformation of the Kemalist 
movement into a "military-bureaucratic regime" in O/.budun's words'2‘' it will later 
be analysed in depth and deUiil.
Conclusion
son, whf) was an ambas.sador. I am grateful to Mete 'l'unçay for this 
in form ation.)
'^*^!>erif Mardin, "Yeni Osmanlilar, jön 'lurkler ve Silahlı Kuvvetler", 
Siynsiil ve Sosyiü Bilimler, Mukalelcr 2, der.: M.j'ürköne, j'.Önder (İstanbul: 
İletişim Yayınları, 1990), 120.
'^^ Kazancıgil, " The Ottoman", 46.
•22ibid., 48.
12-l[;rgun Özbudun, "The Nature", 93.
•^^Ibid., 94.
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The process of formation and early ideological considerations of social 
democracy in Turkey is strictly related with the history of RPR The hislorio-political 
and socio-fx)litical development of this party can be divided into two periods. I’he first 
pci iod should cover the years between 1919 and 1930 and the second period should 
focus on the years between 1930 and 1950. This division, as argued in the chapter, in 
detail, is a conseiiuence of a methodological approach, fhe relevant literature, when 
the political history of a political organisation is concerned, usually evolves around 
two different view points. The historical events and their repercussions arc taken as a 
starting point by some schcx>ls and the concepts and their ideological backgrounds arc 
lavoured by different schools. In this chapter, it is argued that, up until the 1923 the 
historical development have determined the basic ideological concerns, whereas after 
the proclamation of the republic, the concepts arc of primary importance. When RPP 
is analysed with this assumption, it is suggested that, in the first period, it is rather 
more cotivcnictU to define the first |x;ri(xl as a party-led state pcrit)d, for it is (irst the 
party formed and than the 'new' state is established. The second period could be 
defined as a 'state-led party.' and in this respect the second period of RPP is mote 
idcologiad than the first period.
In the first years, the formation of RPP is more related with the tactical 
manoeuvres of Mustafa Kcmal. In this piwcss the historical thresholds, like lir/urum 
and Sivas Congress, the moves of the former CUP have been effective. Nevertheless, 
when the |x)litical and ideological concerns of the leader is analysctl, it is interesting to 
sec that 'populism' has played the leading role in the formation period. Populism is the 
key concept which has also determined the basis of the 1924 Constitution which has 
akso brought the early but long time perpetuating split between Mustafa Kcmal and his 
friends. From this differentiation comes out the first and early political formations.
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Tliis piocess also paves the way to the formation of a new political structure which has 
coiilimicci all (luouyh (he Republican period, 'fhis is the evolution of the para-mililaiy 
organisations to RPR In this process, as shown in the chapter, a chain of formation is 
followed. The representatives of the Society of Anatolia and Rumelia for the Defence 
of Rights (SARDR) in the first National Assembly are considered to be the members 
oi the Fiist Group, formed by MusUifa Kcmal, then the RPP is formed as a political 
organ of the First Group and the members of SARDR in the country are transformed 
into the grassroots of the party.
'I'hc second step is the political-ideological direction of the early RPP. When 
analysed, it is clear that, since the early periods, republicanism, in a convoluted way 
with populism, has been one of the main concerns of the founding core of the party. 
Nevertheless, republicanism is more attuned to national sovereignty and populism is 
more formulated as the elites taking care of the people. With this assumption, the 
thesis displays that, the early period more focuses on the program than the party and 
secondly, again in the same pcricxl, the party is formed on a basis of a dual structure. 
This is the pragmatism that appears as the idea behind the program and the elites that 
would lead both the party and the nation. From this analysis it could be deduced that, 
the early RPP, even though formed as a break with the former CUP, yet refers to its 
centralism and this has shaped the epistemological structure of the Republic which is 
further analysed the next chapter.
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CHAPTER III
THE STATE-LED PARTY: RPP IN THE 1923-1950 PERIOD
3.1. The Aspects of the New State and Regime
After the proclamation of the Republic in 1923, the steps taken toward the 
establishment and stabilisation of a slate in Turkey arc of great importance. Among 
these arc the abolishing of the Caliphate^ and, adjoining to it, the unification of the 
education which should be taken as the preliminary attempt to the implementation of a 
new understanding of s(x;icty based on the Civil Code, which was issued by the year 
1926. Taken together with these two events the demolishing of the Religious Courts 
(^SVt /vc Mahkenwleri) also demarcates a further move to the same end“. 'I’his [moccss *
*A tlificrent approach to this Issue considering the reaction of Aral> world 
is Idund in lilie Kedourie, Politics in the Middle Past (Oxford, New York; 
Oxford University Press, 1992), 98-103.
^In many sources these developments are considered as the process of 
secularization. Rut it should be remembered that up until 1928 and to the 
amendment of the Constitution in April 10, 1928, with law Number 1222, 
the state continued to be attached to Islam, with article num ber 5 by 
saying, "the religion of Turkish Republic is Islamic Religion." liven this 
amendment did not pronounce the concept of laicism. I'hat is settled by 
another amendment, dated Februray 5, 1937, law num ber 3115. See,
A.Şeref (îözübüyük. Açıklamalı Türk Anayasaları (Ankara: furhan 
Kitabevi, 1993), 56 and, M.'funçay, Türkiye' Cumhuriyeti'nde Tek-Parti 
Yönetirni’nin Kurulması (1923-1931) , (Ankara: Yurt Yayınları, 1981), 226. 
As a consequence of these developments it is more convenient to 
understand the early reforms as a process of modernisation or 
'civil'ization. This, of course does not exclude the tacit and implicit
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could be defined as the founding of a specific notion of secularism which should be 
seen as a mode of 'civil'ization as, in the same year of 1926, there are three more laws 
translated, issued and put into force in Turkey as. Law of Obligations, Code of 
Penally, Code of Commerce. Civil Code and Law of Obligations were taken from 
Swil/erland, Code of Penalty was taken from Italy and the last one was taken from 
Germany and Italy. In the following years also other laws such as Penal Procedural 
Law and Civil Procedural l^w  were adopted.^ But the period is definitely scaled by 
the 1924 Constitution. To understand the structure and even the 'spirit' of the newly 
established slate, it is necessary to analyse the 1924 Constitution but, it should be 
noted immediately, that the most dominant political event of the period is the 
foundation of the Progressive Republican Parly {Y^RV-Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet 
Fırkası)) which was the termination of a long lasting opposition movement against the 
radical wing of PP. The related two other moves are the l.xiw on the Maintenance of 
Order which signals the nature of the early stale and, the demolishing of PRP, as a 
consequence of the issued and implemented law. In short, the achievements of the 
1923-1927 period is more prone to the structuring of a new state which is usually 
referred as a modernisation and/or, identical in meaning with it, the Westernisation 
process. In this context it seems more beneficial to discuss and dissect the new state 
from the view jxant of m(Kİerni.sation and its institutions as well as referring to the 
constructive epistemology immanent to this facluality.
3.1.1. Putting State First: Authoritarianism versus
Democracy
understanding of secularisation, taken in its largest meaning, with its 
alributions to modernism which will be discussed further below.
■ '^I'uncay, I'ck Pavii, 172-173.
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'I’lic aigumcnts concerning this pcri<xi usually revolves around (lie concepts of 
civility and autliorilarianism. The arguments of civility, basically, refers to the absence 
ol democracy in (he establishing of the state and to the 'from the above' charactei istic 
of the new regime, which has been clearly put by Alattlrk himself^, usually stated as 
authoritarianism. In the period started by 1924 both characteristics have played a 
leading role in the formation of the state and the ideology encircling it. This state of 
conditions is deal in an ofl'icial party dcxMiment.
I'he point which attracts attention in the party history, registered up to 
here, is that the phases of the realised reform, have not been 
developed through the decisions reached in the party congresses...In 
the period of transition, from peace to reform movements, it was 
much more convenient to the political and scx^ ial realities of tho.se days 
not to write Principles to the program and then putting them into 
practice but, first, enlightening Turkey's horizons by applications and 
practices, as lightening following one another, generated through the 
light of the reform sun, rising in the spirit of Great Leader. The 
function of the congress in this period was carried by the group 
formed by the members of the party in the Grand National 
Assembly."^
The centrality of the leader also has Ixien stated tacitly by Atatilrk him.sclf when 
he talks about the proclamation of the republic, showing him.sclf as the basic figure 
incorporating the idea, since the beginning and, putting the party and the GNA into a 
secondary plan.^ This very condition, apparently, has opened space to many
"^Atatürk’ün Söylev ve Demeçleri I: T.B.M.M. ce C.II.P. Kurultaylannda  
(1919-1938), (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1961), 11.
‘’Cıımluıı iyet Halk Partisi, Onbcşinci Yıl Kitabı (Ankara, n.p., 19,18), (>.
M^f the '(hi)slory' of both the proclamation and establishment of the 
Republic is followed, the conclusionary remark given in the text might 
better be understood, for it is Atatürk himself who immediately responded 
to a political and executive as a crisis, and used it to transform the existing 
system into a new political regime, showing the inefficiency and 
inadequacy of the already existing one. Also himself clearly states that 
this was the possibilty to apply the idea he has developed in his mind. To 
follow the stages of this process .see, Atatürk, Nutuk, v. 11: 1920-1927
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arguments and speculations that the early Turkish state was a single-party, 
aulhorilarian one. This is a debate growing around the discussions of 'democracy in 
rurkey.' On the other hand even though the non-demœratic, at least one-party 
dimension and characteristic of the state is accepted, without any reservation, there is 
one point emphasised by many scholars. That is the natural lack of conditions 
disabling the regime transforming itself to democracy.^ Nevertheless, there arc two 
more points stressed in this context which are worth discussing. The first one is, as 
has been put by Ilcpcr, in return to the ab.scncc of democracy, the constitutive
(Istanbul: Milli liğitinı Basımevi, 5. baskı, 1962), 796-815. Another 'officaT 
source, for this way of explaining the developments, as well as to be used 
in the public service is the M alcni liilfrUcr. It is a book see,mingly 
prepared and written by Л. Afetinan. Nevertheless, Afetinan explains, in 
the prefac e she wrote for a recent edition of the book, that all text is 
written under the strict control of Atatürk. In the chapter, "How the 
Republic is Established in Turkey" the same emphasis is made and it says: 
"Mustafa Kemal decided to save country from the hands of rotten people 
and he did it." A.Afetinan, Medeni Bilgiler ve Mustafa Kemal A tatürk'ün  
Idyazıları (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1969), 37. l;ven though 
Afetinan proclaims that this part is written by help of 'I'.Biyikhoglu, 
Secretary of Presidency, depending on the above explanation, it could be 
accepted as Atatürk's personal view. On the other hand, Atatürk'e close 
friend and, a prom inent 'furkish intellectual and novelist, Yakup Kadri 
Karaosmanoglu, once has developed a completely different view point on 
this ground. According to Karaosmanoglu, Atatürk has never thought and 
expressed anything like republic. He tends that the first one who has 
declared the concept of republic was İnönü. Karaosmanoglu also insists on 
the point that Atatürk has tried to complete a project of 'salvation.' 
Karaosmanoglu also emphasizes the point that not only during the 
Independence War but, also in the process of reforms, Atatürk's sole aim 
has never been the republic. I'he reason why he has ended up with it, for 
Karaosmanoglu, is the ability of forming governments and bringing 
solutions to the political impasses that republic bears. 'I'he crisis that 
triggered this problem is the domestic situation arouse in Turkey, just 
after the lausanne I'reaty, over the prime ministry f)f Rauf Bey, Ге|1п Bey 
and İsmet l’aşa. See, Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoglu's ideas in Ali (îevgilli 
(moderator), "Düşünenlerin Forumu", Milliyet Gazetesi, (October 28, 1973).
^Especially substructural, economic and cultural definitions and their 
emprical data given for modernity as the carrying structure of 
democracy and the condition of the country and the state are concern of 
many analysis, but as an example, see, Walter Weiker, Poiiticai Tutelage 
and Democracy in Turkey: Tree Party and its Aftermath  (l.eiden: I;. J. Brill, 
1973), 9-35.
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principle of the regime and the state which is the 'construction of the people's state' 
through popular sovereignty.^ The historical development of this notion leiids the way 
to the csUiblishmcnt of first the National Assembly and then to the prcxiliunation of the 
Republic. Secondly, this condition of popular sovereignty is mentioned both in the 
1921 and 1924 Constitution and, after 1923, the problematic turned out to be the 
construction of the ideology of the state. This ideology although has different and 
diveigcnt o|x;nings can best be stated as the 'modernisation' of the state.
Nevertheless, at this point, it should be noted that in the pre-1931 pericxJ, even 
though it is not possible to argue that there is a concrete and watertight isolation 
between ideology and state construction attempts, yet, there are two points to be 
mentioned. The first one is that ideology is more a matter of discussion when the 
secondary institutions founded for eultural matters but, expected to coagulate the 
ideology of (he slate by transferring it to the nalion-s<x:icty. DependenI on this 
argumentation, the early notions used in the establishment of the state are more 
'natural' should they use the .same eoncepts .such as nationalism, republicanism and 
sc'culai ism. I lerc, the condilion ol .scculai isin is helpful in the uiulerslanding ol the 
argument which has just been proposed. Secularism, playing the leading role in the 
construction of the new state, was .still like an unknown concept which has never 
interfered the political life.^This also shows that the pre-1931 period is more related 
with the notion of civilism or civilisation rather than the construction of a well defined
^Metin lleper, "Atatürk'te Devlet Düşüncesi", in Çağdaş Düşüncenin 
¡şığında Atatürk  (Kstanbul: Dr. Nejat F. Eczaoıbaşı Vakfı Yayınları, 1983), 
222.
fhis point is clear in a book analysing the early development of laicism. 
Nuray Mert, ¡¿liklik Tartışmasına Kavramsal Bir Bakış (İstanbul: Bağlam 
Yayınlan, 1994).
59
and closed ideological system as in the case of post-1931 period. What is called 
çivilisin, or civility in this scn.se, is the moderni,sation of the country.
3.2 Turkish Modernisation: Civility via Authoritarianism
A.·; Iiii.-j just l)ccii iiu'nlioncd, iiIh)V<^ tlic |)I(kcs.s o( Itiinsfoi iiiing the I •’inpiic niul 
its system into a new and 'modern' one is usually rclcrrcd as the modernisation 
process or, identical in meaning, the Westernisation p rcx ;css.T h is aim has been 
succinctly put by Atatlirk himself saying, "is there any nation who wanted to get 
civilised but not taken the direction toward Wcst?'l  ^ This is usually conceived as 'the 
wholesome modernisation' of the country^^. This modernisation is not the 
restructuring of an already existing state but the formation of a new one, 'a modern 
s t a t e 'T h i s  state has a main target of carrying the country to the level of the 
contemporary civilisation. Modern state includes the implementation of new 
institutions and, a new understanding which relics on science''^ and on the 'rational 
thinking'* ^. According to Karpat the "ultimate purpose of the reforms was the
^^Hinver Ziya Karal, " I'he Principles of Kemalism" in Atatürk: rounder o f  
Modern Slate, eds. IBA.Kazancigil and EÖzbudun (London: Hurst and 
Comiiany, 1997), 30-32.
• •Utkan Kocatürk (ed), Atatürk'ün Fikir ve Düşünceleri (Ankara: lidebiyat 
Yayınevi, 1971), 83.
^^Suna Kili, 1960-1975 Döneminde Cumpuriyet Halk Partisi'nde Gelişmeler 
(İstanbul: Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Yayınlan, 1976), 50,57.
’ Üleper, "Atatürk'te", 216.
l^lbid., 224.
• '^Ibid., 223.
l^Metin Heper, The State Tradition in Turkey (Eothen Press, 1985), 64.
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modcrnisalion оГ Turkish sc)cicly by siipplanling its traditionalist, emotional ways and 
customs with rationalist, modem ideas.
In Atatiirk's words this framework constitutes the 'Republican ideal'^^ 
(Ci/mliuriyet mejkuresi). This 'ideal' is a point of contradictory and argumentative 
approaches, for some scholars refer to the understanding as an 'epistemology', some 
others insist on the point that it is more a 'Weltanschauung'^^ and some others take it 
as an 'ideology.'2^  ^ This notion of ideology can not be taken independent of the 
'practicality' of the new state as Karpat puts it. Karpat, considering the 1923-1925 
period by nationalism, secularism and populism, says that "nationalism was at the 
basis of the regime and secularism was its chief means of fulfilling the ultimate goal of 
a modern national Turkish Republic, based on the sovereignty of the nation."21 Ц is 
possible to put here another characteristic of the regime, which has also been officially 
accepted by both the party and the state in time, republicanism, and it is possible to 
understand the nature of the ideological stmeture of the regime by referring to very this 
notion at large which is strictly merged with constitutionalism.
l^Kcmal Karpat, Turkey's Politics , (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, 1959), 53.
^^Atiitürk'ün Söylev ve Demeçleri //, yay. haz.. Nimet Unan (Ankara: Türk 
İnkılap linstitüsü Yayınları, 2. baskı, 1959), 340.
19||cpcr, Tnıdilion , 05.
29'Paha Parla, Türkiye'de Siyasal Kültürün Resmi Kaynaklan: Kemalist 
Tek-Parti İdeolojisi ve ClIP'nin Altı Ok'u, Vol. 3 (Istanbuhİletişim 
Yayınları, 1992). Гог an attem pt of situtaing Kemalisin in a framework of 
ideology see, lirgun Özbudun, " l’he Nature of the Kemalist Political 
Regime," in Atatürk, in Kazancıgil and Özbudun, eds., 79-103.
21 Karpat, Turkey's, 49.
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Accoicling loTanor, logelhcr with Karpal, the reforms which started by 1922 
have been realised under the authoritarian political conditions, lacking of opposition 
but, taking the legal institutions and niethcxls (i.e. parliament) into consideration. The 
basics of Turkish Revolution' could be .scrutini.sed as 'nalionalisation/nalionization 
and establishing a nation state; moving toward universal values, secularisation, 
démocratisation."22 Situating this framework into the 1924 constitution, Tanbr, 
makes an interesting point and, says that the essence of the 1924 Constitution is 
political demœracy.23 Accepting the authoritarian character of the regime, still, Tanor, 
secs the 1924 Constitution as "has been attached to democratic philo.sophy."24 and 
TaiK)i· strictly correlates this approach with the notion of national sovereignty.
3.3 Populism as the Basis of Popular Sovereignty
Depending on the aforementioned arguments, it is po.ssible to characteri.se the 
pre-1931 state nuxJel as an authoritarian one iclying on the constitutive idea of national 
sovereignty, staying loyal to the understanding of mcxlernity which is unscparablc 
from the abstract notion of civilisation. When demcx;racy-m(xlernisation coexistence is 
taken into consideration, this framework might only be seen as a problematic but a 
constitutive element and, in this period, all components of civility is identified with the 
notion of re|)ublicanism which is adjacent and adherent to national .sovereignty. Under 
this assumption, national sovereignty could be conceptualised as not only the 
constitutive idea but also the legitimi.sation of the state in the establishment period.
2égalent Fanör, Osmanh-ltirk Anayasal Gelişmeleri (İstanbul: Yapı Kredi 
Yayınlan, 1998), 321-322.
1., 315.
^^Ibid., 328.
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riiis poini 1K44İS <i lurdicr aiuilysis, Гог il is also rclaicil witli "(lie new incliviclual 
whom the Republican tegime wanted lo Гогт."^^
In (his regard, Ihc 1924 Constitution, as a consequence of a tradition started in 
(he pre-i epiiblican era by the 1921 I^uv on the Fundamental Organisation, coni inns 
that "(he sovereignty belongs lo the nation without any restriction or icscrvalion."^^* 
This is the only concept that the 1924 constitution rests on. Beyond this, the early 
republic is free from any ideological or conceptual basis. Heper, taking this point into 
consideration, prefers tackling with the ramifications of the national .sovereignty 
|)iinciple. Here, the source and the origin of the concept is the nation itself and, 
according lo him, Atatiirk's continuously dc.scribing the new stale as the 'people's 
state' dilTcrs it radically from even the late Ottoman model, for the previous one was 
the slate of individuals.^^ In this context, Heper points out that the notion of 'people's 
state' is a slate free from the political system and any state of power above it.^^ 
Besides, declaring that the sovereignty belongs lo the nation is, indeed, figuring out lo 
whom the sovereignly docs not bclong^^ which might be taken as (he early 
configuration of the concepts which arc more pro-political.
This understanding is vciy much related with the notion of populism which has 
played an important role in the development of the republican thought. The nxits of 
populism could be found in the Populism Program prepared by Atatürk which is
-^‘^ Karpai, I'urkey’s, 53.
(îö'/übüyük, Açıklamalı, 56. 
Порог, Alatürk'lo, 220. 
^«Ibid., 223.
29|bid., 226.
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considered lo be the basis of the 1921 Consliliilion.^f) Beyond this, populism has 
paved (he way lo the much argued solidarislic and corporatisl structure of Turkish 
politics and stale in the 1930s by rejecting the class notion and serial differences and, 
taking the nation as a whole. Republicanism, in this sense, without relying or founded 
on Ihc olhci crmccpls, in verbaiim , is denoting the basis of the new regime, merged 
with such tenets as populism, sovereignly. The political and ideological formulation of 
(hese coiu cpls is carried out in (he 1927 Congress of Ihc Republican People's Parly. 
The Article 1 of the Statutes of the Party, issued by the Congress, defines the parly as 
"a republican, populist and nationalist political organisation."31
In the same Ct)ngress, also has been issued, the Declaration o f the General 
Presidency ,which goes further, for it defines the party as "RPP is republican, laic, 
populist and nalionalisl"32 as Kili obscrvcs.33 This is (he first official document 
referring lo the laicism and, it is again the first step, expanding to the merging of the 
parly ideology and the stale, for it says, in the second sentence of the already quoted 
article that, "this basis is determining for our Party in its policies".34 This framework 
is completed by the 1931 congress, transforming the state-led parly to a parly-led slate 
and, also by completing the ideological foundation of the party. The stale-parly
39i,snıail Arar, Atatürk'ün Halkçılık Prof>raını (İstanbul; Haha Matbaası,
I ‘)().-l).
Cumhuriyet Halk Fırkası Nizamnamesi,: 15 Teşrinievvel 1927'de İnikat 
Ikien Cumhuriyet Halk Fırkası Büyük Kongrasının 22 Teşrinievvel 1927 
Tarihli İçliınaında Müzakere ve Kabul Fdilmiştir (Ankara: /.cllic Biraderler 
Matbaası, 1929), 3.
32cilP Büyük Konresi, Umumi Riyasetin Beyannamesi (Ankara: l'HMM 
Malbaa.sı, 1927), 1.
33 Kili,CHP'de, 59.
34cilP Büyük Kongresi, Umumi, 1.
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iinilication is reached its full tcrminalion by the 1935 Congress but, the 1931 congress 
is also important, for it lays the ground for the transformation of the concepts from 
being pro-political to being pro-ideological.
3.4. Party-Led State; Post-1931 Period
After setting the ground for the political regime by the 1927 Congress, 
Republican Peoples Party has further developed itself toward a new political structure. 
This period of post-1927 Congress is marked by various political events. The most 
striking one, in this context, is the 1929 Crash, which shook the world economy 
tremendously and, pushed Turkey to construct a new tenet which in time, would be 
included among the principles of RPP, namely slatism. The implementation of this 
tenet has a long history, for it also encompasses the new cadres of the party and the 
state-party merging.^^ If the first reason in moving to statism is the search for a new 
political Older which would put liberal state understanding into a secondary level, the 
second, basic reason and motivating force behind this progress is the foundation of 
I'ree Parly?^^ The third reason might be the two state centred political regimes 
confronting with each other on the international political arena, namely the Socialist 
and the Fascist models. These three factors have gradually affected the new structure 
of the state and party and, the 1931 Congress, in search of a 'doctrine' that would 
carry the state-party unification, moves to develop an ideology. This approach has
I'he locus classicus of the beginning of the history is Ahmet llamdi 
Ha-var, Atatürk'le Üç A y  (Istanbul: fan Matbaası, 1945); İlhan rekeli-Selim 
İlkin, /929  Dünya ¡hthraiunda Türkiye'nin İktisadi Tolitika Araytşlan  
(Ankara: Orta Doğu Teknik Üniversitesi, 1977), 197-206.
36weiker, Tutelage.
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immediately been accepted and developed by a group of intellectuals united around the 
journal Kadro^^, liying to figure out a doctrine for the slatc.^^
In the l<)3l Congress, for the first time, RPP has prepared a Party Program^^^ 
other than the party statutes. In this program the basic tenets such as republicanism, 
nationalism, populism and secularism have been enlarged by adding sialism and 
rcibi niism or revolutionism'^ and, it is a usually accepted view'll that these F’l incipics 
have been symbolised as 'Six Arrows' by personal endeavour of Rcccp Peker, the 
Secretary General of the party and a fervent supporter of sialism, attached to the 
radical wing of RPP.^^ 1931 Congress should be considered as a congress of 
transition and transformation. The transition is toward a party-stale model and the 
transformation is toward the doctrinisation of the basic founding principles, through 
the establishment of new cultural institutions. As this process has been tlcvclo[xxl 
gradually and reached its crux by the 1935 Congress, in the 1931 Program, there is no 
detailed explanation of the tenets as in the case of 1935 Program. Nevertheless, two 
points should be emphasised regarding the Congress and Program proces.ses.
37cem Alpar, Kadro-Ayhk E kir Mecmuası, vol. I (1932)/ ripkibasitn 
(Ankara: AİTİA Yayınları, 1978) and for the background history of the 
movement; Şevket Süreyj^a Aydemir, Inkilap ve Kadro (Ankara: Başnur 
Matbaası, 1908).
'^^l'or a discussion of Kadro movement sec, Karpal, l'urkcy's, 70-73.
•^ *^ (311·, Program, (İstanbul: Devlet Matbaası, 1931).
•'hlfîiritlioğlu, Türk, 90; Kili, CUP'de, 59; Bila, CHP, 85-86.
Başar, A tatürk’le, 47-48, Ilhan Tekeli-Selim İlkin, 1929, 204.
'^ '^ l or an explanation and justification of the Program as well as to follow 
the views and ideas of Recep Peker see, Recep Peker: CHI· Programının 
iy.abi: lirkit Katihiumumisi B.R.Peker Tarafından 10 Teşrinievvel 1931 
tarihinde İstanbul Darülfünunu konferans salonunda konferans olarak 
teşrih edilmiştir. (Ankara: Ulus Matbaası, 1931).
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'I'hc lirsl one is the impicmcniation of slalism^^ which in lime would turn out 
to be a more political and social issue than an economic one with the rejection of 
liberalisin'^^· second, the nature of the slate is started to be consolidated by registering 
in the Program that Turkish people is a classless one.“^ ^ The society, the program 
supposes, is a conglomerate, established by the unificalion ofdii l'cienlialcil groups on 
the basis ol division of labour for the good of the individual and social lifc."^^ The 
solidarist but, mainly, corporatist 'spirit' of the state is much argued to be leading the 
way to the fascistic approach that further developed in the post-1931 p e r io d .T h e  
solidaristic and corporatist mentality of the regime, developed after 1931 and reached 
its peak in the post-1935 era, has been concern of many writers, mostly Ataliirk's 
close friends. Falih Rilki Alay, a friend of Atatllrk, journalist and parliamcniarian is an 
example. In one of his famous books he says: "For the education of the Turkish 
masses, the mass education methods of Moscow and, for the statist Turkish economy 
the corporation methods of Fascism should be a c c e p te d .T h is  period is a gateway 
to the ideological formation of the RPP and the formation of the Republican 
epistemology which needs a detailed analyses.
'bllsmct İnönü, "lirkamizin Devletçilik Vasfı." Kadro Dergisi, vol.22 (1933), 
4-6.
"^4"ismet İnönü'nün Nutku", Cumhuriyet, (August 31, 1930).
'^>Clli·, Program 1931, 13.
4f>Ibid., 13.
47ı>arla, Türkiye'de, 140-145 and Taha Parla, Ziya Gökalp, Kemalizm ve 
Korporaii/.m (İstanbul: iletişim Yayınlan, 1989).
'^^lalih Rıfkı Atay, Moskova-Roma (Ankara: Hakimiyeti Milliye Matbaası,
1931), 5. riıis point is also discussed in Tunçay, Tek-Parti, 313.
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3.5. The Culture of the Ideology, the Ideology of the Culture
3.5.1.The Turkish History Thesis, The Sun-Language 
Theory, The National Education and Beyond
'I'urkisli republic, as has been aforeinenlioned is developed on (he 
underslanding of an individual relying more on (he scienlii ic world view, rather lhan a 
metaphysical one, in contrast to the assumed Ottoman Empire model. Atatürk, 
defining Republic as 'virtue', has tacitly stressed this point but, it turns out to be a 
clear one when he addresses to the teachers by saying, "Republic asks you to raise 
students liberated in their thoughts, conscience, (spiritual) culture and knowledge 
(irfan)." On (he other hand, first, in (he early 1934, (he courses of Turkish Revolution 
is implemented in the universities^^ and, in the 1935 Program, states that, "holding 
the 3'urkish nation. Assembly atid state on a respected level will be doctrinated to the 
whole citi/.ens a.s a duty
This approach, first started by deciding to dissolve (he Türk Ocakları (Turkish 
Hearths)-'^* and the establishment of Halk Evleri (Peoples' Houscs)-^2_ x|,c dissolving 
of the Türk Ocakları, depending on a resolution registered in the Article 40 of the 1927 
Statutes of the RPP,^^ is taken as a sign by various scholars as the demolishing of a 
power focus which might be in opposition to the new regim e.^'I'hc gap created by
CUT, 89.
IV Programı (Ankara: Ulus Matbaası, 1935), 17. Italics added.
51f usun (Istel, İmparatorluktan Ulus Devlete Türk Milliyetçiliği:Türk 
Ocakları (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1997), 321-357.
^^Karpal, Turkey's, 380-381, Mete Tunçay, Tek-Parti, 295-299.
Cumhuriyet Halk Tırkası Nizamnamesi (1927), 29.
54üslel, İmparatorluktan, 321-357.
68
the demolishing of an ideology production centre is filled by the establishment of 
People's Houses, in 1931. Atatürk, many times before the establishment of the 
insliliilion, has demarcated the nece.ssily for the establishment of such institutions for 
the enlightenment of the people. On the other hand, the dissemination of the RPP 
ideology and, the idcologi/ation of the society in that context, is not only through 
People's Houses. In 1931, the same year a new institution. People's Orators {Halk 
Ifaiiph'ri) is implemented. In the People's Orators Regulations published^-^ the basic 
aim .set (or the orators is the inculcation of the people with the paity principles. 'I’hc 
framework of duties for the orators is explained in the very detailed way and, 
interestingly, they are ordered that, attacking the opposing ideas about the principles 
cither should be in a mellow but sometimes a more brutal w ay.^
This ideologically manipulated cultural development is conjugal with the 
Turkish History Thesis {Turk Tarih Tezi)and the Sun-Language {Güneş-Dil Teorisi) 
interventions. The long history of the development of the Turkish history thesis has 
been analysed by various scholars. The main point is the nationalist-racist approach 
behind the manipulation. The basic argument that all cultures flourished in Anatolia 
generated from the Turkic origins^^ has been one of the main basis on which the 19th 
century Turkish nationalism founded.^^ After 1925, this idea has gradually developed 
in collaboration with the expansion of nationalism. It is also related with the
Hatipleri Talimait (Istanbul: Devlet Matbaası, 1931).
Sf’lbid., 6.
-‘^ ^I'or a polemical discussion of this view see, Halil Berktay, "Osmanli 
Devletinin Yükselişine Kadar Türklerin İktisadi ve loplum sal 'farihi," in 
Kriz, Gelir Dağılımı ve Türkiye'nin A lternatif Sorunu , Türkiye Tarihi 
Düşmanlı Devletine Kadar Türkler, ed. Sina Akşin (İstanbul: Cem 
Yayınevi, n.d), 60-64.
■'»«Uriel Ileyd.
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demolishing and dissolving of the Turkish Hearths beeausc, it was this institution as 
llie main source for the development and disseminating of both tlie Turkish 
nationalism and pan-Turkist ideas.^^ As they are closed, it is decided to transfer (he 
historical researches to an independent association.^^ This is called The Association 
for the Turkish Historical Research, at the beginning and then transformed into 
I'lirkish History Foundation,*^^ In the July 1932, all Lycee and secondary school 
history course teachers are invited to Ankara Peoples' House, for a course designed to 
teach (hem the new Turkish 1 lislory Thesis*^ .^ This meeting is la(cr entitled as the First 
Turkish History Congress. Before the congress, the three volumes text books 
prepared for lycees have been send to various different scholars and arc asked to 
di.sciiss it.*’^
riiis might be seen as the climax of a new policy depending on the 
indoctrination of the youth. This approach is undersUindable, because in the 1931 
Program ol the party, the target oi teaching all citizens the 'Furkish histoiy is carefully 
put: "Our party takes seriously that all citiz.ens should know the deep history of the 
Turk."*^'^ Here, the reason put forward for this process is more crucial: "this 
knowledge is a sacred essence that reinforces (...) his unbeatable resisUmce against the
•‘^ '^llcyd, 1.50.
*^’*^'l'uncay, I'ck-Piirli, 300. 
’^•ibid., 301.
’^ l^ o r a discuvssion of Turkish History fhesis and other related issues, like 
the new textbooks prepeared for the secondary education see, Hugh 
Poulton, Top //at, Grey Wolf and Crescent: Turkish Nationalism and the 
I'urkish Rcpuhlic {[.ondon: Hurst Company, 1997), 101-107.
’^^ 'Funcay, Tek-Parti, 302.
*^>‘*C111', I’roffram (1931), 28.
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movcmciiLs to claitiage the national e x i s t e n c e . j j ,  concern of
jiiiodici .ii licli' in (he I’roi’iani, liowcvci , in (his one not only (Ik· knowlecij’.e o( liistoiy 
and its connection witli the national existence is stressed, but also the rlulies and the 
'character' of the citizens are defined through the national education: "to bring up 
strong republican, nationalist and laic citizens is the most precise duty of all levels of 
education. "66 in the second part of this article the transition from a state-party to a 
pat ty state and, the im|Toi tancc attributed to state is obvions, which brings out the state 
anthoiity and, as ¡i concept above the society and the citizen:" the peculiarity of 
respecting and making others respect the Turkish Nation, Turkish Grand National 
Assembly and the State of Turkey67 js considered to be a duty."68 in another article, 
there is a binomial but, one tacit the other outspoken and expre.ssive reference to the 
nature ol' the new education: "education, being away from all superstition and all 
foreign ideas, should be high levelled, national and patriotic."69 Here, to develop an 
education, devoted to the externalisation of superstitions is a reference to the
651 bid., 28.
66c7//-/Vograni (1931), 26.
67it is interesting that in the original text not the usual saying 'Turkish 
State' but the 'State of Turkey' is used. I'his might be taken as an indicator 
of the confusion and merging of different concepts such as nation, people, 
republic, stale which will be discussed later in the part devoted to the 
analycsis of nationalism, populism and statism. Nevertheless, this is my 
translation but in the 193,5 Program's official translation it is again 
rendered as ' Purkish Slate,'
6^CIir, Program, 27 .. AKso of importance here is that, the 'discourse' of the 
article, by using the concept of 'peculiarity' (hassa), takes for granted the 
respect directed to the state. The point emphasised here, is the direction 
reminded: "It should be seen as a 'duly.'"
69c///'/'rogram  (1931), 27.
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posilivislic npproach of the Rcpublic7^^ Nevertheless, the main ambition is again the 
construction of the new citizen-student and its character.
3.5.2. Peoples' Houses
'I’hcsc institutions, as has been aforementioned, arc established to replace the 
Turkish Hearths, the basic source of nationalist and pan Tui kist movements and ideas 
for the first time in Febr uary 19, 1932. The first time the will of establishing a new 
institution to replace the former is expressed by Atatürk.^* As Tunçay has already 
shown, referring to the same news-articles, the inspiration for the Peoples' Mouses 
(PH) is from the Fascist party: "The establishing of new youth organisations, 
resembling the l-ascist organisation and, founding branches in all par ts of the country 
is a part of the new p r in c ip le s .T h e  basic motivation behind the Peoples’ Hou.ses is 
the dissemination of the ideas of RPP, as well as the indoctrination of the youth. 
According to Karpat, they "assumed the role of agents for the Republican Party."73 
This point might further be seen in the Satutes of PH.
In the introduction of the Statutes, after rcllccting on the Party Program and, 
restressing the importance of the articlcs74 embodying the 'national cullrttc', first, the
^‘^ This positivistic approach is also clear in the construction of the Statirtes 
of I’eopics' Mouses, dated 1932 which will be analysed in depth below, when 
it puts the function of the 'Peoples' Courses' as "delivering courses on 
foreign language and natural sciences." CUP, Halkevleri Talimatnamesi 
(Ankara: Hakimiyeti Milliye Matbaası, 1932). The point is further discussed 
by Walter P. Welker referring to İsmet İnönü and his approach to Peoples' 
Mouses. Walter P. Weiker, Tutelage, 172.
"Cay.i'nin Iteyanati", Cumhuriyet, 2 Kanunisani (1931).
l'unçay, 7’ek-Pari/, 296.
^■■^ Karpat, i'urkey's, 380.
74Phis is a reference to the Article 40 of the Party Program (1931), which 
was m entioned before.
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aim ol the Parly is staled as: "to bring up strong citizens, sharing the same principles, 
for the sovereignty of the basic and main principles."^^ Moving to the aim and the 
luiKlion ol (he I’ll, the vStaUilcs declares: "Ihc target of PI I is (o be liouscs for 
gathering and uniting the idealist citizens who would work for such an aim."^^’ 
According to Weiker, with reference to the article, which appeared in New York 
Times, the existence of PH was a step taken forward, in the Fascist tendencies of 
Atatürk and İ n ö n ü . This point is also discussed by Feroz Ahmad. Ahmad, referring 
especially to the Kadro group and their harsh polemics with Italians, in the journal 
pages, insists that, even though the parly and the administrative cadres were affected 
Irom two totalitarian regimes. Fascism and Socialism, but emphasised the first one, 
rather than the other.^^
The rca,son why Weiker starts with such a point is that, the importance stressed 
by both leaders, Atatürk and İnönü, for the creation of a society, through the 
unification of people, disregarding their cultural, social, economic differences.^*"  ^ The
■^‘’Clll·, llulkcvlcri 'liilimalmwicsi, 3.
^^ ’Ibid., 3.
^^Weiker, Tutelage, 172.
^^heroz Ahmad, The Making o f Modern Turkey (London and New York: 
Rouilcdgc, 1993), 65-68.
I'hc discussion of similarities and the differences between Rl’P and 
l ascism should bear a more vigorous attempt. 'Ihough there will be a trial 
in the following .sections when nationalism and populism is analy.sed here 
it should be noted that the only known conscious attem pt among the ranks 
of RI’R to construct a similar .structure belongs to Recep I’eker who was 
dismi.ssed by Atatürk in 1936. Zürcher, without compromising about the 
totalitarian structure of the monopolized .state by the Rl’l’, still insists that 
the differences are much greater than similarities. Lrik J. Zürcher,
'Turkey: A Modern History (London: LlL'Iauris, 1993), 194. Neverthlc.ss an 
im portant document is G. Carelto, "1930'larda Kemalizm-Laşizm-Ktmıünizm 
Üzerine Polemikler", Tarih ve 'Toplum, n. 17+18 (May-June 1985). I anı 
grateful to Mele Tunçay for drawing my attention to the article.
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second point raised by Weiker, as well as Karpat, is the parly-PH co n n ec tio n .T h e  
'organic' connection of the party and PH is obvious in the PH Statutes, for it clearly 
shows (he iiscal sources of the establishment as the money supplied by the party 
adminislration in the towns and, also clarifies that the PH buildings arc supplied and 
furnislicd by llic RPP administrations.^^ The third point, dclibciatcd by Weiker, is the 
success of this institution on the basis of indoctrination. Though Weiker accepts the 
historical condition that "Turkey is not among the emerging states in undertaking cither 
mass political or mass cultural indoctrination," he secs Turkey "unique in trying 
doggedly to maintain a separation between the two."^^ In other words, PH 
functioned as a party instrument for the indoctrination of the large masses. Here, 
lastly, one capturing issue should be brought into discussion. It was not only the 
newly established opposition complaining about the RPP-PH connection, an issue 
usually Iricd to be overruled and rejected by the RPP adminislration, it was afso the 
party members protesting the symbiosis. In the 1947 RPP Congress, there were 
numerous proposals asking for more autonomy for the PH.^^ In the end, depending 
on these discussions, PH was dissolved on November 26, 1951 and they became the 
property of the I ’rcasury.^
^(^Weiker, Tutehige 178-183; Kemal Karpat, "The People's-Houses in Turkey, 
lislablishment and Growth." Middle Bust Journal, vol.XVIl, n. 1 and 2, 
(Winter-vSpring, 1963).
^Icill', Halkevleri Talimatnamesi, 4.
^^Weiker, Tutelage, 182-183.
^hbid ., 181. Por an implicit approach accepting the criticisms see, 
XV.Yildoniimiinde Halkeveleri ve Halkodaları (Ankara: Hakimiyeti Milliye 
Matbaası, 1947).
^"^Karpat, Turkey's, 381.
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As a conclusion two points should be restated. The first one is that, two 
totalitarian approaches of the era. Socialism and Fascism, seems to have played a role 
in the establishment of these institutions.^^ As various sources show, at the 
beginning. Fascism was alTcctivc on the decision to establish the PH. However, 
when, in 1951, the new government of Democrat Party wanted to break the organic 
links between RPP and PH, they refened to Narodm Dorn (Peoples Houses) of Soviet 
Union^^ which pushes the matter to further analysis. The second point is the aim put 
bcloic the PI I and, in this contc.xt, even though lor many times the party 
administration has declared that not the daily pc l^itics but the cultural affairs should be 
the concern of the establishment^^, the intriguing issue is the implicit togetherness of 
culture and ideology. Karpat distinguishes this point by describing the situation as 
"cultural modernisation within the framework of nationalism and p o p u l i s m . I n  this 
sense, Iİ1C insistence of the paity administration is understandable but, it is dilTicult to 
find it sufficient, for the ideological interest of the party is structurally cultural. The 
Turkish History Thesis, the Sun-Language Theory^^ and the PH are all 'cultural'
l'unçay shows that just before the prepration of the 1931 Program of 
RPP, the programs of various different parties of different contries had 
been translated into Turkish and printed. They are kept in GNA Library. 
Mete lunçay, 'I'ck-Pnrti, 'M2.
^^ ’Karpat, Turkey's, 381.
1'o reach this distinction later the llalk Odahm (People's Rooms) are 
established.
Karpat, " Phe Republican," in T o litka l, eds., M.lleper and J.M.Landau, 
52.
^‘^ Ibr a recent discussion of the Sun-l.anguage Theory see, Hugh Poulton, 
Top Hut, Grey Wolf and Crescent (Ijondon: Hurst & Co,1997), 109-113; Jacob 
M .landau, ' I'he Pirst I'urkisli Language Congress," in The Earliest Stage o f  
Language Flanning:The 'First Congress' Phenomenon, eds., Joshua 
A.l'ishman (Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter, 1993); Geoffery L.l.ewis, "Atatiirk's 
language Reform as an Aspect of Modernisation in the Republic of 
I'urkey" in Atatürk and the Modernisation o f Turkey, ed. Jacob M .landau 
(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1984) ; Uriel Ileyd, language Reform in
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steps taken but the function, they are expected to perform, is to support, even to 
establish the ground for the ideology, namely nationalism^^. Again in this context the 
construction of the notion of citizenship, the fortification of the nation state and 
laicism, the reinforcement of the state authority is the ideological concerns of the era 
which has reached its peak by the fourth Congress of RPP held in 1935.
3.6. The Authoritarian State Through Party-State 
Ijiiiricatlon
If Recep Peker's definition for Turkish Republic is accepted, "it is a party- 
state and the party works together with the state''^^, then it is possible to say that this 
structure is erected by the fourth congress of RPP, in May 9, 1935.^2 Atatürk in his 
opening speech reevaluates the 1931-35 era and his focus is more on statism.^^ 
Statism finds its economic and ideological openings in his speech and, the cultural 
dimension is also stressed together with the developments in history, language, music. 
But more emphasis is put on the overwhelming character of the days the congrc.ss 
held. According to Atatürk, implicitly referring to the "effort spent in the construction 
of a manipulated economic sy.stem", again a reminder t)f statism, the congress is 
realised "in the period of development."^“^ Atatürk, also prompting the previous
Modern '/urfcey (Jerusalem; Israel Oriental Society, 1954); Frank I'achau, 
"language and Politics: Turkish Language Reform", Review o f  Politics, 
XXVI, n. 2 (April, 1964), 191-205.
‘^ ^Watiirk himself considers the establishment of PIl as ah revolution on 
the cultural and social basis. ASDII, 380.
‘^ Uîiritlioglu, '¡'ürk, 102.
‘^ ^For a survey of the 1935 Congress see, Bila, CIIP., 91-94; Giritlioglu, 7'iirk, 
100-112; Kili, CUP’de, 61-64, Funaya, Siyasi Partiler, 570-573.
II, 379-383.
9^1bid., 380.
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congresses, interestingly, defines one by one the characteristics of the periods in 
which the party conventions are held and, in this sense, he defines the 1931 Congress 
as corresponding to the "days of the establishment ol security and order”^ ^. He 
concludes that the post-1935 is the search period to find the ways of realising this 
framework and, in this regard, the Party Program prepared and issued in the Congress 
is of extreme importance.
The post-1935 period for many reasons is the most crucial one in the 
development ol modern political system in Turkey. The establishment and the 
fortification of the economic slatism, in this period, akso encompasses and 
incorporates the social and political realms and constructs an economic-stx;ial matrix. 
As the Western originated word 'party' is inserted into the party's name and it is 
transformed from 'Cumhuriyet Halk Fırkası' to 'Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi', this 
framework is concretised as Kemalisin in the fourth eongress by saying; "all of these 
Principles, which are the fundamentals of the Party, constitute Kamalism.''^^ and the 
primordial of the new state model is inherited in the Six Arrows^^, for the first time 
explained both in the Party Program and Satutes. In conjuction with (he interpretations 
brought to the Six Arrows, the articles establishing the sUite-party togetherness is
‘>-‘>lbi(J. 381.
Republican Party of the People, Program: Accepted in the Poiirth 
Grand Congress o f the Party (Ankara: n.p., May, 1935), 3. It is interesting 
that the 1935 Program has been translated into various foreign languages 
just after the convention but none of the western writers seems to be 
aware of it. I’or example, Peroz Ahmad in his book for a translation of the 
programme refers to Donald Weber, The Turkey o f Atatürk: Social Process 
in the Turkish Reformation (Philadelphia, 1939), 308-309. Feroz Ahmad, 
I'he Making o f Modern Turkey (Fondon and New York: Routledge, 1993), 
Z31.
‘^ ^1Ъг the official implementation of the principles concerning Six Arrows 
see, CUP Bayrak Talimatı (Ankara: n.p., 1933).
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saittered all around the Statutes and this finds its roots in the early state understanding 
of Rcccp Peker, the powerful secretary general of (he era. Peker, as early as 1932, 
underlines his com prehension of state by .saying "the simple state understanding has 
been an ancient matter for a long time."^^ In the same line with this argument, just 
before the opening of the fourth congress. May 9, 1935, Peker, in a speech he 
delivered in a radio transmission, on May 8, 1935, immediately rejects the idea of 
'lilK'ial state' by saying that "it is passing away all a r o u n d . N e x t  and more severely 
he attacks (he notion of 'classical dcmcx:iacy' by saying:
"We prefer a disciplined unity relying on love and belief which 
causes the development of the citizens' minds instead of the classical 
democracy, the enemy of order and unity, introduced by the liberal 
state model, spoiling the condition and the progress of the state, 
availing the growth of a ll bad seeds setting citizens at 
loggerheads.”
Peker, beginning with such an attempt, replaces the liberal state with 'national 
state'l^^ which he does not explain further. But, Peker, with the notion of national 
state, defeats the idea of class state shifts his discussion to democracy. In a
much quoted and argued passage^^^ Peker, first, gives a brief definition of
I’eker, CllV Programının tzabi, 9.
‘^ ^CIIP Genel Sekreteri R. Feker'in Söylevleri: 1-Parti Dördüncü Büyük 
Kurultayının açılmasından önce, sunulacak işleri aydınlatm ak üzere 8 
Mayıs 1935 gecesi Ankara Radyosunda (Ankara: n.p., 1935).
5-5 . Italics added.
l^^kdlP Genel Sekreteri R.Pekerin Söylevleri:Yeni Parti program ının 
konuşulm asına başlanırken prensiplerin ana çizgileri aydınlatm ak üzere 
13 mayıs 1935 Kurultay toplantısında (Ankara: n.p., 1935), 14.
lO^Ibid.
Id3pc|.;cr publicised his ideas through the party newspapers and journals. 
Ülkü was the official journal published by People's Houses as
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democracy as "by the people, for the people" 104. Then, Peker, insists that the 
'application' ol democracy shows varieties in among different nations and countries. 
Lastly, makes a remark, saying that democracy is not a dogma, not a Koranic word 
(nve/)105 and, again, underlines the specificity of the conditions that will 'apply' 
democracy. l Yom (his he moves to his 'famous' .sentences 10<> aiul, says "we never 
say we should do the same as it is the way applied in any place or by any nation. We 
only apply (hose tha( are suhable for (he country and (he nation."
The 'coup dc grace' in Peker's speech about the democracy crystallised at two 
points. The first one, according to him, is '(he unification of powers.' 'I hrough this 
we can reach (he definition of demcxracy. It is a non differentiated power whose 
source is the people. This is the democracy which can be formulated as 'for the people 
and by the people.' Seamdly, according to Peker, instead of a one-tier election system 
a two-tieied election mcxlel is more dem(x;ratic, for it gives the people (he possibility 
of voting for already selected and nominated candidates. 1^^ Apart from these, the 
'dcmi.se' of the liberal state, especially in Turkey, had already been cxprcs.scd by
aforementioned and, Karpat indicates that, by the year 1933 Ülkü had 
20.000 readers. Karpat, Turkey's, 72.
104i>eker,/rtk//ap, 21.
l().5wiih a drastic mi.stake, Walter R Weiker attributes these words to Şükrü 
Kaya, once .Secretary General of the KI’P and the predecessor of Kecep 
Peker; see, Walter F.Weiker, Tutelage 255 . The same mistake is repeated 
when he refers to his original text in "The Free Party, 1930" in Political 
eds., M.l leper and J.M.Iandau, 95 and 98.
I(){>P(^ c(^ p |>o|<er has al.so prepared, in his late years, a book to be used as a 
text book in the universities for the instruction of the history of I'urkish 
Revolution^ which started in 1934. Recep Peker, Inkilap Dersleri 
(Istanbul: lleti.^im Yayınları, 1989).
107ibid., 23.
K)8lbid.,23.
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Pcker by saying "vvc embody the limits of rights within the authority of the slate''*^^ ,^ 
as early as 1931. This way of framing dem(x;racy and, as Peker continuously stresses, 
(he iinplenu'iUalion of (ho idea of nationalism that "sliielly locks 'I’lnkcy's doors 
against the outer world, to protect Turkish people"* reaches a terminal, by 
referring to the prineiples of RPP and resituating them as the basic tenets of the state: 
"the basic characteristic of the program that captures attention is RPP getting more 
closer to (he state which has already worked together with the stale."* * *
This model is put into application first by various articles registered in the 
Statutes of RPP issued in the Convention.  ^ According to Article 64, the Party could 
invite the civil administrators to local congresses and, if necessary, these 
administrators could deliver some explanations. * *  ^ Article 95 and 96 arc very 
important, for they assert two basic issues, uniting the party and the state. 
Accordingly, the first one declares: "party, conceives itself and the government, which 
descents from its hearth and, as a .single unity complementing each other," whereas the 
latter affirms that the relation between the party and the government will be, at the 
centre, through Secretary General and, in the provinces, through the governors and 
the kx:al chairmen. ^  This preliminary attempt is solidified approximately in two 
years through a set of steps put forward.
*ri9c//p Gene/ Sekreteri R.Peker'in Söylevleri, (193.5), 3.
' b>lbid., 10.
* * * Ibid., 9.
* *^Q)ngrc.ss also decided to change the word 'congress' into 'convention.'
* * 'V.irillloglu, Türk, 109.
**^*lbid.,109.
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First, Recep Peker is dismissed from Secretary General post on June 15, 
1936. The reason behind this development is, according to Giritlioğlu, the party-state 
unification, for the Minister of Interior is appointed also as the Secretary General. 
Besides, the governors in the provinces are appointed as the local chairmen of the 
party*  15 7 hjj5 transformation is declared by Acting Chairman İsmet İnönü, with a 
decree dated June 18, 1936. * Second, with the Constitutional amendment. Law 
number 3115, dale February 13, 1937İ*^, the Six Arrows of the RPP has become the 
constitutional Principles* *^and Weiker puls this as : "in one stroke the program of the 
RPP became the official ideology of the entire nation." * *  ^The consequences of this 
development is the establishment of a new condition which is defined by I leper's 
words as the 'bureaucratic tran.sccndcnlalism.'*^** This is first criticised by Yakup 
Kadri Karaosmanoğlu, a long time friend of Atatürk, when he says that "after leaving 
the party oiganisalion to the governors it lost all its links with the |x;ople and reached a 
bureaucratic character."*^* It should be remembered that this is only the officialisalion
* I·''· I'll is point is missing in Rila's book. Bila, loc cit, 94-96.
* *^ ’l'or the complete text see, Giritlioğlu, I'iirk., 114 and Bila, Cl IF, 94 95.
* *^G(')/iibüyük, Açıklamalı, 55, 56.
l***For a critical discussion of this development by Fahir Giritlioğlu, a 
former member of RPP group, in the GNA, see, Giritlioğlu, Türk, 1 16-118. 
(îiritlioğlu, lakes this development as a principle which restricts the 
differentiation of the political life in Turkey and the same rem ark is made 
by Karpat, Turkey’s, 245-249. Also, see, Tanör,Osmanlı-Türk, 316.
l l^^Weiker; op. cit, 236.
*^ **l leper. The Stale, 67-97.
*^*Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu, Folitikacia 45 У;/(Ankara: Bilgi Yavmevi, 
1969), 62.
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<)Г Komalism. ik'Ciuisc, Jimonp (lie in(cllccUials'22 Kadro movcmcnl (here was 
already a search and an eKort lor (he cons(ruclion ol Kenialisin as an ideology.
ЛКег 1935, (he in(elleclual search for the development of Kemalism continues, 
and the later approachesl23 also encompass the 'new' historical, linguistic and other 
cultural developments 124 as well as relying on a strong and sometimes racitilly based 
nationalism 125 ]a i(ic late years, also appeared some publications trying to combine 
Kemalisin with a more statist-left understanding.^26 With these developments, 
Giritlioglu insists that the relative autonomy of the part is totally eradicated•27 and, 
7’unaya points out that RPP has become a single, authoritarian and totalitarian 
party. *28 'piijfi ютагк is consolidated by (wo different approaches. The first one is 
IİMİ (he ei\ d seivants could get legistered aiul he a parly member, as in the ea.se o( 
governors 129 'fhc second, Atatürk, in November 1938, in his opening speech read
'22'1'iie most prominent one was Sadri lirtcm, Türk Inkihıhmın 
Karakterleri (Istanbul: Devlet Matbaası, 1933).
relatively lale example is M.Saffet lirgin, Kcnuılisnı Inkılahınm  
Prensipleri (Ankara: Hakimiyeti Milliye Matbaası, 1940).
124şeref Aykut, Kamalizm (İstanbul: Muallim Ahmet llalit Kitap livi, 1936).
• 25'1'he most striking example is Tekin Alp, Kemalizm  (İstanbul: n.p., 1936)
•26|'hjs approach is eminent in the 1960s among the left intellectuals 
around the journals as Yön and Ant and this very specific search will be 
discussed later. Here suffice to give one interesting example as Emin Türk 
liliçin, who has personally experienced the Kadro movement and the 
1930s. Emin lurk Ellçin, Kemalist Devrim İdeolojisi (İstanbul: Ant 
Yayınlan, 1970).
•27(;iritlioğlu, Türk, 224.
•2H'| una3/a, Siyasi Partiler, 572.
•^7|ıı ıJıijj context Hilmi Uran's memoirs rellccting Atatürk's approach is 
im portant. Atatürk, when he is shown the Law on Civil Servants, banning 
them to be involved in the politics, interprets the related article in such a
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by Celal Bayar in the GNA stressed that by the party-state merging, it is proved that 
none of them eonsider any differences among the people. ^ 30 might also be 
deduced remembering the great effort spend all around and using every oppK)rtunity to 
indiKtrinate people with the basic ideas.
3.7. Towards Democracy
3.7.1. The Early Attempt for a New Ideology
The post-1935 RPP has two important and categorical phases which needs 
further assessment in order to understand the development of social democracy in 
Turkey. The first one is the 1935-1950 period and the second one is demarcated by the 
years 1950 and 1960. Each period has in itself multi-faceted openings. For example 
the first period can also be divided into sub-categories. With this approach, the first 
sub-period might be the 1936-38 years, beginning with contradiction among the party 
cadres and ranks, between the more radical wing of Recep Peker and liberals 
sometimes addressed as İş Bankası group ox Aferists whose leader is Celal Bayar. In 
1936, Atatürk, dismissing Recep Peker from his post, shows his tendency toward the 
liberal attitude and, this move is also supported by İnönü, even though they both arc 
known for their severe statist approaches. It could be said that although the radical 
wing is excluded from the administration, there is hardly found any radical change 
toward liberalism in the period between 1936 and 1938. In the year 1938, Atatürk died
way that it "bans the officers to be engaged in the political life involved in 
any party but Rl’P." Ililmi Uran, Ihitirahinm  (Ankara: n.p., 1959).
130/V5'D//, 405.
' A practical application of this understanding might be followed in two 
documents: i 935 Cumhuriyetin ¡lam Yil Dönümünde Kurulacak Halk 
Kürsüleri Öğreneği (İstanbul: Devlet Basımevi, 1935) and 1935 Cumhuriyet 
Yıl Dönümü Kutlama Öğreneği (İstanbul: Devlet Basımevi, 1935).
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and İnönü was elected as the second president of the republic. In the extraordinary 
congrcss^^^ iieij İnönü is also elected as the chairman of RPPl^^ İnönü period in 
Turkey might also be divided into two parts. The first one is 1938-1946 period, 
usually known as the 'National-Leader Period'i34^ whereas the second period covers 
the 1946 and 1950 years and, ends with the general elections held the very same year 
putting RPP into opposition and carrying the newly found Democrat Party ^ 35 jpio 
power. The last pha.se is, no doubt, the 1950-1960 period, ending up with a military 
coup, 'flic development of the 1960s, which brings a radical transformation in the 
RPP policies, needs the negligence of the many historical events and, to take only the 
political ones into consideration. These issues structure and restructure the RPP, and, 
finally, in the 1960s the party starts transforming itself to 'left of centre' policies. The 
process could only be deduced by going back to some of the critical turning points, 
registered in the party programs which arc issued by the party congresses.
riic early attempt to detach party from the state and government is .seen in the 
1939 Congre.ss. amendments made in the Statutes mark a few important
transition toward liberalisation, which might akso be taken as the continuation of the 
liberalisation process. Accordingly, a) party chairmen of the provinces and towns 
would be cut off from the governors; b) an 'Independent Group' of 21 members of •
^32 CUP, 112-119; I’unaya, Siyasi Partiler, 572-573.
• 33(;emil Koçak, Türkiye’de Milli Şef Dönemi (1938-1945) (Ankara: Yurt 
Yayınlan, 1986), 63-68.
134 Koçak, Milli.
13.5|.’or a comprehensive 'history' of DP see. All Yaşar Saribay, "1'he 
Democratic Party, (1946-60)," in Political cds., M. Ileperand J.M.Landau, 
119-133.
136Koçak, Milli, 227-234.
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parlianicnlary group would be founded; c) civil officers would not be involved in the 
political life; d) the active party chairman did not need to lx: the prime minister and, 
instead, to perpetuate the party-government merger, secretary general would be a 
member of the cabinet; e) the dextrine of Kemalisin needs to be explained. 'I’unaya, 
reflecting on the last point, but in a manner encompassing the others, argues that there 
Is an atmosphere of confusion and transition. 1^8 jh js  evolution is also evident in the 
Second Extraordinary Congress of 1946, when both the Party Program and Statutes is 
changed and rewritten. But between the 1 9 4 3 and 1947 congresses, there are a 
set of political events that forced RPP to reconsider and reassess its centralist structure 
and character. The first one of these is the opposition movement started in the party 
that would end up with the founding of Democrat Party in January 7, 1946.
Before passing on to the analysis of the events characterising the post 1946, 
through RPP, it seems necessary to discuss one point which might be also speculative 
to a certain extent. The opposition movement, which gave birth to the DP, might in 
fact be considered as the liberalisation process fermented in the RPP and, it can be 
connected to the clash of two wings aforementioned. Here, İnönU's position is 
challenging, for even though he belongs to the statist and radical side of the party, 
still, aflcr 19.38, during his presidency, he has shown a tender inclination towards the 
restructuring of Turkish politics. This tendency of İnönü is not clear and sharp 
enough, but one of his first spectacular political movements to rehabilitate the former *
5nci Büyük Kurultay Zabıtları {Isianbul: Devlet Matbaası, 1939).
* '^  ^Гипауа, Siyasi Partiler, 574.
13‘)(x,m|,u,-iye( Halk Partisi: Program ve Tüzüğü (Ankara: n.p., 1947). 
•‘^ f^Koçak, Milli, 337-344.
14Е['Ье period is analysed in Kemal II. Karpat, Turkey’s.
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structure is his approach to the well known figures of the Independence War with 
whom once he himself had gone into severe clashes and had them expelled from the 
party. İnönü has called them back to the party ranks and this move has different 
connotations. '^2 Nevertheless, going back to the origins of the oppositiem movement 
and, viewing his approach to it, gives sufficient clues to come up with such a 
conclusion and, in this sense, the starting point of the opposition shows that in RPP, 
the centralist hegemony was reaching an end.
The main cause of the opposition was the I^nd Reform Bill submitted to the 
Parliament on January 5, 1945 and issued after strong opposition on June 11,
1945.14.3 j |,js  event not only starts an organised opposition against RPP within the 
RPP but, also points out a metamorphosis in structural character of the 'I’urkish 
politics. To say it with Çağlar Kcydcr, the aim of Ixind Reform I^aw was not initiating 
a social revolution but observing the growing power of bourgeoisie in the country. 
This was more an attempt of the bureaucracy for a unity with the poor peasantry. ^ 44 
J’here are afso attempts to explain this very event by the centre-periphery 
confrontation. Going back to Shil's notion of ideology, the RPP is considered to be 
placed in the centre depending on centralism, bureaucracy and the state elites whereas 
the periphery, namely first the opposition in RPP then the DP, enforcing the
I42gjli,^ speculating on ihi.s development demarcates two points, as either 
İnönü wanted to show that the contradiction was not between him and the 
others but between Atatürk and the e\-Paşas; second, he could have 
wanted to supress the opposition by carrying them into the active political 
life. Hila, CIW, 117.
^43|’or a more Marxist attuned but a strong analysis of the law see, Taner 
fimur, I'iirk Devrimi ve Sonrası (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, 1993), 194-212.
^44çağlar Keyder, State and Class in Turkey: Л Study in Capitalist 
Development {london: Verso, 1987), 104-105.
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cicvclopmcnl of a decentralised model founding itself on periphery and local political 
choices and behaviour.
This context and framework has always been crucial for students of Turkish 
politics. Only two examples might be sufficient. The first one is Samet Agaoglu's 
approach. A former minister of DP cabinets and the .son of prominent scholar, 
politician and intellectual Ahmet Agaoglu, a fervent supporter of decentralisation idea 
in the late Ottoman and early Republican political life, in his book, strictly insists on 
the condition that DP has been a grassrcx>ts movements against the central bureaucratic 
c a d r e s . A g a o g l u ,  to prove his ideas, tries to connect DP movement with all 
op|X)sition movements of the Republican peri(xl. This point has also been accentuated 
in Timur, when he refers once more to the Land Reform Law. He insisLs that very this 
law has isolated RPP, by cutting its tics with the l(.x:al notables increasing its strong 
bureaucratic tendencies^'^^. Igniting his ideas from very this point, Idris KU^iikbmer, 
a controversial scholar, is a keen defender of the point that DP and other related 
movements should be considered as the 'leftist' movements, for their connection with 
the pcriphciy and their resistance against the bureaucratic state. On the other hand. 
RPP, according to Ku9likomcr, could only be a centralist, right wing party. What •
*^‘>Şcrif Mardin, "Center-Periphery Relations: A Key to furkish Politics?" 
in Political Participation in Turkey: Historical Background and Present 
Problems , eds., li. Akarli and G.Ren-dor (Istanbul: Boğaziçi Üniversitesi 
Yayınlan, 1975), 7-32.
^^^\Samet Ağaoğlu, Demokrat Partinin Doğuş ve Yükseliş Sebepleri: Bir 
Soru {N.p.: Baha Matbaası, 1972).
• l imur. Sonrası, 211.
148jtiı-is Küçükömer, Düzenin Yabancılaşması,, 2nd.ed.^ (İstanbul: Alan 
Yayıncılık, 1989), 79.
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is more interesting is that Kii^Ukomer's attack on RPP is after RPP's new opening, 
which is known as the 'left of centre' movement.
In this explanation the concept of bourgeoise is playing a key role for neither 
the development of it nor the condition and the situation of it enables us to situate and 
observe it as an independent class in Turkey bringing out its political openings mostly 
on the basis of rights and liberties. Nevertheless, the Proposal ofihe Four^^^, June 7, 
1945 has made the ground for further liberal and democratic transformations in the 
RPP, as it asks for the enlargement of the limits, as well as the scope of the political 
and constitutional rights in T u r k e y . T h e  rejection of the proposal by the 
Parliamentary Group of the party did not bring an end to the unrest of the opposition 
but provoked it, as Celal Bayar prepared and submitted a proposal to the GNA, 
rc(iucsling the amendment of the Article 17 and 50 of the Press l^jw which rcstiicts the 
freedom of information.^^*
After the rejection of this request, joining the other three deputies, who were 
already expelled from the RPP, Bayar resigned first, from the Assembly and then 
from the RPP,*^^ declaring that he and his friends were about to found a new party. 
Following the foundation of the DP, RPP has held its, aforementioned extraordinary
*' ‘^^ Cclal Bayar (Izmir), Refik Koraltan(İçel), Fuat Köprülü (Kars), Adnan 
Menderes (Aydın).
l.SOpor ıhc complete text see, Bila, CHP, 542-544.
Karpat, l'urkey's, 146-147. Interestingly this point is not discussed in 
Cem liroğul's book devoted to the study of DP. Gem Erogul, Demokrat Parti: 
Tarihi VC İdeolojisi (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, 1990).
1^^’lc‘vfik Çavdar, Türkiye'nin Demokrasi Tarihi (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, 
1995), 402.
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congress of 1946 and decided lo amend its Statutes. This shows a remarkable shift 
from the previous history of the RPP, according to Karpat in four points:
a)lifting the ban on the formation of as.sociations and political parties 
based on elass interest; b)adoption of direct voting system;  
c)amendment of the party by laws to nominate and elect the party 
chairman; d)abolition of the Independent Group and the holding of 
new elections.
Mere, the most crucial point, no doubt, is accepting the class based party model 
and the direct voting system.
This process of liberalisation, as Karpat rightly observes, has given birth to 
several important consequences as the government monopoly on the prices of goods is 
reduced, the emergeney work obligation imposed on the villagers was abolished. 
Article 50 of the Press Law was amended, a partial press amnesty was issued, 
authority to close a newspaper was lifted from the administration and left to the courts. 
The Turkish Press Union whieh controlled the press was disbanded and the journalists 
were Ici t (rcc to join professional associations, universities were given autonomy in 
their administration and internal affairs and, lastly. The Law on Associations was 
amended and grounded on a relatively liberal basis. 5^ 4 'p|,c 1946 elections, in this 
context, has brought many contradictory consequences. First of all, Recep Peker, was 
appointed as the Prime Minister and, this brought again the radical, authoritarian 
approaches into practice. The first move of the government was the restrictions 
biought to the press and, the punishment of the ncwspa[XMS who have given a support
' Karpat, Turkey'.s, 154.
IS ^ id ., 157, 158, 159.
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to llic DR *^ -5 Among these events, DP held its first congress on January 7, 1947 and 
declared the Oath Pact which asks for the realisation of the Principles similar to 
'Proposal of the F o u r . ' T h e  government's ignorance of the demands raised in the 
Charter has been noted as one of the hurdles before the development of the democracy 
in 'furkey.
3.7.2. Opposition and the Transformation of RPP; an Interim 
Modernisation Period
The RPP, encircled with all these political events, holds its last congress before 
moving to op|Xisition in 1947, trying to adopt itself to the multy-party system' 57 
this does not prevent it to loose the 1950 elections.^ 58 year 1950 designates a 
turning point in the modern political history of Turkey. Though DP's attempts coming 
into office is defined by Karpat as a "great mistake" for "the principles of democracy 
had been only barely touched upon and checks and balances of government's powers 
had not been properly regulated" *59^  these lacking facts were not the fault of DP and, 
on the othci hand, with the amendments made in the Statutes and Program of the RPP, 
it is observed that democratic system is developed through time but, with the outcome 
<i( the similar problems that RPP has faced during its staying in the office.
• Alpay Kabacah, Türk Ihismmda Demokra.si (Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı 
Yayınları, 1994), 200-201.
l ‘’9|'or the whole details of the first congress see, Orhan Mete, Bütün 
Taisihü VC Akisleriyle Demokrnl Pnrli'nin 1 inci Büyük Koiifiresi 
(Istanbul: n.p, 1947).
Yedinci Kiirnhny Tutnnagi (Ankara: Ulus Matbaası, 1948). 
l ^^ l unaya, Siyusi Partiler, 575-576.
159KKarpat, Turkey's, 181.
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Nevertheless, for example, the Congress of 1951 shows a delicate shift 
lowaids du' d('(Tn(ralisali()ii of the inlra parly practiccs'^’^ l I hc new Slalul('.s acct'pls 
and appiovcs Ihc view that piovincial chairmen should he elccled in Ihc local 
congresses and, even though, it has no responsibility and authority, still, the 
establishment of a Parly Council is allowed, together with the principle, that Secretary 
Cencial should be elected directly by the Congress and Secretary Oencral's deputies 
.should be < kcktl by Ihc vScciclaiy Cicncial. Also, il was llu' ScHK'lary (¡(Micial's 
responsibility to organise Youth and Women's' Organisations. With the last condition, 
it is clear that RPP started to realise that there would be no more a uniform and 
homogeneous youth created by the indoctrination through the National Education. 
Besides, and what is more important, in the Declaration prcx^laimcd by the Congress, 
il is asked that juridical security should be fortified and a Supreme Court should be 
established.
The decentralisation of the RPP's structure was so definitive that in the 1953 
congress when the powerful liuuili wanted the Secretary General lo be elected by the 
Executive Committee, he could not achieve it ,for the Congress decided in the 
diamcirically opposite way, logciher with the Secretary General, Kasim Gtiick, who 
relied on the grassroots politics. Besides, in the 1953 Program, a totally new 
social and economic understanding starts to develop, for basically, instead of the
 ^ I Dokuzuncu Kurultay Beyannamesi ve Rapor (Ankara: Ulus 
basımevi, 1951).
Tüzük (Ankara: Ulus Basımevi, 1951).
Ibid., 17.
Î ’^-^ Bila, CUT, 207.
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c ()iuT|)l ol Konuilism, 'AlaUlik's Wj»y' is piclcucd and Ihc lirsi lime die 'r ule o( law' 
{.Hukuk devleti) concept is pronounced. This is enlarged to such an extent tliat even 
though the separation of powers is not proposed, a constitutional guarantee is 
demanded to create the checks and balances that would foster the political liberties, as 
well as (he consolidation of election security and the judge independency. Not need be 
less imporlani (han llicsc, in (he Article 38, the right lo strike (or the workers is 
ratified.
This new structure of RPP is reflected in the 1957 elections. The age average 
of the RPP candidates was 38 and this rejuvenation is also true for die Election 
SlalemenI, sayiii}’ (hal tiu' (aig.el is llu' implemenlalion ol a iiih' of law, loimded on Ihe 
human rights, the freedom of expression, press and meeting, proportional 
rcpre.sentation, broadcasting and university autonomy, foundation of the Supreme 
Court, laws to prohibit antidemocratic intra-party movements, the neutrality of the 
President, the strike and collective negotiation rights for the workeis, the right of 
establishing unions for the public officials, the enlargement of the stx^ ial security rights 
and involvement of the workers in the State Economic Enterprises. As a 
consequence of this movement, in the 1959 Congress, the party proclaims the 
"Statement of First Goals" (Ilk Hedefler Beyannamesi).Thh  Statement is not a 
ilillercnl one than the Election Statement of 1957 but, it is a more concrete one Ixith on 
the legislative and social grounds. Besides, İnönü, in this Congress has put the 
party's target as the achievement of 'workers' rights.'
/’/o/'ra/m  (Ankara: Ulus Matbaası, 1953). 
•^ ‘■‘’('liritlioğlu, lurk, 451-453.
If’f’lbid., 453-455.
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This shows a noteworthy change in the history of RPP. Through the 
metamorphosis it has gone under, beginning by the mid-1950s, RPP has moved to a 
new position and, in this displacement, there are two specific conditions. The first one 
is llic enforcing of the DP, .second, the change in the economic and social structure of 
I’lirkcy. I'his development might be taken as the initial step for the develo|)ment of a 
new political trend which finally ends up with the left-of-centre movement than 
transibrming itself to democratic left ideology. This might be conceptuali.sed as the 
seeotui moderni.sation movement. It is founded on a more economic basis and mainly 
•spaikcnl l>y (lie nibanisalion and iinmigialion. The.si' .social events while causing this 
new structuration, on the other hand, has brought the radical reconfiguration to the 
'furkish political realm. Beginning by the early 1960s a new .social mind started 
determining the political issues and, as Turkish politics is sharply separated largely 
into two segments, as left and right, some other i.ssues like the voting behaviour of the 
people, the loaition of the political parties on the political map, cither as left-right or as 
ccntre-peiiphcry distinctions. I ’hcsc conditions taken together starts a new period not 
only in the history of RPP but also in the new political agenda usually referred as the 
'Icit politics.' 1’hc 1960s arc the starting decade of this new .search, usually .seen as a 
possibility of uniting with the people living in the periphery, on a more ontological 
level and sometimes seen as a ncccssaiy consequence of a gradual development.
Conclusion
In the previous chapter, it has been argued that in the 1919-1923 pciirKi, both a 
pai ty and a new state is formed by the cadres conducted the National Independence 
War. Although the two formations arc convoluted, yet it could be purported that, 
when the social and fx>litical events are analy.scd, in the early formation years, Turkish 
republic might be defined as a party-led state. I lowcvci, in the second pci iod, which 
covers the years 1923 and 1960, the party is analy.scd on two different basis. First, in
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İliç 1923 and IS)46 pcricxl, il becomes a 'sUUc-lcd parly' and beginning by Ihc year 
1946, all (lirongh Ihc 1950s RPP slarls ils Ihird period. 4’licsc have been Ihc basic 
aigumcnls of this chaplcr.
3’hc chaplcr, l(x:using on Ihc 1930s and 1940s, argues lhal Ihc 'stale-led parly' 
slrucUirc is an outcome of the state-party unification. All bureaucratic and 
adminislralivc cadres of the Republic arc, simultaneously, the members of Ihc parly. 
This is due to the gradually increasing eficcl of sialism, which has gained an 
acceleration, all over Europe, in different forms, after the Great Crash of 1929. 
However, the Fascism of Italy is balanced by the sialism of the Soviets, as long as the 
central role of the stale is concerned and both models have been affective on the 
political and ideological formation of RPP. Under this influence, RPP, especially in 
Ihc 1930s and 1940s has developed not only a statist economic order but an ideology 
which was strictly dependent on the nationalism, secularism and republicanism. The 
framework of this ideology is constructed through the national education system, 
which was controlled by the parly, and the cslablishmcnl of two imporlani inslilulions. 
These are the Peoples' Houses and the Public Orators. They both are intended to 
indoctrinate the masses with the Kemalist tenets, which were symbolised by Six 
Arrows and carried to the Conslilulion. This ideology, rejecting the existence of 
classes in Ihc .society, has insisted on the formation of a .solidarisl and corporalisl 
.society, 'flic 'liberal slate' model and the notion of 'democracy' is al.so refused in this 
period, as centralism, under the strict leadership of elites is supported. This is mainly 
the rcali.salion of the project of nuxicrnisation through authoritarianism.
'I his political and ideological .slructurc, while creating a hegemonic discourse, 
alter Ihc Second World War, stalled to change gradually. In this new pcricxl, 
bourgeoisie has started a new search to take power back from the control of
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buicaucracy in a rcconcilialion with poor peasantry. This new upsurge has not only 
been conducive to the formation of political opposition, first in the RPP then as a 
didt'irnl pally, but al.so brought the lake ovci of the power by the newly louiuleil 
Democrat Party. This, period, started by the year 1946, as argued in the chapter, is 
important in the history of Turkish social democracy. It not only breaks the single­
pat ly structure but paves the way for the second modernisation movement in the RPP. 
RPP, beginning by 1946 and in the 1950s through the amendments of the Party 
Programs and Statutes, has developed a more 'democratic' and social approach which 
ends up by the Ici t-of-centrc policies of the 1960s and the democratic left ideology of 
the 1970s. Nevertheless, the ideology developed in the 1930s and 1940s, except the 
slatc-RPP unification, has been immune to a radical criticism and change and although 
the tx)litical power has stayed on the centre right, all through the 1950s and 1960s, 
yet, the basic republican epistemology has stayed indiffcicnt to the transformations. 
The 1960s and the new perirxl of RPP is analysed in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER IV
HIE LONG TRANSITION TO LEFT OF CENTRE' AND
DEMOCRATIC LEFT'
4.1. Towards Renewal; Issues and Conditions
4.1.1. RPP in the 1960-1965 Period
1’hc most iinportanl determinant in the post I960 military coup alxHit RPP is 
tlic arduous process of change tliat began by the second half of the decade and 
continued in the early 1970s. This course of action which reached its crux with an 
election success in 1973, has its ra)ts buried in the late 1950s. The direction of the 
1960 military intervention and the intellectual support given to i t , as Ayata notes, 
more or less, is a proof that RPP's ideas had found and echo among the 
intellectuals and bureaucracy' . According to Ayata the Constitution^ prepared by 
(he ConsliUilivc A.sscmbly, in which RPP was directly represented with 49 and 
indirectly 125 deputies, reflects the reminiscence of the 1958 Program oi' the *
* Ayşe Güneş Ayata, CHP (Örgüt ve İdeoloji), trans., B. 'I'arhan, N.l'arhan 
(Ankara: Gündoğan Yayınları, 1995), 92.
 ^riıe full text with amendments is found in A. Şeref (îözübüyük. 
Açıklamalı Türk Anayasaları (Ankara: Turhan Kitabevi, 1993).
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parly.^ Another student of Turkish politics, Frank Tacliau, rightly observes in his 
article that the ladical change came to lore in RPP during the 1945-80 era is a "shilt 
from ideological cleavages to functional cleavages."^ Tachau in his attempt to 
explain the sti ucturc of change proposes three |Xiints:
"First, the party's electoral base began to shift from the old 
coalition of elites at the centre and periphery to a predominantly 
class-based alignment, i.e. from a cultural to a functional basis. 
Second, the party began to assume a more clearly defined 
ideological position. Finally, the party experienced the .second 
major transition of top leadership in its history, replacing the 
venerable İsmet İnönü with the more youthful and ideologically 
inclined Bülent Ecevit."·''
The change started in the late 1950s as explained in the previous chapter. 
DcfXMiding on the clash between the radical and more moderate wings of the party, 
as the cadres sup|)orting a more libcial approach parted away and formed the DP, 
RPP, in .search of a new policy to compete with the new political organisation, 
sUirtcd to develop a more .serial and democratic programme. Also backing this new 
tendency was the populist programme of the DP. The trajectory of the DP 
programmes and pragmatism also had effects on the renewal of the RPP
rhere should be a mi.sprint in this remark for, CIIP has never prepared 
a programme in 1958. What Ayata refers should be the 1957 Statement of 
lilections; (Л IP, CUP Seçim Beyannamesi (Ankara: Kültür Matbaası,
1957), or more possibly '7he Statement of First Aims' accepted in the 
Congress of 1958: CUP, CIIP 14. Kurultay İlk Hedefler Beyannamesi 
(Istanbul: n.p., 1900).
^Frank Fachau, " Fhe Republican People's Party, 1945-80" in Political 
Parlies and Democracy in Turkey, eds., M.lleper and LM .landau 
(Fondon: l.R. rauris & Co l.td, 1991), 99.
-‘>lbid., 100-101.
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pm gram m c. Kasaba, on Ibis grourul epitom ises the essence  оГ DP in (our
categories:
The democrats were openly critical of the alliance that had been 
behind the Ottoman and Turkish reform movement in partieular ol 
the state bureaucracy and certain segments of th e  
intclligcntsia(...)'rhc second way in which (he Democrats were 
dilTcrcnt was how they distanced themselves (rom tiic militant 
secularism of the early republican governments(...yrhc third main 
component of the Democratic program was an unqualified support 
for private initiative and unhindered private enterprise (...) Finally 
(...) through their discourse the Democrats and (heir successors 
elevated the formal procedures of demtxaacy, in particular the act 
of voting, to a very high level of esteem.
This liamcwork is encompa.ssittg (he various dichotomies on whiclt llic 
Turkish democracy is founded as bureaucracy-civil elites-military coalitic^n vs. 
provincial bourgeoisie, secularism vs. folk Islam^, slatism vs. private 
intcrprcncurship, pluralist democracy vs. authoritarianism. RPP beginning by late 
1950s started to cover one ol the.se 'binary dichotomies' and the (irst period ended 
up with the coalition govcrniticnts of the post I960 military coup with the 1961 
elections. Dankwart Rustow, once has suggested that Turkish party history could 
be analysed on a basis of 'diastole' and 'systole', as expansion and contraction.^ In 
this case, through a process of change, RPP was reaching a systolic period and in
’^Rc.şat Kasaba, "Populism and Democracy in 'Purkey" in Rules and Rifrhts 
in llic Middle Hast Democracy, Law and Society , lillis Goldberg, R. Kasaba 
and J.S.Migdal (Seattle, l,ondon: University of Washington Press, 1993).
^I'or the analysis of the 'folk Islam' concept, from where we have 
borrowed the term, see, Şerif Mardin, Din ve İdeoloji: Türkiye'de Halk 
Katındaki Dinsel İnançların Siyasal Eylemi Etkilendirmesine İlişkin Bir 
Kavramlaşlırma Modeli (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınlan, 1990), 107-116,
^Dankwart A. Rustow, " The Development of Parties in l'urkey" in 
Political Parties and Political Development , eds., j.laPalom bra and 
M.Weiner (Princeton, Nj: Princeton University Press, 196()), 112-13.
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(he 1961 clcchons RPP bccaine the biggest parly iii the parliament by receiving % 
,U).7 o( (lu- vole s. This lesnll, in lae(, was ledccling a (.lec ieasc wilh lespci l lo llic 
1957 elections, in which RPP has received the % 40.8, but as the Justice Party 
(JP), the succcs.sor of D P \ also showed a loss of votes, RPP even though it did 
not gel the majority, was still the leading party of the GNA.
Between (he 1961 and 1965 elections, CMP, under the leadership of 
iiuniii, has iormed three coalition governments. It is interesting that these 
governments have been founded against the will of the party members and 
grassroots. rhe reason why İnönü was insistent on constructing the coalition 
govemmenis was that he conccivcti him,self as the 'sceiirily ol the democracy'". 
He afso believed that democracy could only be sustained as long as it works and it 
was al.so the only way of healing (he wounds opened by (he mililary intervention'^, 
riic program of the coalition governments, not unexpectedly, reflected (he various 
coiitradiclicms occurred on the political realm in (he 1960s and as Bila puts it, 
especially (he first one of (he three governments İnönü formed, has a three partite
ПР did not participate in the 1961 elections for it was banned after the 
mililary coup of I960. Here, when I say .)P voles showed a decline 1 refer 
lo the votes recieved by DP in the 1957 elections. In the unification of jP 
and DP 1 refer to Özhudun. lirgun Özbudun, " I'urkey: Crisis,
Interruptions, and Reequilibrations", in Larry Diamond, J.L Linz, S'. M. 
Lipsel, eds.. Politics in Developing Countries (Boulder, London: Lynne 
Rienner Pbs., 1995), 231. For a reminder I should note that DP recieved 
in the 1959 elections the 47.7% of the votes.
Idllikrnel Bila, CUP, 26.
Metin I'oker, Demokrasimizin İsmet Paşa'Iı Yıllan, 1944-1973. Altıncı 
Kitap. İnönü’nün Son Başbakanlığı, 1901-1965 (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 
1992), 119.
' '^Mclin lleper, ismet İnönü: Making o i a Turkish Stateper.son, (l.eidcn, 
Boston, Köln: Brill, 1998), 282.
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slriicUirc, i.c. Ihc wealthy provincial bourgeoisie and the landlords, the industrial 
and small business sectors and the relatively poor social layers.*^ The governments 
has triggered the unrest among the party ranks and some youth leaders have 
resigned Irom the party.*"* On (he other hand, government programs rellect a 
softened RPP elTecl. The only point sustained with extreme care is the issues 
concerning the social .security system, the laws regulating (he labour market and 
(wo important laws. Law of Unions and the Law of Strike, Lock-Out and 
Collective Bidding'-“', 'riiese laws issued during İnönü governments not only 
shows the tiajectory of the renewal of the party but al.so empowers Bülent Ecevit, 
that time Minister of Labour, towards his destiny as the chairman of RPP. Also, 
anothei sign of the new dircclion that RPP took was the establishment of a new 
ministry, the Ministry of Village Affairs.'^
Among the party congresses held in the 1961-1965 period the most 
important one is the 17th congress of 1964 proclaiming a statement called 'Our
'■^Hikmet Hila: C7/P, 262.
*"*riie same reaction is observed during the crisis after the military 
intervention of March 12, 1971 . Again, İnönü wanted to be involved in 
the government whereas Hiilent licevit, the secretary general of the 
part}/ reacted and resigned from his post. Although the intra-party 
crisis of 1960s were settled by Inönü's personal authority and prestige 
this second crisis ended up with Inönü's resignation from the 
leadership. Interesting is that, licevit, during the process, was 
succsessfull in uniting and getting the support of the same youth 
leaders. This might be taken as another indicator of the rejuvenation of 
RFF that continued all through the 1960s and early 70s.
*'’('ahit lalas, Türkiye'nin Açıkhımalt Sosynl Politikçi Tnribi (Ankara: 
migi Yayınevi, 1992), 155-202.
' f’fhere is also another ministry founded in the third İnönü 
government, which is the Ministry of linergy and Natural Resources.
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İdeal of Advanced Turkey.'('/fer/ Türkiye Ülkütmiz')^^. l'his statemenl .suiTicienlly 
reflects the RPP's politics as well as the expectations of Turkey a)nvened not only 
from the political but also from the social and economic developments. This 
statement is connected to the 'Statement of First Aims' {'ilk Hedefler Bildirisi') of 
the 14lh congress, 1959, and to the 'Statement of the Basic Aims' {'Temel 
Hedefler Bildirisi') of the 15th congress, 1961, and it is declared that this new 
statement is put forward as the aims determined in the previous declarations arc 
achieved.’  ^There are two important points in the statement. The first one is the 
emphasis put on the concept of 'social justice' which will play an important role in 
the following period, paving the way (o the concept of 'left of centre.' The second 
point is that, there is no reminder of the basic issues debated much in the political 
period as the Petroleum Law, L.<md Reform and Foreign Investment. As Kili 
observes the ignorance of the issues has induced the result obtained in the 1965 
election which shows a very sharp decline in the percentage o( the votes received. 
RPP in the 1965 elections received 28.7% of the votes. Besides, another i.ssuc that 
effected this outcome is the impression that, RPP not only played an imjx>rlant role 
and took part in the military intervention against the DP government but, it 
sustained its uniiication with the army even after the coup. 1'his very last point luis
CUP Cencl Sekreterliği Yayın Bürosu, Ilk Ucdcflcr Kcynnnamcsi, 
i'cmel Hedefler Beyannamesi, İleri Türkiye Dlkümüz (Ankara: n.p., 
I96.S).
I^l'or a fervent support and analysis of these developments, taken as 
the inital point of transformation that RPP has achieved see, Pevfik 
Çavdar, "Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (10.SO-DRO)", in Cumhuriyet Dönemi 
Türkiye Ansiklopedisi,, V. 8 (İstanbul; İletişim Yayınlan, n.d.), 2025- 
2056.'
Î'^Sıına Kili, aiT 'de, 221.
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created much of a criticism against the governments formed under the leadership of
İnönü.20
This period, when a chronological order of the events arc followed might be 
taken as the last attempt for RPP to form a coalition between the provincial nobles 
and the civil and military bureaucracy. Through an effort of keeping the 
parliamentary open and active, İnönü has not hesitated in sustaining RPP's 
traditional role as the "guardian of the state"2i "as closely identified with the 
Kemalist stale." -  The second issue forcing RPP to reali.se a metamorphosis might 
be taken its the social extension of this understanding. In other words, RPP entered 
the mid-1960s with a look still conceals it with the centre-slate demarcated by civil 
bureaucracy and military whereas the whole society was about to face a 
metamorphosis much triggered by the .socialist parties and activities. The swaying 
o( RPP beginning by the early 1960s and coming to a crux by the declaration of the 
concept 'left of centre' should be analysed especially rcferi ing to this development.
4.1.2. The Impulses for the change: Labour Party 
Turkey (TLP) and Other Leading Socialist Groups
o f
^9i^pi> in the process of baffling the criticism directed to itself, 
published various documents; see Hükümet Değişikliği ve CHF'nin 
Görüşleri (Ankara: Rüzgarlı Matbaa, 1965); CHP Araştırma ve ve Yayın 
bürosu,///. İnönü Hükümetinin İstifası Üzerine CHV Merkez Yönetim  
Kurulu taralından Yayınlanan Tebliğ (Ankara: Rüzgarlı Matbaa, 1965).
21 frank l'achau, " l'he Republican", 112.
22ibid.
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.Ills! ¡iKc'i llio miliinry coup oi I960, (he most impoilnnl |>olilic:il |>ar(y 
Nİ(ııa(c<l < »11 (lu· Ici I wing ol political dispersion was (he I ahoiii I’ai ty ol Tiii key·’ ' 
(TLP-7>»· í^yıг İşçi Partisi). Tliis party, in its complicated history^"·.
"at (iist (...) .supported full employment, a moie equitable disliibution 
of income, the nationalisation of natural resources and respect for 
private property. In 1964, the TLP's propaganda emphasised wider 
nationalisation through overall planning and slate supervision, along 
with redislribuiion of land among the peasants.^“'Its anti-American 
theme also became more pronounced."2<>
According to Ahmet Samim^^ p рщ«, played a very important role on the 
left politics of 'furkey for it did not only dissolve the vaiious factions by
•^^ " I his party, the first of two unrelated parlies bearing the same name 
is .sometimes akso referred to as the 'Worker's Party of Turkey; " see, 
frank I'achau, Volilical Parties o f the Middle Pa.st and Noth At rica. 
(Westport, Connecticut: Creenwood Puhlishers, 1994).
^^'This history is explained in various sources; sec Mehmet Ali Aybar, 
/7/’ Tarihi (.^  C'ilt) (Islanhul: HDS, 1988); Bellice Horan, Türkiye ve 
Sosyali/.tn .SV);iin/an (Istanhul: Sarmal Yaytnian, 1992); Hehice Horan, 
iki Açıdan Türkiye İşçi Parti.si Dava.'ii (İstanbul: Hilinı Yayınları, 1975); 
Sadun Aren, TİP Ol aşa, 1961-1971 (İstanbul: Cem Yayınevi, 1973); Yahya 
Kanbolai, Olduğu Gibi Türkiye İşçi Partisi Üzerine Anılar (Ankara: 
Akademi Matbaası, 1979). M.landau, Radical Politics in Modern Turkey 
(l.eiden: li.|.Hrill, 1974); Kenan Ö/türkmen, Türkiye İ.şçi Partisinin 
İçyüzü  (İstanbul: Aydın Yayınları, 1965); Murat Sarıca ve Nurkalp 
Devrim, Türkiye İşçi Partisini Tanıyalım (İstanbul: İz Yayınları, 1968); 
Ahmet Samim, "Left" in Turkey in Transition, Irvin Cemil Schick- 
li.A. ronak (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), 159-188 and for an 
early evaluation, Kemal Karpat, "Socialism and the Labor Party of 
Turkey." Middle Past Journal, XXI (2), (Spring 1967), 157-172.
25for the details of these issues .see Türkiye İşçi Partisi Programı 
(İstanbul: n.p., 1961).
Tac hail, Political, 608.
^7'1'he pen-name of prominent writer Mural Helge.
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incorpomling llicm to the body of the parly^ *^  but also for linking the arguments of 
the socialist left with the concrete problems of the masses by organising open, 
energetic and heterogeneous campaigns.29 According to Aybar, the roots of TLP 
was deep buried in Kcmalism for he defined it as an anti-imperialistic and anti­
capitalist ideology which is situated on the left even if Atatürk and his friends were 
not awaie o( the concept and they did not know wheie they were standing and what 
was defended by TLP was nothing but a new social structure grounded on these 
ideals.^'· Nevertheless, the TLP has supported a clear and open idea of socialism 
pushing RI^P an edge to develop a new |X)litical trend.^'
Not only 'PI but the condition o( Turkish intelligentsia of the early P)6()s, 
just al tci the rciciendum of the New Constitution, generally showing a Icl t leaning 
was also another factor in the reconstitution of RPP.^^ jj pio-lcft but more 
significantly a neo-Kcmalist Journal trying to deliberate a 'Turkish socialism' 
grounded on "Kcmalism and workers"^^ by way of its statement published in the
an atialysis of the paily striietiirc sec D»)gn IVi in<;ck, " Piirkiye 
i?f(;i I’ailisi Üyelerinin Sınıf Yapısı." A ydın lık , n. (January l ‘J()9), 205- 
22(y; Artun Ünsal, 'TİP Yönetim Kurullarının Sınıfsal Yapısı", Ant, n. 12, 
(April 1971), 54-69.
^‘^ Ahınct Samim, 168.
•^9[vlchrnet Ali Aybar, Tip Tiirihi, 125-143.
'^ l^ or another analysis on the same line see Murat Beige, "Türkiye İşçi 
Partisi" in Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türkiye Ansiklopedisi, Vol.8 (İstanbul; 
İletişim Yayınları, n.d.), 2120-2131.
3^For an analysis of the left movements of the period see, Murat Beige,
" lurkiye Cumhuriyeti'nde Sosyalizm (1960'tan Sonra)", in Cumhuriyet 
Dönemi 'lurkiye Ansiklopedisi, Vol. 7 (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, n.d), 
1955-1962.
•^'^l.M.Lındau, Radical Politics in Modern Turkey {l.c\den: Brill, 1974),
81.
104
finsl issue of the journal^^ was the leading niovement.35 Yon's basic task was the 
construction of Turkish socialism which was entirely different than communism, 
riiis very notion and mtxlcl of socialism has been declared as the mere barrier 
¡igiiiiisl Ihc (lcvcIo|>mcnl of Ihc communisin, a 's|X'ctrc that haunted' Turkey in Ihc 
lueanliiue, and in this context the only way conveying the acclaimed end was the 
development of neo-statism.^^ Landau, in this respect, observes Yön as an 
intellectual opening whose ideas are inspired by and found in Kadro movement. 
I ’hough the concept of Turkish socialism' was ambiguous and even the concept of 
'socialism' was used in different contexts^^, loaded with different meanings, 
usually changing from one writer to another, still Yön has performed an important 
function in the introduction of the idea of socialism to Turkish political rcalnP^ 
giving birth to more radical journals. Ant, being the most important one, after 
Yön's demise with frustrations for not being able powerful enough to accelerate the
■^^"Biidirgc", Yön, no .l, (December 20, 1961), s.l2. fhis statement has 
been translated into English Irank Tachau:"...", Middle liiistern Affairs, 
V. XIV, No 3, (March 1963), 75-78.
35por a ( ritical survey of Yön, see Igor P. Eipovsky, I'he Socialist 
Movement in furkey 1960-1980 (Eeiden, New York, Köln: E.J.Brill, 1992), 
85-108.
36i;or a lengthy discussion of the ideology of Yön especially from an 
economic view point see Hikmet Özdemir, Kalkınmada Bir Strateji 
Arayışı: Yön Hareketi (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1986), especially pp. 237- 
263.
■17|.M.Lıntlau, The Radical, 75.
‘^ ^Ahmet Sarnim prefers to describe Yön as a "left-Kemalist substitute", 
passim, 168.
'^ ‘^ Kemal Karpat, " I’he Turkish heft". Journal o f Contemporary History, 1 
(2): 1966, 173.
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rcibrms proposed and expected in Rustow's words.'·^  ^Here, as an evidence which 
shows liow was clicclcd (roin Yon's upsiiigc is llie support letter send by 
Bülent Ecevit to the journaH* who at the time was the Minister of I^xbour.
On the other hand, in Ant, a more radical journal published^^ support
ol' intellectuals who were unhappy with the moderate approach of Yön, as 
mentioned above, started a new search. Although at the beginning the ideas 
developed by the writers were not so much different than the ones found in Yön, in 
time, it has become a more radical Journal."·^  ^It could be said that in the period after 
1970 up until 1971 military intervention which banned the publication of the 
Journal, Ant began sup|X)iting a more radical and practical basis foi· 'icvolution' 
and the roots of this tendency is found in the journal for the journal itself declared 
that it was a 'radical leftist' onc ’^^ . On the ground which they believed that would 
force the political life to develop a more radical approach to the existing problems 
by way ol a new dcmcx;ratic organisation. Ant suppt)itcd i) the detachment of 
radical DİSK (Devrimci İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu-Confederation of 
Revolutionary Workers Unions) from Ttirk-İş (a more moderate confederation of 
workers unions), ii) encouraged the political movements of the 'revolutionary
b)|).A.Kiist()w, " liirkey's second try at domocrai y." Yule Review, 1.11, 
1%2,5:U.
yön, n. 2, (December 27, 1%2), 8. 
n. 1, ( January 3, 1%7). 
landau, I’he Radical, 107.
“^ "^ An excellent survey of Ant is found in landau. The Radical, 95-108. 
^^Ant, n. 121, (April 22, 1969), 3.
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teachers"’^ ’ and iii) advised the university students not to be afraid of the police 
terror in the universities; in short it tried todevelope a synthesis of revolutionary 
(heoty aiul practice.''^ With such an approach not the undcidcvclo|)men( ol 'I’mkey 
is del)aled imidi in (he journal but the empluisis was more put on the social and 
political conditions of Turkey affecting the interest groups and the other actors of 
the political realm.
In this context the difference between various groups is crystallised on the 
level of statism they defend for. The statism even though is formulated as a method 
for economic growth and welfare still as an ideology is used as a medium to unite 
dilfeient and scattered powers in order to achieve the already determined task.'·^ 
This has been one of the most important issues in the determination of the political 
|)iac(iccs in the I96()s even sometimes ending up with para-military movements and 
trials for unachieved military interventions as in the case of Talat Aydcmii.'''^'fhe 
left's relationship with army or at least the factions in the army has been a 
controversial issue in the realignment of the political structure in Turkey for, the 
concert of links between (he state elites, bureaucracy and military has been (he 
natural support system of the RPR As RPP has been the initiative force of social
^ ’^ I'cachers were organized in TÖS ( i'ürkiye Öğretmenler Sendikasi- 
'feachers' Syndicate of I'urkey).
47j.M.iiiiidau, Radical, 99.
^^I'or a di.scuvssion of left dispersions in the 19G0s and i97()s including 
this diversity see Çetin Yetkin, Türkiye'de Soldaki Bölünmeler 1960-1970 
(Ankara: Toplum Yayınlart, 1970).
"f‘^ Tor a discussion of Talat Aydemir intervention see Nevin Yurdsever, 
Türkiye'de Askeri Darbe Girişimleri, 1960-1964 (İstanbul: Üçdal 
Ne.şriyat, 1983) and Talat Aydemir, Talat Aydemir'in Hatıraları (İstanbul: 
May Yayınları, 1968).
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cliange and modernisation with the cultural epistemology it has created in Turkey, 
(lu'ie has Ikvii a hdicl that the liirlhci· developments and changes should also he 
through the same coalition oi powers. 'I'he 1960s in this context has heen the 
battleground of not only the new coalitions on this ground but also of the breaks 
between the long time allies.-'^
Samim, discu.ssing the relationship between the military and the socialist 
gioups puts the dii rcrcncc between Yön and more radical lurk Solu by referring to 
Yon's naive inclination towards the patriotic army officers^!. On the other hand, 
Türk Solu believed that the militant youth and students would initiate an upsurge 
and pave the way for the movement of radical army officers which would end up 
with 'national junta's domination of the statc.·'’^  'I'his strategy has been detined by 
Fîclli as 'National Democratic Revolution.' Samim tics all thc.se developments, 
which icached a way station, in Haris' words,-''  ^ in 1971, to the "deep sense of 
continuity" and the efforts for the resurrection of national revolutionary tradition 
demarcated by Kemalism.^
-‘'^^Kemal Karpat, "Military Interventions: Army-Civilian Relations in 
I'urkey Before and After 1980," in Turkey in Transition, Stale, 
Democracy and the Military: Turkey in the 1980s, eds., Metin I leper, 
Ahmet livin (Berlin, New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1988), 137-155, 
especially p. 144.
‘'M'or a critique of this approach see Hikmet Kivilctmh, 27 Mayıs ve Yön 
Harekelinin Sınıfsal lileşlirisi (İstanbul: Ant Yayınları, 1970).
57Mİİ1I-İ Belli, Milli Demokratik Devrim (Ankara: Şark Matbaası, 1970).
53cîeorge Harris, " I he Role of the Military in Turkey: (îuardians or 
Decision-Makers?" in M.IIeper, A.Iivin, State, 41, 185.
‘''^Ahmet Samim, "Left", op. cit, 171. The same opinion is repeated by the 
.same author in Murat Beige, "68 ve Sonrasında Sol Hareket", Toplum ve 
IVHim, 41, (Spring 1988).
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This point is a matter of argumentation in tlie restriictiiring of Kemalisin in 
llic I<)6()s and in the orientation of the groups existing within (he Ri’P. To 
Ö/.demir, in thcl9r>()s the debates arising in the journals and papers show two main 
categories of left'*^ : the first group was supjx>rting the idea that in Turkey it was not 
easy to sustain a Western type democracy and, consequently, to solve the existing 
s(x:ial and economic problems, it was not logical applying the Western mcxiels. The 
second group rlid not believe (hat there was a need (or tieep economic and social 
reforms to implement demoeracy and if (he continuity of 1950 transformation is 
sustained, I'urkey would go on with its development. The (list group was l(K)king 
for the possibilities of invigorating Young Turks-Committce for Union and 
Progress-Defence of Rights-RPP line whereas the second gioup defended the 
Prince Sal)ahanin-Liberly and Understanding“'^'(Hdrriyct ve İtilaf)-Progressive 
Republican Party-Free Party-Democrat Party line. The first group united around 
Yon and looked for a radieal transformation not through the pluralist democracy 
and paiiiamantarism which they called the 'pretty democracy' ( 'd d  denwkrasi')^'^ 
and nu)vctl lowaid the coalition with army (officers undei (he geneial notion ol 
National Demcx^ratic Revolution, under the control of Mihri Belli-“' .^ This trend has
‘^ ‘'llikincl (j/dcinir, "Siyasal I'arih 1960-1980" in Türkiye Tarihi 4: Çağdaş 
Türkiye ¡908-1980, Sina Akşin, ed. (İstanbul: Cem Yayınevi, 1990), 212.
“'f 'l his is the translation given by liridi Züreher, Tolitical Opposition in 
the Uarly Turkish Republic: The Progressive Republican Parly, 1924- 
1925 (Leiden, New York: Ej.Hrill, 1991). Nevertheless it seems more 
suitable to change the term 'understanding' with 'reconcilliation.'
•‘'^Dogan Avcioglu, Devrim Üzerine (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1971), 55- 
56; 115-121.
“^ ^Mihri Belli, Devrimci Harekelimizin Beştirisi 1961-1971 (İstanbul: 
fimekçi Yayınlan, 1977) and for a critical assessment of Mihri Belli and 
his ideas Rasih Nuri, Mihri Belli Olayı (İstanbul: Anadolu Yayınlan, 
1976).
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readied ils crux by the iinsueecssf ul March 9, 1971 inlra-mililary trial ol'a radical 
coupe which was coiilrollcd and cxlcmiinatcd by Match 12, 1971 UltimaUini.“''^  
The March 9 intervention was believed to be Kemalist-socialist in origin whereas 
the second March 12 was a conservative Kemalist intervention.^^’This model of 
(lansrorming the society by the coalition oC intelligentsia and militaiy groups is 
Ix'licvcd to have been inculcated to'l’urkish intelligentsia by Arab-Alrican scxialism 
which really did find an impact and echo among different political factions.^ '^
The two models found an echo among the RPP ranks as well. When RPP is 
approached through this view point Karpat makes a differentiation among pat ty 
tatiks atid lactiotis.* ’^“ Accotditig l<i aitthot those who had a cotmcctioti with Yön 
wete the strotig statist radicals. Radicals wetc also "nationalists (...) and tiaturally 
secularist" and
"iti the last analysis ideology ol the radical witig iti the RPP 
amounted principally to a typical bureaucratic-intellectual relation 
to the rise of the enttepreneurial business-oriented class and to the 
thtcal of erosioti of the traditiotitil statist-eliti.st vjilucs."^’’
rhe details of this intervention is analysed in a vast literature but the 
main sources are Ismail Gem, Tarih Açısından 12 Mart: Nedenleri,
Yapısı, Sonuçları. (İstanbul: Cem Yaymevi, 2. hasım, 2 cilt bir arada,
1980); Muhsin Batur, Anılar ve GörüşIer:Üç Dönemin Perde Arkası 
(İstanbul: Milliyet Yayınları, 1985).
’^^ ^Por the details of March 9 trial see Cemal Madanoğlu... and I’alat I'uran
hi The similarities between models is analyzed in Roger Owen, State, 
Power and Politics in the Making o f The Modern Middle Past (London 
and New York: Routledge, 1992) and Flic Kedourie, Politics in the Middle 
Fast (Oxford, New York: O.xford University Press, 1992).
Kemal Karpat, "Military Intcrventions:Army-Civilian Relations in 
furkey Before and After 1980" in State,, eds., M.lleper, A.livin, 142.
’^-^Ibid.
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In another part of his article, Karpat observes that
"the social cicmoeralie (statist-socialist) groups in the RPP (...) 
were no longer interested in rebuilding the old ruling coalition on 
behalf of the ideas of Kemalism and secularism, but wished 
instead to achieve the political and ideological supremacy of its 
own cadres in order to carry out schemes for economic 
development and social welfare."^>4
This framework shows that the restructuring of RPP was bringing the 
renewal of the ideology but nevertheless it was dependent on the new coalitions 
among different power groups having an influence on the state. I'hc left of centre 
was being shaped under these conditions. The development of left of centre was a 
step toward the victory of the radicals in RPP. Nevertheless, in lime, positions arc 
changed and debates developed among groups differentiated from each other on the 
basis of an abstract notion of state and people. The ineoi |X)ration of the |Xioplc into 
the body o( politics in the 1960s did not eradicate the central role and function of 
state nor the power of Kemalism. The mere change was the breaking of ties 
between the party and the military which was an early warning to Inonii's position 
who gave his support to army after the 1960 military coup which meant leaning on 
the state and replacing the party after the state. A process culminated with a 
continuos loss of power in the general elections between 1957 and 1973.
'I'his framework designates an interesting condition. Turkish socialism 
occurred after the 1961 Constitution played an intriguing role in the political
>4lbid.,144.
I l l
plall’orm as long as its ideological characlcr and the rcverbcralion of RPP to this 
lunclion is concerned. Socialism in Turkey, even though the most radical 
movcmenls are examined, was not, in the final analysis, away from (he basic 
construclivc ideology already established in (he country. As long as the early left 
movements ol the I9(')0s is concerned all activities arc related to statism and has 
been forniulated as a way to social and economic development with a keen 
attachment to Kcmalism as Lipovsky puts it:
"All the adhcicnts of Turkish ,s(x'ialism were agiee<i that Kcmalism 
was one o( their tenets, ant that the principles ol Kemalisin were 
also the basic principles of Turkish scx)ialism. 'fheir chief (ask was 
to apply thc.se principles to contemporary 'I’urkish reality and to 
impart to them a .socialist orientation on the social and ccoiu)mic 
level.
Not only on the level of economic development but also on the grounds of 
other ideological tenets of the RPP, with little alterations, the socialist groups were 
in concert and reconciliation:
"(...) different positions of Marxism became interwoven with 
Kemalism and with precepts from West European social 
democracy. The principles of Turkish socialism were a blend of 
its various ideological sources: an anti-western slant, which the 
Turkish socialists called 'anti-imperialism', anti-feudalism, 
statism, anti-capitalism, nationalism, and anti-communism.
The lel t of centre movement was an eclectic attack constructed on this 
ground effected from another condition of Turkish srK'ialism, pul by Lipovsky as
’^ “'Igor P. I.ipovsky, The Socinlist ,107. 
i’ ’^lbid.
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"Turkish socialism was not a distinctly ronnulatcd ideological s t r e a m . T h i s  
I ramcwork loices the emergence of the left of centre not as an idcologieal stream 
but as a pragmatic issue relying on the Kemalist tenets. In this context it is not a 
renewal of the party ideology but a restatement of it with a legitimacy gained from 
(he condition and concerns of (he .s<x:ialisl left.
4.2. The Remedy for Survival: "Left of Centre"
4.2.1. İnönü and the Left of Centre
As Ecevit points out later*^ ’^ , İnönü uses the concept of 'left of centre' for 
the first time in the interview he gave to Abdi İpekçi on July 29, 1965. Although 
(Ik· impact of (he concept is gieat, the eaily delinitions made, e.xplanations given 
and the debates arouse are all buried in an ambiguity. IikmiU himself has preferred 
to explain the concept more relying on Kemalisin and the basic tenets of it mostly 
referring to laicism and statism*'^. With his much (juoted words, according to 
Inthiti, "RI^P is a statist party by its existence and with this eharacteristic is a party 
which has an economic understanding situated on the left of c e n t r e . I f  his 
continuing explanation is examined it is observed that the primordial of (he new 
concept is economism and it seems that İnönü is more interested in economic 
development.'^' Here, the priority is given to economic development through
67|bicl.
f’^ 'Ticevit Siyasi Hayatım Anlatıyor", Cumhuriyet, (January 22, 1975) 
also in Bülent ücevil, Ortanın Solu,, Glh.ed. (İstanbul: J'ekin Yayınevi, 
1974), 21.
69д recent compilation of articles both from the 1930s, selected from 
the journal Kadro and the recent literature is found in Nevin Coşar,ed., 
Türkiye'de Devletçilik (Istanbul: Bağlam Yayınlan, 1993) .
^"Ahdi İpekçi, "İnönü ile Mülakat", Milliyet, (July 29, 19()5).
^4 n ö n ü  Ortanın Solunu Anlatıyor: CHP Nedir, ne değildir? (Ankara: 
Ulusal Basımevi, 1967).
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sialism which he finds more provocalive, and left of centre is proposed as tlie 
c<au'cpl groimdinj» (lie real delcrminani: sialism: "As in Ihe dcslioyed counity of 
1923 sialism was the only, unique remedy of development, without in need of any 
suppoil, il slill is I he basic clement of our economic lifc."^^ /\i jx)ip( Ayala 
makes an analysis of the concept, tacitly combining il with the very condition of 
scx'ialism in Turkey, that, it is not an ideology:
"being on Ihc left of cenlic, al this |X)int ditl not mean lo change llie 
parly ideology t)r program; the existing paily views were being 
redefined with new fashionable concepts of the post I960 era. 
There was already existing a program relying on republicanism, 
democracy, planned economy, statist development, social justice 
and reformism. İnönü was just defining the location of this 
program on the spectre of ideologies by 'left of centre.
The early consideration for liKhui is lo show that left of centre is not the 
sur passing of the Cl IP ideology or progr am nor the six ar rows.^ ' Otr the contrar y 
the left of centre is deliberated as 'limited with RPF’ programme' and il is a 
'progressive attack, a progressive thought movement.'^-''The development of the 
notion has an interesting history for, after the first utilisation of the concept, the 
country, in the year 1965, underwenl the general elections. In this election RPP has 
faced a dramatic drop in the percentage of the voles, receiving only 28.7% with
^^Ibid.
^^Ay.şc Cüne.ş Ayala, Öifjüt, 82.
^^CUP Genel Iktşkanı İnönü'nün IV. Olağanüstü Kurultayı Açış 
Konuşması (Ankara: Ulusal Hasrmevi, 1967),7.
■^‘'İbid., 0.
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respect to the 36.7% of the 1961 elections. This has forced İnönü to abandon the 
concept in tlie partial elections for the Senate in 1%6.
The second critical issue in the history of the left of centre opening is the 
repercussions of the quitting of the concept. This condition has not only been 
abused by the other partics^^’ but also brought a new break out in the parly. Being 
impartial to İnönU's position and condition and especially his attitude, trying to 
br ing an end to the debate on the concept, Bülent iiccvil, Ankara deputy, later the 
chainnan of RPP and the prime minister, has not only continued using and 
developing the concept consistently among the party grrrsstoots but afso tr ied to 
provoke the argumentation.
A strong evidence to his position is the publication of his book, named 
Ortanın SoliP^ and focu,sing the whole discussions of the XVIII Congiess on to the 
subject-matter.^^ In other words, the attack of Ecevit is a movement which might 
be taken as a deliberation even against İnönü^^, criticising him for his cynical 
position irr the 1966 ciccliorrs, which will end up, in the short rurr, defeating the
^^*rhc reaction to these remarks and the explanation brought by the 
party group in the GNA is reflected in XVll ve XVlll C.U.P. Kiirultnyhin 
arası dönem de C.II.P. T.B.M.M. Gruplarında Yiiyinlanan Bildiriler 
(Ankara: Ulusal Basımevi, 1966), 26-30.
77Bülent licevit, Orlanın.
18th Congress is the mile stone in the development of the left of 
centre policy in the RPP. I'he debates in the congress not only ended up 
by the Declaration proclaimed by the Congress confirmed that RPP is a 
party situated on the left of centre but also in a shor t time brought the 
most important break up in the party. For the declaration see, CUP 18. 
Kurultay Bildirilesi (Ankara: C.II.P. P.B.M.M. Grupları Yayını, 1966).
7‘-)Suna Kili, CllP'de 227.
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party sects against the concept and, in the long run, İnönü himself. The reminiscent 
ol an early ci iticisin and clash is found in his explanations by his insistence on the 
point that, RPP should perpetuate defending the concept without the fear that it will 
cau.se a loss o( votes whereas an ambiguity and hesitancy is the basic .source of the 
losses. In this scn.se the position taken in the 1966 partial elections should be 
criticised.^'*
4.2.2. Ecevit and Left of Centre: 1965-1971
Fxevit, al ter the defeat of 1965 elections, has written a book called l^ ft o f 
Centre and presented it to the 18th congress, held October 18, 1966. The timing 
and the ground it was presented is interesting. Because, after the elections, when 
İnönü showed a tendency of shifting away from the utilisation of the concept, as 
has Ik'cu iioIchI Ih'Ioic, l',cevil with a sheer passion conlinued lo support it aiul 
insisted on the point that if a shift is realised than the party would get 
disintegrated.* '^ In his bcx)k Ecevit explains the left of centre by empha.si.sing certain 
points and underlying various i.ssues related with the social and political 
environment. In his early explanations, directly or tacitly, Eîcevit, together with 
iii(>nii, refers to Kemalist tenets at least by reusing and reproducing the Kemalist 
principals or in general the Kemalistdiscour.se.
In this context according to Ecevit's description, tho.se who situate 
themselves on the left of centre arc for humanism, populism (halkçılık), .social
«"Itiilcnt li( evit, Oruinm, 9(>; Kili,(;///”(/<·, Z2H. 
«lllülcni liccvil: Ortm iin, 81-84, 104-105.
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justice and security, progressivity, revolutionism, reformism^^, statism, planning, 
their freedom and for social dem ocracy .jh is framework, according to Ecevit has 
created a tendency in Turkey toward a shift to radical lef t lor various reasons and 
the only condition to stop this movement is democracy and better the social 
democracy. In this context, the limits for the left of centre is democracy^^ and this 
is not only the basic condition that differs it from the other left developments but 
also is the only possibility to create a social condition distanced from a state and 
wealth diclatoiship.^-“’ In this regard the source of left of centre and more concretely 
of the social democracy is nothing but the Constitution of 1961 and, left of centre 
movement should be taken as a constitution movement which, in the final instance, 
would akso be taken as a movement realising the constitution iLself.^
The tacit and indirect explanation of left of centre which should also be 
taken as the icali.salion of the constitutional principles arc framed by I-xcvit as such:
"Unless principles, condition and rules of our Constitution as 
accepting the right for property and inheritance but dictating that 
those rights could not be used against the public good; accepting 
the right of property on the land but also declaring that the quantity 
of the land owned by people could be limited for enabling the
^^liccvit, the first time in the long history of Kenialism, brings a clarity 
lo the ambiguity between the concepts of revolutionism and reformism 
by emphasising them .separately whereas the 'clas.sical' Kemalist 
concept of 'inkihıpçiUk', as has been discussed in the previous chapter, 
has a blurred meaning .swinging between reformism and 
rcvolutif)nism.
8'^lUilent licevit, Ortanın , 32-33.
«4|bid.,32.
«5Ibid., 43-51.
«h|bid-, 58-59.
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cvciyhody wIk) arc bound to carlli to gain Ihcir living; supplying 
Ireedom and even security to private ownership but forcing that 
sector "to move together with the needs of national economy and in 
accordance with the social goals"; dictating to consider the public 
good with priority; expecting the wage justice and social welfare 
for the whole society; laying the opportunity and possibility 
equality as a condition; assigning the state with the duty of the 
development of cooperations; asking for the revaluation of the 
lalnnir in farming; keeping the natural resources and wealth under 
the control of the stale; are realised with an uncoinproinising and 
straightforward manner would be no more than a mere document 
on paper
If left of centre is the realisation of the Constitution than, the above slated 
issues are the modus operandi of this concept. In developing his argument and 
explanation as well as his insistence on the realisation of the constitutional 
principles, Ecevit, refers to two main points. The first one is his belief and 
observation about the 'left pressure' that 'rurkey faces. 'Phese pressures arc of three 
partite: from the north, the SSCIi, from the south, namely Irom the Aiabic 
countries, Egypt and Syria and from the West, the scx^ ial dcmociatic movements.^ 
As has been stressed before, if lef t of centre is accepted as the basic policy for the 
party and the countiy, through the reforms it foresees, the social justice and a well 
regulated society would be constructed which would defeat the danger of radical 
left and righl. '^  ^This, by definition, is the social dcm(x;racy. In using the concept 
of social dcmociacy, which he will later reject and refrain IVom utilising and 
ullcring, by making a clear distinction between the 'democratic socialism' and 
'social democracy', as will be discussed in the following sections, Fxevil reflects
87ibid., 58-.S9.
««Ibid., 85.
«9|bid., 60-61.
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on it not taking it with its political connotations but rather preferring to see it 
through (he abstract concept of democracy by saying 'for those on (he left of centre 
the social content of democracy is as important as the lormal dimension of it." 
Ayata, argues that "social democracy was being utilised in the meaning to 
encompass the social reforms that would be the premises of a well settled 
democracy.
F'or Ixcvit, the left of centre is not moving away from the basic history and 
principles of RPP; on the contrary first, the Turkish revolutionary movement 
beginning by the Independence War and culminating by the Republic was a left 
movemenf^' and, second, left of centre, in this path, is the apparent characteiistic 
of the RF^ P program i.e. the program of an already revolutionary and 'avant-garde' 
party, which has passed through various developmental phases and now, once 
more crystallised in the existing 'social reform' peritxl. In other words, left of 
centie is the party's apprehending of its own programme and identity in the field of 
social r e fo rm .Th is  opening should be in coherence with the reinterpretation, 
rcconccptualisation and restructuring of state and people notions.
fhe heart of left of centre upsurge is (he restitution of RPF^ 's mono-party 
period. Ecevit, in this endeavour has been the first and the single voice 
pronouncing the party's condition in the mentioned era. In this context, without any 
hesitation he proclaims that RPP should develop a new image which would go
Güneş Ayata, Örgüt, 83. 
Bülent lïcevil, 36.
‘^ ^Ibicl., 80, F05, 106.
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belter with its natural eharacler among the people. This should be started by the 
eradication of an image which incorporates the bureaucratic, repugnant stale and 
party identification as well as a the party image distanced from the people as a 
characteristic inherited from condition (x;eurred in the late Ottoman Empire as the 
elite-people duality and dichotomy.^·^ This process should be completed by RPPs 
approach to people. This is a critical point for Ecevit. He dwells on the idea that, 
the weakness of RPP emanated before the mully-party period and this was due to 
the ct)ndition that the RPP ideology, perpetually disseminated every revolutionary 
idea from centre to periphery, whereas in democracy the situation should be the 
reversed and be a movement flowing in the opposite direction, from periphery to 
centre. Ί'ο achieve this g(ial reforms should be appropriated by the people.'^'
Taking this framework as the constitutive of left of centre it is piwsiblc to 
say that the early consideration is directly related to a) the construction of a new 
stale understanding more prone to periphery rather than centre, accepting the basic 
notion of national sovereignly and complete independence of the country; b) a more 
liberal notion of cili/.cnship which is strictly sustained by the acceptance of private 
proprietorship and freedom of entrepreneur ship controlled by scx^ ial justice system; 
c) the vast aiul vague democracy preference which includes the peoples' will as 
well as the restructuring of economic and social life believing that the class 
differences would be dissolved if public dominance is attained.' ·^'’ The left of centre 
with lhc.se a.ssumplions is a blend of various different concepts but the backbone of
‘>; l^bid., 99.
‘>^lbid., 101.
95ibid., 109-117.
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(he nolion is determined by the Icxise s(x:ialist movements manifested themselves in 
ruikcy. In (his sense, llie led of centre is a double gcslurcd action lor on (he one 
hand it was trying to eapture the basic social piogrammatic issues oi those 
movements but on the other hand acclaiming itself as the mere possibility to halt 
their upsurge. This point has been the issue of a large debate between TLP and 
l^ l>l> <)i> 'I I,jj, (I,;,I |c || ccntic is moic a pragmatic movement (if the RIM’
rather than is a vast ideological shift. Early RPP's definition of 'people' and 
'populism', in this .sen.se, might be found at the basis of the movement together 
with the statist character of the party.
According to an author, (he left of centre in the last analysis, is structured on 
premises as a) it is against the uncontrolled development of capitalist mode of 
production but in this context as long as some restrictions arc considered it is more 
inclined toward the Westem models; b) it is against the .social classes and .seaichcs 
for a .social c(|uilibrium on behalf of people; c) the will to u.sc the state and the 
government apparatuses in a controlling and directing way; d) refraining from the 
ccntralisl/statist tendencies and in this sense might go into a cla.sh with the official 
ideology; c) together with the state ownership it supports a vast public entrepreneur 
ship ('halk girişimciliği') and in the long run tries to reach a peoples' ownership 
Chalk mülkiyeti.)^^
4.3. Left of Centre; Structure, Policies, Issues
4.3.1 Left of Centre and Socialism
9(>||T()i- | \  i.jpovsky, The SodnUsl, 22-23.
‘^ ^Ali (ievgilili, Yüksciiş vc Diişüş^ 2mJ.cd. (İstanbul: Hağlam Yayınlan, 
1<)«7), 3.S3-354.
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I .cK o( ccnlrc is nol it concept itgainsl i<cinalism but what is interesting here 
is tlie contradictions between tnönü's and Ecevil's approaches to the concept. As 
İnönü insists on explaining the concept through Atatürkçülük' '^^, Ecevit , especially 
at the early period, seems not to dwell on the same basis. It is nor a notion relying 
on the Marxist undcistanding. On the contrary the party iulministnition on various 
occasions but mainly because of both the intra-party groups and other party 
cnforccmcnts, felt itself obliged to state that 'RPP is not a socialist p a r t y . T h i s  
point many times was stressed by the party and Eicevit. Left of centre, let alone to 
be a .socialist movement, has been proposed as the only possibility to block the 
socialist and communist movements.'^ All the RPP programme is.sues, leaning on 
left ol centre ideals, aic presented as the remedy for a better dcmociacy in which 
there would be no (need (or) socialist movements. The similarities between RF’P 
and TI .P have not only been rejected by RPP and Fx'cvit but also by Aybar and, in 
(his con((;,\l, Aybar has situated RPP togctlier with ccntic right .lustice I’arty. 
Aybar's rejection of togetherness with RPP is because of RPP's rejection of 
.s(x;ialism."" Mehmet Ali Aybar, in (his context makes a very impoitant distinction 
between the two parties.A ccording to him, even after the left of centre opening, 
RPP is a 'bureaucratic' party. For Aybar the vital point is the togcthcrnc,ss with the
(lend  Ihışkiint İnönü'nün IV. Ohığiinüslü Kurullnyi Açış 
Konnşmnsı (Ankara: Ulusal Hasnnevi, 1967), 6-8.
The long and detailed history of this debate is found in Kili, CUP'dc, 
p. 28 2-242.
^dOpülent licevit. Ortanın, 32-38.
Mehmet Ali Aybar, Cvmhuriyct, (November 21, 1966). fhe intra-3’l,P 
debate on this issue might be followed from IgorP. l.ipovsky. The 
Socialist, 22-23.
l02"f ,^|Qİ-jni(.t Ali Aybar" in Abdi İpekçi, Udcrlcr Diyor ki (Istanbul: Ant 
Yayınları, 1969), 140-141.
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people and the belief that socialism by way of elections is possible. Otherwise even 
though such relbiins as land tclbim is realised still this would contribute to nolx)dy 
but the privileged position of the elites.'' '^* And, in this sense, RPI  ^ is detached 
from the people, still perpetuating the traditional from the above reformation 
notion.'^’·'
4.3.2. Left of Centre, State, People and Economy
4.3.2.1. Slate and People
'I'his context in Eîcevit's explanations has performed an important function. 
In one of his relatively later efforts to explain the concept of people, he stresses 
that, merely referring to the concept of proprietorship is less than a sufficient 
critérium to conceive the term.^^’-'’ The concept of people should include all the 
cleavages and social groups. In EIccvit's understanding this is where mainly the 
stale-people interaction is realised through the changing condition of bureaucracy. 
According to him, the left of centre, if taken as the denial of the early RPP Ideology 
as a mono-party ideology has exerted an important funclit)n on the Iransfornialion 
of bureaucracy. RPP as a mono party has, he believes, relied on the state, ignoring 
and externalising the people.'·’^’ But as RPP has changed his ideology and moved
^^^^Ibid.
^b4|.()r a very .sharp criticism of left of cetilre notion sec, Idris 
Küçükömer, Düzenin Yabancılaşması, Znd.ed. (Istanbul: Alan 
Yayıncılık, 1989), 92-134.
l^ -^‘’Hiilent licevit, Demokratik Solda Temel Kavramlar: Bülent İkevit'in  
İsmail Cem İpekçi ile /975 güzünde ’Politika' gazetesi için yaptığı 
görüşme-Bazı düzeltm e ve eklemelerle- ve konuyla ilgili başka m etinler 
(Ankara, Ajans-Iürk Matbaacılık Sanayii, n.d.), 8.
early attack on the mono-party ideology of RI’F has not only 
been the concern of Bülent licevit but also of his friends who have 
played an important role in the construction of the notion of left of 
centre. See Ilaluk Ülman, "Başyazı", Ulus, (November 10 , 1969).
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Irom cciiltc, nnmcly I'rom Ihc stale toward periphery, i.e. the people, biireauciacy 
has also changed; "what is changing in our country is not our way of interpreting 
Ihc l)uicauct:icy lull the Ixdiaviour of bureaucrats and inlcllccluals. In (his 
Iransloi Illation our undcislanding of democratic lcH has imposed a great edect.""’^
This is a double gesture approach for, on the one hand, Ecevit strictly 
believes in the virtue of statism^^’^  but in his somewhat a more vast conceiving of 
slale-pcojile relationship, continuously underlying the priority of the latter, tries to 
place bureaucracy after the people. The way of achieving this task for Ecevit is 
more an economic condition. If a popular sector is created and if the mechanisms 
producing the economic power is left to the people then the stale would shrink 
together with the bureaucracy and it would be transformed into a 'child state' 
serving the people but not more a 'father state' controlling it.'^’'^  This is a 
Iramcwoik which liccvit constructs to show that a) kl*P has changed its basic 
attitude towards state and bureaucracy; b) 'people' is the basic concern of the party. 
Nevertheless Exevit by clearly stressing that "this (Turkish) people can not do 
without the s t a t e "o nc e  more delineates the im|K)itancc he gives to slate.
According to Beevit, the logcihcrnc.ss of the stale and Ihc people could only 
be achieved through a new economic order. This new understanding of economy
'O^lbid., 1«.
IbSgüieni licevit, Bu Düzen Değişmelidir {hlanbuh I'ekin Yayınevi, 5. 
ba.ski, 1978), 205.
■^ ‘^^ Bülcnt liccvit, Demokralik Solda ,31,  29.
1 '^^Hülent liccvit. Ortanın , 49.
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can no! I)c tlclachctl irom Ihc populism imclcrslaiuling of Ixcvit. I'-spccially at (he 
beginning, the concept of 'people' has such a vast content that EZcevil explains the 
situation of the party by rejecting the concept of 'mass party,' saying that in Turkey 
it is not possible any more to be a mass parly, for it does not allow the RPP to 
criticise various cleavages." ' In Ecevil's approach (his explanation shows (he early 
premises of a differentiation between the parly and the social groups. He tacitly 
implies (ha( the 'old' RPP was a mass parly rejecting the class notion and 
encompassing a cot poralisl social view. 7’hc left of centre RPP, on the other hand, 
is a party relying only on certain groups. Though RPP and Ecevil continuously 
refused (he cla.ss struggles in the process of démocratisation still there was a tension 
between (he parly and (he old interest groups previously giving support to the RPP 
as the provincial notables usually referred as 'aga'Iar, the feudal Iandlords."2
I his approach has been (he subject matter of a fur Iher debate. Pck(a:ÿ, irt his 
book, in opposition to Ecevil's formulation, situates RPP as a party showing a 
liend ol lx;coming a ma.ss par ty alter the 1970s' and still defines RPP as a 'cadre 
parly'' I'his is a contradictory point in the sense that when Ecevil refers to RPP 
as a 'cadre parly' he much relates it to certain sœial groups, in other words, puls it
11' Milliyet, (July f), 1970), Kili, Clirdc, 262, Bila, CW\ 327.
long polemical approach to this issue is found in Bülent licevit. 
Düzen. Also in his book OrUtnm Solv, Ucevit accepts that RPP has been 
supported by this cleavage before the implementation of left of center 
notion and even though a group of them has left the part>' afterwards, 
still found some perpetuating their support of the party. Bülent ficevit, 
Ortnnin Solti, 8()-87.
' ' ^Arsev Bekta. ,^ Demokrnlikle.sme Sürecinde l.iderler Olif.nr.şisi, ('.UP \ e 
A/'(/960-/9<S0j (İstanbul: Bağlam Yayınlan, 1993), -19.
114|bid., 41,50.
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as class parly. Bui Beklaş's analysis shows lhal Ihough il has a Icndcncy of 
becoming a mass parly in Ihc Diivergerian sense of Ihe concept RPP is a small 
cadre parly relying on bureaucratic centre. This centre is encircling the stale and 
bureaucracy elites more than the grassroots politicians, This point needs a 
I ni (her analysis and will be done in the following section bnt before Ihc nolion o( 
populism and ils relationship to economy should be revisiled.
4.3.2.2. The economic model for populism
Ecevil's populism is strictly related with his economic model. This model
h.is a binary s(inelnie: Ihe piipnlar .seel<>r (//n/A .veAVf////) iwu\ koykrnl. Allhongh il is 
cxi)lained at large in Ihc later years al lcr he had developed the notion of 'dcnu)cratic 
left' and he had RPP's first trial in power through its coalition with National 
vSalvation Party (NSP- Milli Selamet Parti.si) in 1973, still in the early explanations 
(ound is the accentuation he put on the popular .sector as an economic agent.' 
Ecevit, starts his analysis by saying that there would be no power above the 
people.'"^ The constitutive condition of this approach is the popular sector. It is 
defined as the control of the economy by the people."^ The agents of this 
development are the investments that the pea.sants realised in cooperation with the 
capital accumulalcd by the Turkish workers abroad.'^-'' *•
1 •-'»Maurice Duverger, Poliliail Parties: Their Organization ami Activity  
in Modern Stale (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1963).
11^ ’Arsev Bektaş, Liderler, 106; Ayşe Güneş Ayala, Örgüt, 91-96.
• '^Bülent licevit. Ihı Düzen, 178-183.
••«Ibid., 182-183.
' • ‘^ Ibid., 182.
•^^•Bülenl licevit. Demokratik Solda Temel Kavramlar, 73-77.
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'I’licsc invcstıncnis, according to Ecevil, should not be controlled by small 
number of stakeholders but should be supported by cooperative assemblies, unions 
and social security inst i tut ions.They might, preferably in the beginning, be 
backed by the State Economie Entei p r i s e s .The  management of these enterprises 
should also be democratised.*23 what is interesting here is that, Ecevit, as a 
component of the eclectic structure of this concept, proposes this model to hinder 
llie paililion o( Ihe vvoiking class aiul to pcipetuale Hu· iinily of i(.*2· When 
analysed carefully it is clear that even in a late period the notion and the practicality 
of the popular sector is not well structured as Ecevit confronts the cpicstions by 
saying it is not proper to go deep in the details of the nuxJel.*25
Köykent, on the other hand appears as a better defined model. Here, he 
insists that the crux of the model is not the villages but the villager or the 
peasants.*2^ ' Köykent, in a sense, is the unification of various different but closely 
kH;atcd villages around a centie which bears the basic substructural investments.*27 
This model would have impacts on the economic, social and political life of the 
peasants. Economically it can not be detached from the popular sector, i.e. the
I Ibid., 71.
122ibjd., 75.
123Ibid., 74-75. 
l^^Ibid., 75. 
l^Sibid., 76. 
l- i^»lbid., 62. 
l^^ibid., 62-63.
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investments cooperated by peasants and workers abroad. The development of 
köykent, he believes, would accelerate these investments.' 8^
S(x:ially, köykents would help the peasants to stay in their villages and keep 
them away from the 'psycho-sociological' problems of a necessary but unwanted 
immigration. Peasants would reach the comfort of the metropolitans in the rural 
area. Lastly, the work power in the rural area would be transferred to industrial 
work power.'29 Politically, as peasants would shift to a better life condition 
through unification and a new organisation, this would help them to enhance tlicir 
democratic consciousness. In the same line with this, as they would also be the 
owners of these investments as stakeholders they would be liberated not only from 
the economic and political control of the feudal landlords but also from the 
repressive approach of the political power.'^o
This model is the unification of peasantry and workmanship through 
urbani.sation. This would eradicate the traditional conservatism of the peasantry and 
the ruial aicas as well as the contradicloiy and reversal existence of the agricultural 
and industrial development.'2' In the final analysis it could be said that, above 
given framework is inclusive of some concepts developed in time, especially after 
1972 Ecevit's triumph in the RPP replacing İnönü in the chairmanship and the 
transformation of left of centre notion to democratic left. Nevertheless referring to
'^^Ibid., ()().
129ibid., 66-67.
' ^"Ibid., ()9.
I I b i d . ,  69.
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these consliliilive elements, left of centre might fui tlicr be analysed trying to dissect 
its ideological structure.
‘/.,>.2..? ¡.eft o f  Centre as a Socio-political Itleoloffy
Led ol centre is moic a pragmatic opening rather than an iticological 
deliberation. This development is the result of various exogenous factors, the 
leading one being the results obtained in the 1965 elections just after the 
pi(K:lamalion of the concept. But realising the social translormalion in the country, 
marked by ui banisation and industrialisation giving birth to new classes but, more 
correctly 'strata', would be the fulcrum of further developments, the party 
intelligentsia and youthful cadres stayed indilfcrcnt to the ever worst results held 
and continued developing the idea. This was due to the belief that renewing its 
ideology and getting into concert with the new emerging structure through the 
notion of left of centre the party would do better, otherwise would loose even its 
already existing minority condition.
The consequence of this reasoning was that the party could not continue by 
staying loyal to the bureaucracy which has al.so and already changed. This 
assumption has brought the denial of the bureaucratic heritage and past and a move 
toward workers, more concretely, pea.sants. Beyond all, this was, as vSunar 
observes, a kind of 'mathematically based' move, presuming that the majority of 
peasants could easily replace the betrayed bureaucracy.Eicevit, did not hesitate 
on this issue when he insisted that RPP should direct its policies and ideology 
towards the new and old social groups, namely to the people already \’oting for the
' ■^ i^lkay Sunar, Slutc and Society in the Politics o f I'w k ey ’s 
Development (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler l'akültesi 
Yayınlan, 1974) , 180-181.
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conservative Justice Party.'^3 'fhis basic supposition lias created a set of concepts 
on vvliicli lel't ol centre has been constructed. This IVainework lias a two 
dimensional structure. The I'irst dimension is the continuing togcthcincss with the 
RPPand the second is the new ideology in the process of construction. When these 
two dil lerent dimensions are juxtixposed, it is seen that the early left of centre [xilicy 
has a more eclectic character. This eclecticism is a result of somehow contradicting 
concept couples. But before passing to the analysis of (hem it should be noted here 
Ihal the cclcdic character of left of centre is evident to the extent (hat it, at (he .same 
time, develops a concept as the idiosyncrasy of the movement but also being critical 
of it. For example, left of centre, on the one hand definitely relied on Kemalisni but 
on the other hand did not hesitate to criticise it saying that it realised the 
supcrslrticltiral reforms but did not grasp the iiifraslrucUiral ones as land reform.’^ '·
riiis is also obvious in its a.ssociation with RPP. vSlaying loyal to it did not 
obstruct (he left of centre group to criticise and even condemn it. Ecevit, rather, 
reformulated the past practice of (he RPf’ saying, "RPP is a revolutionaiy par ty 
and in this sense it will renew ilself"*35 and it was also Ficevit saying that "we do 
not conceive (he events in Turkey from a bureaucratic intellectual view point; wc 
conceive (hem from the view point of the people. In RPP the view angle has 
changed. In RPP the idea of revolutionism has changed. Revolution now means the
^^^Biilent licevit, Ortanın Solu, 85-91.
'-^^'fhis very contradictory position is clear in Bülent licovit, Atatürk ve 
Devrimcilik (İstanbul: Pekin Ya^'inevi, 1969).
’-^•‘’Bülent licevit, Bu Düzen Değişmelidir, 256.
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inlVaslrucliiral revolut ion."Lef t  of centre develops its concepts on this basis of 
antagonisms.
Left of centre can easily be analysed on three dominating concepts. Fhese 
arc populism, statism and nationalism. This basis of the ideology makes it more 
prone to traditional RPP ideology. On the other hand, Cem stales that the 
motivating lactor behind the ideology is the wsearch for an expanded democracy. 
riiis selling is closely connected with the .socio-|X)lilical essence of llic masses 
which RPP wants to get into an interaction. Though the cmpric data is rare on this 
groimd, when 'fachau's'^^and 0/,budun's’ ‘^^ analyses are taken in conjuncture 
with the natural shifts, transformations and the changes in the body of voters. 
Gem's basic assumption is validated; that is "the reconciliation attempt and trial of a 
party relying on petit-bourgeoisie basis with masses."''’* ’ Left of centre in this 
process eleaily stales that it would sup|X)i l the rights of the workers, peasants and 
even civil servants.'“'*' The nationalism-populism and statism is the framework of 
grasping this task. This loose-knitted structure of left of centre gives populism a 
primorilial and ambiguous character as Emrealp has observed, becaii.se it rlid not
L^b|Uilent lieevit Açıklıyor, MiUiyet^ (July 6, 1970), also in Siina Kili, 
ClirUle, Z() I.
*■^715-11,^ 111 ('em, Soldaki Arayış (Istanbul: C>eni Yayınevi, 1994), 27.
I^Sfrank I'achau with Mary-Jo D. Good, "'I’he Anatomy of I’olitical and 
Social Changer furkish Parlies, Parliaments and lilections" in 
Comparative Politics, (July 1973), 551-573.
* -^ ‘^ lirgun Ozbudun, Social Change and Political Participation in Purkey 
(Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1976).
*99i,smail Cem, Soldaki Arayış, 27.
*91 İlkay Sunar, Stale, 176-181.
131
hold a llicorclically dclcrmincd naliirc.’'^’^  jj. ^dcxscd by Sunar,
saying that "for example populism means socialism to some and a mixed planned 
ctonomv to nllu is."' ' * I'lu' sanx' (‘oiutifion, again as nolcd hy Stinat . is also (inr 
loi die eoncepi of slate.· ' ·
Populism, then, might be put as the crux of the left of centre concept and the 
ollu'i (wo, nalioiialism and sialism aic Ihe loofs used l<» hold lh(' foiima. I'liis is 
obvious and ciucial when Lxevit says, "what drives me lo gel involved in the 
labour issues arc primarily the populism and s t a t i s m . T h i s  is, in the process of 
establishing a coalition with the peasants, as Yiicekök s t a t e s , i s  also another 
instrument used for fulfilling the nationalist expectations. Statism is not the 
nationalisation of all tools of production. Ecevit, stresses this point. In his 
reasoning when all Ux)ls of pnxiuction is nationalised then the economic power 
vvouhl be monopolised in the stale which does not mean (hat it is Ihe people's 
power (halk iktidarı). It is more the alienation reached between the state and the 
people lot (he slate would (um lo be a dominating power over Ihe |xx)plc.'''^ Then, 
statism should have a moic populist and nationalistic chaiacicr. It must be, for
i'^^vSadun linırealp, Sosyal Demokrasiden 'Sosyal Demokrasi'ye... 
(İstanbul: Afa )^ayınlan, 1991), 140.
İ43jı^;ay Sunar, State , 175.
1^4ibid.
^45/% 2'dc ClIP'nin Gövüşüdnönü ve C.H.PF'li Bakanların 20-23 iem nuız 
¡1 Başkanlar! Toplantısındaki Konuşmaları (Ankara: Rüzgarlı Matbaa, 
I9()2), 86-87.
^^ ’^Ahmet Yiicekök, 100 Soruda Türk Devrim Tarihi (İ.slanbul: Gerçek 
Yayınevi, 1984), 112-115; Sadrın limrealp. Sosyal, 184.
'^^lirgun Ö/.bakır, Dünyada ve Türkiye'de Demokratik Sol Belgeler 
(Ankara: Kalite Matbaası, 1977), 239.
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example, (he ttalionalisalion oC |)clroleum rcsoiiieos, whieh is a slop lakcn against 
imperialism and it should include the land rcl’orm which is the only cure against the 
communism danger. This combination o( nationalism with populism is epitomised 
when Ecevit underlines the unseggregated merging of populism and nationalism as 
"populism in the country is nationalism for the outer w o r l d . T h i s  is what 
briefly put by Kcydcr as, "the dcvciopmcntalist, nationalist stream within 
Kcmalism has (bund an echo in the anti-imperialism of the left."
The togetherness of these concepts docs not inhibit the new epistemology 
brought by left of centre polities in the Turkish political life in the post 1965 jxMicxl. 
riic basis of (his evolution is the admittance of the class notion.'·’'*’ Unlike the 
traditional RPP and Ketnalist approach towards the denial of the existence of the 
diKerent classes in the society and, the ambition of developing a corporatist state, 
the lef t of centre starts by assuming this reality at least thiough thb accentuation of 
peasantry and labour. I'his is intcipreted as a new coalition not only between 
[)casan(s and (he RPP but also between (he organised lab(Hir and the RPP. 1'his is 
understandable as long as the sducture ('if early Republican era is considered. In 
that f)criod what is dominant in the country is the agricultural, sometimes referred 
as piovincial notables in this thesis, and small business or trade bourgeoisie. This 
was (nore or less in accordance with the RPP. But, beginning by the 1950s when 
the gravity of the social structure is shifted towards industrial bourgeoisie, uniting 
with the ccntie right politics in Turkey, the repercussion is the RPP's search for a
■ 48güient licevit, Iht Düzen , 201.
 ^•^ ‘^ Çağlar Kcydcr, '¡'he Slate and Class in Turkey (London, Verso, 1986), 
168.
' •‘’dsadun limrealp. Sosyal, 180; İlkay Sunar, State, 176-177.
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coalition with the organised l a b o u r . T h i s  is, more than anything else is the 
introduction of antagonistic politics into the Turkish political a g e n d a . T h i s  is 
al.so to admit that politics is a hegemonic practice.* ^^  Related with this it could also 
he said that, together witli the TLP praetiee, left ol centre has urged tlie 
development ol' class identity and consciousness in Turkey and in this sense it 
might be suggested that it is a step in the modernisation of the political structure.
4.3.2.4. The Phases and the ceniralisation of Left of Centre
in RPP
The receiving of left of centre as the basis of the party politics in RPP has 
been a troublesome procedure. The transition to left of centre as a new ideology in 
RPP is important as it shows the new coalitions and the new cleavages backing 
RPP. It is also a benchmark exhibiting the breakage of traditional symbiotic 
iclations established in the mono-party period. This procedure also embodies even 
the elimination of İsmet İnönü from the party chairmanship.'-'^
The development of the left of centre politics in RPP could be divided into 
three periods. The first phase is the incorporation of the intra-pai ty power by left of 
centre politicians. In this process Bülent Ecevit is elected as the secretary general of
TSlsadun limrealp, Sosyal, 190.
• lirdogan, "Demokratik Sol ve Sosyal Demokratik Portreler", in
Birikim, n. 44, (December 1992), 27-32.
'-“^ -^Ibid., 32.
*54pQi- a discussion of this development see Metin Heper, İsmet İnönü; 
Melin Poker, İsmet Paşa'nm Son Yıllan 1965-1973 (Ankara: Bilgi 
Yayınevi, 1993).
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RPP in the XVIII. Congress of October 18, 1966.’-“’^  This congress has been the 
first ground for the clash of the left and right wing, lead by Turhan Fey/.ioğlıı, in 
RPl·’. '“''^* l ey/ioglu, with a group around him, characterised as "liberal and middle- 
of-the-road group" by Karpat'-'’'^ , since the beginning, has insisted on the point that 
left of centre politics is an ideology prone to socialism, a shift from Kemalist tenets 
and moving away from the six arrows principles of RPR.'"'^ In (he .same line with 
his views Feyzioglu, has succeeded to convince İnönü to have in the Statement 
proclaimed by the congress that "RPP is not and will not be a socialist party" 
Nevertheless in the same statement wiiat once more announced is that RPP is a 
party on (he left of c e n t r e . T h e  continuing unrest between the two groups has 
ended in the Fxtraordinary Congrc.ss of April 28, 1967.'^’’ The congress has 
decided to dismiss Feyzioglu and his other close seven friends from the party. But
 ^' '^' I'lic background of Feevit's election, in a sense, nomination, by 
prestigious chairman İnönü, in the party council, which was already 
controlled by Feevit, as a succsess reached in the congress, is found 
"Feevit Siyasi Hayatım Anlatıyor", Cuinlniriyct, (January 25, 1975).
I ■'^<>S’Lina Kili, СИГ’йс, 229-237.
'•'►^Kemal Karpat, "Military Interventions: Army-Civilian Relations in 
lurkey before and After 1980" in Slate, eds., M.lleper and A. Fvin, 145.
> Turhan l eyzioğlu et. al., СИР Faili Meclisine Sumıhın Önerge: 
IJmıırsuzJuğun Sebepleri ve Giderilme Yollan (Ankara: Doğuş 
Matbaacılık ve 'Ticaret Ltd. Şti. Matbaası, 1967).
XV///. Kurultayı Uildirisi (Ankara: Ulusal basımevi, 1966).
li>< l^bid., 3.
161 por the details o f this congress see ClIP Gene! Başkanı İnönü'nün IV. 
Olağanüstü Kurultayı Açış Konuşması (Ankara: Ulusal basımevi, 1967); 
CHP Genel Başkanı İsmet İnönü'nün Partiiçi Sorunları İnceleme 
Komisyonuna Sunduğu Rapor {Ankara: Ulusal basımevi, 1967); /V. 
Olağanüstü CHP Kurultayı Bildirisi {Ankara: Ulusal basımevi, 1967).
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I 'cy/.ioglu with his 48 (Vicnds resigned from llie p a r t y . d ' h e  impact of Fey/,ioğlu 
and his Iriends movement on the left of centre politics has been interesting. As an 
answer to their unending reaction against this concept, especially İnönü has felt 
himself obliged to situate the notion between a real left and AtatUrkisin.^^^ jg 
po.ssibic to say that criticisms concerning the eonlent of left of centre'^’'* has 
emanated basically from this condi t ion .But  with the purge of Fey/.ioglu group, 
the left of centre movement has sUirtcd its second period which lasted up until 
1972. Before an analysis, it should be noted that this eradication shows that RPP 
has moved away from its traditional coalition with the bureaucratic elite as well as 
from the provincial notables in the process of "encouraging the mass participation 
in ])olilics"
The second period is a product of an eminent issue. It is the 12 March 
military intervention via an ultimatum addressed to the parliament and Ecevit's 
resignation Irom the post he was holding in the party as reaction to the following 
events. According to Kar pat, "the take-over of March, 1971 drew its impetus (Vom 
the old tradition of the army's assoeiation with the statist-elitists and the RPP."‘^ >’^
lOZpei-Q/ Hedia furgay Ahmad, Türkiye'de Çok Partili Politikanın 
Açıklamalı Kronolojisi 1945-1971 (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1976), 326- 
327.
İnönü Ortanın Solu'nu Anlatıyor. CHP Nedir, Ne Değildir? (Ankara: 
Ulusal Basımevi, 1967).
'f ’^ ^Celal Bozkurl, Siyaset l'ariliiniizde C.H.P.: Dünü, Ihiffünü, İdeolojisi, 
Siyaset İlini Açısından Bir İnceleme (n.p:n.p, n.d), 184-187.
If’İ^SunaKiIi, C7/P'dc, 241.
If’^ ’llkay Sunar, State, 177-178.
^^ ’^ Kernal Karpat, "Military Interventions", 147.
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Karpal linds Ihc reason for mililary's parting away from the RPP is (he party's 
reliance on left of centre politics. According to the author, "RPP gradually 
discarded Kcmalism as an ideology and look a position opposed totally to the basic 
tenets of the republican r e g i m e . " T h e  first part of this proposition might be 
accepted that beginning by mid 1960s there occurred a tension between the army 
ami llic Rl'l’ especially with the radical statist part of the military. 'I’his has reached 
its cmx with İnönti's non compromising intervention against the Talat Aydemir 
attempt. Besides, among RPP the party members who had a kind of affiliation with 
Aydemir junta, like Avni Doğan, has been expelled from the party.i^^ ^
Kaipat's second argument is open to debate. It is clear that RPP has tried to 
enlarge the limits of AtatUrkisl tenets and Ecevit, at the beginning, was holding a 
more critical situation about those principles also criticising the mono-parly 
ideology and sli ucture of RPP as explained before. But, RPP, cannot be said that 
has given away or moved away from those tenets. Yet, Karpat defines Ecevit and 
his followers using the most overwhelming and determining ideas among the 
military as 'seciilarist-statist-elitist."i^^’The 1971 ultimatum in fact reflects a more 
confu.scd character. The ultimatum not only condemns tacitly the existing
H>8ibitl., 147.
li»‘^ Avni Doğan has been dismissed from the party, December 11, 1962 
together with other two very prominent members, Kasim Gulek, Nihat 
lirim, for one year, fhe reason for this dismissal was the relation of 
these memberes with the army. Nevrtheless this allegation has never 
been pronounced officially and only Avni Doğan has been criticised on 
this ground. For these details CUP Yayın Bürosu, СИГ Bünyesindeki 
Gelişmeler (Ankara: Rüzgarlı Matbaa, 1962). la te r Talat Aydemir, in his 
memories mentions that not only Doğan but also other members have 
been involved iii the preperation of 21 May attempt. 'I’alat Aydemir, Ve 
'¡'ixhit Aydemir Konuşuyor (Istanbul: May Yayınları, 1966), 193-194.
Karpat, "Military Interventions", 148.
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governmenl and asks the formation of a new one which would, with an AtatUrkist 
view, implement the reforms envisaged by the Constitution^^* This demand 
brings llic contradiction of reception concerning the concept of 'constitutional 
reforms.''^2 According to Beevit, the 12 March ultimatum was against him and the 
left of centre p>olitics.*^ 3 j..|e jhinks that all efforts they have exerted for democracy 
have been ruined and the gist of the ultimatum is to stop the democratic 
m e c h a n is m .O n  the other hand in spite of the ultimatum pronounces the 
conslilulional icfomi, in lime, proving FxcviCs approach, Ihc new Nihal Ivrim 
govcinmcnl has amended the constitution in the opposite direction, in accordance 
and in coalition with Demircl's Justice Parly, saying that the existing one was close 
to socialism and was a luxury for a country which is in need of rapid 
development.'”^-'’ In fact the amendment was Demirel's demand since the beginning 
in search of a more strong executive.
'file crisis that 12 March Ultimatum gave birth in RPPearne into view when 
İnönü decided to support the Erim government.'^^This abstract will for the backing
'7 'l 'o r  the original text of the ültimatom sec Kurtul Altuğ, 72 A7art ve 
Nihat lirim Olayr, in the translation I benefited from hero/ Ahmad, 77ie 
Making, 148.
•72fs|evertheless it is interesting that the 1901 Constitution has been 
amended by the military junta in the direction that has been fervently 
supported by the conservative Justica Party, See, Bülent l'anör, Osmanh- 
Türk Anayasal Gelişmeleri (İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınlan, 1998), 364- 
381.
I7.1"|;ce\/it 12 Mart ve Sonrasını Anlatıyor", Cumhuriyet, (l ebruaıy 1 I, 
1975).
174(7/1,,ç, (March 22, 1971).
175 İsmail Cem, Tarih Açısından 12 Mart: Nedenleri, Yapısı, Sonuçlan 
(İstanbul: Cem Yayınları, 1980),
170"|nönü'nün Parti Grubu Konuşması", Milliyet , (March 16, 1971).
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of a mililaiy controlled government has been concretised when Nihat Erim, a 
memlx'i of Rl^P parliamentary group nominated as the prime minister.'’^ The same 
day, 21 March 1971, Ecevit not participating the party council meeting which 
would decide to give confidence vote for Erim government, resigned from the 
|X)sition of secretary genera!.'^® In the following years Ecevit insisted that 12 
March is a plot against not only to him but also to RPP because the left of centre 
politics of the party would be dissolved in a above-party bureaucratic-techncx^ratic 
govern men t' '^  ^and İnönü's support was enabling this procedure.
Ecevil, after his resignation, has continued his activities in the provincial 
congresses.'^' Besides, Inönll frei|uently declared his discomibrt with the party 
council backing E c e v i l . Kemal Satır, a prominent parly member, and his group 
in the party against Fxevit, backing and backed by Inraitl according to Party 
Regulation called for an extraordinary congress to defeat Ecevit and his friends.'^-'' 
file congress is held May 6, 1972.'^ After the speeches delivered by Satır and
Milliyel, (March 22, 1971).
•78|bid.
179(//„,s-^  (March 22, 1971).
180gülent hce\'it. Perdeyi Kaldırıyorum (Ankara: Ajans lü rk  
Matbaacılık Sanayii, 1972), 14.
'«'ibicl., d5.
182y\/////vx>(, (pebruary f), 1972).
'«-^Hikmet Ihla, C//P,351-352.
I84'i’he offical date for the congress is May 5, 1972. But that very day due 
to İnönü's sickness the congress is postponed to the May 0, 1972.
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Eccvil'^-\ Ihc leaders of two clashing groups, the next day in the voting procedure 
the parly council reached the confidence and by the May 8, 1972, İnönü resigned 
from Ihc chairmanship of Also Kemal Satır and his friends resigned from
the p a r l y .T h e  congress to elect the chairman of the party was held May 14, 
1972 and Ecevil became the leader. This is left of centre's taking power in the RPP 
and closing of the second phase of it, started by 1965. That politics shortly after 
this development is changed into democratic left politics.
The 12 March ultimatum among the Turkish intellectuals has been based on 
four issues. First of all, it was regarded as the last attempt of the 'petit bourgeois 
(in the) 'from the above' rad ica lism .H ere , the concept 'radicalism' signs the 
traditional Kemalist attitudes. In fact, the first Erim government is called 'brain 
trust' and embodies former army officers and technocrats. The government, as 
explained before, was established to carry out the reforms. Here, reforms, should 
be conceived as some measures taken to stop the unrest developed in the country 
through some socio-economic transformations, mainly the land reform. Second, 
it is a lulilc attempt foi a coalition between the commercial provincial bourgeoisie 
and industrial bourgeoisie as the former felt itself in danger thinking that .lustice 
Party governments had shifted towards the latter.’*^** I'hird characteiislic that paved
1 ^‘’Bülent ficevii, Kurultaylar ve Sonrası (Ankara: Şark Matbaası, 1972). 
186fv/fetin iicpcr, İsmet İnönü, 129.
' 87ıiik,net İhla, CHP, 370-372.
l^^AIi Gevgilli, Yükseliş ve Düşüş, 2nd.ed. (İstanbul: Bağlam Yayınları, 
1987), 521-581.
18‘^ Гог the firim Government Program see Kurtul Altuğ, 12 Mart ,30-37. 
•’^ •^Ismail Cem, Tarih Açısından, 364.
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the way lo the Ultimatum is the resistance of state elites-civil bureaucracy-military 
coalition to dcmocracy^^*. The last point is the last attempt to complete the 
Wcsicinisation piojcct through the above mentioned coalition.
RPP, seen as a peer resisting to these developments, with Ecevit's 
movement, in the same period has tried to constitute a new structure. This 
procedure includes various issues as such, i) RPP tried lo stay out of the slate 
clitcs-mililary coalition and break its links with it*'^ ·' but it docs not ignore the 
importance of the civil bureaucracy as might be deduced from the composition of 
the parliamentary group after the 1973 elections, ii) RPP supported the existing 
Constitution and resisted against its amendments as it believed that only the 
complete framework of the constitution enables the state todcvcibpc the reforms, 
like land reform. Hi) Left of centre politics in the split between the industrial 
bourgeoisie and the new emerging working class did not ignore the private sector 
but run for the latter. This is not a divisive and high tensioned approach; instead, 
the party tried to convince the bourgeoisie that only the social rights supplied to 
labour class would keep it away from radical m o v em en ts .iv ) Left of centre.
•‘^ llbicl., 305-376.
P>2ibid., 390-405.
the other hand Sunar and Sayan thinks that it is not the part}' 
driving away from the military but the military, who is staying 
indiffrenct lo the political developments, due to the growing 
radicali/.ation of the RPP. İlkay Sunar and Sabri Sayan, "Democracy in 
I'urkey: Problems and Prospects", in Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. 
Schmitter and laurence Whithead, eds.. Transitions from Authoritarian 
Rule (Baltimore, MD and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1986), US.
1‘^ ^l'his point has been criti/ed sharply by Marxist jeft; as an e.xample 
see: Sungur Savran, "CUP ve Sosyal Demokrasi:Bir İlişkinin Anatomisi ", 
in 11. Tez,4, 1986, 78-106.
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without denying the Kemalist tenets, followed a more populist poliey ineluding the 
search (or a new economic structure. It is interesting that, in this context, left of 
centre did not follow a remarkable new distribution policy as expected. It, instead, 
as seen, tried to provoke the investment gathered in foreign countries, v) Last, left 
of centre RPP was not against centralism and statism but slightly tried to reverse the 
Westernisation side of the modernisation. The second period of modernisation in 
Tui kcy will be discussed in the following section but before it needs to discuss the 
ttansition from left of centre to democratic left concept which is the third phase of 
RPP history before its closure by the 1980 intervention.
4.4. From Left of Centre to Democratic Left
4.4.1. The Development and the Meaning of the 
Concept
'I'hc 'official' transition to dcnKM:ratie left and quitting the utilisation oi left 
of centre concept as the party ideology is realised with the change ol'Statutes in the 
congress held for this purpose by June 28, 1974.^‘-^ 5 But, as Bila observes rightly, 
the concept first time has been introduced in the 'First Forum of Democratic Left 
Thought' in November 20-22, 1970.19 ’^The change, reached in the mentioned 
congress, carries the concept to the second article of the RPP S ta tu te s .T h is  
change rcliccts a sheer transition in the basic ideological understanding of the party, 
riic first article, grounds the basic principles of the party and brings a relatively 
new interpretation to the traditional principles of the party by saying; "Republican
Hikmet İhla, CUP, 395; Suna Kili, CllP'dc, 425-428. 
l ‘>f>llikmct İhla, CUP, 405.
Tüzük (İstanbul: Şevket Ünal Matbaası, 1974), 7.
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IVopIc's I’arly is, with ils nature explained in the Prof>ram, a republican, 
nalionalisl, populisl, laic and revolutionary political establishment."^*'**  ^This is the 
formalising and concrete end of a process started by the left of centre.
In the beginning, Eicevit seems to be more moderate in using the term as 
democratic left in lieu with social democracy. He is aware ol' the coincidence as 
well as resemblance between the two terms. For Ecevit they aie essentially one and 
the same concept. The reason wliy democratic left for is preferred is the belief that it 
reflects their task and aims better. Second, democratic left is a self-explanatory 
term.'***^  Ecevit, in his analysis carefully situates democratic left diametrically 
opposite to Marxism. Me characterises the crucial difference by .saying that while 
dcmociatic lei t encompasses the peasants scientific materialism excludes them.2^*^* 
But when he talks about the democratic left-labour relations, on another platform, 
he uses once more the social dciiKx r^acy as identical with the formcr.^ *^·
The shift to democratic left idea in various resources has been explained by 
Ecevit as an attempt of opening the party to the people.202 Although in his later 
explanations he declares that 'democratic left' concept has been chosen to show its 
difference from the Marxist originated 'social democracy'2«3, in an earlier speech
l^^Ibid., (), emphasis added.
Demokriilik Sol Düşünce 1Ъгшпи (Ankara: Kalite Matbaası, 1974), 6. 
^ooibid., 3.
^^^4)cmokriiiik Sol Düşünce Ibruinu , 4 Gill (Ankara: Kalite Matbaası, 
1976), 24.
'^d2p(ilcin I'cevil, " d l l ’ l'üzük Kurultayım Açış Konuşması", Milliyet,
( June 29, 1974).
2b3/^ıi/cni liccvit, Demokratik Şokla Temel Kavramlar, 52.
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he delivered, Ecevil, concludes lhat dcniocralic left is a left atliludc relying on 
liberal tleim)cracy, an idea merging national sovcicignty concept with public power 
(halk iktidarı) putting people above all classes. This needs the reinforcing the 
economic capability of the people. Nevertheless public power does not mean the 
total nationalisation of the prcxJuction kx)ls, even though up to a certain extent it is 
necessary. I'he boundaries of the process will be determined by the limits of liberal 
democracy. Democratic left is also to unite the economic and political power. 
Democratic left is not a from the above but a from the below leftism. <^>4 'p|,c 
democratic left concept of RPP has been officialised second time with the 
'Democratic Left Statement' proclaimed by the XXII Congress, held December 14,
1 0 7 4  2 0 5
4.4.2. lAffi of Centre amt Democratie Left Politics: A
Modernising Project
As has been noted before, Tachau views the transformation of the RPP 
from a cultural cleavage to functional cleavage. This point is also discussed by 
1 l e p e r . I  leper, in di.scussing the political structuic of 1980s refers once moie to 
the concept of functional and cultural cleavage and makes a distinction between the 
notions. According to him, "democratic elites and the military (or the state) elites 
may be said to primarily represent a 'cultural cleavage'" whereas" the functional
Ccnel Başkanı Bülent Ikevit'in CUP XXII. Kurultayı Açış 
Konuşması (Ankara: Güneş Matbaacılık I.A.Ş., 1975), 32,34.
^^^^CIIP Genel Başkanı Bülent IJcevit'in CHP XXII. Kurultayını Açış 
Konuşması, 38-40. This Statement should be taken together with the 
Statement for the 1973 General Elections: Akgünlere: CUP 1973 Seçim 
Bildirge.si (Ankara; Ajans Türk Matbaacılık Sanayii, 1973).
2()(>Mctin I leper, "Conclusion", in Stale,, 250.
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cleavage may move the regime towards moderate in s tru m e n ta lism .T h is  
comment also encompasses the possibilities of creating a civil society in Turkey. 
On the other hand, Gevgilili, tackling with the repercussions of left of centre, 
makes another suggestion. Aceording to him.
"left ol centre, in practice, is an eliort (u et)mbine (he 
statist/populist/centralist ideology of Ziya Gökalp with the 
yearnings of Kara Kemal or in general of the Ahi/Lonca tradition, 
creating a wide private/social ownership against the modern 
socialist and Marxist openings."208
Gevgilli, attuned to Küçükômer's view point, makes another remark which 
siUialcs the Icll of centre into its socio-political context with a comment as such: 
"the left of centre might be the last melaclass model produced by westernist petit 
bourgeoisie, which might also be relatively acentralist {merkez dt^i'ci) with its 
t e n d e n c ie s .Whether this remark is true or not is a matter of further analysis 
and, a research made by Heper^i'’ niight be helpful to understand the connection 
between the bureaucratic elites and Atatürk reforms backed by the bureaucratic elite 
since Ihe beginning. When a group of buteaucialic elites were questioned to icdcct 
on the idea that
Tabic I. "One of Turkey's most distinguished needs is well educated, 
experienced people to be active In the policy making process of government"
207ibid.
2^^Ali Gevgilli, Yükseliş ve Düşüş, 354. 
2Ü9lbid., 354.
Metin lleper, Hüroktcilik Yönelim Geleneği: Osnmnh Impnnıtorluğu 
ve Türkiye Cumhuriyet Gelişmesi ve Niteliği (Ankara: Ongun Kardeşler 
Matbaası, 1974).
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F strongly support tliis view 
1 agree vvilli this view
1 don't agree 
1 totally rejeel this view 
eei lain view
20
12
1
Source, Metin lleper, lUlrokraiik Yönetim Geleneği, 154.
Another question witli the answers obtained was
Table 2. "Point out the two issues as 'the first' and 'the second' among the 
others ns you have considered the most important issue all through your 
office-life
146
Seulement of demœraey in 
'l’iirkey
Proteetion of A ta tü rk  
rel'orms
Beonomie development of 
Tuikcy
To find solutions to the 
problems of eeo n o m ic  
devcb^pmcnl and soeial 
Itanslomialioii
First
6
18
Seeond
8
5
12
Source, Metin Ileper, ttUrokratik Yönetim Geleneği, 153; Ahmet Yücekök, 100 
Soruda, 114-115.
riiis analysis shows that (hcie is a slionj» coalition between the bineaueialic· 
elites and the Kemalist tenets and ideals. But this relation is more obvious in the 
answers given to another question.
Table 3. "To save Turkish political life out from some of the basic troubles it 
might be compromised from some of Atatiirkist principles ns laicism, 
nationalism and revolutionism
I strongly support this view 
I agree with this view 
I don't agree 
I toUiIly reject this view 
No certain opinion
0
0
15
21
0
Source, Metin Ileper, lUirokratik Yönetim Geleneği, 154.
Another question enlightens that even in a clasit between Atatiirkist and 
scientific approach the former is overwhelming the latter.^' i
'ibid., 154.
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In this sense, any party supporting the Kemalist ideals and staying close to 
them would be |>rc('crrcd by this group. 7'hc second evidence might be llic election 
results. When the RPP vote composition is analysed not only the shifts but also the 
explanation for the intra-party struggle might be understood. As Tachau observes 
with a reference to Feroz Ahmad, the left of centre was a kind of in-between 
maxim. It was too progressive for the status quo supporters and disillusionary lor 
(he radicals.2(2 reflection of this situation on the votes would better be 
undeislood if it is compared with the 1950 election results. According to Tachau in 
this liisloiical dcfcal.
"traditional elites continued to dominate the politics of less 
developed aicas; that these elites continued to suppoi t the RPP as 
they had since the formation of the republic; and that they 
controlled the votes of their clients, the peasants. By contrast, the 
society and polities of the more highly developed parts of the 
country were considerably more complex (...) Moreover, rural 
peasants in these more modern parts of the country were more 
likely to enjoy greater autonomy and prosperity, and thus to 
support DP-sponsored departuies from (lie stale centred policies 
traditionally favoured by the RPP."2(3
'I’liis condition might be linked to the modernising character of the left of 
centre politics. If Gevgilili's view point is taken into consideration than, in the 1969 
elections, after long lasted struggles within the RPP, around the left of centre 
concept, the party with respeet to 1965 elections, still witnessed a drop in the voles 
given. The %28.7 of 1965 elections now reduced to %27.4. This is interesting for 
two reasons. The first analysis should bear the composition of the voles taken 
together with the drop. For Tachau, the most significant issue in the composition of
212peroz Ahmad, Turkish Experiment in Democracy, 1950-1970 (London: 
C.IIurst, 1977), 251; Frank Tachau, "Republican", 108.
21-hTank I'achau with Mary-Jo D. Good, , " I'hc Anatom}/", 570.
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the votes are observed when regional support of the party is discussed. 1^4 Before 
the 1965 elections, Tachau observes that, RPP has traditionally been strong in the 
IcSvS developed liastein region of 'furkey. 'I’liis is due to the party-local notables 
connection. As local notables had a direct effect on the clients and directed them to 
vote for RPP, the region became the most important ally of the party.^'5 But 
beginning by left of centre politics as the party rejected this alliance, especially as 
this break and loss of enthusiasm became apparent when one-third of the RPP left it 
and founded the Reliance Party (Güven Partisi), in 19672i<>, especially in the 
following elections of 1969 the regions supporting the RPP showed a remarkable 
change:
"in 1950 the party drew its largest proportion of votes in the least 
developed eastern regions and made its worst showing in the most 
highly developed Marmara region. In 1965 and 1969, the party 
obviously suffered bruising setbacks, loosing strength in all 
regions. In terms of relative performance, however, the party 
recorded an increase in the proportion of votes it received in the 
wore developed regions from J965 to 1969, while it continued to 
lose strength in other areas, especially the least developed 
Southeast. Thus the region in which the RPP was weakest in 1950 
was the region of its greatest strength in 1969, and vice versa.
Not as the only reason but this condition might be taken as an indicator that 
left of centre politics, even though it is strictly related with lower classes, in time 
became a policy rooted in the urban environment. This is due to two reasons. The 
first one is the changing character of the urban life. Alter 1950 as studies have
^'^Ibid., 571-572.
^15ibid., 571.
^'^’ I hc long process of this debate is found in hero/, Ahmad, '¡he 
Milking,144; Suna Kili, CllFde, 222-242.
217'rachau, 563-564; emphasis added.
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shown incliopolitan areas arc loaded with working class. Il is presumed that RF^ I^  
in this region is backed by this new emerging force. Second, when the 
backgrounds of members of parliament is analysed by parly, significant results are 
achieved sustaining this hypothesis. Tachau's study shows that as party policy 
moves towards left of centre, especially in the 1965 and 1969 pcritxis, the social 
backgrounds of the party parliament group members show interesting 
characteristics. In comparison with DP and JP three qualifications display the 
below results.
'lal)lc 4. The social characteristics of the members of parliamentary in the 
1950-1969 period
1 9 5 0 1 9 6 5 1 9 6 9  .
D P R P P JP R P r
% % %
O c c u p a t i o n
o i  l i e i a l 3  5 1 9 3 0 2 5 3 0 3 6
l i c e  p r o l e s s i o n a l 3 5 4 6 53 4 6 5 1 4 6
H d u ca t io n
u n i v e r s i t y  l e v e l ,
i n c lu d in g  m ili tary  
u n i v e r s i t y  l e v e l
7 9 7 3 91 7 4 7 4 6 9
e x c l u d i n g  m ili tary 7 8 6 9 6 6 6 5
P o l i t i c a l  e x p e r i e n c e
p r e v i o u s  p a r l ia m e n ta r y 5 6 1 7 61 4 8 3 6 5 2
e x p e r i e n c e
Source, Aficr, Frunk Tnclinii with Mnry-Jo I). Good, "The Annlomy of Politicnl 
and Social Change", 557.
^l^Ibid., 557; table modified.
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When these figures are eompared with the results of a later analysis it is 
seen that the condition has not changed remarkably after the 1973 elections in 
which RPP declared itself as a democratic left party and introduced a more radical 
|)rogiam with respect to other parties.
Table 5. Social characteristics of the members of the parliamentary in the 
post-1973 period
oœupatioii
burcaiicralic 
iVee piolTcs. 
cdncalioii
univ. level
RPP JP NSP
% % %
26.4 24.4 12.2
48.5 37.9 44.0
70.6 64.0 65.3
Source, Frank Taclinu and with Mary-Jo D. Good, "The Anatomy of Political 
and Social Change”, 554.
As seen, higher edueation percentage rises from 79 to 91 between 1950 and 
1965. Besides, political cxpciicncc is always ahead of centre right parties and the 
same increase is observable also for the free professionals. Both qualifications 
might be taken as the indicators of the effect of urban lile as well of higher classes 
in the RPP structuring. This very condition is related with two more issues. The 
first one is still the left of centre politics is a part of the 'from the above 
modernisation' yet it accentuates a populist policy. Second, the social 
transformation propo.sed by left of eentre RPP, espeeially in the 1969 elections, by 
the publication of a program called 'RPP's Transformation Program'^''^ lists fifteen 
issues in need of transformation. These are, 1. transformation legarding the
İnsanca Bir Düzen Kurmak İçin Halktan Yetki İstiyoruz: CHP'nin 
Düzen Değişikliği Programı (Ankara: Ulusal Basımevi, 1969).
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peasants; 2. (ransilion to irulcpcncicnl industrial society; 3. a humanitarian forest 
order; 4. contemporary and populist education order; 5. national foreign policy and 
national defence policy; 6. new and populist order in the eastern region; 7. national 
order in the natural resources; 8. principals and tasks of an efficient and just 
economic order; 9. a humanitarian labour order; 10. social security order; II. social 
dwelling, land and urbanisation order; 12. populist and revolutionary law order; 
13. administrative transfoiination^^*’; 14. constitutional changes as a new 
constitutional order is established; 15. Towards the new order: amnesty."22i 
These, all together have changed not only the character of RPP but also the 
structure of rural area political participation^^^ as well as the urban environment 
|X)litical behaviour.
Some of thc.se principles might 1x3 rc.scrvcd as a project of nKxIcrni.sation in 
coincidence with Ecevit's presumption that Kemalistrefonnation was inadequate to 
transform the substructure, i.e. the society.223 What is interesting here is that this 
setting is based on the data obtained through a survey. It has been carried out 
among the provincial leaders of the party and the results reflect the complaints of 
the province. They are in general, agricultural, land, inadequate economic order 
problems like banking and credit issues. The educational problems arc still related 
with the economic shortcomings. The other insufficiencies are related to health
‘^ '^ ^^ 1 have translated 'düzen dcğişkiliği' as 'transformation' but it could 
also be translated as 'change of order.'
221c7/P'n/n Düzen Değişikliği Programı, 135.
222p]-gun Özbudun, Social Change, 118-126 and 152-182.
Bülent I'cevit, Atatürk ve Devrimcilik.
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system, disorganised state administration and other bureaucratic defects and 
partisanship.224 They all reflect the problems of pre-modernity.
Conclusion
Dc|X'iKİing on these paiameters and variables the left of centre politics might 
be epitomised as a part of the traditional RPP politics regarding the transformation 
of the society, with a 'revolution from the above."225 Here the coalition the party 
constructs shows a shift substituting the traditional and stiuctural state elites and 
military with intelligentsia emerging as a new eleavage in the .society and petit 
bourgeoisie. Together with the .socialist left, the left of centre politics has 
introduced the class con.sciousncss and class ba.sed politics into the |X)litiaU agenda. 
Politics, for the first time, however tacitly, conceived as a hegemonic practice. The 
pressure im|x).sed by the radical left has from time to time |)ushed left of centre 
policy to declare that it is not scxialism and the only possibility to hinder it. On the 
other hand, the same politics would stand for the land (xcupiitions by the peasants. 
This eclectic structure has ended up with the transfonnation of left of centre politics 
to demcxratic left and the ehange in the party leadership. The demcxratic left politics 
is a tlef initive decision reached that it is completely different and distinciated f rom 
the univensal Marxist background. Democratic left has always been formulated as a 
politics detached from social democracy. Both left of centre and democratic left 
politics is the last attempt to continue with the traditional methodology of the
XX. Kurultayı Parti Meclisi Raporu (Ankara: Ulusal basımevi, 
1970), 163-164.
frimberger, Revolution from  the Above (New Brun.swick, N.J.: 
fransaciion books, 1978).
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modernisation, i.e. from the above reforms developed under the control of the 
cliles. It is, in short, a new mctliod developed to keep the new emerging classes 
under the control and the tone of 'people' added to the party discourse should be 
conceived in this framework.
In this context, it could be said that both left of centre and dcmcxratic left 
politics fit in the traditional republican ideal of modernisation. The early 
modcrnisatit)n movement was the construction of the nation state, the national 
identity and the early introduction of mtxlcrn institutions even if with much 
deficiency. In the second period of modernisation, through the new approaches 
RPP has developed, Turkey is prc.scntcd the construction of political identity, the 
increasing of political participation and the acceptance of class notion. This is the 
surpassing of a corporatist state model and the implementation of class ba.sed, 
ideology oriented and polarisation grounded politics.2^ 6 in (his sctisc, there are also 
some shortcomings of RPP's 'new deal.' The first one is the importance given to 
populism which disabled the party to move towards a more libertarian politics. 
Second, the left politics of RPP with its populist character also kept the parly away 
from a more radical and 'real' left or social democratic policy. The party, in the 
final analysis stayed loyal to the expectations of the stale clilcs and military 
coalition. The basic shortcoming and the constraint of left ol centre and democratic 
left politics is that, over the intrcxluction and aecentuation of new concepts, in the 
effort of encompassing new developing social strata in the society, the parly 
epistemology tried to find a middle of the road policy which was a combination of 
basic, traditional Kcmalist tenets with the new vocabulary and catch the control of
^^^MTank I'achau and Metin Ileper, " fhe Stale, Politics and the Military 
in I'urkey", in Comparative Politics, 16;!, (October 1983), 24.
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the new developments. It was an attempt to eontimic with the oiganie society and 
(rom liic above modernisation by ineiilealing the new c(^nccpts into Kemalism or 
reading Kemalism with the new vocabulaiy.227xhis contradictions emanating form 
the eclectic character of the new politics might be seen as the most determining 
(actors in the difficulties Turkish S(xial dem(x:racy meets in (he |X)st 1980 |x;ri(Kİ.
^^^ rhis is a condition of 'discourse.' Aziz-el Azmah has shown that Islam 
has been read with the vocabulary of Western positivist thinking. What 
has happened within the boundaries of left of centre and democratic 
left polilicis is not different than this development. The analysis of 
what Aziz el Azmeh has said will be done in Chapter VIII, when Islam- 
Kemalism and modernisation is discussed.
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CHAPTER V
1980s AND THE CRISIS OE SOCIAL DEMOCRACY: THE 
NEW SEARCH FOR MODERNISM
5.1. The Dissection niul the Anatomy of the 1980s
5.J.I. MilUary Intervention and its Aftermaths
1980s slarlcd in Turkey with a military coup. 'Phis was the third attempt of the 
cirmy to hold office in the last twenty years. The peri(xl anticipating the military 
intervention, which was more furious and radical than the first two, was marked by 
the political polarization and ambiguity terrorist activities that ended up with political 
unrest giving birth to political assasinations.' Other than those, it is demarcated that 
"the crisis which spawned the 1980 military intervention in Turkey was multifaceted, 
including economic breakdown, civil violence, and open challenges to such highly 
symbolic values as secularist nationalism .O n the other hand, according to later 
explanations what played the leading role in the pre-intervention ¡political life was the 
inability of the political parties, belonging to different ideological wings, to form
Mrank 'Pachau and Metin lleper, "'Phe State, Politics, and the Military in 
Purkey." Compiirative Politics (October 1983): 17-33.
^Ibid., 25.
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coalitions in the parliament.^ Especially the unending and inefficient, as well as 
blocked, process of trials to elect the president in the par liament scxui pushed the army 
lo interA'cnc.'·
liven though the military intervention is considered as a non-democratic 
takeover of the army, still a many of the writers were apt to see it as the only possible 
remedy lo dissolve the set of blockages. This is also true for the politicans. As Hale 
obser ves, when, after the coup, Bülent Ecevit, the former leader of RPP resigned 
from his post and star ted publishing a weekly magazine Arayış (Search), though he 
criticized "the aspects of the new regime he did not openly attack the necessity for the 
12 September coup."-  ^The only critical point was the scheduling of the inter vention. 
At this point there has been critical assumptions having a consequativc conclusion: it 
has been argued that the waiting of the army to intervene has cau.sed the increasing of 
the blood shed in the civil violence and, as everything is baffled the very day the cou|) 
has been rcali.scd, it is taken as a sign indicating that the political unrest was already 
under the control (T the army before the move. I his |xiinl has irsually been sup|X)r ted 
by the pre-intervention period politicans and especially by Süleyman Demirel, then the 
prime minister. As there was already a declared martial law' in some parts of the
■^A lengthy inventory of the events that were taken as the evidences of 
the position which was qualified as the 'cvl-de-sac' and, also as events 
indicating that nothing more could be done but the military intervention, 
is found, from the view point of the army, in General Secretariat of the 
National Security Council, 72 September in Turkey: Before and After 
(Ankara: Ongun Kardeşler Matbaasr, İ982).
^Kenarı livren, Kenan Tvren'in Andan, Vol. 1 (İstanbul: Milliyet 
Yayınlan, 1990).
^William Hale, " fransition to Civilian Government in l'urkey," in State, 
Democracy and the Military: Turkey in the 1980s, eds.. Metin Heper and 
Ahmet livin (Herlin, New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1988), 168-109.
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country and as, according to his explanations, especially in the National Security 
Council meetings, the military has been offered and supplied by any thing (hey would 
be in need of, the perpetuation of the political unrest might be taken as an indicaor of 
their unwillingness to solve the problem in the democratic regime/’
Not exactly this but a relatively similar point, i.e. the reasons for the over- 
careful approach of the army to intervene has been analysed by Taschau and Heper 
with two major presumption. The first, "the half-hearted nature and relatively 
indifferent results of the 1971 intervention" and the second, "the fear that a new 
intervention would exacarbate the politicization and factionalization of the army 
itself."^ In this context the authors sum up the 'raison d'etre' of the intervention on 
two points: (he loss of the complete erosion ol (he governmental authority aiul 
political polarization and uneasiness to form coalitions.^ Mere, the first point is of 
impoitance for, it docs not only indicate the army's distrust to the 1961 ( ’onstitution 
but also detemiines the nature of the intervention. Beginning by the latter, it is po.ssible 
to say, together with Ahmad, that the early explanations by Kenan Evren, chief of 
general stall'and the spokesman of the military Junta, showed "(hat the army was there 
foi· (he long haul."’-^ The first issue mentioned above, on the other hand, is clearly put 
by Zürcher as:
’^I'his point is reiterated by Karpat due to an interview with Süleyman 
Demirel, Kemal Karpat, "Military Interventions: Army-Civilian Relations 
in Turkey Before and After 1980," in State, Democracy and the Military: 
I'urkcy in the 1980s, eds.. Metin Ileper and Ahmet livin (Berlin, New York: 
Walter de Gruyter, 1988), 149, 150.
7'1'achau and Ileper, " I'he State", 25.
«Ibid., 25-26.
‘^ beroz Ahmad, The Milking o f Modern Turkey (l.ondf)n and New York: 
Routledge, 1993), 182.
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"in many ways, (he changes they wrought consislccl of undoing (he woi k 
of their predecessors, the perpetrators of tlic coup of 27 May I96()."'^^
Again this |X)in( is stressed by Ahmad as a 'counter-revolution whose aim was nothing 
short o( revoking all the political and socio-economic gains made by the country since 
I 9 6 0 ." ' ' riiis was obvious in the measures taken just alter the intervention when the 
National Security Council
issued decrees which suspended the constitution, dissolved parliament, 
closed down the political parties, detained their leaders, and suspended 
virtually all professional associations and confederations of trade
unions.'2
This makes a point certain that, the intervention "was not envisaged as a 
pennanont military regime but aimed toward (he eventual re-establishment of civilian 
parliamentary rulc."'^ Also, another challenging point in this context is what Karpat 
insists as
(|uitc unlike its predecessors, the military seem to have dclcrmined in 
detail the basic constitutional principles that would be enacted, the type 
of institutions that would be established...and the .sort of mechanisms 
that would be needed to ensure smooth lunctioning after the return to 
civilian rule.’^
^^ l^irik J. Zürcher, Turkey: A Modern History (l,f)ndon, New York: 
I.B.'l auris and Co lAd, 1993), 292.
Ahmad, The Making, 182.
'2|hid., 182.
'3Karpat, "Military," 148.
•'»Ibid., 149.
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This ambitious task is reduced to four points by Hale as
fiistly, to suppress terrorism; secondly, to restore economic growth and 
stability; thirdly, to introduce a new Constitution and legal arrangments 
which it was hoped would prevent another lapse into anarchy; fourthly, 
to work out effective arrangments witli the civilian politicians'-“’
In this context, the military icgime first banned all activities of the existing 
political leaders, then dissolved the political parties and later promulgated the new 
Political Parties Law in May 1983. This last attempt can be taken as one of the 
milestones in the reconstruction of the new political era and as an annex to the new 
Constitution, together with other reorganisations concerning the higher education and 
odici cultural instutions.
Bclorc passing to the short analysis of the 1982 Constitution, here, the essence 
of the 1980 military coup could be defined on the basis of military's state 
understanding. It could be said that thcl980 intervention, though shows some 
remarkable dilTcicnces with regard to the previous attempts of 1960 and 1971'^’, still 
undei lines some common points which goes back to the structuic and the mentality of 
the military, as well as its place in the political realm, together with the function it has 
realised since the beginning. Apart from the differences between the various 
endeavours and ventures, the prevealing points might be summarised as, "firstly its
1‘’William Hale, "Transition to Civilian Governments in 'furkey," in 5’iaie , 
ed. I leper and fivin, 166.
Karpat, "Military," 149; Hale, " fransition," 162-166.
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political inheritance from the Atatürk and earlier periods; secondly, Turkey's 
international situation."'’^ Both of the conditions arc directly and strictly related with 
the 'guardian role of the officers...deeply rooted in Turkey's past, until after the 
abolition of the Janniserics and the institutional reforms oi the 'I’anzimat, which is 
"reestablished by the patriotic seiwicc of the army during the struggle for independence 
under Atatiirk."*‘-^
Sequential to these remarks, it might be argued, as has been discussed by 
d'achau and 1 leper, with reference to Eric Nordlinger, that I ’urkish army has acted as a 
guardian army and in this sense it was the guardian of 'governmental authority, 
national unity and Atattlrkism.'^*’ Added to these is the point discussed by Bvin as, 
"the chief concern of the military in undertaking all three interventions Wcis to protect 
the state by reducing its vulnerabilitiy in the face of intra-elite conflict."^' Thc.se 
points, when taken as a whole, determine the central position ol the army as well as 
the legitimacy basis for the interventions it has performed. But, Sakallıoğlu, after 
iclaling the mililary's fX),sition once again with Kemalisin, makes an interesting rcmaik 
and says, "historically, not the Turkish military's attitude and discourse, but its
•^Ilale, "'fransition," 160.
George Harris, " fhe Role of the Military in Turkey," in State,, ed. lleper 
and livin, 180.
J^lbid., 180.
^d'l'adiau and lleper, " The State."
^ ' Ahmet livin, "Changing Patterns of Cleavages Before and After 1980," in 
'¡'he State, ed. lleper and livin, 204.
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slralcgic posilion/fronl within the political realm has determined the parameters of its
political involvement.''^^
Ill the 1980 inletvenlton, the military has been dependent on these variables in 
dilTering proportions. Nevertheless the 'guardianism' notion and concept might be 
taken as the premi.se when military enacts its task. However, this c()iu‘e|>l is strictly 
inleilwiiH'd with the stale slriicliire of riiikcy in the post ri>i)() |x'ii(Kl. l Yom this view 
point, as has been argued by Heper, the axis on which the military's activities are 
crsytalliscd is the interaction between the military and the state-civil bureaucratic 
clites.2-  ^The history of the military in this context, including the interventions, might 
be |)ul as its isolation from the society due to its vanguard role together with the 
civilian bureaucracy. This, naturally, gives birth to a twofold consequence. The first 
is the army's identification with the state, whereas the .second is its back and forth 
relation with the civilian cleavages usually staying akxif from the society.^'· The last 
point that could be bound to this approach is its relation with Kcmalism and 
iTKxlernisation which has been the crux of the 1980 intervention.
As has been observed by Karpat, one of the basic motivations of the 
intervention was the condition of Kemalism in the anticipating period. He succinctly 
observes that "on the eve of the 1980 takcewer, Kcmalism as a state philo.sophy had no 
longer a formal, organized reprevSentalion."^  ^Karpat, rightly connects this situation to
^^Oniit Ci/.rc Sakalhoglu, " fhe Anatomy of the Turkish Military's Tolitical 
Autonomy," Contparaf/ve/W/t/rs (January, 1997), 151-160.
2-^lleper, "State and Society in Turkish Political llxperience," in The State, 
eds., I leper and Gvin, 7-9.
^'^Sakallioglu, "'The Anatomy," 155.
2“>Karpat, "Military," 149.
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llie ideology that RPP derived beginning by the late 1960vS. The new direction that 
RPP has underlakcn as the 'left of centre' was not the rejection of the AtatUrkist tenets 
but coincidentally, a move to renew the ideological framework ol the party without 
much reference to the basie and already existing ideological concepts with a more 
pragmatic tone and touch. This was, more or less, the first crack obsci ved in the 
tiaditional coalition between the army-the state/bureticratic elites-RPP^ö. The last stress 
on the 'sacred pact'^^ has been the RPP's backing the 1960 coup. Nevertheless, as 
has İK’cn analysed in the previous chapter, when the 1971 intcivention via comminic|uc 
was realised RPP has already moved away from its basic and historical split. Bülent 
Ecevit, through his opposition against the intervention, surpas.sed not only İsmet 
İnönü, but also the the traditional understanding that army should be supported and 
not be left alone.
1971 inici vcniion, in (he icccnl political history ol I'uikey, has been the only 
move by the civilians to reject the agenda imposed on them by the army in a two year 
process. When the plot of having Faruk Gürler, the chief of staff hastily resigned from 
his post, elected as the president of the republic by the parliament, was declined with a 
coalition of partics29, this block has been shattered into pieces even though it was 
disguised for a long period of time with a continious stress ol the good relations 
between the governments and the military. But, it is clear that up until 1980, army has
144.
^^Ilasan Bülent Kahraman, "licevit, Ordu ve laiklik lişigi," R adikal, (June 
6, 1998), 16.
^^Melin I leper, İsmet İnönü: The Making o f a Turkish Stateperson 
(Leiden, Boston, Köln: Brill, 1998), 221-245.
29Alımad, The Making, 155; Harris, " l'he Role", 190; Zürcher, Turkey, 274.
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lost its not only political allies with respect to the pic-1960 period but also has 
witnessed the fading away of its ideological basis. Since then, the basic trajectory of 
the army has been threefold. The first one, the renewal of the ideology, second, the 
construction of a new political ally and, third, the method of involvement in the 
political realm. The 1980 military coup has been the landmark for alt these issues.
A(tci· the coup the measures taken to renew the fxilitical agenda and the realm in 
Turkey has been through a .set of legal reorganisations. The striking one among the 
others has been the dissolving of the existing political parties Just before the f irst 
meeting ol the Consultative Assembly^^’, October 23, 1981, by the decree dated 
October 16, 1981, one year after the banning of the political activities of the parties 
with the decree dated October 27, 198031. gven though the basic rca.son behind this 
development was the political conditon of the pre-1980 coup period and the 
unwillingness of the political parties and politicians in agreeing to stay away f rom the 
political life, according to General Evren's explanations32, still, more important than 
that, this step, as Karpat rightly observes, "ended the phase of moderni/ation that had 
begun with the founding of the Union and Progress Party during the Young Turk 
era."33 'I'his point has been stressed also by Ueper relerring not only to 1980 but also 
to the other intciwentions:
.^Opor an analysis of the structure of the Constituent Assembly see 
Aynur Soydan, "Danışma Meclisi'nde Üye Kompozisyonu," in Edip Çelik'e 
Arımığun: Değişen Dünyada İnsan, Hukuk, Devlet (İstanbul: lingin 
Yayıncılık, 1995).
31 Mehmet Semih (îemalmaz, "12 Pylül Rejimi," Yüzyıl Bilerken Cumhuriyet 
Dönemi Türkiye Ansiklopedisi, vol.l4 (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1996) 
97-1-998.
32Kenan livren, Kenan Evren'in Anılan, Vol. IV (İstanbul: Milliyet 
Yayınları, 1990), 68.
33Karpat, "Military Interventions," 157.
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"Tlic 1960-1961 and 1971-1973 military interventions were eondiieted 
basieally because the political elites had drifted from Atattlrkism and had, 
therefore, lost their legitimacy in the eyes of the intellectual-bureaucratic 
and, particularly, military elites.
Not only the links with RPP has been broken in this period but also the 
traditional tics with the civilian bureaucracy have also been wekened, for in the 
Government Programme of the Ulusu cabinet, constituted just after the inteiwention, it 
has been acclaimed that the civilian bureaucracy is the obstacle before the economic 
development. In the void occured by the fading away of AtatUrkist ideology, as a 
measure, the military under the regime of 12 September, started a new procedure ol 
the reconstruction of it, using the centennial ol Kemal Atatürk. The ideology 
developed in this period rellected once more the corporatist conceiving of sUite and of 
the organic society, more than the others, relying on the nationalistn, a concept whicli 
is inscribed in the 1982 Constitution.^^ The other attempt was once more towards the 
renewal of the transcendental state under the assumption that the state elites' 
detachment and aloofness from the society would reiterate and ignite the 
modernisation. It is in this context that the 1982 Constitution incorporates the notion 
of strong executive and, taken as a whole, the 12 September regime rejects the civil 
society.
^■^Metin llepcr, "'iransition to Democracy in Turkey: Toward a New 
Pattern," in Politics in the Third Turkish Republic , ed. Metin Ileper and 
Ahmet livin (Boulder, San Francisco, Oxford, 1994), 19.
-^■‘>Mctin 1 leper, '¡he State Tradition in Turkey (Beverly: The Fothen Press, 
198.S), 14-4.
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The second task that the military has set for itself, after the 1980 coup, has 
been the ct)iistitution of a political ally to replace the RPP which has already been 
deleted from the political realm. This is a cioicial point which can not be detached from 
the military's traditional way of getting involved in the political life. As Sakallioglu 
puts, 'fill kish army's dealing with the political life, if interventions arc taken as s|xjcial 
cases, has not been direct but indirect: "ever since the inception of the republic the 
military has tended to be politicized in an antipolitical, rather than above-political 
direction."·’·^ Even, according to the author, "the transition to competitive democracy 
in 1983 provides evidence of indirect in flu en ce .S ak a llio g lu  connects this 
development to military's exclusion from the political realm in the early republican 
period and concludes that "in the course of Turkish political development it was 
necessary (or the military to constitute a political front which claimed to be 
an tipolitical.N evertheless this condition should not be recepted as military's 
iiiapincss ill tlic .socio-political developments. Evidently the reality is the othei way 
round. "Military (...) can include not only direct but also indirect influences on the 
govcrnment"39 and "since 1983 the military has used legal/constitutional, 
historic/cultural, and structural reasons and mechanisms to retain its privilaged 
position in issuing demands, policiy suggestions, and warnings on political matlcr,"^^ 
Here, according to the author what differs Turkish militaiy
f^’Sakallioglu, " fhe Anatomy," 150. 
-^7ibid., 153.
•^Ibid., 150; emphasis added. 
■^‘>lbid., 1 53.
■^^ I^bid.
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"from armies elsewhere in the Third World is its acceptance of the 
legitimacy of both democracy and civilian rule...It is not practoiian; it has 
not tried to undermine democracy or usurp civilian authority. The Turkish 
military has not destroyed civilian-militaiy boundaries.
Here, interesting is that, in this model, although the military has refrained from 
diiccl involvement "they choo.se to wield influence in the structuring and vetoing ol 
political initiatives from a position outside the civilian authorities' constitutional 
conliol." '" I leper, contributes to this )x)int by .saying (lint Ihc army has taken an active 
but indirect lolc in the political realm through above-party cabincts.^3
This framework of analysis is important for two main reasons. The f irst is that, 
as also has been stressed by Sakallioglu, the military has enhanced its vetoing power 
more after each intervention and, second, for army defines itself as devoted to the 
solidaristic and corporatist national interest and as it caicf ully keeps itscii away (rom 
the direct involvement in controlling the system their influence lasts continiously on 
the system, no matter it is implemented and incorporated through an indirect way. This 
very last point is afso supported again by the condition that because the political 
system happens to be seemingly democratic and as the military seems not intervening 
it, the transformation of the system to a more democratic one is delayed due to the 
difficulty of perception. It is at this point that the army needs a political ally to 
perpetuate its existence in the political environment with the tacit acclaim that through 
the political tool control over the system could be regulated. The military with this 
role, in Heper's words, "assumed the function of the state" as all social cleavages.
41 Ibid.
4^1bid.
43Metin 1 leper, The State Tradition, 127.
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classes and particular groups interested in its own in te res ts .I t is also remarked by 
Heper that in the post 1980 militaiy intervention the aim of the reorganisations was to 
construct a 'transient transcendental state' wliich, in the iinal instant would transform 
the state into an instrumental regime.^^
Although this claim embodies a contradiction for, it is strictly connected with, 
let alone the impossibility, the difficulty of the transformation of a transcendental state 
into an instrumental polity. Nevertheless this is a common and shared understanding 
among a group of students of Turkish politics, Dodd being a member: "the Turkish 
Constitution of 1982 provides a fair enough plan for the creation of a liberal and 
democratic s t a t e . I n  this context and after all these assumptions it can now be 
proclaimed that the 1980 coup in the final instant had a dual function. On the one hand 
it was an intervention in .search of the formation of a political tcx)l to be equipped with 
the role of a political ally to the army to carry out the unfinished proec.ss o( 
modcrnisalion; second, it was again the endeavour undertaken by the military, having 
the frustration of being left alone by the moving away of the civilian political cadres 
from (he pr imordial ladt contract, reached between them and the army, and afso loss 
of the trust in them, to restructure the state in such a way that it would be above even 
the reach of the political parties and other .socio-political cleavages. 1’his is the 
identification of the army with the tran.scendentality of the state, rather than the
^"^Mctin I leper, "Bureaucrats, Politicians and Officers in I’urkey: Dilemmas 
of a New Political Paradigm," in Modern I'urkcy: Continuity iind ChiWfiC, 
ed. Ahmet livin ( Opladen: Leske Verlag+Budrich GmbH, 1984), 77.
■^'*1 leper, ihe Slnlc'i'nidilion, 152-153.
II. Dodd, "I’olitical Modernization, the State and Democracy:
Approaches to the Study of Polites in Turkey,' in Slnle, Dcniocntcy nnd the 
Miiiinry: Turkey in the ¡980s, cd. Metin Ileper and Ahmet livin (Berlin, 
New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1988), 20.
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"parlially tiatiscendenlal state", as Heper pronounces."·^ Karpat attributes to this point 
as "a substantial number of the army officers...viewed the political parties as either 
hotbeds of strife and dissension or simply as convenient means of achieving 
power. He also indieates that "in 1980 the prestige of the parties was at an all time 
low." The crucial (x)int is that he defines the jx)sition of the political parties in the eyes 
of the military as they "should be instruments of national unity  ^ order, and stability 
rather than vehicles for the expression of special interest of social or economic groups 
or particularrcgions of the country."'^^This is receiving the parties behind a doctrine­
like ideology, which was nothing but AtatUrkism, which was in this sense a state 
ideology, backing up the transccndcnUxlity of the statc.- ·^
The path to achieve this task was first the dissolving of the pre-1980 parties 
and than permitting the political activités with a decree dated 24 April 1983 after the 
rcfcraiulum of 6 November 1982. This has been a long process first ignited by the 
issuing of Law of Political Parties, dated 22 April 1983, code number 2820, Law of 
Elections, dated 10 June 1983, code number 2839-'’* then the permittince given for the 
formation of the new parties. The basic assumption behind these regulations and 
reorganisations was primarily "to prevent the excessive politieization of eitizens and
4^Melin lleper, The Slate Tradition, 124-148.
"*^Kcnial Karpal, "Military Interventions," 152.
"^ ‘^ Ibid.
“^Plhid., L5.L
•'’ •lo r an excellent elaboration on these laws see İller Turan, "Political 
Parties and the Party System in Post-1983 Turkey," in Stale, ed. M. I leper 
and A. livin, 63-80 and liter 'furan, "Evolution of Electoral Process," in 
ToUtics, ed. M. lleper and A. Evin, 49-62; also see Taha Parla, "Partiler ve 
Parti Sistemi Üstüne Bazı Gözlemler," in Türkiye’nin Siyasal Rejimi: 1980- 
1989 (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2nd ed., 1993), 125-131.
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groups.''■‘’2 It is iu this phase that the military openly exhibited a clear advocacy for a 
party which would support the basic ideals of the 12 September regime. 3^ basic 
İcar lor the militaiy after the re-politicization of the regime was the rejuvenation of the 
pre-1980 period and it is after this reasoning that some leaders and co-leaders of the 
pre-1980 pci iod parties were subjected to custody in Zincii b o z a n .Nevertheless and 
whatever arc the overt allegations about the future of the political regime, the 
constitutive clement of the procedure, to renew the polity structure, depends on 
another condition which should be searched within the changing body of the 
modernisation. This point can not be apprehended only with a reference to the 
conventional tics between the military and the RPP as the fervent supporter of the 
Kemalist tenets in the pre-mid-1960 period as has been discussed above. The better 
dominating condition emanates more from the economic iruxlel implemented in Turkey 
just before the military intervention which is known as the 24 January Decisions, 
issued and a|)plicd by the Demirci government.·“'''
-‘'^ ilier Furan, "The Dilemma of Turkish Politics," Toplum ve Ekonomi, vol.2 
(September 1991), 31-54.
.S.lfvietin I leper, " fhe Military and Democracy in the Third Turkish 
Republic", 118.
‘''^ •Au excellent and interesting survey of the struggle developed by 
Bülent licevit, former leader of RPP before the coup, for democracy and 
against the regime, just after the military intervention, is found in the 
book by the renown Arcayürek which owes a lot to Ecevit himself. Cüneyt 
Arcayürek, Hapishanede Ecevil (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 2nd cd., 1991).
•'»5'1'here is a vast literature on this programme, inter alia, see
Rü.<jdü Saraçoğlu, "l.iberali/ation of the liconomy," in Politics, ed. M. 1 leper
and A. livin, 63-75 but one of the main sources remains as
Pikret Şenses, ed.. Recent Industrialization Experience o f Turkey in a
Global Context, (Westport, Connecticut, London: Greenwood Press, 1994);
Tosun Ancanh and Dani Rodrik, eds.. The Political Economy o f Turkey:
Debt, Adjustm ent and Sustainability (London: Macmillan, 1990);
Şevket Pamuk, "24 Ocak Sonrasında İktisat politikaları. Sınıflar ve Gelir 
Dağılımı," in Kriz, Gelir Dağılımı ve Türkiye'nin A lternatif Sorunu , K. 
Boratav, Ç. Keyder, Ş. Pamuk (İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 2nd enlarged
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5.2. A New Step in the Modernisation Process
5.2.1. The 24 January Decisions
The essence of the 24 January decisions has basically been the shift from the 
import subsliUilion economy, started mainly by the 1960s, to free market model 
limiting the slate entrepreneurship as well as the sUUc dominance in the economic realm 
to (he m inim um .The commanding position of the stale in the economic arena has a 
long history going back principally to the elatism. Nevertheless stalism should not be 
seen the mcie condition determining the econonomic relations as has been analysed in 
the previous chapters. Anticipating it is the early attempt initiated by the Committee for 
Union and Progress to construct an entrepreneurial class, i.e. national bourgeoisie.57 
Beyond its economic openings, elalaism's basic aim and task is to establish a well 
structured political framework which is filled by the transcendentalily of the stale in a 
pciiod facing the absence of a bourgcosic.58 What makes the import substitution 
different than the conventional model, although it keeps the slate active in the 
economic process, is the "existence of a sufficiently powerful middle class which 
could operate hand in hand with the already established, though inefficient Stale
ed., 1987); Korkut Boratav, Türkiye İktisat Tarihi 1980-1985 (Istanbul: 
(îcr(,'ck 3^ ayinevi, 1988);Tevfik Çavdar, Türkiye’de Liberalizm (1860-1990) 
(Ankara; İmge Kitabevi, 1992).
5b Henry Barkey, "Crisis of the Turkish Political Economy: 1960-1980," in 
Modern I’urkey , ed., A. Evin, 47-48.
57i eroz Ahmad, "Vanguard of a Nascent Bourgeoisie: The Social and 
Economic I’olicies of the Young Turks 1908-1918," in Social and IJcononiic 
History o f Turkey (1071-1920), eds., Osman Okyar and Halil İnalcık 
(Ankara: llaccUepe Üniversitesi Yayınları, 1980).
58Korkut Boratav, Türkiye'de Devletçilik (Ankara: Savaş Yayınlan, 1982), 
33-177.
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Hciinomic P'nlcrpriscs.''-^^ This might be conceived as the togetherness of the national 
boiiigct)isic and llie stale where the former still feels itsell weak enough to ask the 
support ol' the latter and here it could be argued that the main task of the Slate Planning 
Organisation has been, after 1961, the regulation and distribution of resources on a 
basis of mutual consent. As this model predicts and grounds, in Turkey there has been 
a kind of inter-class alliencc in the final analysis which emanates from the corporatisl 
apprchensi(m which shatters down by the 'adjustment' policy ignited by the minority 
Dcmircl government in 1980 more prone to the expectations of the bourgcosic which 
has by the time reached to a power point where it could feel itself able to be 
emancipated from the control of the statc. ’^^  Boratav also formulates the process as the 
'counter-attack of the capital.'^’·
The 'adjustment policy' not only aims to find a radical solution to the problems 
created by the Import Substitution Industrialisation (ISI) usually prescribed as the l<x)p 
of dcpendcncy-indepcndcncy between the domestic and foreign markets, the 
disequiibrium of balance of payments, the government regulation and control 
piincipally on the foreign exchange rates. ’^^  beyond these conliguralions which 
arc the common points in the economic policy making, in Turkey's case, what has 
been of specific importance is the new position defined for the stale on class ba.se: 
Demirers Justice Parly, although it has always been in gtx>d iclations with the urban
-‘''^llcnry Ilarkcy, "Political liconomy," 48.
^»bkorkut lloralav, "Inter-Class and Intra-Class Relations of Distribution 
Under 'Structural Adjustment': Turkey During the 1980s," in The Polilkal 
Economy, eds,, T. Artcanli and D. Rodrik, 212.
6lRoratav, lurkiyc, I 19.
f>2Barkey, 'Political,' 51-52.
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bourgeoisie eoiUrolling (he incliislrial aggregation, has mainly been in a close coalition 
vvilli the provincal powers. But in the January 1980, JP has proclaimed its preference 
on (he former. ’^3 Second, this mrxlcl has ended the conventional authority of the statc- 
biireancracy elites, in (he last pliasc ciealed by the controlling role of the vSlale 
Planning Organisation. On the other hand, with the emergence of such political 
cleaveages as National Salvation party of the 1970s and their fervent support of a 
genuine industrialisation rather than IS! the modernisation model has undergone a 
radical transformation. This onset, to many students of Turkish economy has been a 
modest transition to economic liberalism drifting from statism. It is in (his framework 
and context that the military starts its new role.
To such .scholars who were dissent to the economic regime of the post 1980 
period, it would be impossible to accomplish any result if the military had not 
intervened. This is somewhat a paradoxical situation. Because, when military has 
decided as early as the next morning of the intervention to continue with the already 
existing economic policy, which was nothing but a process of dissolving the state's 
active role in the economic realm, i.e. statism, also nascent of many repercussions 
such as the breaking of the imperial power of state elites together with bureaucracy and 
ending the conventional coalition between military and the others it on the one hand 
gave support to the success of the existing mixlel and on (he (ithcr paved (he way to a 
model which was, at least theoretically to hinder its existing role and powci. It is on 
this ground of transition from statism to liberalism lies the shortcomings, bottlenecks
»^s a speculative approach, it could be argued that, in this development 
effective is the power of the urban bourgeosie which has been expressed 
and exhibited during the 1977 I'cevit-Government through the 
declarations publicized by the newspapers. This is believed as one of the 
major factors that brought the end of the Kcevit government.
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and restrictions of the post-1980 period which needs an elaboration on the political 
sti uctuic developed in Turkey in the jx)st 1983 elections |x;riod.
S.2.2. A New Hegemony and the Shift of Paradigm: New
Right
Not only in 'I’lirkcy but in America and lIurojK; as well l<)8()s has witnessed the 
rapid rise of the new right, a phenomenon strcching and sprawling to create a 
conglomerate of new but hegemonic attitudes and discourse on social, economic and 
political matters, usually referred as Thatcher-Reagan decade/»^ As has already been 
indicated 'Thatcherism represents the practical application of a set of theories, whose 
proponents arc known as the New Right."^’-“’ Here the problem turns out to be the 
answer to the question what isAvas the New Right? In an attempt to explain the nature 
of this concept with its implications on the political, social and ccononic realms. Gray 
gives a brici account more accentuating the llritish cx|XMİcnce
At the level of policy...New Right sought to dismantle the corporatist 
institutions built up in Britain in the posl-War pciiod, to limit 
government and at the same time to rcstain the power of inordinate 
organized interests such as the trade unions, to achieve a stable currency 
to abandon deficit financing and, in general, to engineer a transfer of 
initiative and resources from government to civil society that was 
massive and politically irreversible.^ *^ ’
h^l'or a recent revisting of the decade see Andrew Adonis and Inn liâmes, 
eds., A Conservative Revolution? The Thatcher-Reagan Decade in 
¡Perspective (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 
1994).
^Speter Riddle, 77ie 'Thatcher Decade: How Britain has Changed During the 
1980s (Oxford; Basil Blackwell, 1989), 4.
’^^ ’John Gray, "(Conservatism, individualism and the political thought of the 
New Right," iti Tost Uberaiism: Studies in Tolitical Ihoughi (New York 
and London: Routledge, 1993), 274.
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On Ihc economic level, Ihe repercussions of (his
|»olicy oiiciilnlion expicsscil ilscll iti nicasiiics (or tlu' |)iiv:ili/.:i(ioii o( 
siiilc-ovvned indiislries, in (he Medium Term l inancial Slralegy, (ax 
reduclion, a curb on public expenditure, and a variety of supply-side 
measures deregulating prices, wages, rents and some planning 
controls/’^
I as! I)ii( o( course not lcas(, (he inoic complica(cd level of discussion levolving 
around the New Right is directed to its philosophical setting ajid Gray in this context 
claims
The intellectual perspective which infused these (philosophical and 
theoretical) policies was not that which dominated post-War British 
conservatism; it came from outside the Conservative Party, from the 
works of r.A. llayck and Milton Friedman, and from the free market 
think-tanks, above all, from the Institute of Fconomic Affairs, 'fhe 
pedigree of of this perspective on policy and society was classical liberal, 
not conservative. This is to say that it was strongly and sometimes 
stridently individualist, it sought to reduce government to an 
indispcnsible minimum, ami (...) it concerned ¡(.self very little with the 
cultural or social cotiditions of a stable restoration of market 
institutions.^’^
Even though it has been asserted by Gray that philosophical and theoretical 
sides of New Right play a more determining role in the construction and in (he 
analysis of the model, still, in another analysis again with reference to 'rhatchcr 
decade, it is stressed that New Right did not have a master plan.^’^  Again the same
i>7|bid., 275.
’^‘^ Riddell, Thatcher Decade, 5.
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author insists on two points; a) it was "a personal, highly distinctive, approach to 
politics rather than a coherent set of ideas""^ ’^ b) the commitments did not represent the 
deliberate start of an ideological revolution, or rather that of a counter revolution.^* 
This point is well defined by Freeden with a sheer attack to those assumptions that 
Thatcherism d(x:s include a radical political manner
'fhe illusion of radicalism was thus simply created by the fervour and 
scope of Thalcherite reactionary counter-reformism. The idea is a 
reactive one: not the creation of new institutions or new form of .social 
behaviour, but -in parallel with Marxist argument- the negation of
negation.
Merc, the distinction between the neo-liberalism, the new Right and neo- 
Conservatism should be discussed. As Gray, succinctly puts, the 1980s has been the 
cia <)l llic coii(|ucst of conservatism by (he ideas and doedins o( (he New Right. 
This is, briefly, to say that, there has been a clash between the two concepts because 
the New Right, especially in England, has been critical of con.scrvatism on the ground 
that
a generation of conservative practice has led nuxlern Western democratic 
states into a dead end of corporatist stagnation in which a ratchct-cffcct 
operated that moved the political centre steadily leftwards, i(s theorists
^**lbid., 2.
71 Ibid., 8.
^^Michacl Irceden, Ideologies and Political Theory: A Conceptual 
Approach (Oxford: Clarendon Tress, 1996), 4 1 1,
7-^Gray, Post-Liberalism, 212.
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consistently neglected the cultural inlieritence which is the matrix of a 
stable capitalist ordcr7'·
On the other hand, Giddens, when discusses the difCerences between the 
American and European conservatism more refers to the existence of capitalism, 
where, according to him, the former is aggresively pixx:apitalist7'^ Still, he tacitly 
poinis (Mil ibe togcihcrncss of market forces and conservatism when he uses the 
'genetic (etni New Right,' and by saying 'mote oltcn neo-libcralism'' '^ '^ he identifies 
the two concepts. Also, in another place, he definetely identifies New Right by neo- 
libcralism saying "the ideas of New Riglit are better described as neo-liberalism rather 
than ncoconscivatism," and again the reason behind this is that, "economic markets 
play sik Ii a laige lole in tliem."'^
Mere, two different approaches to the (piestion 'what makes the 'rhatchcrile 
approach more close to conservatism or neo-liberal ism?' might be briefly discussed. 
Even though, as has been indicated by Gray, in the first years of Thatcherite 
gt)vemments there has been a pedigree of genuine conservatism, yet the leading role 
in the construction of the model is played by the New Right's criticism of the 
condition of state, namely trying to create the minimal one. Nevertheless, it could also 
be said that early Thatcherite governmenls, as it is clear in the Manifestos ptxxilaimed 
by the Conservative Party in 1979^^, 1983^ '-^ , 1987* ’^and 1992^*, but at large
7‘‘lbid., 273.
-^'’Anthoii}'' Giddens, Beyond Left and Right: ¡'he I iiture o f Radical Rolilics 
(Oxford: Polity Press, 1995), 23.
7f>lbid., 23.
^^Giddens, Beyond, 33.
^^The Conservative Manifesto (I.ondon: 'I’he Conservative Party', 1979).
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Thatcherism, shows a good deal blend of liberalism and conservatism, reflecting an 
ccclcctic character. This very point emenates from, once more, Thatcher's 
comprehension of the state role not only in the economic realm but also in the 
reconstruction of the neo-liberal individualism. Giddens argues this point with 
icicicncc to Lctwin as below:
Thatcherism ... does not, as laissez-faire liberals do, seek to minimize 
all state intervention in economic and scKial life. Rather it distinguishes 
two senses of intervention, one to be rejected, the other to be regarded 
positively. A market economy is incompatible with state intervention in 
the form of overall planning or a^rporatism; but it actively demands the 
strong hand of the state in respect of the maintenance of law and order, 
the fostering of national ideals and the capability for defence. 2^
Giddens, reaches the coda when he says "Thatcherism was a programme for 
radical change in many areas but it recognized the importance of tradition in other 
c o n te x ts .I t  is this very point that brings fore the clash between the answers related 
(o'fhalcheiism's standing with respect to con.servatism or liberalism for'. Gray, clearly 
condemns not only Thatcherism but the whole body of neo-liberal New Right for its 
ignorance ol traditions when he goes deep into the discussion of individualism. It is 
afso an answer to Giddens' understanding of neo-liberalism's relation to conser vatism
7‘^ 77ic Conservative Manifesto 1983 (London: The Conservative Party, 
1983).
89'//jc Next Moves forward: The Conservative Manifesto 1987 (London: 
n.p., 1987).
8> 7/)c liest l uture for Britain: fhe Conservative Manifesto 1992 (London: 
Pembroke Press, 1992).
^^(itddens, Beyond, 39.
83ibid., 40.
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as he sees the former 'in a direct line of conliniuily with the Old Conservatism of the 
British variety, which has long emphasized the importance of a sturdy moial 
individualism.®''
John Gray, on the contrary, argues that the New Right thinkers were more, in 
the same line with classical liberal philosophy, neglecting the historical and cultural 
presuppositions especially when civil society is concerned. This, according to Gray, 
as has also been defended by Scruton®^ is also the ncgicttcncc of the individualism 
that constructs the common culture of Western civilization.'^^’ The absence of this 
philosophical background, to Gray, purports two specific i.ssues. First, he conceives 
that
this neglect has disabled the policies of governments animated by the 
thinking of New Right, in that |X)liciy has been concerned almost solely 
with securing the legal and economic conditions of market competition 
and thereby of geneial prosperity and has only rarely ami inadequately 
addressed the cultural conditions thut undergird and sustain a stable 
market ordci®^
Second, as New Right raises the idea of 'government as an enterprise 
association' binds Thatcherite approach to an earlier version of conservatism and, in 
this .sense, it 'has distinguished itself from neo-liberalism ami has established its 
affinities with American neo-conservatism by its reiterated emphasis on the familiar
^“^ Ibid.
'^ -‘’Rogcr .Scrutoii, r ite  M euning o f  C o m c rv u lism  (llarmoiicJ.sworlli: 
Penguin, 1984),
^kiray , V osl-L iberahsn t, 274.
«7ibid., 274.
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and religious values.'^^ Gray is critical of this framework for it is his allegation that a 
project or utopia of minimal state is useless for the perpetuation and well being of the 
liberal civil society, which he secs closely linked to nationhood and government, the 
two foundations for the protection and nurture of civil scx;icty.'^ '^
The condition of the state is crucial in the discussion concerning the New Right 
and nco-libcralism. As, Bogdanor argues, in the late 1970s, 'I’liatchcr believed that the 
society was already saturated with the 'adversary culture' and the conservative values 
were lost'-’*’. To put them back needed a more authoritcrian sUitc and government and, 
what she tried to achieve was to 'restore the authority of the state in a |x;riod when the 
social preconditions for the restoration of authority (were) a b s e n t.T h is  condition, 
no doubt, provokes a lengthy discussion and argumentation which can not be 
developed here but if one point needs clarification, it is that, as long as its relation to 
the imdcistanding of 'strong state' is concerned, the New Right and more neo- 
liberalism takes a dubious position for it becomes, as in the cases of Reagan and 
Thatcher models, more apt to conservatism more than liberalism lor two reasons. 
The first, as such conservatives like Oakeshott believe the market needs the regulation
88lbid., 276.
8*>lbid., 280.
‘^ (^Margaretli rhalcher. The Downing Sircet Years (London: Harper and 
Collins, 1998).
Vernon Itogdanon, "The ('onstitution", in 7hc Thntcher IHTect, A Dcciuie 
o i Change, oils., Dennis Kavanagh and Anthony Scldon ( Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1989), 141-142.
‘^ ^Situating New Right's place congruent to liberalism and conservatism
see
Rodney barker, Political Ideas in Modern Britain: Ina and Alter the 
Twentieth Century (London and New York: Routledge, 2nd and improved 
edition, 1997 (1978), 233-241.
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<)( :t símil}.», sliiU· ;iiul :i }>ovcrnmciil nllachccl lo sixroiul, as has Ix'cn mcnlioiu'cl 
alxivc, (he ixasoiial picicrciicc o r i ’halchcr was (he rcconsolidalion ol (he shoiig. moie 
audioriiciian, s(a(e not only for (he market and economic reasons but also for the 
construction of a new individual related to traditional values, which was again nothing 
but Ihc situation in the Reagan case.^“* Here a differentiation and dislancialion line 
could be drawn between the Thatcherite and Reaganite forms of New Right and, it 
would be more convenient if not definitive to situate latter to lx; situated more in the 
framework of conservatism for two reasons. The first, as has been pointed out in the 
relevant literature that American New Right is more capital based and dependent on the 
religiosity'' -^“', i.e Christian epistemology and related to other moralistic values attached 
to it‘^ ’^; scconti, it proposes a more communitarian social structure, whose roots arc 
found deep in the Christian morphology encompassing liberal individualism, free 
choice, lamily understanding, ethical and moral perceptions and other literal American 
norms in (he vacuum cretUed by what is called the hegemonic crisis of American 
liberalism.
‘^ -^Michael Oekeshott, 'Rationalism in I’olitics', in Ralionalism in Politics 
¿md Other Essays (London: Methuen, 1967).
'^^Cillian I’cele, "C'ullure, Religion and Public Morality," in A ('onservative 
Revolution? The I'hatcher -Reagan Decade in Perspective , cds., Andrew 
Adonis and 'Pirn Hanes (Manchester and New York: Manchester University 
Press, 1994).
9-‘'Banu llelvacioglu, " The New Right in the U.S.: A 'Morbid Symptom' of the 
Crisis of American Capitalism." Unpublished Fh. I). Dissertation (Kingston, 
Ontario: (lueen's University, 1988), 191-230.
'^6Mj('hael Cillespie and Michael Lienesch, "Religion and the Resurgence 
of Conservatism," in The Resurgence o f Conser\^atisin in Anglo-American 
Democracies, eds., Harry Cooper, Allan Kornberg, and William Mishler 
(Durham and London: Duke University PrevSS, 1988), 425.
97iMonnan Harry, The New Right (London: Groom Helm, 1987).
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This brings out another condition which is usually debated as the hegemonic 
stale of New Right. Gray, determines the upsurging of the New Right ideology as 
hegemonic in the Gramscian sense, "in that conservative parties, governments and 
inlelicctual journals came lo be dominated by a discourse and agenda of policy that 
emanated from thinkers of the New R ig h t .T h e  notion of hegemony, here 
developed with reference lo Gramsci has also been utilized by Sunic, when he 
discusses the contradictory position of European New Right with respect lo American 
and English versions.*^  ^ Sunic, argues that, the New Right, has conceived and 
unknowingly embodied the basic principle of Gramscian notion of hegemony, seeing 
the cultuial as the basic factor in the determining power of the political.G ram sci, 
developing the notion of 'organic intellectual' sees the 'literati' as the missionary and 
the persuasive of the dominating class and the ideology bound lo it and (he crisis of the 
hegemony commences when the inlelligenl.sia begins lo drift from the power that is 
embedded in the s t a l e . I n  this context, for the emergence of the New Right there 
comes two slightly difiercnl interpretations.
5.3. New Right, Neo-Llberalism and the Crisis of
Keynesianism
*^^Gray, Post-Liberalism, 272,
99'romislav Sunic, Against Democracy and [¡quality: The Ihiropean New 
Right (New York, Bern, Frankfurt, Paris: Peter I^ng, 1990), 29-32.
13)0/\ntonio Gramsci, The Modern Prince and Other Writings (New York: 
International Publishers, 19.S9) and Sclcciions Prom Prison Notebooks , cd. 
(I  Oare and G. Newell-Smilh (New York: International Publishers, 1971).
l^^lpor a discussion of the Gramscian notion of hegemony see F. Fuat 
Keyman, Globalization, Slate, Identity/DUTerence: Toward a Critical Social 
Theory o f International Relations (New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1997), 
112- 122.
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Colin Leys argues that the emanation of the New Right movement in England 
should be seen as a reaction against the social and political movement developed in the 
society above and beyond the class politics such as women's movement, the student 
movement, (he movement against racism, the gay liberation movement, the ecological 
movement, riiis reaction, has 'tap|x;d a larger reservoir of traditional sentiment among 
ordinary people.''®^ In other words, what the author suggests, together with Sunic 
and Gray, is that the New Right movement has created its own epistemological 
discourse and situated and enhanced it as the scx^ ial and political culture. On the other 
hand, I Icivacioglu, still departing from Gramsci and his understanding of hegemony, 
secs the New Right as a consequence of the hegemonic crisis of the liberalism in 
United States as a derivative of the transition from Fordism to post Fordism. 
Helvacioglu situates the New Right as the counter hegemonic attack that txxured in the 
ideological, economic and political vacuum and argues that it could be summarized as 
an offense on "individualism and on the legitimacy of the American political 
system." The interesting point here is that, it is the New Right answering and 
facing the crisis of the hegemony of liberalism but not any other political movements. 
Leys focuses on this issue by saying, "the Labour Party did not respond as positively 
to these new movements as the Conservative Party responded negatively.'" '^-'’ Yet, the 
whole pKKess of transition to New Right politics is a shift from the labourist model 
and behind this development, there are two different but related determining factors.
i^^^Colin keys. Politics in Britain: Pram Labourism to Thatcherism (London, 
New York: Verso, 1989), 183.
^03jielvacioglu, New Right, 101-102.
•<W|bid., 113.
F)-‘’I,cys, Politics, 183.
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The first one is the inadequacy of Keynesian economic policies and the second its 
iclationshi|) with motlcrnity.
New Right's relation with the concept of 'strong state' is crucial. On the one 
hand it is believed that 'it sanctions the legal rules that allows markets their necessary 
free play.*^ ^^ ’ In this sense there has been a close interaction between the New Right's 
approach and the cconomism of the classical liberal thought. Neverthele.ss as has been 
mentiemed alxwe in the Oakeshottian mcxlel of con.sei-vatism 'market cannot prosjxjr in 
an autonomous way,''^^ in need of a regulation. They imply norms and mechanisms 
of trust, which can be protected by law but only to a degree produced by legal 
lornuilations. They arc not inherent in the economic contract it.self.'''”^ I’his leads the 
New Right to its problematic relation with Keynesianism which is usually .seen as the 
model carrying the state intervention to its crux. In the same line with this it is 
articulatetl that Keynesianism has also been the source ol the economic crisis reached 
its peak by the late 1970s in the fiscal, debt and employment realms. The crisis of 
Keynesianism should not only be taken arising as a consequence of the proposed new 
solutions to the troubles already existing. It is more a crisis derived from the 
globalization, in Giddens' account whose concrete effects observed in the 1990s after 
the hegemony of the New Right, neo-liberal politics.
Giddens, in his analysis, considers the influence of internationalization of the 
capital due to the advances reached in the communications technology and order. In
lf)<^ >(;iddens, Beyond, 41.
I‘>«lbid.
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this context, according to him. Keynesianism has become incíTcctivc due to its 
allachmcnt to the national and tciritorial boundaries causing a cor|X)ratist model and 
t o t a l i t y . 'I ’hc dismantling of this model has also caused the deconstruction of the 
established social structure, as well as the state model. Through corporatism"^’ the 
basic idiosyncracy of the Keynesian economic order, the function of the stale has 
;idln (<d (o (ItKc s|)ccilii‘ «ondilions a.s, i) the s(a((\ to iniliu'iicc (he eeoiiomi«· 
mechanisms must construct a distributional condition; ii) for such a condition to be 
possible it must perform the orchestration of social concensus; iii) ftjhc state must 
achieve an adequate balance in the disKibution of its llscal resources and iLs regulatory 
activities between the national, regiontil and municipal levels of government."' As the 
impact of globalisation has stalled to loo,sen the established stiuctuie of the 
Keynesianism, this state model turned out to be local aulhorites of the global 
system "2  more prone to new conceptualisations of cili/cnship which is an 
independent variable of modernity as has been argued by Giddens with an interesting 
appeal once more to Keynesianism through dclraditionalizalion. Giddens supports the 
idea that globali.sation has a direct effect on the process of delradilionalisation in the 
everyday social activity and it means "an acceleration of the icficxivily of lay
l<>‘^ l ()r a deep elaboration of the relalionsliip between corporatism and 
Keynesianism see Peter Unge, Liberal Corporatism and Union 
Responsiveness: lixil, Voyage and Wage Regulation (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 1984).
I "4 ran k  I.. Wilson, "Neo-Corporatism and the Rise of New Social 
Movements", in Challenging the Political Order: New Social and Political 
Movements in Western Democracies , eds., Russell J. Dalton and Manfred 
Kuechler (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990), 67-83.
II lPaul Hirst and Grahame Ihompson, Globalization in Question 
(('ambridge: Polity Press, 1996), 146-147.
'l^lbid., 176.
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populalaions."''3 The articulation between Keynesianism and detraditionalism, (o 
Giddcns, brings lore the modernisation process for, "Keynesianism worked tolerably 
well in a world of simple modernisatum; but it could not survive in a world of 
reflexive modernisation- я world of intensified social reflcxivily."'''·','' Uislly, 
Ciiddcns lomuilales Keynesianism-state inleiaclion through cili/.enship in the context 
that, the former, with the priority it attributes to the welfare stale, "presumes a 
citi/.emy with more stable lifestyle habits than are characleristic of a globalized 
universe of high renexivity."·'^
This discussion should be completed with Offe's reflections on the connection 
between modernity and neo-liberal development. Offe argues that ne<x:on.4ei valism has 
a dual condition as long as modernism is concerned. The reason is twofold: on the 
social and cultural levels it is attached to a more reactionary understanding whereas it 
is rather modernist on the economic, technological and inilitaiy policy terms. Al.so 
included in this dilemma is the traditionalism because the scene that appears in the first 
half of 1980s is a juxtaposition of traditionalism and modernism.’ '^ Offc, sees the 
welfare stale playing the leading role in the construction of these problems for, he says 
that it is thought that the interventionist, welfare, Keynesian state, has become loo
’ l^(;i(ltlen.s, Itcyond, 42. 
l l^lbid., 42; emphasis original.
115 l or the further discussion of the concept of reflexive modernisation
see
Ulrich Heck, Anthony Giddens and Scott Lash, RcHcxivc Moderni/alion 
(Cambridge: I’olity Press, 1994); Anthony Giddens, Consequences o f  
Modernity (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990).
 ^*^ ’(iiddens. Beyond, 42.
ll^Claus Offe, Modernity, 17-20.
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heavy a himlcn on economy and lie I’nrllicr develops three points: i. wellaie state does 
not any more stand for a minimal standards of welfaie but is counted as a piovidcr of 
maximum standards of welfare; ii. welfare state due to the limits set by liberalist rule 
of law and the protection of public sphere is prevented from transgressing the limits of 
formal-legal entitlements and distribute benefits according to principals of attributed 
need and this makes it infeasible to make the receipt of benefits on conditions of moral 
obligation. I ’his situation involves a potential for 'moral hazard;' iii. welfare state 
programs tend to be more reactive than active or dilTcrcntiatcd rather than 
integrated.^'^ For Offe, the situation of the welfare state, should these issues are taken 
into consideration, is under attack and pressure not only from both sides, neo-liberal 
aiul piowellare, but also ends u|) in a discussion more concentrated on the moral 
dimension, in search of a universalist modcl.n'-  ^This framework, also, brings out the 
neoconservative 'remoralization' approach as the inverse image of left-libertarian 
critique of the welfare state which could only be ended up with the discussion that is 
left to democracy-welfare state relation. *2^ ' Though this discussion necessitates a 
further elaboration on the liberalism-free market economy relationship, yet in 
anticapation to that we should more concentrate on the condition that 1980s faces: the 
modernity as a larger problem than the reconstruction of the state as an end in itself 
which has been sufficiently a rg u ed .H ere , if the position taken by Hall is accepted.
••«Ibid., 151. 
ll^Ibid., 153.
• ^•^Ibid.
•^'David IlcUl, 'Tower and Legitimacy in Contemporary Hrilain," in .State 
a/id Society in Contenipornry Briinin, eds., Gregor McLennan, David Meld 
and Stuart Hall (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1984), 347-361.
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in the 1980s stale and its status is more a consequence of post-modernity or rather than 
the critical approches to modcrnilyJ22
5.4. The 'New' State of the New Right and Neo-
Liberalisni
I ’he stale-free market correlation, is a long debated problem. The originality 
of the New Right, more neo-liberal ism is once more calling this interdependency with 
one specif ic condition, as has been put by Held. He argues that the success of the nco- 
libcial politics in the 1980s in Britain has rested i) on the attack they performed against 
"the claim that the stale and government are inextricably linked to the direct creation of 
expanding economic opfXMiunitics and social welfare" and ii) "on the uncoupling or 
separation of the stale, i.e. the stale as an instrument for the delivery of goods and 
services from consideration of the stale as a powerful, prestigious and enduring 
rcprcscnlalivc of the people or nation."'24 This liberal context. Held argues, has 
provided nco-libcralism with the ability lojuxlapo.se the cocxislancc of minimal slate 
with the strong slate, in Thompson's words, 'rolling back the statc.''2‘' 'Strong stale' 
in the realm of liberalism, plays a role for "providing a secure basis upon which 
business, trade and family life will prosper.’"26 This duality, according to Hall,
'^^Stuarl Mall, " fhe Meaning of New l imes," in New Times: The Clninging 
Vin e o f PoUtics in (he 1990s, eds. Stuart Hall and Marlin Jacques (l.ondon: 
lirwrence and WishaiT in association with Marxism Today, 1990 (1989)).
i^^l'or a classical assumption see 
C.I’.Macpherson,
124i)avid Held, "Power", 348.
l^-‘>Grahame Thompson, "'Rolling Back' the Stale', in State ¿incl Society, 
274-298.
l^i'lleld, "Power", 347.
188
should not be seen as a unique and truly original formulation worked by the New 
Right. Rather, he argues, New Right and its originality is an outcome of a bunch of 
changes that has developed in the West upon the demise of Fordism, Taylorism and 
other related eoncepts. These changes have not delivered the New Right, but 
tiansloiination itself was produced by what Hall calls 'the new times''^'^ and it 'refers 
to social, economic, political and cultural changes.'*^ 8 it is this set of changes that 
breeds the debate on modernism. In other words, the question turns out to be as if 
nco-libcral. New Right movement might be a political agenda in the process of the 
fading away of mcxiernism and the nascent of what is called pc:)stmcxlernism.
I lall, more focusing on s(x;io-cconomic aspects of the discussion drives upon 
nine points encompassing, inter alia, the transition. These are i) a shift to new 
information technologies, ii) more flexible specialised and decentralised form of labour 
process and work organisation, iii) contracting-out of functions and services hitherto 
piovidcd 'in house' on a corporate basis, iv) Icadign role of consumption, v) decline 
in the proportion of skilled male, manual working class and the rise of the service and 
white collar classes, vi) more flexi-time and part-time working, vii) an economy 
dominated by the multinationals with their new international division of labour and 
their gicater autonomy of nation state control, viii) globalisation of the new financial 
matkcLs; ix) emergence of new patterns of social divisions especially between private 
and public and two,thirds who have rising expectations and the new poor and 
underclasses of the one-third.‘29 Amid the Jamesonian, Baudriallardian and
l^^llall, " I'he Meaning," 116. 
I28lbicl.
»29ibid., 118.
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Lyolardian dciinitions proposed for the postmodern unfolding and advances, this 
fiamcvvork adccpialcly enough draws out the limits of the .structure developed in the 
1980s which fostered and fortified by New Right as well as fostering and reinforcing 
it. It is in this context that Hall says
the hunger duree of new times, Thatcherism's project can be understoexi 
as operating on the ground of longer, deeper, more profound 
movements of change which appear to be going its way. but of which, 
in reality, it has been only cx^casionally, andT'lcetingly, in command over 
tlic past decade. We can sec Thatcherism as an attempt to hcgcmonisc 
these deeper tendencies within its project of 'regressive nuxlcrnisation', 
to appropriate them to a reactionary political agenda and to harness to 
them the interest and fortunes of specific and limited .social intcrcsts*^^
Without going any further, here it could be said that the challenge of New 
Right should not be seen as a collective and total break with modernity. In fact, with 
its emphasis on the strong state, the 'transformation' of the social structure, the search 
for a new political agenda, the concentration on the national, ethnic, racist and sexual 
i.ssues it is, as has been suggested by Hall a 'regre.ssive moderni.sation' and its 
succsess should be searched on this basis. Other than that, if once again Hall's view 
point is considered, and if New Right is presumed as it political movement and agenda 
not only realising but also attaching to the already developed changes, even though 
with a reactionary and regressive mode, yet with that characteristic it could be situated 
as a modernist movement and it is at this point that starts the suffering of the left in the 
1980s for its inadequacy cither for sensing the new appearing changes and proposing 
.solutions for them.
5.5. New Right in Turkey
l^ ^^ l^bid., 127.
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5.5.7. The Motherland Party
Qiuililying (he |X)st-l98() cm as a luming point, NiKlIci dole furthei enlarges 
her opinions rather slaying on the changing pattern of the niodcrni/.ing movement 
(Wcslcrni/ation) by referring to the development of new cicvcagcs in Turkey, 
replacing the stale elites as technocratic elites as well as excluding the mentioned 
concept as the leading political paradigm.’ *^ Accordingly, the consequence of the 
'relative autonomi/iUion of economic activities, poliliail groups, and cultural identities, 
an autonomous societal sphere' beginning to develop shilting the focus from the stale 
to society. I'hc last phase in this new process has been, again as a matter of the 
constitutive power allribuled to mcxlernisalion, the ceasing of transforming the sex^ iety 
Irom the above. G()lc ob,serving the Motherland Party (MP-Anava(an Partisi) as the 
peer and the pioneer of this transformation, thus draws on the combination of three 
points: "moderate political discourse, a pragmatic engineering ideology, and 
conseiwalive social values.
riiis framework might be taken as the impact of the New Righl-neo-liberal- 
New Con.scrvalive movement in Turkey in the post 198.1 era, and MP, the political 
parly in power between 1983-1991 should be considered as the constitutive of the era. 
Although, in the relevant literature it is much accepted that in the period in which MP
I • d o l e  discusses this devclopmeiil at length in her hook;
Nilüfer döle. Mühendisler ve İdeoloji: (Öncü Devrimcilerden Yenilikçi 
Seçkinlere), ir. R Levi (İstanbul: İletişim Yayıncılık, 1986) also see 
Nilüfer dole, "lingineers: Technocratic nemocracy'," in lürkey und (he 
West: Changing Political and Cultural Identities, eds., Metin I leper, Ayşe 
Öncü and Heinz Kramer (London, New York: I.B Lauris and Co Ltd, 1993), 
199,218.
• döle, " Loward an Autonomization of Politics and Civil Society in
I'urkey," in Politics in the Third Turkish Republic, eds.. Metin I leper and 
Ahmet livin ( Boulder, San I rancisco, Oxford: Weslview Press, 1991), 213- 
222.
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has played Ihc determinant role the soeiety has undergone an overwhelming 
transformation still it is not immune to harsh criticism once more drawing the attention 
to basically (he above mentioned three factors.'33 Nevertheless, the generally accepted 
points have always been MPs reliance on a politics of toleration, its afiiliation with 
the New Right hegemonic discourse, as well as its ambition in the transformation 
pi()cess.'3 i 'Pile debate more encompasses the tools of the transformation and the 
results obtained with one specific inquisition, whether MP, as a political party of the 
post-1980 era, has really been challenging the structure intentioned by the military 
through the 1982 Constitution, i.e. a party having a definitely 'new' aspects and an 
ideological framework or a continiuation of the political understanding came out in the 
pie-1980 cra.'^‘' 'I’lic answer given to this question has always been negative much 
referring to the linking MP with to the Democrat Party tradition in Turkey with an 
emphasis first on the periphery then the civil S(x:ictyi36 by Turgut 0/,al himself, the 
founder and leader of the party. Then, the discussion concerning MP's role in the 
recent political history of Turkey starts revolving around the originality of the MP 
icgarding two specific issues; first the delails of the programatic as well as the
I T^/\s an example see, Levent Köker, "Anavatan Partisi," in Yüzyıl 
lUlcrken Cumhuriyet Dönemi Ansiklopedisi, vol.15 (İstanbul: İletişim 
Yayınlan, 1996), 1253-1257.
•34Qsiün Lirgüder: " Phe Motherland Party," in Political Parlies and 
democracy in Turkey, eds.. Metin Heper and Jacob M. Inndau (London, New 
York: I. H. lauris, 1991), 152-169.
I35ysiün lirgüder and Richard 1. Hofferbert, " Lhe 1983 General lilections 
in d'urkey: Continuity or Change in Voting Patterns?" in Stale, Democracy 
and the Military: Turkey in the 1980s (Berlin, New York: Walter de 
Gruyter, 1988), 81-102. Ibis is the slightly revised version of the article 
first appeared as: "Restoration of Democracy in Turkey? Political Reforms 
and the lilections of 1983" in Bections in the Middle East: Implications o f  
Recent Trends , ed. l.inda layne (Boulder, San Francisco, Oxford: Westview, 
1987), 19-38.
f36[;rgüder, "The Motherland Party", in Political Parties, 162.
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ideological approach of MP, second, whelher it has been a transient or stable political 
Ibrce in Turkey.
5.5.2. The Success o f  (he MP
MP, was founded in 1983, when the elections is forsccn by the military, as 
explained above. The founders of the party were more a group of technocrats cither 
performed in the state or in the private sector.*37 According to the surveys carried out 
by Ergiidcr, even though a group of both the founders and the grassroots politicans 
had been involved in the pre-1980 right wing political parties still MP was not the 
leincaination of a previously existing p a r t y . I t  was one of the three parties who 
were allowed to iiin (or the 1983 elections with an interesting characterisiie that, it was 
the only 'autonomous party' while the Populist Parly (Halkçı Parti) representing the 
lc(t-wing politics, National Democracy Party (Milliyetçi Demokrasi Partisi) was the 
political organi.sation apparently sup|K)itcd by the generals.' In the cicetions held in 
November 1983, when MP recieved the 45.2 % of the votes It has been regarded as 
an unexpected success. This succe.ss is linked to three conditions.
i) 1’hc leadership problem of NDP. I ’he chairperson of the NDP was a iormer 
general and he was attaching the party to the image of 'state party' and holding to the 
power of the military'^^^ which has usually btiunced back in the Turkish polities as
I37ibid., 155.
' 3HiirgiKİer ami lloffcrbcrt, "The 1983."
1390mit Ci'/rc Sakallioglu, "1983-1994: Siyasal Parti I'opografyasi," in 
Yüzyıl Biterken Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türkiye Ansiklopedisi, vol. 15 
(İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1996), 1248-1252.
'^^hirgun Ö/budun, "'l'urkcy: Crises, Interruptions and Reequiibrations," in 
Politics in Developing Countries, eds., J.LlJnz, S.M. I.ipsel (Houlder, 
London: Lynne Rienner Publications, 2nd edition, 1995), 219-201.
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has been observed and experienced in the aftermaths of 1960 and 1971 military 
inlci vcnlions. In both periods the political organizations challenging the military have 
gained power. In this case, Göle argues that MPs success was a response to 'the 
dem(x;ratic margin permitted by the military.''"’*
ii) The second reason placing MP in the top ranks of the political eschalon after 
a long process of rcsconstructing the Turkish social and political life in the military 
pciiod is again supported by ErgUder insisting that, like Jl’ has done alter the I960 
intervention, MP has not refrained from using the clicntalistic politics to fill the 
political void. The interesting point is that like JP, MP also "forged a coalition of the 
light which cut across diverse cultural and .social cleavages."'''^ i’hi.s point is 
important for, it explains MP's ambition in persisting that it has mixed and merged the 
lour political tendencies, i.e. liberals, fundamentalists, nationalists, social democrats, 
the sources of the political polarization before 1980. It is also important for it explains 
another dimension which has been situated by Göle referring to the 'politics of 
toleration.'
iii) Göle, speaks of toleration with a remark of the political culluic in Turkey 
cslablishcd in the republican |x:ri(Kİ. She rightly defines Ihe chaiacleiislic of Ihis fxniod 
on the basis of a) 'single actor syndrom,' b) utopias replacing ideologies giving birth 
to the authoritarian tendencies; c) catharsis, the consequence of the domination of 
centrifugal forces ending up in the watershed constituted by the military-stale between 
center-periperhy, replaced by pluralism, an outcome of the autonomization of the
*"^*(îöle, " Toward," 217.
I42[:rgüder, " The Motherland Parly," 154.
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political slruclure stretching it towards tlie importance of civil scx:iety in the political 
life. As a matter of fact, MP has replaced the more abstract and isolated utopias of 
the Republican pci iod with more pragmatic ideological approaches, which is l)cUcr put 
as (he adoplalion of policy-oi iciUcd approach rather (han |X)li(ics-oricntcd, which also 
introduccti a synthesis lx;twccn market economy and Islamic values, holding on (o a 
'conservative progressive’ ideology combining Islamic and local values with 
Westernisation, the dream of the Republican periodJ*'·"·
5.5.3. IMP, the New-Right and the Elements of the
Hegemonic Discourse
I liuU'i (hese assumptions M P might be seen a political parly emerging in the 
1980s, as a prolongation of the search for a more civil oriented |X)litics, started by the 
1950s, developing a new discourse by bringing a set of new issues into discussion, 
which, among others, the decentralization, debureaucratization, destatism being the 
leading ones.'"*·“’ A further elaboration on MP should focus on these issues for they 
not only signify the expansion of a new discourse in the right wing politics of Turkey 
but also indicating the crucial points regarding the demise of the Turkish left wing, 
sœial democratic policies in the 198()s.
MF’ can not be detached from the hegemony of the New right politics as 
aforementioned. I'his is one reason why its policies are ecclectic and streching Ixjyond 
the conventional center right politics in Turkey usually relying on (he transcendental
l"^^Göle, " rovvard,"' 216-219.
l^ l^bid., 220.
Masan Bülent Kahraman, "Özal Dönemini Yeniden Değerlendirirken," 
in Siiğ, Türkiye ve Partileri (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, 1995), 201-212.
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iindcrslanding of llic stale albeit the coveilcd process of tiaiisforming the social and 
economic slriicliire.·'^^ This is a dual process tried to be achieved through the 
dominatil role ol' bouigeoisie. It is possible to say that, in the 1965 elections the main 
dclcrminanl that delivered the power to Justice Parly has been the strength of the 
provincial bourgeoise, more a component of the trade rather than the industry. 
Between the 1965 and 1980 the political climate in Turkey has deeply been effected by 
the momentum created by this class leaning on to conventional and traditional values 
and feeding a more conservative view point which places the stale to the centre. The 
state-provincial bourgeoisie relationship on this grounds should not be taken as a 
matter of surprise for, the development of this class, traditionally, is controlled and 
determined by the s t a t e . A  bourgeoisie going beyond the slate could not have been 
conceived by that period because, slate, on the other hand has been suing for a 
corporatism foreseeing the adjoining of the sœial forces as well as denying the social 
diffcrcnliation. The State Planning Organi.salion, to remind once again, in the 1960s 
and 1970s has been the central organ not only controlling the central distribution 
process but also governing the development and the momentum of the s(x;ial cla.sscs, 
mainly bourgeoisie. Justice Parly, in this social structure has conventionally been 
dependent on the trade forces, the provincial, suburbanal sœial elements. In this 
context, the long march of bourgeoisie between 1960-1980 has not been conducive to 
dcccniiali/ation or destatism. Import substulion policies have al.st) backed this 
framcwoik.
•^^Mlasan Bülent Kahraman, "lurkiye Sağının Değişim Arayışları," in Sağ, 
273-280.
*^7ç;,ji|j,,- Keycler, "'l'he agrarian Background and the Origins o f the 
I ui kisli Bourgeoisie," in DcvcIopntcniaUsnt and Hcyond: Society and 
i\)lilics in Hiiypl itnd Turkey, eds., Ayşe Üncü, Çağlar Keyder, Saad liddin 
Ibrahim (Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press, 1994).
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1980s, is (he pericxl in which under the leadership of MP, the dislanlcialion of 
the stale and bourgeoisie is observed on the political, economic and social level. This 
very peculiarity contributing to both destatism and décentraii/ation, two issues usually 
taken as the upsurge of liberalism in Turkey. In this context, for the first lime, 
paradoxically in a period when the slate is rcsduclurcd and in I leper's wonls, '(he 
resurrection of a partially transcendental state' is observed* "'^  by the regulations 
conducted and defined by the military the raison d'etre as well as the function and 
dimensions of it has been pul under consideration. This is more an allcmpl whose 
reflections are found on the economic, social and political environments. The 
dcburcaucrati/alion in this context has been the crucial and most dcbalcil issue for, 
accoiding to Ilcpcr, what is called deburcaucralizalion should be followed on three 
bases none of them sufficient enough to demarcate a real dcbureaucratizalion 
process.' ''^  riiey arc i) the further politici/,alion of the public buicaucracy; ii) the 
decreasing of the influence of public bureaucracy with the allegation by the prime 
minister and his enlurage that "civil servants could not summon the dynamism their 
government's policies required"; iii) to bring the autonomous agencies under clo.scr 
control of the government. Central Bank being a prominent example.’·'^ ’Thc.se, Hcper 
argues that have pul "the public burcacracy into insignificance"'·''' where an 
assumption that dcbureacrati/ation has been achieved is totally an illusion. Even 
though this approach has caught a noteworthy point, still what is important is the
l"^^Metin I leper, The State Tradition in Turkey.
• ‘^ '^Melin I leper, " I he Stale and Debureaucrali/.alion: I'he Ca.se of Turkey." 
' 610-611.
' •‘>'lbid., 612.
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macro ajjpioacli backing it Ihal, stale-public bureaucracy is inadequate adopting itself 
to the new discourse and policy figured out by MP. Actually this should rather be 
taken as the complaining of the bourgeosie in need of a better organised bureauciacy to 
meet its expectations in a pcriixl of global i sat ion. In the same line it is a weighty 
issue showing the first breaking of the state and the bourgeosic equipping it with the 
possibility of establishing its political cultural dominance*-'’·^ using the opportunities 
supplied by the mass urbanisation and the demising of the rural power gathered in the 
provinces.
Stale was brought into discussion also on the level of dcccntrali/ution which 
has developed on two levels the earlier attempt being the establishment o( what is 
called Iwo-licrcd municipal systems in the urban centres, i.e. a metropolitan 
municipality and a number of district municipalities.^-'’^  This has again been 
considered a major step in the differentiation of the stale and the localities opening 
itself to a debate more revolved around the new understandings of democracy which 
demarcates the second issue in the pi(x:ess. The new understanding of democracy 
was more prone to the merging of the notion of democracy with civil society pulling 
both the slate and the democracy itself loan instrumental position. The civil .society 
debate came out in the 1980s in Turkey, with the emergence of various different .s(x:ial
152por a discussion of this relationship see, Korkut Boratav, 
’’Contradictions of 'Structural Adjustment’: Capital and the State in Post- 
1980 furkey," in Developmentalism and Beyond: Society and Politics in 
Egypt and Turkey (Cairo: The Amerucan University in Cairo Press, 1994),
155-176.
Ahmet İnsel, Türkiye Toplumunun Bunalımı (Istanbul: İletişim 
Yayınlan, 1990), 87.
' ‘’ 'Metin I leper, "MolherlaiHİ Party Covernments and Bureaucracy in 
Turkey, 1988-1988', (iovcrnancc, Vol. 2, n. 4, (October 1989), 460-471.
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identities attached to vSocial groups such as ecologists and f e m in is ts .Thc.se groups 
were more in search of an identitiy defined in the private space instead of being 
impo.sed on the individuals as a part of the modernising project merged with the 
nationalism. I'his was again a detachment from the authoritarian public domination. In 
the I980.S the basis for all thc.se developments was the nco-libcial economic progiamc 
started as early as 1979.
The liberal economic program of Turgut Ozal was, resembling the other 
likewise models developed in Britain and America, foresaw the mass privatization, 
the minimali/ation of the state on the economic level, the monetarist |)olicics replacing 
the finance policies, the establishment of the stock market, and the populist capitalism 
usually referred as the 'adjustment p r ogr am. Thi s  bunch of economic policies have 
brought not only a quasi-liberal political environment but also put the statism under 
di.scussion both on the economic and .social levels, pulling the stale backwards to a 
certain limit. Even though there has been a much of criticism concerning this last 
i.ssuc, insisting that slate, on the contrary, during the 1980s has perpetuated its 
dominating role on the economic level, still from the political perspective it could be 
argued that the liberal movement, expressed as 'freedom of entreprise' ('iei'ehhus 
ozf>iirliii>iT) emerged as a concept giving birth to the role and the im[x>rtancc of both 
individualism and a democracy notion seen undetachable from this phenomenon. In 
other woids, the democracy defined in Turkey relying on the civil sex i^ety was, in fact.
I 'i^CioIe, " foward", 218-219.
i ‘'^’rikrei ijonscs, " fhe Stabilization and Structural Adjustment Program 
and the Process of lurkish Industrialization: Main Policies and their 
Impact" in Recent Industrializiation Experience o f  Turkey in a Globiil 
C ontext, ed., Pikret Senses (Westport, Connecticut, London: Greenwood 
Press)i .s’l-74.
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a democracy understanding, articulating a classical liberal approach. This point needs a 
careful examination for, in a political and social culture where an individalism has 
never occured, contrary to the classical liberal model, it proclaimed the 'sc|x;ration of 
economics from politics.'*^^ This implies once more the imperative of economics on 
demociacy intending the transition to market economy via state control and from the 
above.
More important than that, the dcstati.sm in Turkey, in spite of all inadc(|uacics 
during the 1980s has contributed to and fostered the liberal development of the 
Turkish right wing politics. The right wing politics, assumed naturally to be founded 
on a liberal basis, buttressing the individualism, minimalising the state and cncouring 
the development of the civil society, on the contrary has been a state oriented, 
corporatist, collectivist one. In the 1980s the new approach especially with the 
amendment ol the Penal Uiw, with reference to its articles banning the Ibundation of 
political parties on class and religion basis, the call for a more populist cultural 
understanding compromising 'the people' stimulating the cultural agenda known as 
'arabesque', enabling the broadcasting of private television channels challenging the 
monopoly of the state channels has not only contributed to the conservative politics 
but al.so put the left politics into a crucial position pushing it to an impa.ss, provoking 
the society to ask for new but alternative policies of the left. 'I'his phenomenon has 
brought the great void especially faced by the left as a politics which has rested on the 
stale aiul (he regulatory economic |x>licics and the 'grand narrative' of modernising 
project depending on the state elites and military, nationalism and secularism being its 
two pillars. Through the development of the new understanding of identity, more used 
to express the cultural, religious, ethnic identities, 1980s has witnessed the state
 ^ Gole, ' I'oward," 218.
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dcllaling and diminishing on the public realm. This framework has contributed to the 
crisis ol' tlic left politics as well as to the crisis t)f (lie republican cpislcmology wliich 
will be discussed in the forthcoming chapters.
Even (hough there is a commonality between the crisis faced in the West and in 
'i'urkcy wliich is the sliortcomings of mcxlernity, this strait has a dual clicct in Turkey 
with respect to (he Western democracies. It is obvious (hat the Western left, at large, 
has also faced a catastrophic condition due to the development of the new social and 
political demands culminating after what is known as the New Social and Political 
Movements, together with the new theories constructed by the poststrucluralist 
searches. In 'Furkey, it is dill'icult to say that, this framewoik has a direct alfceted on 
the political left because this bulk of new epistemology has exerted a determining force 
first on the foundational republican epistemology which is identical with the mcxicmity 
project. Left has been impressed by what has been achieved indirectly due to its 
symbiotic relationship with the state and its constitutive ideology. In short, what has 
taken place on the social and political level in Turkey in the 1980s should be seen as a 
Cl isis of a specific project of nuxlcrnity which has always aimed putting (he state into 
the center.
Conclusion
The 1980s not only in Turkey but also in the West witnessed the emergence of 
the New Right policies. The early debates around this concept have aimed to analyse 
the structural aspects of it to see whether it is a new version of traditional liberal 
policies and philosophy or of conservatism, even though there is a hidden relationship 
between the two concepts. Although (here are major differences tetween the American
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and English mcxlels of New Right, neo-libcral policies, there are a set of similarities as 
well. The major one is the direct effect of the economic policies applied. Economic 
policies have not only been related with the realm of economy but rather intended to 
change (he overall structure of the social body, in this respect, the overwhelming 
c'ondilion has been (he search for and the process of consirucling the minimal stale. 
This period has been backed by the remarkable changes that appeared on the social 
theoretical level. In the transition to a new epistemology, under the influence of 
feminist and ecologist movements, the modernity project is put under severe criticism. 
The demise and the dismantling of the state might be taken as a consequence of (his 
development which brings the rejection of the centralised model of economic 
development. The left, under these circumstances, has not only faced a radical 
breakdown but the New Right political and social discourse has turned out to be a 
hegemonic one.
In 'I’mkey, the New light polices have also, in the lOKOs, playetl a 
groundbreaking role. The functioning of the New Right policies in I'urkcy has been 
through the economic policies first designed by the last pre-1980 Dcmircl government 
and later reached its climax with the basic preferences of Motherland Party 
governments. Mi^ in developing its hegemonic discour.se for the first time in the 
Republican period Turkish politics has tried to sei/e the determining role of the state. 
This condition was a new step put forward in the long process of modernisation for 
two reasons. First, the project has foreseen the creation of the bourgeosie and with 
this attempt it has become clear that bourgeosies could be detached from the state. 
Second, should modernity be conceived as the development of the individual less 
relying on the controlling power of the state this condition is fulfilled giving birth to 
the critic of modernity in Turkey through the discussion of such conditions as national
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iclcnlily and cili/.cnsliip. 'I'lic 'Furkish Id I, vvilli these determining (actors has deepened 
its crisis. This crisis might be determined as an inevitable one and in this aspect 
determining is the left's symbiotic relationship with the stale. Usually attached to the 
post-War Keynesian left mtxlels, relying on the regulatory economies, Turkish left 
faced the problem of not being able to develop alternatives to the demise of statist, 
corporatist policies. Usually defining itself as the posscsvsor of the mcxlernity piojecl, 
Turkish left in this pericxl has deeply been effected by the deburcaucrali/ation process.
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CHAPTER VI
IN SEARCH OF AN IDENTITY: 1980s AND THE LEFT IN
TURKEY
<».I The Reconstruction of the Politics
6.1.1. Early Attempts and Foundational issues
The crisis of the left is first fell when MP achieved an unexpected success in 
the elections held in 1983. The left entered the contest in a catastrophic condition. 
When the National Security Council decided to held the elections, the first parly 
founded on the left, depending on the consent of the Council was the Populist Parly 
{PP-Halkçı Parti).^ Populist Parly was founded by Necdet Calp, a former cabinet 
.secretary of İsmet İnönü. The party after it was established and achieved the 
ratification of the Council started a furious debate on the left, especially among the 
politicans who had taken places on the ranks of Republican Peoples' Parly before it 
was dissolved by the military junta, with the argument that a parly which has adtnillcd
Ipor a brief survey of PP see Hikmet Bila, Sosyal Demokrat Süreç İçinde 
CHP ve Sonrası (İstanbul: Milliyet Yayınları, 2nd ecl,, 1987), 502-503. Also 
see Ilalkçt Parti Programı (Ankara: Halkçı Parti Yayınlan, n.d.); Halkçı 
Parti, Tüzük (Ankara: Halkçı Parti Yayınlan, n.d.).
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tlic conditions set by the military regime can not be democratic and cannot represent 
the lel't.2
'File incentive oC the search for a new party was not only emanating from the 
existence of PP but more from the blurred condition of RPP for two reasons. The first 
one was that, RPP was dissolved by the NSC due to the L.aw number 2533, dated 
October 16, 1983. In this condition there was not a party existing any more but the 
more confusing circumstance was the process started before that when the former 
leader of the party Bülent Ecevit resigned from his |x)st with a declaration by the 29 
October 1980.-^  Though Ecevit in his proclamation draws the attention to the 
constraints to fulfill the responsibility of party leadership due to NSC's decision, 
banning any political activity especially for Süleyman Demirel and him.self, after their 
custody following the military coup, his basic intention was to continue with the 
politit'.'il aclivity. Though later he was accti.scrl of leaving (he parly in a turmoil by his 
resignation^ he immediately realised the publication of the journal Arayış (The Search) 
in the f'ebiuaiy 1981 which was also banned by the Headquarters of Martial üıw and 
tried to establish a foundation called Лгулг Güvercin (White Dow) which was intented
^Yavuz (¡(ikalp Yıldız, "Sill-CHI’" in Yir/.yil liilcrkcn ('iimlniriycU Dönemi 
l urkiye Ansiklopedisi, V. 15 (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1996), 1268.
l^ or the text of this declaration see İhla, СИР, 482-483.
^Ceznii Kartay,! / liylül 1980'den Günümüze Siyasal Anılar ve Sosyal 
Demokrasinin Öyküsü (Ankara: Sanem Matbaacılık AŞ, n. d (1997 (?)), 82.
205
lo be transformed into a parly in time.*“' Consequently Ecevit began continiously and 
sliictly lo be (bllowed by the Martial Law Courts and sentenced lo imprisonment.^’
FBcsides, Ecevit, after his rela.se, skepl a distance from the former ranks of 
RPP, arguing that "RPP had already completed its misson for it was a bourgeoise 
p a rly .A fte r  receiving a definite rejeetion and refusal from Ecevit both for the 
relbrmalion of RPP or leading a new party with the unexpected allegation that the 
.scx:ial democracy in Turkey is in need of a new organisation method which might even 
last for thirty years and could not even be lived by the existing cadres, the former 
polilicans induced their search vigirously® declaring that the mission of RPP has not 
yet completed.^ The same day it was announced that PP has been founded, Erdal 
İnönü, lalcı the leader of S(x;ial Democracy Paity {SDP-Sosyat Ih'lnokrasi Partisi) and 
Social Democratic Populist Parly {SDPP-Sosyaldenwkrat Halkçı Parti), announced 
that he was involved in the founding prcx;ess of a parly and later the parly was 
established by June 6 , 1983*o embodying the important polilicans, cadres and 
grassroots activists of former RPP. After PP, SDP was the .second party on the left 
but the crucial point was that due lo the vclos of the NSC it was obsliucled liom
‘’Yalçın Doğan, Dar Sokakta Siyaset, 1980-1983, (İstanbul: Tekin Yayınevi, 
1985), 113-117.
’^ Tho long procedure of the.se courts and hcevit's struggle is found in 
detail in Cüneyt Arcayürek, Hapishanedeki Ikcvit (Ankara: Bilgi 
Yayınevi, 2nd pr., 1986).
^Doğan, Dar, 147.
8 The different attempts on this basis is explained in Kai tay, Siyasal. 
Doğan, Dar.
Id The full text of the petition given to Ministry of Interiors is in Kartay, 
Siyasal, 144-147.
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running for the 1983 elections. Nevertheless in this election PP, as the only party on 
the left received a well 30.5 % of the voles with respect to the 45.2% of MP and 
23.3% of (he NI3P."
6.1.2. Two Parties on the Left: SDPP and DLP
The most important phenomenon up until the merging of the two parlies has 
been (he local elections of March 25, 1984. In this rally SDP has come in the second 
by tccciving (he 23.4% of the voles after MP who has received Ihc 41.3%. 3’hc crucial 
issue was not only the third position of the PP but the difference between the vole 
percentages as it could only gained the 8.3%.'2 This weak condition of the parly on 
the left wing politics has started a set of unrest in the parly, commencing with the 
harsh criticism directed to the leader Calp and then ending up with his defat in the 
parly congrc.ss, June 29, 1985, Aydın Güven GUrkan replacing him.·-  ^ The new 
period on the left wing politics just started after this event has developed in two major 
steps, i) The merging of the two parties, SDP and PP, was realised in November 3, 
1985· ' under the name of Social Democratic Populist Parly (SDPP-.SVi.vyr// Drinokmt
' 'lo r  an analysis of this election with a retrospective approach, 
comparing the percentage of voles obtained by IT and other parlies with 
the pre-1983 parties of left and right see, Ahmet Kardam and Sezgin Tüzün, 
l'ürkiyc'clc Siyn.si Kutuplaşmalar ve Seçmen Davranışları (Ankara: Veri 
Araştırma, 1998), 55.
'^-Hrgun Özbudun, " l’urkey: Crisis, Interruptions, and Reequiibrations," in 
litrry Diamond, J.LKing, S.M. Upset (eds.). Politics in Developing 
Countries {]^)u\der, London: Lynne Rienner Fbs, 2nd ed., 1995), 243.
13llikmet Bila, CUP, 509.
* '^Lhe long process could be followed in Süleyman Coşkun, SUP: Bir 
Oluşumun Perde Arkası (Ankara: Esen Yayınlan, n.d.). The insider 
information is found in Kartay, Siyasal, 295-318.
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Halkçı Parti) and, ii) by the November 14, 1985 again another party on the left, 
DciiKKaalic I xft Parly {OLP-Deniokratik Sol Parti) was founded by Biilcnl Eleevil and 
his friends.'-'’
The merging of the two parlies, PP and SDP, has not been an easy task. On 
(he c( mil ary not only i clalcd to the days of merging but even in the lalcı years this has 
been a subject of discu.ssion among the social democrats in Turkey.'^ The main 
op[X)si(ion has conccnlralcd on the point that PP, since the beginning, has been a pai ly 
of no concrete backbone which means its grassroots cadres were not known in the 
public realm and was well beyond an organisation showing a rejil political character.
In this process, according to the Protocol signed by the two chairpersons of the two 
parlies, in Ihc first congress of SDP, held in July 6 -8 , 1984, the propo.sal lor the 
merging is submitted to the approval of the Party Council."^ In the first extraordinary 
parly congress, November 2-3, 1985, the decision of the Parly Council is ralifed by 
the delegates and Aydın Güven GUrkan was elected as the first chairperson of the
■ ‘’Na/.mi llanoglu, "Demokratik Sol Parti," in Yüzyıl Biterken Cumhuriyet 
Dönemi Türkiye Ansiklopedisi, V.15 (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınlan, 1996), 
1272-127.5.
1 ^l or an opposing view for the merging see, Cezmi Karlay, Siyasal Anılar, 
295-318; Erdal İnönü, Anılar ve Düşünceler 2 (İstanbul: Yorum Kitapları, 
1998).
i^Erlugrul Günay, Speech delivered in the Conference: The New Searches 
lor Social Democracy . Ilarb-İş .Salonu, June 24, 1992. I'lie present aulhor's 
notes (lirluğrul Günay was the chairperson of SDP Ankara fown Unit 
(Ankara ll Başkanlığı). See akso lirtugrul Günay, "Hu yapılarla sol politika 
olmaz," Yeni Gündem, no. 66 , 1987, 24-25.
^^HP-SODPP Bütünleşme Protokolü ve İmza Töreninde İnönü'nün 
Konuşması (Ankara: .SODEP Genel .Sekreterliği, n.d.), 5-12. AKso .see 
Sülejmıan Ale.ş, SHP: Bir Oluşumun perde Arkası (Ankara: Esen yayınları, 
n.d), 171-176.
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Social Democratic Populist Parly. In the second extraordinary congress of May 30- 
31, 1986, Glirkan was replaced by İnönü, another item of the Protocol, who would 
keep this post up until September 12, 1993, fourth Congicss.
The appearence of two parties on the left, the first one being SDPP 
incorporating well organised grassroots activists, relying on the political tradition of 
RPP, having deep relations with the intelligentsia, and looking for the urban 
suppoi l,·’” the other one depending only on the charisma and the rhetoric of Bülent 
Eccvil2i, apparently calling for a more populist policy and seeking power in the 
provincial and suburbanal regions^^, insisting on a 'national left' modcl^^ started a 
debate on the meaning and the insight of social democracy in 1'urkcy and the whole 
1980s has been the battle ground for these two dilferent approaches one supp<.)rted by 
SDPP and the other by DLP. This debate has been of no practical use for three 
reasons; fiist, the whole 1980s up until 1991 has been under the rule of Ml·’, center 
right politics; second, there has been no further momentum acquired either regarding
l'>lbicl., 188-207.
^^^Andrew Mango, "The Social Democratic Populist Parly, 1983-1989", in 
Volilicixl Parties and Democracy in Turkey, eds.. Metin I leper and jacop M. 
landau (Pondon, New York: I.R. 'fauris and Co l.ld, 1991), 170-187.
^Iparly intentions and opinions of Bülent Ficevit, in the process of 
founding the party is found in Bülent licevil, "Siyasette herkes kendini 
lasiiye eder," Yeni Gündem, n o .l l,  (1986), 14-15; and Bülent licevit, "Sol 
Pekelciler Şantaj Yapıyor," Yeni Gündem, no. 24, (1986), 22-23.
22 |.()|- the organisation model which evoked a harsh debate oti the left 
wing politics with the allegation that licevit was following a path 
depending on exclusion of the former cadres, politicians and especially 
intellectuals, see the explanations given by one of the early prominent 
names of the parly, Seyfettin Gürsel, "Örgütlenmeden başkan sorumlu". 
Yeni Gündem, no. 56, (1987), 29.
23Nazmi llanoğlu, "Demokratik," 275.
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Ihc incigcr oi the two parties, which lias always been a hot project for all the decade, 
even l urlhci, in (he 1990s, or the compromising of any one of the parlies for the views 
aeccntiialcd by the other; third, as DLP being a 'one-man party'^^ continued in the 
1990s2‘’ keeping loyal to its political views which have been fervently criticised for 
being mote |)ionc to center right, sometimes conservatism^^’. On (he other side, 
though SDPP after merging with reformed RPP in 1995, gave up some of its 
arguments concerning a more Western-type social democracy notion and became a 
more con.scrvativc parly continued with the same accusation directed to DLP on the 
same basis.
This iramework needs a deeper analysis of the two parties with a specific 
reference to their programmes and attitudes. But without going further, here, it should 
be noted that the recent history of the Turkish social democracy in the post-1983 
period might be categorised as such, i) 1983-1989: the preparatory period including 
the come-back of the pre-1980 RPP top level politicans and Deniz Baykal's election as 
the Secretary General in SDPP; ii) 1989-1991: power in (he local administiations; 
iii) 1991-1995: power in the central administration. This perirxlisalion, no doubt brings
24'rhis very much debated issue might be followed through a published 
diary, with much insider information about the post-1983 period, to 
understand better licevit's position and approach in his struggle for a new 
parly lingin On.sal, Hcevit'lcn I:cevii'e...(1977-1987 Yilinn Aiiisindii Sosyal 
Demokratların Çöküşünü Belgeleyen Anılar), (İstanbul: İnkilap Kitabevi, 
n.d).
25seyfettin Gürsel, who was also one of the ideologes of DI.F together with 
the prominent professor of economics Asaf Savaş Akat, left the party soon 
after publishing a book on D1.P programme and giving the 
aforementioned interview, criticising Bülent Hcevit of being anti­
democratic in the intra-party policies: "DSP'den iki 'beyin' SllP'de," Yeni 
Gündem, no. 86 , 1987, 22-23.
^i’llasan Bülent Kahraman, " DSP,..Sağ mı Sol mu?" in Sosyal Demokrasi, 
Türkiye ve Partileri (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, 1993), 198-201.
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SDPP and lalcr (after 1995 merger) RPP fore. For DLP this time period is clearly 
divided into two halves as 1985-1995: the opposition years and beginning by 1997 
years of power. In this discussion a short and overall view of SDPP will be given and 
DLP will only be referred to deliniate a different scxial dcm(x;mtic approach in 'I'urkcy.
After the forming of the party, the major event has been the come-back of the 
former RPP top rank cadres to SDPP. Deniz BaykaP^^ the pre-1980 RPP deputy, 
minister and Deputy Secretary General a very well known politician in the intra-party 
coni lids as a leader of a faction, has been elected as the Sccrclaiy General in the Party 
Congress held in 1988.^  ^Baykal's election started a debate in the party, which lasted 
lor a long pci iod of time and gave birth to the organisation of many factions. One of 
the first critical milestones in this debate, apart from the other intra-party and inter- 
(adion ticbalcs was the expulsion of the Kurdish deputies from the party. The main 
point of contradiction between the factions was the alleged exclusionary approach of 
Baykal and his friends. Beyond the other political and ideological contradictions the 
Principle debate was concentrated on the point that Baykal and the central 
administration in the party was trying to control all the organisation and grassroots 
with an anti-democratic understanding.^'^This claim further supported by the faction
■¿7|.()г a subtle and impressionistic biography of Deni/, Baykal with absence 
of a critical methodological approach see Ahmet Kahraman, Karanlıklar 
Frc'nsi (Ankara: Verso Yayınları, 1990).
^^I'or the social, political and economic background of the congress period 
see, lirdal İnönü, Ilrdal İnönü’nün 2. Olağan Kurultayı Açış Konuşması 
(Sosyal Demokrat Halkçı Parti, mimeograph, n.d.).
^9|)uring the 198()s there was a series of extraordinary congresses held in 
the party against the will of the central administration controlled by 
Baykal and friends coalescing with firdal İnönü. Most of the congresses 
were to discuss the amendments realised in the Party Regulations, fhe 
allegation was that Baykal and his group was trying to hold and centralise 
all the control in the party. Гог these arguments see Örgütlen Parti İçi 
Demokrasiye, Sosyal Demokrasiye, Demokrasiye Saygı Çağrısı (Ankara:
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called Reformists (Yenilikçiler) when they applied the eonrts for the aincellalion of the 
amendments in the Statutes whieh had been implemented by the Party Council. The 
Parly Council was under the control of Baykal faction and the amendments aimed at 
the (urlhcr centralisalion of aulhorily in the party (o eonirol the parly organisation.^*’
Al ter an unsuce.ssful result reaehed in a local election in the year 1990, the 
inlcr-faclions conflict .suddenly turned out to be a clash between the Chairman and the 
Secretary General. In this round the latter was accused by Brdal Inönti of trying to 
get the full control of the party sidelining the existing Chairman in the leadership and 
llic r’ai ty Congress was held by the September 29, 1990 totliscuss the allegations and
n.p., I0 ‘)0 ); Yitik l'i'v/.ük-Kınk Dcivoknisi, Dönüm Kurultnyt (Ankara (?); 
n.p., 1900). both prepared for the June 4, 1989, bourth Extraordinary 
Congress. For İnönü's approach see SIIF, Genel Başkan Brdal İnönü'nün 4. 
Olağanüstü Kurultay Açış Konuşması (Ankara: n.p, 1989).
is worth consideration that though there are only two amendments of 
the Programme in SDPP there are five Regulations between 1985-199.S. 
SUP, 7'tixiik , 2 Kasim 1985 günü yapılan 1. Olağanüstü Kurultayca kabul 
edilmiştir (Ankara: n.p>, 1985); SllP,7’iiz:ilk, Üçüncü Olağanüstü Kurultay, 
Haziran /9 5 7  (Ankara: n.p., 1987); SHP, Tüzük, Son değişiklerle (Ankara: 
n p 1989); Sili’, Tüzük, V. Olağanüstü Kurultaya kadar olan değişiklikler 
işlenmiştir, ocak 1990 (Ankara: N.p., 1990); SHP, Tüzük, 3-4 Nisan 1993 
günleri toplanan SUP 'Tüzük ve Program Kurultayı'nda kabul edilmiştir 
(Ankara: n.p., 1993). This point might be taken as one of the evidences 
showing that during the 1980s, as well as in the 1990s, the social 
democratic politics is more controlled by the intra-party conflicts evoked 
by party cleavages with a definitive will of central control. This point is 
also acclaimed by Bülent licevit, saying that more than the programme, 
the regulations and the structure of the party is important for a left 
party; see, Bülent licevit: "Siya.sette", 14. Phis view is harshly critici.sed by 
various scholars; see Sarah Benton: "The Decline of the Party," in New 
Times: The Challenging Pace o f Politics in the 1990s, eds., Stuart Hall and 
Martin Jacques (l.ondon: lawrence and Wishart in association with 
Marxism Today, reprinted 1990, first edition published 1989); Perry 
Anderson, "Introduction," in Mapping the West European Left, eds.. Perry 
Anderson and Patrick Camiller (London, New York: Ver.so, 1994), 12-13.
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lo гс-clccl ihc chairpcrson.3· 'I'hc reluctant Baykal was I'orccd by İnönü to be the 
candidate for the chairpersonship and the contest would be between the two politicans. 
The congress elected Erdal İnönü as the chairman of the SDPP but this conflict 
between the two groups lasted for two more rounds and reached a new turnitig point 
when Baykal and his li icMuls led the SDPP lo recslablish (he RPP.
These later events are the issues of 1990s and will be analysed in the following 
chapter. Here a more theoretical approach to the social democratic developments of the 
1980s will be proceeded with a special emphasis pul on the ideological openings and 
their roots. Mere, an important point .should be brought into discussion. As will be 
lurthei analysed when the ideological aspects of Turkish social democracy in the 
1980s is discussed, in the mentioned decade, there arc a few but important 
achievements obtained by this political ideology. This is, first of all, due to the 
condilon that, in Ihc 1980s Turkey has faced a radically new discour.se on the political 
realm raised by the New Right as has been analysed at length in the previous chapter. 
I'hc transformation that Turkey has undergone in this period, as has also been 
analysed, sparked a certain support for especially SDPP, alter the f^)pulisl Parly 
success of 1983 elections. This was mainly due to the fear ignited by the rapid 
changes and expressed by the relatively conseivalive s(x;ial cla.s.ses remaining loyal t(i 
the already existing norms and conditions. Ncvcrlhclc.ss this iTaincwoik could only be 
further analysed by reviewing the election results of the 1980 decade.
6.J.3. Elections and the Social Democracy in the 1980s
31 lo r the details of the background of the congress as well as the 
allegations by lirdal İnönü see (Erdal İnönü), 'Parti İçi Demokrasi h in  
Atılım!' Kurııitayı (Mimeograph).
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Having already analysed the 1983 elections and not once more going deep into 
(he ilctails ol i(, Iiere, this relatively brief survey of the elections lield in tlie 1980s 
should be started by the unexpected success of 1984 local elections which has been 
mentioned above. The next general elections was in 1987.1’hc countiy has undergone 
this election in a more tense medium emanating from vaiious issues. These were, as 
described by Turan, first, the reinvigoration of the opposition parties questioning the 
legitimacy of the MP governments when corruption debates were dominant in the 
social-political agenda. Second, the rcprc.sentativc power and legitimacy of MP was 
under disputation regarding the conditions and the determining power of the National 
Security Council during the 1983 elections. This very last issue was also backed by 
the debates eoneerning the lifting of the bans on former political leaders. MP in this 
debate running for the perpetuation of the bans once more faced the criticisms 
regarding the legitimacy and democracy understanding of the party. One another vital 
t|ues(ion was the continiously rising inllation which .seriously weakened MP's 
position especially among the middle classes which was the central axis for the 
political power of this party.^^
On the other hand MP realising its weakening politiciil situation did not hesitate 
in changing the existing electoral system to reinforce the majoritarian aspects. These 
changes were clearly against the smaller parlies whereas "the stronger was favoured 
more than the looser."33 The raised district level threshold, the introduction of the 
district-level candidate system all backed MP's reinforcing its majority in the
'^ i^lU‘1· riiiati, ’'i■vollItlon of the lilocloral Process,'' in Politics in the I'hinI 
I'urkish Republic, eds. Melin lleper and Ahmet livin (boulder, San 
li ancisco, Oxford: Westview Press, 1994), .S2-.S3.
^ '^ I^bid., 55.
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parliament. In the eleelions as MP hold the 297 seats eleaiiy more than the 211 seats of 
the 1983 eleelions by gelling only 36.3% of the votes as compared to 45.6% of the 
1983 elections. On the other hand SDPP reached the 24.7% of all the voles. This was 
more than the 23.4% of the 1984 lcx:al elections which was the first and unexpected 
success of this parly. Besides, DLP of Bülent Ecevit, in the 1987 elections, got only 
the 8.5%, a figure which did not let this party pa.ss the national trcshold of 10%. The 
lolal pciccniag.e of tlu' h'll was 33.2 '/n, a liguie still Indow the e('iit('i ligjit but 
slaying loyal to the 'iradilional' ccnlcr-lcft bloc figures of the 1970s which was 
approximately 30%. ·^  ^Yet, according to Kardam-Tli/.iln anaİ3'sis which concentrates 
on the voting behaviour of the mob that refuses going to the polls, the 1987 elections 
is the third elections in which the traditional ccnlcr-lcfl bloc has raised its percentage 
by successfully receiving a support from those protestors in the |X)sl 1950 period.^-“'
The last elections which also attested an apparent victory for the cenlcr-lcft 
were the local elections of March 26, 1989. In the elections with respect to the 1987 
general elections results, SDPP has come in the first party by receiving the 28.7% of 
the votes. DLP, in these elections with a very small increase in the vote percentage 
recieved only 9.0 % of all voles. Whereas, True Path Party under the leadership of 
charismatic Siileyman Demirci has reached 25.1% and become the second parly. MP 
was only able to gel 21.8% and to lx; third parly in the rank ing .T he sharp drop in 
MP voles is explained by various scholars referring to some different variables. 
According to 0/,budun, the main reason behind this ebbing is the high inflation rales
•^Mhmet Kardam, Sezgin Tüzün, Türkiye'de, 56.
I'he other two elections was the 1973 and 1977 elections. Ibid., 56. 
'^^Mirgiin (V/budun, "'I'urkey", 241.
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and the rumours of political corruption.37 On the other hand, Kardam and TUziin gives 
a more technical explanation and préférés, contrary to the common opininon which 
lakes the results as the success of SDPP, to see the situation as the punishment of MP 
by its voters and supporters by not going to the polls.38 This approach is also 
suppoi ted by Sabuncu and Şcker.39 The critical consequence of this election has been 
the power captured by SDPP in the local administrations, especially in the 
municipalities.
7’his outcome has raised various debates in and out of party. First of all, as has 
been put by İnönü, the chairman of SDPP, the percentage achieved by the party is less 
than the summation of voles recieved separately by SDP and PP in the 1984 elections 
In the previous elections the totality of the votes was 33 .2% and this dropped to 
28.7% in the 1989 elections where SDPP was the unification of (he two parlies. 
Ncvcrlhclc.ss İnönü, underlining this specific condition, explains it as the "incrca.se in 
the political power rather than the electoral power"^« for, with respect to the 380 
municipalities controlled by two centre-right parlies totally having more voles, SDPP 
gained power in 650 local administrations.
As a conclusion, in this context, it could be said that, social democracy in 
Turkey, in the post-1983 era, has shown a relatively successful development. Its voles
37ibid., 243.
^^Alımcl Kardam, Sezgin l'üzün, Türkiye’de, 56.
^^^Yavuz Sabuncu, Murat Şeker, "Seçimler", in Yüzyıl Biterken Cumhuriyet 
Dönemi Türkiye Ansiklopedisi, V.14 (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1996),
1148.
"^ ‘^ lirdal İnönü, Genel Ikışkun Trdal İnönü'nün 4. Olüğanüstü Kurultayı A as  
Konuşması (Ankara: SHP, 1989), 17.
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lias conliniously increased but the crucial point is that, to put it once more, this 
upwards mobilising tendency in the votes is not due to the policies proposed or 
pragnniliscd l>y Rl>|’ but more is a consequence of the volatility ol the ccntcr-right 
votes. Besides, two points could also be alleged. First, the volatility of the center- 
right voles, though effects the election results of a single party situated on this jxjlilical 
wing individually, yet does not change the overall vote volume of that political 
idcology.41 Second, as a consequence of the point mentioned above, social demcx^ratic 
ideology, i( ilic voles gained from the prote.slors in the 1<^7 elections arc omitted for 
a while, has never gained any gradually increasing vole mass from center righl.42 
'I'liis is related with the ideological as well as political insunicicncy of the social 
demcx:racy which needs a brief survey and which will be developed further below.
Mere it should be accentuated that soon after SDPP's coming into power in the 
local adminisliations, the votes showed a sharp dccrea.se which might be taken as a 
concrete evidence of the inadequacy o( this ideology. I ’his |X)int is clearly indicated in 
the SDPP survey concerning the 1991 election results by Secretary General of SDPP 
saying "ours should be a parly producing ideology and programme...our 
municipalities should start a new period of attack in accordance with the social
riiis point is emphasized by SDPP survey of 1991 elections with an 
ac( cut on the stability of the MP vote volume. Sosyal Demokrat I laikli 
Parti, 20 likiw Gcnd Seçimi: Anışurnm  ve Değerlendirmeler (Ankara(?): 
n.p., n.d), 8 .
‘+^'fhis point is more complicated in the elections held in the 1990s. 
Nevertheless the volume of the votes moving from centre left to centre 
right is more than the reversed direction in the 1989-1994 period, for 
details see Türkiye Sosyal Ekonomik Siyasal Araştırmalar Vakfı, 
Türkiye'de Siyasi Partilerin Seçmenleri ve Sosyal Demokrasinin 
tabanı (Ankara: n.p., 1995) 32-41.
Toplumsal
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democratic ideology."^^ jj-,is situation, to a certain extent is similar to the Spanish 
Socialist Workers Party's (PSOE) condition in Spain in the early 1980s. Contrary to 
many o( the socialist parties sulTering serious problems in the 1980s, PSOE well 
enjoyed a power experience. Nevertheless, as has been analysed by left-conservative 
Share, "by mid-1987, the PSOE was not in danger of losing power but...five years of 
PSOE government had indicated the severity of the ideological crisis of Spanish 
social ism.
What is interesting in this process is that, PSOE has undergone a series of 
crisis due to the transformation it has realised in the opposite direction, in Share's 
words, "by 1987 the Cambio (Change) advocated by the PSOE 1982 had been all but 
forgotten and had been replaced with the term 'modernisation.'"''*^ Here, 
modernisation encompasses a more liberal prone economic understanding. Although 
Shaic u.scs llic concept in a cynical approach it is conlVontcd by other scholars who 
support the approach and take it with an affirmative approach linking the success of 
PSOE (o (lie modernisation programme is found on certain analysis.T he policy is 
criticised by Share, but election results show that, though PSOE faced a problem of
"*'^Sosyal Demokrat Halkçı Parti, 20 Hkim, 6 . fhe survey in another section 
especially tackles with this issue. See 57-58 and 83-84.
44oonald Share, The Dilemmas o f Social Democracy: The Spanish Workers 
Parly in the 1980s (New York, Westport, l,ondon: Greenwood Press, 1989), 
9.
45ibid.
^ ’^Patrick Camililer, "Spain: The Survival of Socialsim?", in Mapping the 
West European Left, ed. Perry Anderson and Patrick Camiller (London, 
New York: Verso, 1994), 233-266; Paul Kennedy, "'fhe PSOL: Modernization 
and the Welfare State," in Looking Left, ed. Donald Sassoon (l.ondon. New 
York: l.B. Pauris Publishers in association with The Gramsd 14)undation, 
Rome), 88-108.
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iincmploymciil, it has reached a long lasting success in the political arena. Kennedy, in 
this context, prefers to count the other social issues, such as womens' position, 
contributing to the victories of PSOE together with its 'distinctive record on 
privatization.'"^^ Yet, Camilleri insists that the neo-liberal economic features 
'overlooks several aspects of socialist policy which deserves greater attention.' '  ^The 
impass of Turkish social democracy occuring for not realising this opening will be 
di.scnsscd in the following .section.
6.2. The Epistemological Roots of the Identity Search
6.2.1. The Necessity of the Renewal
riiis framework of analysis constructed above is conducive to a specific 
con.scqucnce. As could be deduced from the related literature, in the social demcxTatic 
or centrc-lcl t reorientation in the post-anti-democratic periods, as mostly ob.servcd in 
the South European and Mediterranean countries, namely Spain, Portugal and 
Greece, the main concern has always been the democratic .stabiliziition."’^  One another 
procc.ss which unfolds Simultaneously with this condition is always the ideological 
transformation of the socialist or social democratic parties.^OTliis difficult task of 
recreating the party ideology and a programme synchronically is an issue started first
"17|>a(ri( k Cumilleri, "Spain," 89. 
"f«Ibid.
"^'^(îianfraiK O Pasquino, "Party elites and Democratic Consolidation: Cross- 
National Comparision of Southern European Experience," in Securing 
Democracy: Political Parties and Democratic Consolidation in Southern 
Europe, ed., Geoffrey Pridham (London and New York: Routledge, 
reprinted 1993), 42-61.
S^^Richard Gillespie, "Regime Consolidation in Spain: Party, State and 
Society," in Securing Democracy, ed., (ieoffrey Pridham, 126-146.
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by (lie Bad Godesberg movement in the SPD, German Social Democratic Party, in 
1959.·' '^
The Bad Godesberg movement proverbially refers in general to all new but 
radical amendments of ideology and programme and this is observed in all centre left 
parties in the post-1980 period as a reaction to and as well as through the impetus 
gained from the uprising of New Right policies.-^^ 7 ^^ success of the centre left 
politics in the West European countries is an aClcrcffccl of this process''^ and usually 
(he centre left takeover of (he power, in the post-1980 period, is after the New Right 
or neo-liberal governments. The pattern of change followed by the centre-left parties is 
of crucial debates and it is usually a blend of new mcKlels propo.sed by New Right and 
the inspirations of the conventional paradigm.
In Turkey, what is interesting is that in the 1980s, as the election results 
show, concerning the party ideology and the concept of social democracy, (here was 
not any radical ideological or programmatic change or transformation observed in the 
centre left politics. Rather, as early as the 1983 elections, the single party situated on 
the left was running for the conventional statist model challenging the MP on the
•‘^ 'Donald Sassoon, One Hundred Years o f Socialism: '¡'he West Huropean left 
in the Twentieth Century (New York: I’he New Press, 1996), 242.
52Anthony Butler, The Transformative Politics (New York: St Martin's 
Press, 199.5), 110-129.
S-^lispecially the concept of 'Bad Godesberg' is debated in British labour 
Parly movement in the 1990s and mainly in the Blairite era depending on 
the dis.solving of the Clause IV of the parly regulation. See, inter alia, The 
Changing Inhour Party , eds.. Marlin j. Smith and Joanna Spear (l.ondi)ti: 
Rouiledge, 1992).
i^^As an examplary study and survey see, Donald Share, Dilemmas , 35-97.
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privatisation process and the early successes is bound to this upheaval. On tliis ground 
PP has debated the regulation of the markets through the state control.''·'' Staying akin 
to (his claim it could be purported that the social democratic politics in IPHOs in 
Turkey is more cultural than ideological and programmatic and more tactical than 
strategic, 'flic social democratic policies pronounced were more responsive to 
démocratisation process and on the economic and social level it was only responding 
to an incentive started by neo-liberalism using a more negative discourse. Yet, (he 
demands for a more deep transformation especially in the SDPP were confronted with 
refusal which will be analysed in (he following section. As a conclusion, here it 
suflices to say that in the 1980s what was determining for (he social democracy was 
the piaxis put before the ideology. I ’his very condition, naturally to e certain extent, 
was incapable of surpassing the existing level of practical issues. This could only be 
undcrstocxl by analysing the ideological dimensions of the scx:ial demœracy in Turkey 
in (he 1980s with a reference to its historical legacy.
6.2.2. The Constraint for Change: State, Legacy and Post-1983 
Social Democracy
The history of social democracy in Turkey in the post-1983 era is more a 
discussion of intra-party factions emanating from a search for a new definition of 
social democracy going beyond the limits of the historical legacy set by RPP and 
symbolised by the Six Arrows. This discussion is more induced by the New Right 
policies implemented in Turkey looking for a more liberal understanding of state and
‘^■‘'llalkr.i Parti, Program ( Ankara, n.p., 183), 5-6.
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being more atlenlive to the new eoneepts derived from the New Social and Political 
Movcmcnls came out in (he Western eounlrics as a critique of the modcrttily.'^’
I Icie, it should be noted that the search of the 1980s on (he social democratic 
realm has not been a réévaluation or revisiting of a practical legacy reached by the end 
of a political experience gathered at the end of a certain practice in the power. Rather, 
if a short and a very unsuccessful period spend in power between 1977-1979 is 
exempted, the left wing politics in Turkey has not found the chance and the 
oppoilunity of testing its ideology and policies in practice. 'I’his condition has 
confronted the centre-left scaich in 'rurkey in the early 1980s with a shortcoming. The 
new founded party, after Ecevit's 'rejection of the heritage', has felt itself obliged to 
suspend on the RF^ P tradition and establish itself based on that culture.
This condition was important lor a lew reasons. 'I’hc fir.st one is that, primarily 
SDP then SDPP, instead of looking for a 'real'. Western type social democratic 
culture rather relied on the classical RPP tradition with no concrete s(X'ial dcnux’ratic 
basis and understanding. In this context, as has been argued in the preceeding 
chapters, the new social democratic parties right in the start began with all the fetters 
that kept them away from a new opening. The traditional RPI  ^ has always been 
conceptualised in Turkey as a 'party of the state,' albeit all the transformations it 
underUx)k beginning by the late 1950s and especially in the 1970s.
The slate tradition in Turkey is perceived as a reality suspended between the 
tyrannic and the authoritarian ruling but not democratic and liberal, always generating
an analysis of the relationship between socialism and the new Social 
Movements see, lawrence Wilde, Modern Huropean Socialism (Aldershot: 
Dartmouth, 1994), 98-114.
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a İcar and reserve. This tradition, in the Republican era, has been backed up by the 
military and the state elites. RPP, compatible with that, has never been immune to this 
Iradilioii it not it has been thouglit as a imdethacabic compoiu'iil ol this stniclurc. 
When SDP started its performance this unwilling phenomenon is once more provoked 
in the society by attaching to the RPP tradition. As a result the 1980s has been the 
decade, for the social democracy a soul-searching process probing into the traditional 
and, if it might be said, normative basis.
Second, as at the inital pha.sc the party has been situated on the existing 
tiadition and formed without regarding the new emerging social, political and cultural 
cicavcgcs in (lie .society as well as the developments on the outside world, both SDP 
and SDPP suffered a lot by not being able to take initiative in the policy making 
processes but rather stayed as an opposition to the center right dominated political 
climate. When center-right, through MP, .started the implementation of a set of new 
policies and brought some concepts fore which were formerly alien to the political 
realm, SDPi^, by opposing them, has not gained any momentum but perceived more 
as a conservative party especially when MP accelerated the prcx:ess of unification with 
the outer world, using the motto of 'skipping to a new age' (çağ atlamak) all through 
the 1980s. Behind this development found is the condition that
the new social demcwatic parties and above all SDP, were founded by a 
group of intellectuals and bureaucrats who were close to the educated 
middle classes in the big cities but were quite remote from the grass­
roots activists of the RPP.57
5^Ay.şc Ayala, "Ideology, Social Bases and Organizational Structure of the 
Post-1980 Political Parlies," in The Political and Socioeconomic 
'Transformation o f Turkey, eds., Atila Eralp, Muharrem Tünay and Birol 
Yeşilada (Westport, Connecticut, London: Praeger, 1993), 43.
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The Iiislorical structure of RPP has never been other than very this 
characteristic even the grass-roots activists have always been put into the same 
fiamework. Tliis condition in the post-1983 political era conduced to two important 
developments. The f irst one is the social democracy's immediate situation regarding its 
relationship with the state, the second being the constraints this party has faced in the 
1980s tluc to very this relationship.
Andrew Mango after emphasising that "SDPP is the party of the old 
establishment," continues with two important remarks. Mango, first, rightly argues 
that the social democratic roots in Turkey have always been supported by the 
'enlightened' and 'laique' sects, since the early years of the Republic. The role of 
intelligentsia in this tradition has always been a condition distinguishing this political 
approach f rom its European similars. According to him.
the social identity- in Marxist terms, the class basis- of the SDPP is 
uncertain, but its cultural identitiy, like that of the RPP, is clear: it is 
perceived to be the party of the 'progressives', of the 'enlightened', of 
I'ree-thinkers in the nineteenth-century sense of the term.·'^
The second point is that, the social democratic or in general the parties of 
ideology have always sought for capturing the state in order 'to realize their vision of 
just s o c i e ty ,a  concept deriving from the 'first left' ’^·^ going back to the French
SSMango, "The Social Democratic Party," 172.
^i^lbid., 173.
()0[;or the discussion of the concept see Jan Otto Anderson, "Pundamental 
Values for a I'hird I.cft", New le ft Review, no.2IG (March-April 1990), 66 -
7«.
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licvolulioii. In Turkey, as Mango argues and as it has already been discussed in the 
previrnis cliaptcrs,
the RPP, the parent of SDPP, could dispense with this iJicliminary task 
since it was from its inception the party of the slate. With tlie support ol 
the state it could devote itself to social engineering, and although much 
of this engineering has proved solid, it was not popular.^'
'flic most important consequence of this reasoning is not RPP's (ailiire in 
gelling the majority of the votes in the post-1980 era, as the author puts, but what is 
accentuated iti his conclusion as, "SDPP is not the party of the existing slate but it is 
implicitly the parly of the strong state”(>'^ It is dclerminingly this condition that has 
brought the ultimate crisis of the derncxratic sœialism in Turkey when the New Right 
policies started arguing and surpassing the existing stale. Social democracy has stayed 
in a paralysed situation more reposing on a state utopia. This point has also been 
emphasized by a party-administrator who has been involved later in civil society 
organi/ations as "for the power of social democracy the structure of the slate is the 
best basis." The explanation of this view comes from the 'reality' and 'specificity' of 
Turkey that, center-right parlies, according to the party-executive has always applied 
socialdemocralic policies. Again, the Secretary General of the party, on the same 
grounds, when SDPP is criticised because of holding on a 'passé' stale model and 
utopia, did not hesitate in responding immediately saying 'we are cowards (in 
chatiging the slate-hbk) and we are status quo holders.<^
Mango, " The Social", 173. 
f’^ lbid., 174; emphasis mine.
’^■ '^reoman firgül, Sosyaldemokraside Ayrışma Yıllan (1980-1985) 
(Sosyaldeinokratlann On Yılı) . V.l(Ankara: Gündoğan Yayınları, 1995) 
258.
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Here another interesting point is that, as Göle shows, when social actors tend 
to be dctaclicd (roin tlic society they are adrift to identify themselves with utopias. For 
(he IcK, (his is a non-existent future whereas for the right it is the pas(. ‘^^  This 
detachment also fails them in distinguishing between the ideology and utopia as the 
latter is "informed by reality, utopia by imagination."65'rhis very condition of being 
detached from the social, because of its symbiotic relationship even not with the 
existing but with a concept of strong slate, has brought two distinctive characteristics 
to Turkish social democracy in the period which is under discussion. As a matter of 
lact, because of the yearning for a strong state, an issue of the past, it might be 
s|xrcula(cd (hat Turkish .serial dcmcK'iacy has fallen short of i) developing an ideology 
and, ii) having a socialist-futuristic mind set and has become a right-utopia bii-sed 
[X)lilical movement.
6.2.3. Ideology or Culture? Social Democracy as a
Constitutive Element
'I'hese structural aspects of Turkish social democracy in the 1980s has 
generated a specific condition. The social democracy of the 1980s lends to be a 
political phenomenon more inclined to attach itself to a certain kind of political culture 
rather than to a political ideology.66 The political culture that demarcated the
f’^ isfilüfcr Göle, " Toward," 2 1G.
i>'i|bid., 21G.
^>4îöran Therborn, in his provoking article, slates that socialism is a 
culture and it is related with identity experessed by a set of symbols. 
Nevertheless this culture, as long as the West liuropean socialism is 
cfuisidcred is also linked with a conlinious process of ideology 
construction. Goran Therborn, " The Hfe and Times of Socialism," New Left 
Review, no. 194, (1992), 17-32. For a critique of this article see Nicos
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cpislcinological horizons of Turkish scxial democracy has never surpassed Ihe 
romaiUicisl, 19lli century understanding of Enlightenment tenets resting on a p<.)sitivist 
tradition. I'hcy incorpt>rate the nation state, national identity, rationalism, secularism. 
This framework also encompasses a kind of universalism more inspired by a 
utopianist episteme. The result is a severe clash between a nomothetical approach and 
an ideographic onc.^*  ^ Turkish scx^ ial democracy, even in the 1980s, when the 
Enlightenment principles were put under sharp criticism by post-modern approaches 
has continued with them and in this way has never transgressed the nineteenth century 
party mcxiel. Yet, postmodernism in Turkey, especially on the left has been denied and 
refused which might be because of its tendency to eradicate at least to curb the 
hierarchical alignment between the political and the social as well as rejecting the 
paradigmatic choices and grand- narratives.
'fhe second issue emanating Irom this consideration is the big conflict it has 
undergone on the level of ideology-technology distinciation. In the 1980s the 
watershed between the center right and center left politics started to be demolished on 
(he pragmatic level, 'fhe Turkish New Right without much hesilalion, quickly as.scitcd 
the importance and functionality of the operative issues accepted in the capitalist 
world, pi ivatiz.ation being the most critical one. Following the dominance of the neo- 
capilalist dcregulalionist economic policies, the difference between the.se two political 
camps turned to be more relying on an ideological basis rather than being a 
(cchologically oriented one.
Mouzelis, " I he Balance Sheet of the Left," New Left Review, no. 200, (1993), 
182-185. Гог the answer by Therborn to Mouzelis see, Goran fherborn, 
"Reply to Mouzelis," New Left Review, no. 200, (1993), 185-191.
^^tlhan lekeli, Tarihyazimi Üzerine Düşünmek (Ankara: Dost Kitabevi, 
1998), 12.
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It is at this point that the ideological insistence on the refutations of current 
economic models have become more normative than ideological and, it is especially 
this condition which was overwhelming in Turkey. Because the Turkish social 
democracy, again with a former and romanticist-normative understanding of 
technology, has perpetutated the debate with a more technological intention rather than 
the ideological one. In this debate it did not have any chance of defeating its rival 
unless it had revealed the nature of the transformation and a sa consequence fell into a 
dual dilemma. First, although the debate should have been leaned on an ideological 
basis it was kept on a more technological level; second, on the technological level the 
positivistic attiichmcnt had already lost its viability and its argumentative power. This 
very condition might be registered as one of the prominent characteristics of Turkish 
social dcmcx:iacy, i.e. to be more tcchnologiatl rather than ideologiail.
These aspects of social democracy in the post-1983 era when coincided with 
the issues of secularism, which has been one of the most crucial debates among the 
modernising elites and set as the primordial tenet of Kemalism in Turkey, attached to 
RPP and has never been given up even though the party has pas.scd through various 
transformations, once more fortify the view that this political ideology has been a 
movement for a cultural transformation rather than political one. In fact and it is 
beyond doubt that this understanding has not only started but also enhanced the 
nuxlcrni'/ation process in Turkey in the early decades of the twentieth century. Yet, as 
this model loresces putting the state at the center of the whole process and as it insists 
on the premises of an already accomplished task it reaches an impass for two reasons.
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I ’hc (list one is that, it can not cany the political modernisation of the masses 
liirongh politics because of its exclusionary approcah and blocking the political 
participation on the grassroots level. As a consequence it docs not further answer the 
expectations of the different social groups and actors. Second, there might be a debate 
encompassing this very situation asking whether this is a crisis of modernity or not. In 
the 1980s when the postmodern, state-transgressing political understanding reached a 
culmination any statist model of this kind would easily be criticised for its modernist 
and statc-ccntcrcd understanding. In other words this model would be defeated as a 
mattei· of postmodernity.
fhis cireumstance is a crisis ol modernity lor it neither provokes and reinforces 
the political modernisation and it does not create an opening through that incentive 
which brings the curbing of the prc-mcxicrnist, traditional values; nor it enables the 
development of new methodologies as well as of the new ideologies more prone to 
what could be defined as postmodern. In this sense .social democracy of the 1980s 
was afso insufficient in developing yet a mtxicrnist view even though it dcfinctl itself 
as a modernist model. The reflection of this understanding is found in the clashes 
occuring in the intra-party factions and between DLP and SDPP conflict and the SDPP 
program changes is a concrete signifier of all these movements
At this point it should briefly be suggested that, the 1980 shortcoming of 
Turkish social democracy also emanates from its constitutive character. Attached to 
Kemalism, a grand narrative proposing a structural and total transformation of the 
counti'y in a modernist direction, Turkish social democracy and its advocates in SDPP 
did not realise that any constitutive element, by the virtue of definition, is bexmd to be
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iilopianisl and normalive/^^ Constitutive concepts are more prone to create a mela-real 
epistemology rather than letting themselves to be situated on a practical-real ground. It 
is obvious that any meta-real discourse gains a hermeneutical character and expresses 
itself more with a symbolic, meta-narrative discourse, interwoven with a tradition. 
This procedure ends up with an orthodoxy loosing the possibility of transforming 
il.scif, an end reached only through a practical-ontological methodology. As the 
c()nsc(|iicncc <)l this sysicm is the objcctivi/alivion t)( Ihc snl)jccl, in Turkish 
experiment, through the state-led models, especially on the ideological level of 
nalionalism-,secularism, what is achieved is very this end. The critique of Kcmalism in 
the 1980s and in the 1990s has definetely been on this ground and beyond that this 
hainrwoik is coiuiHidy againsi llic basic cpisicmolog.ical coiu'cins o( social 
democracy for it is more a pragmatic ideology resting on theoretical and practical 
transformations.
6.3. The Ontology of the Change: Party Programmes and Inter 
and lii lra-l*arly  i]!oii(rndic(ioiis
6.3.1. Social Structure aitdlof Social Democracy iu the 
1980s
The post-1983 era from the angle of social democracy is the stage of a .set of 
new relations between different cleavages and this ideology. This is an outcome of the 
condition analy.sed by Mango. He succinctly relates this outcome to the abandonment
^>«Mere, it is interesting that, even though Turkish social democraev as a 
modernist and Kemalist political approach, is utopian since the beginning 
It did not compete with the centre-right approaches in furkey in the 
1980s who were also developing a utopian understanding. In this sense, 
SDFF instead of trying to challenge the basic political approach of MF to 
carry them to an upper step on the ladder, preferred to stay immune and 
indifferent to what was happening, fhe only point of contradiction was 
that SDFF perpetually insisted on calling for the slalus quo and even for 
the past.
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oi the social democracy by the slate-elites because this ideology's inability to acsess 
the power and, conse(|uclively, staying iiway from the office in the post-1950 period. 
Paradoxically, as the social democracy insisted on a more abstract notion of slate as its 
'raison d'etre', the 'people' continued to dislinciale itself from it and when the social 
ticmociacy, realising this condition, started to draw upon the masses, stale and center, 
with all its bureaucracy and other possibilities, loosened its ties with the RPP and kept 
an eye on it as an 'unreliable' political ideology. This circumstance once moie has bred 
the alienation between the periphery and the social democratic ideology. The 
periphery, in 'I’lirkey, in the post 1950 period has u.sed to enjoy the interests deriving 
from the stale-political party relationship which was articulated by the center right 
parties. >^9 This could also be taken as another determinant in SDPP's becoming a 
parly staying on the margin beauise of its dependency on the educated intelligentsia.
On the other hand, as surveys has shown clearly, SDPP, especially after 1988 
when the former politicians were able to participate in the active pc^ litical life following 
the lilt of the ban by the referandum and, when Deniz Baykal was elected as the 
Secretary Cicneral, has become a parly much .segmented between urban middle classes 
and "voters who were mobilised primarily through religious and ethnic affiliations."7« 
This condition which fettered SDPP's merging with the labour and created one of its 
main shortcomings, as well as blocking its relations with the new social cleavages, has 
been backed also by the very idiosynersy that DLP has developed. DLP has been a 
party primarily dependening on urban lumpens with much of a volatility in their voting 
behaviours, having more conservative tendencies, more prone to populist policies with
’^‘Myaia, 'Ideology,' 45.
^^^Ibid.
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no specific socially defined characterislics. A study covering the 1989-1993 pericxl has 
indicated the below results
Table 6. The Representation Coefficient of voters in center left parties regarding 
all fields of work
Work Field Survey Universe SDPP DLP
Blue collars 15.2 0.95 1.55
Wliite collars 5.9 1.16 0.91
state officials 7.4 1.74 0.90
small  s c a l e :
tradesman-
craftsmen- farmer 14.1 0.96 0.86
pi i vate 1.0 0.74 0.90
employer 1.3 1.29 0.94
retired 5.2 0.96 1.72
unemployed 6.4 0.67 1.43
housewife 40.8 0.91 0.76
student 2.6 1.29 0.36
undefined 0.1 - 2.09
'I’utal lOO.O
Soııvce,Türkiye'de Siyasi Partilerin Seçmenleri ve Sosyal Demokra. 
Toplumsal Tabam, Tiises Vakfı-Veri Araştırına A,Ş. (Ankara: n.p., 1995), 43
sının
As the table proves, even in a relatively late pcricxi, after some adjuslniciUs and 
alterations have been reached in the parties, due to criticisms, still SDPP is supported 
by white collar workers, state officers, employers and students whereas the cleavages 
holding DLP emerge as blue collar workers, retired and unemployed^! White collar 
workers arc represented in DLP is 63% more than SDPP. But the more crucial issue
This approach, to find out the character differences of the parties, is 
analysed in Moshe Maor, Political Parties and Party Systems: Comparative 
Approaches and the British Experience (London and New York: Routledge, 
1997), 18-22. Also the relationship between the blue collar workers and the 
social democratic strategics is discussed at length in Herbert Kittschelt,
The Transformation o f European Social Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1994), 41-47.
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is the representation of the state officers in SDPP for the ratio of tlicm in SDPP are 
beyond and above all other parties even than the parties ol' center-right. It is also 
interesting that DLP is supported significantly by the retired and thcuncinploycd.^2
Also one another aspect that comes out in the survey is the voter's affiliation to 
pai ty leader and programme. The research indicates that whereas the SDPP grassrex t^s 
clearly states that if the leader is changed the affiliation docs not affected (% 77.6) this 
ratio diamalically drops (to %37.8) when DLP is considered. On the other hand for 
SDPP mass, tlie attachment to the party programme shows a drastic 58% as this figure 
for DLP is % 29.1. Nevertheless, when two diflerent issues are taken together ("the 
alTiliation to leader and party") % 16.8 of SDPP is overwhelmed by % 52.3 of DLP^ ·^  
showing a less political mobilization and a decisive stagnation which might be 
interpreted as the method followed by DLP leadership in the founding phase of the 
party
This condition has never forced SDPP to develop a new economic and social 
piogiammc. Rather, contrary to the arguments in the direction of the necessity for the 
renewal of the programme, the party preferred to continue with the traditional RPP 
ideology as stated before. Yet, RPP's suggestions in the early 1980s were rather
^^ '1 iirkiyc Sosyal likonomik Siyasal Ara.ştırmalar Vakfı, liirk iyc’clc Siyusi 
Piirülcrin Seçmenleri ve Sosyal Demokrasinin Toplumsal Tabanı (Ankara: 
n.p., 1995), 43-44.
■73ibid., 158-100.
speculative but spectacular history of this condition is found in 
nrgiil, Sosyaldemokraside, 223-228.
^'’ I'he reasons that drived licevit to prefer such a method of exclusion 
might be followed in Orhan Duru, hcevit'in Çilesi (İstanbul: Afa Yayınlan, 
1995),! 18, 123126-127.
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encompassing a traditional economic understanding trying to merge a kind of statism 
with the oveiAvhelming market economy. This blend was named as the 'Social Market 
Eiconomy' in the 1993 Programme'^^. Even this approach forcsiivv the 'democratic 
planning' as opposed to the market economy' '^  ^ and to the 'Role of the Popular 
Scctor'^^ Planning is also defined as 'directed to national targets.'^'^ As has already 
been mentioned, SDPP also run against the privatisation of Economic State 
Enterprises. This approach is clear also in putting the industrialisation as the first 
priority among others in Turkey for it is only through the mandate of state that a real 
industrialisation could be achieved.
In this sense industrialisation is taken as the "main policy that would secure the 
other tasks that not only social democracy but also the country runs for such as the 
basic existance and identity (jucstions which should be concicvcd as sacred issues.
In this context SDPP even in the later programmes did not try to accept and apply a 
new economic policy but emphasised the 'social state'^' concept together with 'social 
security'82 which signifies the welfare sUUe. It is interesting that in the document, The
7i>Slll>, Progr-dm, 32-34.
77/\ra Seçime Giderken SUP’den Kamuoymm Çağrı (Ankara (?): N.r> 
1986(?)),G.
‘^ «WluU is called as 'the public sector' should be taken as the 'State' and 
what is emphasised in the text is nothing but the latter concept. SIIR 
Program, 29-30.
İşte Alternatif (Ankara: N.p., 1988), 11.
S<4)eniz Haykal, SUP Genel Sekreteri Deniz Baykal'ın 'Sosyal Demokrasi'de 
Ekonomi Politikaları' Konulu Uluslararası Konferansta Yaptığı Konuşma 
(Ankara(?): N.p., 1989), 11.
^^SIIP, Seçim Bildirgesi, 10.
«^sıır, Kamuoyuna Çağrı, 17.
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Allemalivc'*^ ,^ one оГ llic most ambitious documents prepared, there is nothing related 
to either Social Security system or WcHarc State. Yet, the 'social state' is understood 
both as the vveUarc state and a modern slate administration for, in (he related section, 
immediately after dealing with the issues concerning the former, the 'public 
administration' is argued and analysed.^
6.3.2. The Synthesis of the Social Democracy: Party
Prof>ra mines
I'hc l9K()s not only witnessed a clash of two .social democratic parties on the 
basis of 'national left' concept but also the splitting of SDPP into two factions in the 
early 1990s, as an outcome of the same issue. It is much more conveninent to argue 
that the debate around the RPP legacy. Six Arrows and Kemalism in SDPP has been 
an unending i.ssucs of the 1990s. In the 1980s the clash was first stalled between 
DLP and SDPP and, in the second phase turned out to be between SDPP and MP. 
Beginning with the second, it is possible to assert that, as the official papers published 
by SDPP are reviewed it is easily observed that, even at the basis of the criticism 
subjected to MP, regarding its economic policy, still lies a tacit reference to the basic 
tenets of Kemalism and mainly to nationalism. As early as 1985 SDP declares that the 
basic principle of the party is an ab,solutc indc|)cndcncy and the basis of indc|x;ndcncc 
is economic independence.As a possibility leading to this end, later, SDPP runs for 
a 'planned economy' in a (Xjriod when the process of establishing the basic structure
^^Işte Alicrnuüi, passim.
84silP, Prof^ram, (Ankara(?): N.p., 1993), 38-39.
^^Sosyal Demokrasi Partisi, Ekonomik Durumun Değerlendirilmesi ve 
Ekonomide Temel İlke ve Öncelikler, (Ankara(?): n.p, 1985), 57. Phis point 
will further be analysed in the following section.
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of market economy was in its heyday.^^ This point is later fortified in W\c Application 
I'olicies by op|)osing the privatization, saying, SDPP would buy back (he State 
Econonaic Enterprises in case they are sold to private sector.
This model which conceives a nationalist approach is reinforced by directly 
rclerring to Atatiirkist principles. Again in an early document, it is argued that the 
owner of Atatürk reforms is SDPP and the path followed is the one which has 
established the Republic. In this context social democracy is identified with the Six 
Arrows.^^ In the 1985 Programme of SDPP the Six Arrows is mentioned as The Six 
Principles to be Followed in Achieving the T a s k s .S D P P  puts these Principles 
bclotc the (asks concerning (he individual and society.*'’^’ In the programs prepared 
later by revising the existing one, these issues created such furious intra-party and 
inter-faction debates in SDPP. The debates also cnconipasscs the definition of stx i^al 
democracy.
Before (he 1987, 'f’hird Rx(raordinary Congrc.ss, in which (he par(y 
programme'^' is enriched by a text prepared and published under the heading 'SDPP 
Programme Application P o lic ies ',a  groiip'^  ^has published a short projxxsal, called
^f’Sosyaldcmokrat Halkçı Parti, Program, (Ankara (7): N.p., n.d), 29.
^^Sosyaldemokrat Halkçı Parti, Üçüncü Olağanüstü Kurultayda Kabul 
Lîdilen Uygulama Politikaları, 14.
^^Ara Seçime Giderken SllP'den Kamuoyuna Çağrı, Mimeograph, 23. 
^‘ASosyaldemokrat Halkçı Parti, Program, 13.
‘>oibid.
‘^ ISo.syal Demokrat Halkçı Parti, Program, (Ankara (?): N.p., n.d).
‘^ ^Sosyaldemokrat Halkçı Parti, Üçüncü Olağanüstü Kurultayda Kabul 
lidilen Uygulama Politikaları (Ankara (7): N.p., 1987 (7)).
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Basic Principles for a Democratic, Productive, New Turkey In the text tlicrc were 
four basic Principles on which the social democracy understanding built. It was 
ar gued that, SDPP is the mass party of labor, of the transformation but not of the 
establishment, SDPl’ holds the whole some of all ficedonis, defender of the pluralist 
soci(My.‘^ ‘’ 'riiese rrrgirments, as mentioned above, has provoked an intense inlra-party 
debate. In the views expre.ssed by some ol’ the members of the party executive 
comittec, it was argued that, the Principle put in the proposal as 'the local 
administrations should be leinforced'^^, would harm the unitary s t a t e . I t  is 
interesting that an approach constructed on the notion of decentralisation and in 
fervour· of a pluralist society curbing the from the above approaches and calling for the
^lispccially in the early 1980s, just after the establishment of SDIM’, 
among the intra-parly factions, there were .some groups, qualifying 
themselve such as 'Unionists', 'Revolutionary Democrats', Left with 
Principles' looking for a more radical left party model, organisation and 
programme. Nevertheless, these factions have never declared or 
manifested themselves with clear programmes and, it is never obvious 
who has been involved in these inlra-party cleavages. Besides, man}' ol 
the published material is missing. Yet, for 'Revolutionary Democrats’ see 
Yeni Gündem, no.47, (1986), 21 and for 'Unionists', see Yeni Gündem, no.50, 
26.
fhe proposal was published by Cahit Angın, Uğur Ratmaz, Cüneyt 
Canver, İsmail Cem, Tevfik Çavdar, Hızır Ekşi, Erzan Erzurumluoğlu, 
Mustafa Gündeşlioğlu, Yakup Kepenek, Ahmet Ketenci, Mehmet Moğoltay, 
Muzaffer Saraç. Actually, at the beginning it was a kind of 'inter-office 
memorandum.' later, when among the party cadres and ranks the 
proposal, due to the opinions it incorporated, was started to be accused the 
group decided to publish and publicize it and, this very special condition is 
mentioned at the beginning of the below pamphlet.Demokrafjk.Üretken, 
Yeni Bir Türkiye İçin Temel İlkeler (Ankara: Özgür Basın Yayın ve l'icaret 
A.Ş. Yayınlan-1, n.d.).
‘>5lbid.
‘^ f'lbid.
'^  ^I he idea belongs to Atila Sav. Serpil Bildirici, "SlIP'nin Program 
Çalışmalarında İdeolojik Kapışma: Daha Önsözde Anlaşamadılar," Yeni 
Ciündem, no. 54, (March 1987), 24-25.
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civil socicly organisations and a participatory process is also criticised of being 
'picpaicci according to stwialist and comiTUinist Principles.N ext, defining (he party 
as 'a mass party of labour' is also criticised for being aimed to confuse the minds.^^ 
Beyond these, the proposal is also questioned, without considering the inclusive 
arguments, on a single basis by saying "first of all you should clarify whether you 
accept the RPP or not! You are refusing RPP."100
One ol (he main problems that have captured SDPP in the intra-party condicis 
has always been the search for situating the party on the basis of the RPP tradition. 
Many different factions have taken different tactful positions in these debates. It is 
more convenient to see these condicts as a search of possibility for the reconstruction 
ol a didcrent sexiial democratic model and understanding other than the one resting on 
(he Kemalist tenets. In the 1980s this debate has emerged not only in the SDPP but 
also in the clash between SDPP and DLP. A DLP mcmbci and the candidate lor 
mayorship in the local elections has clearly indicated that Turkish srxial democracy has 
no connection with the conventional European s(x;ial dem(K:racy emanating from a 
Marxist origin and he also asserted that situating Turkish social democracy on such a 
basis is of no use. More he recognizes Marxism as 'snobism, from the view point of 
our history.''^” In the same article, Özdalga condemns SDPP for letting the Marxist 
originated people and groups penetrating it. This |X)int is al.so accentuated by another 
well-known academic, Aydın Aybay, in an article and the author clearly states that
‘^ «Ibid,, 25.
‘>‘>lbid., 25.
argumenl belongs to Nail Gürnıan; İbid., 25.
Haluk Özdalga, "Marksizmin Hareketimize Faydası Yok," in Yeni 
Gütulcm, no. 24, (1986), 21.
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"SDPP is a iion-Marxisl parly and those who have appropriated Marxism as a political 
solution cannot be permitted to hold a political post in the party or use SDPP as a tool 
lor their ideology."* '^ ^
Under these assumptions and constraints the ideological iiamework o( SDPP 
is constructed with back and forth debates all revolving around the origins of Turkish 
social dcnux;racy and the necessity to identify the party with the RPP tradition. In the 
late 1980s these arguments have been leinvigoralcd by the debates known as 'Second 
Republic debate.' This debate which was ignited by various intellectuals’^^  especially 
just al ter the lall ol the Peiiin Wall in 1989 brought the lirsl clear, public criticism ol 
both Kemalist tenets and the slate understanding and m o d e l .T h e  debate 
immediately found echo among the intelligentsia and SDPP. Some of the party 
factions, especially those who were prone to a different social democratic parly 
understanding departing from European social democratic Principles advocated the 
basic arguments of pro-Second Republic ideals among the parly ranks. 7’hese groups 
were immediately accused of supporting and defending the views first publicized by 
Turgul O/al”’^  and this argument was not without justification for the basic issues had
li)2Aydm Aybay, "SMP'nin Sancılan," in Ycni Gündem, no. 51, (1987), 28- 
29.
• ^ .^Ainong the pioneers of the debate especially Mehmet Altan, a professor 
of economics and a senior columnist in the daily, Sabah; his brother 
Ahmet Altan, a novelist and a columnist in Yeni Yüzyıl, also a programme- 
maker in various TV channels, their father Çetin Altan, a renowned 
journalist and writer should be mentioned. It is surprising that the 
articles appeared in the dailies, unusual in Turkey, did not get compiled in 
book forms.
l()4pQr a survey of Second Republic debates, in spite of its important 
omiilances ancl inadequacies see Metin Sever, 2. Cumlniriyct Tixrti^mnhxn 
(Ankara: Özgürlük Yayınları, 199()).
’’^ -‘’I'or a severe and polemicist but Kemalist critique of 2nd Republic, see 
l urk Devrim Kurumu (haz.), Misixk-i Milli, Ulusal Birlik ve Tam
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been built up on the pro-neo-liberal Principles, foreseeing the minimal slate and taking 
llu· rivil society and (he individual as the central axis of the pio|M)sed system. It is 
clear that the arguments had been immencely affected by the neo-liberal approaches 
and the post-communist era views developed in the West. This pattern was also 
effective especially in the early 1990s in the founding of New Democracy Movement 
(Yeni Demokrasi Hareketi), which started in the spring of 1993, later transformed 
itself to New Democracy Party (Yeni Demokrasi Partisi), in December 1994, and also 
iti the publication of Democratic Republic Programme (Demokratik Cumhuriyet 
Programı), all of which situtated on a liberal basis, critical of the existing 
epistemology.
Under these initiatives the SDPP programme has not undergone a drastic 
c h a n g e .T h e  early demand was a clear break with the RPP tradition. On the other 
hand, Bülent Heevit and DLP, had already, at the beginning, rejected this past, as 
mentioned earlier, with the allegation that, RPP tradition was coming from a 
convention of elitism, refusing the importance of the peasantry in the society and it 
did not yet transgress the 'single party defects... and for this rcast)ii did not create 
relations with social organisations as much as created by the right wing parties."^^^ It 
can not be said that these arguments among the party ranks in SDPP found an echo. 
The programe continued with its attachment to Six Arrows. Nevertheless, it should
Ihığııusızlık İ(;in İkinci (ÂnnInıriyctc'Iluyır’ (Ankara: l'DK Sam y'ayınları, 
19%).
*9b()n ılıe contrarз^ ihc Regulation was exposed to such alterations which 
culminated severe intra-party conflicts and clashes usually endedep up 
with extraordinary conventions.
*^^^Hülent licevit, "Siyasette herkes kendini tasfiye eder," Yeni (¡ünclcm, 
no. 11, (1986), 14.
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oiu'o more he nolcd (hat, as mcniioiicd above, (lie Six Arrows has taken place in the 
Prograinnie as the third part, in the section which bears the heading as The Basic 
l\)int ol View of SDPP', as 'The 'Six Principles to be Followed in Achieving the 
Tasks'. The (list two parts of the section are consequently, 'SDPP's Tasks related to 
Individual', and 'SDPP's Tasks Related to S o c ie ty .'L eav in g  the details to the 
(bllowing section, sufilce to say here is that in the amendments of 1993, ibilowing 
the above mentioned debates, demands and intra-party conflicts, the programme has 
surprisingly undergone a change in the opposite direction, once more reinvigorating its 
relation with the RPP tradition and its idcology.’^ -^
I’hc programme starts by a .section called 'Our Historical Piers', and in this 
sections SDPP's 'ideological basis' is connected to 1919 and 1920s, to the National 
Independence War, Local Congrc.sscs, Er/,urum and Sivas Congress and to the 
RPP MU pix)giam also supports the ctatist tradition of RPP and then, in the 
second section, even surpassing the 'natural' and 'objective' approach exposed in the 
I9K5 Programme, directly relates the Six Arrows and itself to Atattlrk, by naming the 
chapter as 'Our Six Principles Emanating from Atatürk.'*’* It is interesting that, 
contiary to the arguments**2, the basic tenets of social democracy arc counted and
*08si||>, Vıonriim, 13-22.
^^ ‘^^ Sosyaldcmokral Halkçı Parti, Program, (Ankara (?): N.p., 1993),
* 9,
" 'ib id .,  I 1.
" ^ In  two works, published as a response to these debates and, provoked 
new argunioncts ,this approach was already discu.ssed and, criticized. Asaf 
Sava.ş Akat, Sosyal Demokrasi Gündemi (Istanbul: Armoni, 1991), especially 
9-143; Hasan Bülent Kahraman, Yeni Bir Sosyal Demokrasi ¡çin (Ankara: 
İmge Kitabevi, 1993), especially 23-151.
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discussed in a chapter following the already mentioned ones.i*^ With all these 
idiosyiu iisics, SDI’P Programme has reflected an eccleclic chaiacicr, in (rial of 
combining a (imid liberal apprmch, and a New Left iinderslanding' (acilly, with (he 
statist, centralist, modernist RPP ideology.
As a last point, it could be briclly stated that contrary (o the arguments that 
unless a Kemalist position is taken and unless the legacy of RPP is affirmed no 
electoral gains will be achieved has not been proven after these changes and 
amendments. After the drastic transformation observed in the party programme, 
towards Kemalism, the crisis of social democracy in Turkey has become concrete. 1’he 
election results clearly signify this fall. In the 1991 general elections SDPP has 
icccivcd 20.8% of the votes which is a drastic loss with respect to the 1989 success of 
28.7% (and still a loss in comparison to 24.8% of the 1987 general elections). In the 
1994 local elections the decline was still perpetuating when RPP got only 13.6% of 
the votes. In the 1995 elections after the merging of the RPP and SDPP in 1994 the 
new RPl  ^was able only to get 10.36'*-'’. The.se results might be interpreted as (hat, 
Turkish social democracy in the process of renovation should try a new way other 
than going back to its origins.
Conclusion
11-^ Ibid., 20.
is clear in the program chapters such as, 'Democracy for Humans', 
'liconotny for Humans', and 'State for Humans.' Ibid., 25-44.
l '- ''7 ’.C. Dcvlcl İstatistik l-nstitutüsü İstatistik Yıllığı (Ankara: Haşbakanlık 
basımevi, 1996), various tables.
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This framework; shows that the social democracy in Turkey in the 1980s has 
moic conccnlralcd on llic problems of restructuration in wliicli no spcclatucalar 
success is achieved as long as a break with the traditional RPP ideology is considered. 
Rather, the party has undergone a series of conllicts more concentrating on the issues 
such as intra-party dcmcxracy and the definitions of social democracy. In this pi(x:css 
there are two main determinants. The first one is that the 1980s has once moic proved 
that in Turkey there has never been a .scx^ ial democratic tnulition in the West Ruropcan 
sense. The Turkish experiment in social democracy rests on the official ideology 
which has founded the state. The social democratic search of the 1980s, originating 
from this loot, once more, in spite of all struggles, affirms its relation with and 
connection to tins .source restrc.ssing its symbiotic exi.stencc with the slate, challenging 
the liberal movements questioning the conditions of the state. As it is not attached to 
the left tradition of West Europe which has incorporated various very im|)ortant 
prtKesses of revising its relation with the state, Turkish social democracy, in the 
1980s has missed the chance of both constructing itself on a new basis and benefiting 
(rom the arguments developed in thel980s reconsidering state-left relationship.
Nevertheless, more or less, as social democracy in Turkey deliniated a basis 
for opposition to the existing hegemonical discourse of the New Right, during the 
1980s it was successful! enough to confirm its rai.son d'etre, for a specific period of 
time, namely the early 1980s. Here, it should be remembered that, as discussed 
above, the success of social dcmcx;racy depends on two conditions. The first one is 
the volatility of the right wing votes, second, the debate between the center-right and 
left was concentrated on the economic issues. As in the 1990s the debates took another 
direction and the effect of globalization incrca.scd, with the advent of new concepts on 
the political agenda, social democracy started its demise. The basic condition in this
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process is SDPP's, without realising the transformation in the society and the 
demands evoked by the new social actors, going back to its origins and once more 
emphasising its links with the RPP tradition breaking up with the existing political 
agciula.
7'his point brings out the second issue. The 1980s has not only witnessed the 
left-state reconsideration but also revisited the notion of state and society at large as a 
consequence o( nco-libcral and postmodern movements. In this context the notion of 
civil society, the importance of individual, the speciality of the market economy is 
reevaluated. This framework is mainly the rearticulation of modernity whose effects 
are better observed in the post 1989 era. It could be said that Turkish democratic left 
has also closed itself to these arguments and debates. As will be seen in the next 
chapter 'I’lirkish democratic left found it adequate to defend a position which was 
rather pro-state against the new outcomes observed in the social and political realm 
which were more sensitive to the ends of globalisation such as ethnicity, identity, new 
models and notions of democracy, human rights, new economic order, etc. 
Significantly, the social democratic left of Turkey in the 1990s preferred going back to 
the origins after the reestablishment of RPP even by dissolving SDPP and its gains. 
The condition ol .social democracy in Turkish politics is more problematic in the 
1990s. This is due to the concrete demands raised in the more pluralistic and more 
complicated social structure in the ambigious political environment of the late 
Iwientieth century demolishing all given social structural conditions. The crisis of 
'Furkish .S(x;ial democracy becomes more clear not only when serial electoral failures in 
Turkey is observed but when West European social democratic parties' electoral 
achievements, after getting adjusted to the 'new times' is remembered and these 
conditions arc analysed in the following chapter.
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CHAPTER VII
THE SEARCH FOR RENEWAL 
SDPP IN THE 1990S; THE 1990-1994 PERIOD
7.1. The 1990-1994 Period
The 1990s, from the view point of Turkish soeial democraey, can be analysed 
in two segments. The first one is the body of events that lies in the time pcii(xl of 
1990-1994 and the second one starts right before the 1995 elections, in the September 
of that ycai. In September 1995 SDPP is dissolved and merged with the rcfoiincd 
RPP. In the rest of the 1990s Turkish soeial democracy is represented by this party, 
the 'new' RPP and DLP of BUlent Ecevit. Beyond all these, the effect of a specific 
development, which is globalisation is found and globalisation in this sense is 
considered to be ignited by the fall of the Soviet system and the end of the Cold War.
Globalisation, also referred as 'the new world order', together with the fall of 
the Berlin Wall, brought the radical transformation of not only socialism but all Icl t- 
inclincd politics, at large. The effects of this radical movement in Turkish social 
democracy can be observed in the 1990-1994 period. This period is demarcated and 
completed with many intra-party conflicts observed in the SDPP. The arguments put
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forward in tliis period is more related with the renewal of the concept of social 
dcmcx;racy in Turkey with a specific attempt to break its ties with the tradition of RPP 
and Kemalisin symbolised by the Six Arrows. However, the crisis of Turkish social 
democracy which has reached its crux in the second half of the 1990s is a complicated 
issue which should be analysed on two levels. The first one is that the dissolution of 
SDPP and its merging with the re-established RPP coneretely indicates the abandoning 
<)( Ihc ai gmnents attached to globali.sation. The second point which is related with this 
issue is the contradiction that came out in the social democratic politics. 'I’hat is, 
whereas the continuing globalisation process provoked and triggered such debates as 
the demise of the nation-state in Turkey, the reinforcement of RPP was an emphasise 
put on the traditional epistemological origins of Turkish social dem(x;racy, that is, the 
symbiosis of statc-scx;ial dcmcx;racy-RPP.
Here, it might be argued that even the second period is an outcome of 
globalisation. Because, especially after the shattering of the former Soviet Block into 
various different nations, in this post-communist era, the emergence of neo-nationalist 
movements is a matter of observance. But no doubt that the situation in Turkey and 
especially in the social democratic politics is more complicated. The reason behind this 
is the reappraisal ol the centralised state concept which lies at the basis o( the 
epistemology that constructs the RPP tradition. Approached from this angle, it is clear 
that this is, at the very first hand, a trial to rejuvenate the Kemalist-Republican 
ideological roots and to put back into power the nation state model, the intertwined 
structure and cohabitation of state and the party, which means the ignorance of the 
bundle of concepts produced by and in the period of globalisation. This is, as will be 
analysed, mostly observed in the authoritarian discourse the state developed and RPP 
identified itself with, in the post-1995 period, while tackling with such concepts as
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identity, fundamentalisiTi, difference, miilticulturalism, pluralism, etc. The early 
consccjiicncc of this movement is the result obtained in the 1995 elections which has 
been the worst ever achieved in the post-1983 era. It, therefore, would be logical to 
start first with the analysis of the 19SX)-1994 period but with a brief and overall review 
of globalization, to situate the necessity felt in the SDPP for the renewal of the 
ideological structure.
7.2. The Impact of Globalisation in the 1990-1994 Period
7.2.1. The Framework of Globalisation
Even though Albrow's suggestion is a radical one yet "globali.sation is the most 
signilicant development and theme in contemporary life and social theory to emerge 
since the collapse of Marxist systems."^ This definition, if Marxism is taken as one of 
the summits of modernity^, tacitly implies that globalization already marks the end or 
the linishing line of modernity. In this .sense it is rather more convenient to di.scu.ss the 
primary conditions that brought the end of modernity. Again this point could be 
elaborated a contrario going to another explanation brought by Albrow both to give the 
definition of globalization and the vani.shing poinLs of mcxlcrnily:
The global, or the abstract quality, globality, both tran.scendens and 
intrudes on the national in territorial terms; it replaces the time aspect of 
the modern with a spatial reference, which however is indeterminate. 
Globalism operates to temper the particularism of nationalism, while 
decentring values from human to material referents. It counters the 
abstract nature of mcxiernism. For both rationalism and the value placed *
* Marlin Albrow, The Global Age: State and Society Beyond Modernity 
(Cambridge: Polity Pre.ss, 1996), 89.
'^I'or a discussion on this ground see, Marshall Hermann, All that is .Solid 
(llarmandsworth: Penguin Books, 1986).
247
on novelty it substitutes open and pragmatic communication between 
people and peoples and interaction with nature.^
The definition given for globalisation by Albrow, even though is not free from 
criticism yet encircles many of the issues under discussion. Among these conies at the 
first hand the concept of nationalism; others are the facts such as time-space 
relationship, the condition and ramifications of locality and, intertwined with that, the 
notion ol territoriality. Other than this approach, one another imporUint issue is the 
introduction of the existing condition of capitalism usually characterised with the 'end 
of Fordism."* After this introductory remarks, it is possible to elaborate on two 
points. I 'irst, although there is a radical tiansfoi ination in the imxlesof production tine 
to radical changes occurred as a consequence of either the 'time-space compression'-*’ 
or "time-space distinciation"^’and the transformations came out in capitalism^ it is not 
such an easy task to argue that modernism is finished. Second, as Albrow puts it, "the 
crisis of nation-state society has frequently been represented as the culmination of 
modernity, as a stage towards a new mexJernity."** This mcxiernily is what Beck et al 
calls the 'reflexive modernity"^and in this context Albrow says th;it
^Ibid., 81.
^Scoti lash and John Urry, The End o f Organized Capitalism (Cambridge: 
Polity Press, 1987)
■“’David Harvey, The Condition o f Postmodernity (Oxford: Blackwell, 1989).
f’Anthony (iiddens, 'Ihe Consequences o f Modernity (Cambridge: Polity 
Press, 1990).
^Alain Lipietz, Towards a New Economic Order: Postfordism, Ecology and 
Democracy (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1992).
^Albrow, Global Age, 67.
“^ Ulrich Beck, Anthony Giddens and Scott lash, Rellexive Modernization 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994).
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"llic expansion of ralionality appears as a reflexive modernisation, 
modernity with a rationalisation in its principles. But this linkage of 
reflexivity and modernity conceals the indeterminacy of rationality as an 
organising principle.
I'hc critical issue is that Albrow relates reflexive mtxlernity to the crisis of 
nation-state society by saying that the crisis is "frequently been represented as the 
ciilminalion of modernity, as a stage towards a new modernity."” What is at slake 
here is that, he argues, "reflexive modernity is no more capable of providing 
foundations than simple rationality" and continues by arguing, with an implicit 
reference to Ulrich Beck's concept of 'risk society'’2, that, this framework is far away 
from supplying the necessary ontological security to the individuals for the 
nuKlcmisalion's "nation-satc did that by associating ralionality with its own expansion 
and equating society with its own structure."’·^ In this context. Beck, in a later text, 
redefines the 'reflexive modernisation' giving the clues for the transition to 
globalization, such a s ,
1. reflexive modernisation disembeds and re-embeds the cultural 
prerequisites of social classes with forms of the individualisalion 
(emphasis original) of social inequality. That means, on the one hand, 
that the disappearance of social classes and the abolition of social 
inequality no longer coincide. Instead, the blurring of social clas.scs runs 
in tandem with an exacerbation of social inequality, which now dtx;s not
I^^Albrow, Global Age, 67. 
lllbid., 67.
'^Ulrich Heck, Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity (London: .Sage, 
1992).
b^Albrow, Global Age, 68.
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follow large iclcnlifiablc groups in the lifevvorlcl, but is instead 
liagmenled across (life) phases, space and lime. On the other hand it is 
no longer possible to extrapolate the ways of life, life situations aiul 
lifestyles of people from their (vocational) position in the process of 
labour and production...!. The question of functional differentiation are 
replaced by the questions of functional coordination, (emphasis original) 
cross-linkings, harmonoziation, synthesis and so on...Differentiation 
itself is becoming a social problem...3. The concept of linearly 
increasing rationality has the double significance of a descriptive and a 
normative (emphasis original) model.i“*
'I'hc emergence of 'individualisation, functional differentiation and linearly 
increasing rationality' is a specific breakaway with the "simple mcxlcrnisalion' which 
has started the process of nation state according to Elias*-'’ and which is unseparble 
I rom the centralisation of stale {X)wer which commences from the sixteenth century.'^’ 
It is at this point Giddens suggests that modern world is shaped through the 
intersection of capitalism, industrialism and the nation-state system.’^  On the other 
hand, Keyman succinctly summarises Giddens' further arguments which situates the 
emergence of globalization together with the crisis ol nation stale Ihiough the concept 
of 'discontinuity.'·® But, Keyman also refers to another text by Jessop which 
articulates Giddens' account of the nation state. In this context, slate is embodied on
^^Ulrich Beck, The Reinvention o f Politics: Rethinking Modernity in the 
Glohcil Social Order, tr. Mark Ritter, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1997), 20-28.
* •‘’Norberl lilias. Stale and Civilisation, vol. 2 of 'I'hc Civilising Process 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1982).
l^M'or a critique of Hias' approach in the context of globalisation see, 
Roland Robertson, "'Civilization' and the (Civilizing Process: lilias, 
Clobalizalion and Analytic Synthesis", in Mike Peatherstone (ed), Cultural 
Theory and Cultural Change (London: Sage Publications, 1992), 211-228.
1 ^ Anthony Giddens, The Nation State and Violence (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 1985), 4-8.
^^P'uat Keyman, Globalization, State, Identity/DHTerence (New Jersey: 
Humanities Press, 1997), 09.
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territorial centrality, an international context and other techniques employed by the 
nation state to reproduce its national and territorially organised social formation. 
When, a transformation comes out, effective on any one of the issues clarified above, 
the structure starts either to dismantling or alteration.
In the late modern times this metamorphosis is initiated by, first, as has already 
been suggested, the problematization of time-space relationship which should be seen 
as an outcome of technological improvement. This, no doubt, has pnxluced results on 
the spatial, territorial sovereignty of the state-nation as states started to be i.solated 
unites, even though connected with eaeh other in a net of international relations, and 
as Poggi suggests that "it is the very nature of the modern state that there should be 
many states"2*  ^ unique, self-referential, or as Keyman suggests, 'coherent self 
organisations.^* This condition derives the 'society-centric mcxlels' which comes as 
an alternative to the shortcomings of state-centric modcls.^^ In this transition what is 
determining is, again argued by Keyman with reference to Held, the discrepancy 
between "the sovereign state and the complex nature of international rclatioiis."^^
Held, in this context underlines five issues which might be taken as the overall 
structure of the late modern limes or globalization. These arc, "i) world economy; ii) 
hegemonic power and power blocs, iii) international organisations, iv) international
P^lbid., 71.
^^Viianfranco I’oggi, The Development o f the Modern State (London: 
Hutchinson, 1978), 13.
21lbid., 75.
^^Lor the detailvS see, Keyman, Ibid., 75-77.
23ibid., 78.
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law, v) the end of domestic policy. Globalization, then, might be argued that, is a 
transition from the international relations to supraterritorial relations^-“» as an outcome 
of capitalism which culminates in the "transnational practices o( corporate economic 
actors26, ilic developments in the telecommunications realm^^ mostly observed in 
capital transactions immigrations^^ and this shift has repercussions on the already 
established structures of nation-state defined on the basis of a homogeneous society 
encircled with the citizens. The identity is.sue at large, enclosing the rebirth of the civil 
society and the discussions of fundamentalism is another determining issue in this 
period. This framework, to some authors, is the 'emancipation' brought by 
globalization together with a new ontology.2^
This new ontology is not to be differentiated from the notion of 
univcrsal/particular dichotomy for, the international-supralcrritoriality anlagonisma^^'
Ibid., 78.
^-''For the debate of the concept see, Jan Aaart Schölte, " I’owards a Critical 
I heory of Globalization", in Globalization: Theory and Practice , eds., 
lileonore Kofman and Gillian Youngs (Fondon: Pinter, 1996), 4G.
^^\Saskia Sassen, " fhe Spatial Organization of Information Industries: 
Implications for the Role of the State", in Globalization: Critical 
Reilcctions, ed., James fl. Mittelman (Boulder, London: Yynne Reinner 
Publications, 1997), 46.
^^For en excellent overview of this specific situtation see, Gerhard Fuchs 
and Andrew M. Koch, "The Globalization of telecommunications and the 
Issue of Regulatory Reform", in Globalization,, ed. Eleonore Kofman and 
Gillian Youngs, 163- 174.
^^Ahmet Igduygu, "Citizenship at the Crossroads: Immigration and the 
Nation-State," in Globalization, E. Kofman and G. Youngs, 1.SO-162.
^‘^ Jan Aart Schölte, "Towards", 53-55.
^b'Fbis notion is di.scu.s.sed by 'I'aylor as "inter stateness and tran.s- 
statene.ss." l or details see, Peter J. Taylor, " The Modern Multiplicity of 
States", in Globalization, ed. Eleonore Kofman and Gillian Youngs, 99-108.
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is embedded in this understanding if Robertson's well known formulation which 
defines globalization as the "universalisation of the particular and the particularisation 
of the universal."^' In this context it could be argued once more that globalisation 
might be taken as an epistemology, replacing the ideology of mcxlernity, inclusive of 
all concepts developed by the latter on condition that a restitution is contemplative as a 
consequence of the discussion concerning the nation state and state sovereignty.
7.2.2. (Nation) State and Globalisation
Even though there are attempts, nevertheless it is dilficult to say abruptly that 
the demise of state sovereignty is perceptible in the existing world ordcr.^^ What has 
uiidcrgonc a scries of change in the late 90s is (he concept of centre. In the [process of 
globalization, which lies in the same time period, namely in the 1990s, the concept of 
'universalist solution'^^, mostly attributed to a state model created beginning by the 
16th century as the mcxiernisation project, is put under a critical questioning and in this 
context it is possible to argue that mcxlcrnity itself is the implementation of a central 
and ccniialising state structure which, in the second pha.se, would be conducive to the 
construction of other concepts related with it, like the notion of citizenship, 
dcvciopmcntalism, homogenisation of the society, etc. In other words, globalisation is 
the ramification of a process initiated by post-modernist and post-structuralist
3lRoland Robertson, Globalisation: Social Theory and Global Culture 
(l.ondon; Sage, 1994); Roland Robertson, "Cilobalisaiion or Glocalisalion," 
Journal ()/' International Communication, no. 1, (1994), 33-52.
the contrary there is a call for the new reinforced state model. l,eo 
Ranitch, "Rethinking the Role of the State", James II. Mittelman, 
Globalization, 83-116.
'^'^Richard j. Ilarknett, "Territoriality in the Nuclear lira", in Globalization, 
lileonore Kofman and G. Youngs, 141.
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argiimenls34 questioning the 'essentialist view of the state as a coherent self not only 
concentrating on the ontological existence of the slate but going deep into the analysis 
of (he discourse attached to it and dcrivaling a hidden epistemology^^
This is where the hegemonic power of the slate as well as the sovereignly of 
the state over the nation and the existence of the individual is dismantled through the 
process o( rcconslruclion of the civil scx:icly.36 In fact, pulling civil stx;icly against the 
state, as Kcyman slates correctly, is not a sustainable argument for "viewed 
historically, it can be seen that the stale and civil society are ,so interpenetrated that they 
can not be conceived of as analytically distant s p a c e s .S t i l l ,  "an analytical or 
abstract theory, because it detaches itself from time and space cannot account for the 
intcipciictiation between the slate and civil society. For this reason, theory should 
always be lime-space bound and be contingent on historicity."38 ii is this framework 
and comprehension that enables the development of the argumentation which situates 
civil society as a contingent power conveying to the dismantling of the sovereignly of 
stale in the I990s.3‘^ The possibility created by the civil .society in this proce.ss is the
Ibis context for valuable contributions see, Peter Beilharz, Gillian 
Robinson and John Rundell (ed), Between Totalitarianism and 
Tostmodernity (Cambridge, Massachusetts, Fondon lingland: I'he МГГ 
Press, 1992).
'^ l^ or an excellent discussion of this framework sec, li. l uat Keyman, 
Globalization, 54-192.
■^f’Andrew Aralo and Jean Cohen, "Civil Society and Social 'I'heory", 
P.Beilharz, G. Robinson, J. Rundell, Between, 199-219.
17 Ibid., 1 14.
-l«lbid., 114.
l ‘lln this regard two different articles might be analysed. liric Ilobsbawm, 
" rhe Nation and Globalization", Constellations (]99S), V.5, no. 1, 1-9; and 
Robert l ine, "Civil Society Theory, hnlightenment and Critique, " 
Democratization (Spring 1997), v.4, no. 1, 7-28.
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"local participalion and decentralisation."^^^ This process should be taken as the 
determining fact in the distinciation of globalisation from modernity and it needs an 
elaboration on the notion of hegemony.
The concept of hegemony is very well discussed by Keyman and it is him to 
suggest three fundamental problems concerning this notion which not only dctcmiincs 
the state condition in the international realm but also the existential condition of the 
individual in the society. Accordingly, the hegemony concept can be used to overcome
"first, the problem of economic reductionism that results from the base- 
superstructure metaphor...Second, it helps overcome the problem of 
political reductionism...Third, the concept of hegemony permits the 
recognition of the im|X)rtancc of the limiting and constraining aspects of 
siriictuics without requiring the reification of the concept,of totality."''’
Keyman's arguments lor the hegemony concept with an elaborati(m on 
Ciiamsci gives the nece.s.sary clues for transgre.ssing the limits of the hegemony, a 
notion itself reduced to basic metaphors, and opens to a new dimension enabling the 
articulation of the ideology as a reproductory concept as long as the state-hegemony 
relation is concerned. In this context Keyman first argues that hegemony "consists of 
both ccxîrcion and consent, material capabilities, political and discursive practices and 
the cieation of a consensual politics."''^ This framework for a very specific reason 
bnngs out the inevitability of the implementation of the ' universal language:'
^^^Giles Mohan, "Globalization and Governance: Sub-Saharan Africa", in 
Globiilization, eds., Lileonore Kofman and Gillian Youngs, 290.
^ ' li. I'uat Keyman, Globalization, 117.
^^Ibid., 117.
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"A hegemonic ideology helps llic system reproduce i(seir...ln llie course 
of creating and manufacturing 'consent' a hegemonic ideology 
implements a universal language (norms and ideas), according to which 
the interests and demands of the constitutive elements of the existing 
system arc formulated...Since the ideological formation of hegemony is 
iieccs.sary for the creation of 'consent,' the rcpixxiuclion of hegemony is 
dc[>cndcnt more upon its ability to operate as a universal language 
than...the material capabilities that the hegemonic power possesses.'"’·^
Even though this understanding of hegemony is more convincing for the 
international relations still it might be used for the state-society-individual context for 
two rciisons. First, it interrelates the concept with the notion of "false consciousness"; 
second it demarcates its function as a constitutive factor of intcrsubjcctivity: "The 
crucial point here is that...hegemony does not remain external to, but instead becomes 
an integral clement of the constitution of subject"^ which means that, the modern 
stale, iiuleetl, uses hegemony to |)I(kIucc ideology in order to sustain the 'onlei' 
necessitating the development of the civil society as the only possibility of 
emancipation. I’his is where the break from modernity comes out as a concrete 
constitutive agency of the present day world order not only allowing but also 
facilitating the construction of new discourses, i.c. discourses of identity, at large, as, 
in Ciills's words, "transnational countcr-hcgcmonic blocs."' ·^'’
This framework is first shattered by the plural existence of various different 
attacks directed to the modernity as it is considered as a hegemony and in this regard
43lbid., 117. 
^'hbid., 121. 
45lbid., 122.
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following Keyman's approach, the posislructuralisin with its ramifications such as 
clisciirsivity and genealogy, textuality and deconstructionism ends up with the 
culmination of postmexiemism.^^ All of the attempts start by the basic incentive of the 
dismantling of the modernist rhetoric which aims the construction of a hegemonic 
ideology dependent on log(x:entrism, externalising the ontological existence of the 
self, i.e. subject, centralisation of the knowledge interrelated with the reinforcement of 
power. The final achievement in this trajectory with no intuition of a progressive 
understanding in the deconstruction of modernist hegemonic discourse and textuality 
is postmodernism, acknowledging the end of grand narratives.^7 The distinciation 
Irom the Ibucaultian notion of modernity which dwells on the construction and the 
hegemony of one identity over the other, plurality of identities, after a series of 
attempts, is surpassed by the constitution of the counter-hegemonic discourses which 
should be dependent on "the recognition of marginalized identities. In other words it 
should be pluralistic, in order to be open to a number of voices and to their specific 
resistance to the discourse of modernity."'^ The postmodern alternative here comes 
out involving.
"i) the rejection of such modernist concepts as totality, universality, the 
autonomous character of epistemology, the rationally acting subject; ii) 
the promotion of such concepts as the discursive and textual construction 
of reality, meaning, identity, historicity, and the powcr/knowicdgc
■^ bAxcl llonnctb, "Fluralization and Recognition: On the Self 
Misunderstanding of Postmodern Social Theorists", F. Beilharz, (?. 
Robinson, j. Rundeli, Between, 163-172.
47jean Francois I.,yotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on 
Knowledgei, tr. R. Durand (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
1984). Doubtless, the other 'models' of postmodernity are not interx'ened 
here.
K. Fuat Key man. Globalization, 140.
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relationship; iii) the privileging of critical social movements as the new 
agents of social change.
I'hc point (hat ncctls a fiii thcr elaboration is that, after the |X)slm(xlcm set-out 
which puts the state as a constitutive agent of modernity under pressure is the 
culmination of globalization; in other words, in discussing the difference between the 
globaliziUion and the postmodernity it is possible to situate the premise that the latter is 
llic in.slilulionalisation of the foiTncr. Even though it is possible to take globalization as 
an entity with its relation to modernity, as Keyman succinctly docs^^\ still the 
disconnection cx:curs when globalization is considered as the phenomenon, mentioned 
above, which unites the particular with the universal due to the transformations 
achieved on the arena of communications and capitalism with exceptionally effective 
outcomes of time-space compressions and distinciations simultaneously.
Even though globalisation is a cerUun kind of involvement with inodeniity, yet, 
in the final instance, modernity is the sum total of all criticisms directed to it. In the 
late mcxicm pcri(xl, it might be argued that the postmcxlern pencxl's achievements are 
immanent in the existing modernist discourse which is the integration of the nation 
stales with the world economy together inclusive of (he shift from monolithic 
understanding of identity to difference and other; from the state of monism to 
pluralism.·^' This very last point is the institutionalisation of postmodern discourse
4‘>lbid., 140.
•‘^ Olbid., 16-17.
■“’ IFor an c.xrlennet discussion of this condition see, William li. (Connolly, 
'Tluralisin, inuliiculturalism and the nation-state: rethinking the 
connections”, Journal o f Political Ideologies (1996), v .l, no. 1, 53-73.
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through the concept of radical dcmocracy^^ yja secondary associations calling for an 
associative democraey^^ other words, it is the new notions and dimensions of 
dciiKHaacy (hat concretises tlie globalization. Those concepts such as recognilion of 
difference, pluralism, multiculturalism, ete. follow this condition without disjecting 
(he cons(i(u(ivc clcmcnls of iiKxIcrnity critics, feminism playing the leading role.
Turkey, in the 1990s has started to build up relatively a new social discourse. 
The initiative behind it is the neo-liberal and the New Right developments. This 
framework tacitly includes the critique of modernity but is rather an attempt to get out 
of the existing statist discourse. The re-formation or the incentive taken by the civil 
society has been determining in this process. Also it is worth to mention that the new 
.social structure is very much effected by the post Cold War peritxl. The emergence of 
new nation states and especially the establishment of the Turkic Republics in the 
loi luei Soviet Union (dying on the ethnic identity has introduced the ct)nsciousue.ss o( 
ethnicity to 'ruikcy, a notion much forgotten after the constiuction of national identity 
in the Republican pericxl.
This initiation has triggered the second phase of secularisation still attached to 
(he notion of identity. In this context, the Kurdish issue has played a formative role as 
well as the new developing feminist discourse which has been critical of the 
citizenship. In short, it could be argued that the 1990s, from various sides, has
-‘>2]:or various aspects of the concept sec, Chanlal Mouffe (cd). Dimensions 
o f liiidicnl Democracy (l.ondon: Verso, 1992).
•‘'•^ror an excellent survey and deliberation see, Joshua Cohen and Joel 
Itog.crs, "Secondary A.ssocialions and nemocratic (lovernance", in Joshua 
Cohen and Joel Rogers (ed). Associations and Democracy (London: Verso, 
1995), 7-100.
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brought basically the critique of the national discourse dwelled on the notion of 
citi/.enship as an agent in the prcKess of the construction of national identity. The 
statist discourse, symbolised by the Six Arrows, in need of being surpassed, at least 
alteration, has forced the SDPP to run for a change in the constitutive ideology and 
Ihc 19')()-1OOd period is the battleground o( this process giving birth to many intra­
party I'actions and clashes.
7.3 SDPP in the 1990-1994 Period
7.3.1. The Intra-Party Conflicts
The demolishing of the Berlin Wall might be taken as an iconic development in 
the history of socialism due to its immense effects on the fall of the Soviet System and 
on the birth of a new period usually referred as globalisation. Globalisation, with its 
complex character and much debated arguments has not only influenced the macro 
level, national politics in Turkey but mainly encouraged to bring foie some of the 
tensions long time kept silent in the centre-left politics. The displaying of this among 
the social democratic ranks and cadres has been through the intra-party conflicts of 
SDPP. Although in the decade of 1980 there has been a .set of extraordinary 
congres.ses which also indicates the .similar conflicts and, even though in those 
clashes found some arguments rc.scmbling the 1990 arguments, the nature of the latter 
unrest is more a radical one. It might be taken as a search for the renewal of the 
concept of sexial democracy with an interest in breaking with the pattern that has 
prepared it rather than a .search for the methods to implement the already accepleil and 
established principles of Turkish social democracy, attached to RPP tradition. This 
was a diffident probe for an answer to the policies developed by the New Right both 
internationally and domestically, as well as a kx)king for the ways of merging the
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iii j>iiin('nls dcvclopcxl in llic post iîcıiin Wall |X'-ri<Hİ willi (he existing S(x;ial cicmoeracy 
in riiikcy.
In this regard two group movements should briefly be analysed. The first is 
(he one known as (he Yenilikçiler (Pro-Reformat ion) which started to develop its 
aiginnenls by declating its establishment in March 25, 1989‘^ k Tlie gtoup enibodied 
such prestigious names as Ercan Karakaş, Ertuğrul Günay, İsmail Cem and Asaf 
Savaş Akat. Although this group has been active and impressive in the last yeats of 
1980s, beginning by the fourth Small Congress of 1988 and in the Fourth 
Extraordinary Congress of 1989 as well as Filth Small Congress of 1989, against the 
patty arlministiation which was (hen controlled by Deni/ llaykal and his friends. It has 
published its first Manifesto in 1991 after the first clash between Baykal and İnönü.
The main arguments of Yenilikçiler has been more concerning with the 
structural issues of social democracy in Turkey more than its established values. Here, 
it should be noted that the basic constituting concept of social democracy has been 
considered as Kemal ism, as has been shown in the previous chapters, among the 
politicians and in the party programmes. Up until the clash between Baykal and İnönü, 
which first became overt in the sixth extraordinary congress of September 29, 1990, 
the criticism directed to this fact has been of secondary imjxxtancc even not 
observable. It could also be argued that the main event that provoked this movement 
has been the fall of authoritarian regimes and the centralised state understanding 
exemplified by Soviet system countries and the minimal state search of the nco-libcral 
politics. In Turkey, as has been shown in the previous chapter, though tacitly, the first 
criticism to Kemalisin is not directed from the left but from the right under the
^"^(Ainilniriyci, (March 2G, 1989).
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1c';kI(tsIiİ|) ol l'mgul Ö/.cl clııc (o his criliiiııc of ccniral strong shUo. İn (his conicxi, (hc 
main group developing the main argumeiiLs of this debate is the one called pro- Second 
Republic (İkinci Cumhuriyetçiler).
I'he lell, on (his ground and principally because (he early eri(icism has been 
raised by (he eendc-righl cadres, at the beginning, has prererred to relrain Irom this 
approach. Tlie choice of the Yenilikçiler was rather to taekle with the leadership, intra 
party democracy and in general the party teehnologies questions, sueh as membership, 
education, participation, etc.^^ The critieism they developed which aimed at the basic 
(ends of SDPP Programme, namely the traditional Six Arrows, is later. Let alone the 
ciiticism, one t>f the prominent members of the gioup, Ettugrul Gllnay, was a roiincr 
member of the parliamentary group of RPP after the 1977 elections and a supporter of 
the line that starts by the late 19th century Unity and Progress Party and reaches to 
RPP. In this context, as well as ctnphasising this chain of development in many of his 
speeches hc deli vet cd*'^ ’ in the eongrcs.scs, when hc began to manifest the arguments 
of (hc Yenilikçiler as an unofficial spokesman of the grcnip he took an itinerary 
identical with the route of Kemal Atatürk when hc first .set out for the National
^^A good cxaniplo of those arguments might be found in Asaf ,Savaş Akat's 
book, Sosyal Demokrasi Gündemi (Istanbul: Armoni Yayıncılık, 1991). 'I'he 
articles compiled here are first published in the journal which served as 
the official organ of Yenilikçiler, Sosyal Demokrat. Their names are good 
indicators of the axis of search: "Örgütte Yenilik ve Parti İçi Demokrasi 
(Renewal of the Grassroots and Intra-Party Democracy); "Parti içi Kğitim 
VC Örgütlenme" (Intro-Part Training and Organization), " Peknoloji ve 
Parti içi Demokrasi" (Technology and Intra Party Democracy), "Sosyal 
Demokraside Lider ve Kadro" (Leader and Cadre in Social Democracy). 
Here, it might be observed that there is an emphasis on the 'intra-part 
democracy' concept, which was a direct and indirect discussion and 
critique of Baykal administration.
•'*^’ l he notes of the present author who has long time been together with 
the group.
262
Independence War.^^ Nevertheless, especially Ercan Karakaş, was continuously 
underlining the discrepancies between the Turkish social dcmociacy and the West 
European m o d e l .Karakaş's claim was that Turkish social democracy, beyond 
coming from a statist, centralist, anti-democratic origin, was impotent of renewing 
ilsc M due to the al)scnce of ideological piobalion.·*’*^
7.3.2. Bay kalcılar: The Yenilikçiler ('New Left')
Depending on a dispute just before the local elections for the district of 
Uayiampava and in tlu' alleiinallis ol loosing it. the chairman of SDI’P, Indal liKaitl, 
immediately called foran cxtraoidinary congicss. The aim of Inöntl was tr) lt)icc Dcni/. 
Baykal to be a candidate for the chairmanship of the party. Believing that he would be 
reelected in the congress İnönü was trying to defeat Baykal and his team and to 
exclude them from the party administration. According to the speech he delivered in 
the congress, he believed that Baykal, together with his 'group of friends', was 
looking for the weak moment of İnönü to defeat him while fortifying his position in 
the party organisation and among the grassrtx)ts politicians.^’^’ Deni/, Baykal, accepting 
the challenge, declared his candidateship. In the period anticipating the congress the 
Yenilikçiler formed a coalition with İnönü group against Baykal. The interesting 
development appeared in the same period was the decision of Ismail Cem, to Join 
Baykal. He was a prestigious name and ideologue who had acted together with
•‘^ ^lirtugrul Günay, interview b)' the author, Ankara, July 1998.
•‘’8i;rcan Karakaş, "Sosyal Demokrasi de 'Bize Özgü' mü Olmalı" in Gelecek 
Sos)iü Demokrasidir (İstanbul: Sosyal Demokrasi Yayınlan, 1992), 21-24.
‘’‘^ lircan Karakaş, "Sosyalizm Bizim İçin Hep Somut Bir Ütopya", Ruşen 
Çakır, İlidir Göktaş, Resmi Tarih Sivil Arayış: Sosyal Demokratlarda İdeoloji 
ve Politika (İstanbul: Metis Yayınlan, 1991), 133-147.
f’^ l^irdal İnönü, '"Parti İçi Demokrasi İçin Atılım!' Kurultayı", Mimeo , 14.
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Yenilikçiler against Baykal administration. His existence in the group together with 
Baykal's decision (o accept lltc contest for leadership brought the first radical criticism 
to and, the demand to change, the SDPP ideology.
In the 1990 congress Baykal and his group, due to the time shortage and the 
unex|iccled move of IniMiU could not declare a well prepared programme, resling on a 
well grounded ideology. Besides, the legitimacy of such a declaration was 
questionable for Baykal was the secretary general of the party just before the congress 
who was resisting to accept the demands raised by Yenilikçiler. As a conscc]ucncc the 
small article he published before the congress has an eclectic character.^’* The 
maniteslo on the one hand was criticising the pro-s(atus-<iuo situation of the Turkish 
social dcmcx;racy and linking it once more to its traditional p;>st and on the other hand 
he was clearly proposing to the party "to leave the past to the past."<’2 However, the 
gioup, alter loosing the election, immediately started to renew itseli to suipass the 
criticism of 'factionism' directed to it since the beginning, from the years when Baykal 
was a member of the RPP parliamentary group before the 1980 military coup and in a 
non declared way iunning for the leadership of the party against Ecevit, to construct an 
ideological framework under the name of Yeni Sol (The New Left) for the next 
congress, the third Congress, .luly 27-28, 1991. ’^-^
’^ 'l)cn i/ Baykal, "SllP'nin Kendini vo lurkiyo'yi Yenileştirmesi", in Deni/. 
Baykal, Ismail Cem, Yeni Sol (Istanbul: Cem Yayınevi, 1992).
b^lbid., 12.
’^■^ In an interview before the congress Baykal accepts the criticisms and 
defines the process of constructing the groups. Deni/ Baykal, "Değişim, 
Yenileşme ve SUP Kurultayı," interview with Omit Aslanhay, Ciiinhuriyct, 
(July 23, 1991), 1.
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Tlic concept of 'New I.eR’^’^ , aetually goes all the way back to the late 1960s. 
It is a concept first developed by various different authors and intellectuals in the effort 
to distinciatc the 'existing real socialism' from the state and to restructure it on a more 
civil basis. '^"' One of the most im|x>rtant themes of the New Ixl t was to revist Marxism 
and draw out a new understanding of socialism encompassing a more humanitarian 
approach .T h is was, in a way inevitable, for the basic concepts of the New Left 
were developed first, after and in reaction to the Soviet intervention to Prague. New 
Left, as a conceptual start, stretched into a search for various synthesis surpassing its 
political constiaints and has been the benchmark for the réintroduction o( Marxism as 
well as the merging of Marxism with various different discourses. In this sense, the 
New Left organised by Baykal did not have any commonalities with the 'New Left' of 
the West European socialist-Marxist tradition.
7.3.2.1. The Six Arrows Debate: Turkish Social
Democracy and the Constituting Ideology
Before the congress, the New Left (NL) group published a set of 
documents.^’^  The aim was to situate the New Left on an ideological basis, a process 
immediately started as soon as Cem decided to join the Baykal group Just before the
evolution of the term 'New Left' is explained in detail in Maurice 
Isserman, If I had a Hammer: The Death o f the Old Left and the Birth o f the 
New Left (New York: Basic Books, 1987).
f’-‘'l or a recent divseussion of the New Left with new developments on the 
left in general see, Richard J. fillis, "Romencing the Oppressed: I’he New 
Left and the Left Out," The Review o f Politics, Vol. LS8, No. 1, (Winter 1996), 
109-153.
66i ()r various different approaches on this ground see, lYiscilla Long 
(ed.), I'he New Left: A Collection o f lissays (Boston: Porter Sargent, 19()9).
f’^ Deniz Baykal, Ismail Cem, SHP'de 'Yeni SoPun Türkiye 
Programı,: "Değişim," M i m eog raph .
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early speech, he develops a ciilical approach lo the notion of 'minimal slate' which 
later the New Left would take a different position.^2 Here he suppoils the idea of 
'organised market economy' with an accent on the third sector which includes the 
cooperatives, non profit organisations.^^ The method of achieving these is, refraining 
from 'from the above' solutions. Lastly, Baykal stresses the point that the absence of 
democracy docs not only generate the social problems but als(i contributes to the 
problems ol labour.'' '
Even though by the end of the article it is pointed out that the preparatory 
material of the French Socialist Party for the 1990 Congress is used, still the discourse 
is ambiguous and hesitant with no clear distinctions between the 'old' and the 'new' 
definitions of social dcmcx:racy. These points arc discussed more by Ismail Cem, 
sometimes even continuing with a more populist and polemicised tone but, touching 
the most ciucial and critical points like the renewal of the 'parochial' .social democracy 
by moving away from its 'regional' and 'historical' origins^“’. In this regard, Cem, 
first, analysis the development of RPP reminding the success it reached in the 1970s. 
He stales that the successes was achieved bccau.se the party acted as a 'disclaimer of 
inheritance', i.e. disjecting to be a state party even facing the reaction of the
^^Deni/. Baykal, in another speech, for example, leaving a.side the concept 
of 'organised market economy' insists that "the starting point of the future 
economic structuring is market economy." Deniz Baykal, "Sorunlar ve 
Çözüm", 02.
73ibid., 30.
74|bid., 34.
^5jsmail Cem, "vSosyal Demokrasi Nasıl 'En Büyük' Olur?", in Deniz Baykal, 
İsmail Cem, Yeni Sol,
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conservatives7^ Cem, on this ground takes another but a very risky step in an article 
he published just before tlic second round in Baykal-tnonii clash which took place in 
the third Congress, July, 27,28, 1991. Accordingly, Cem, insists that no political 
movement can gain a success if it does not get into accounts with its past. In this 
context,
The social democracy of Turkey has not get in into accounts with the 
past of historical reformative movement (tarihsel yenileştirici hareket), 
in others with its own past. Has not questioned its faults. For not 
questioning it, on the contrary, has exagerratedly exalted it and 
transformed it into a taboo. For this very condition it has stuck with the 
values of the past...^®
Cem, al ter criticising Turkish social democracy for not being democrat because 
of not having tackled with the problems of 'Independence Courts' {İstiklal 
Mahkemeleri) and the 'Yassiada Trials.' '^^ Moic inleicstingly, ('em stales that it is the 
movements appearing as the origins of s(x:ial democracy that has prohibited the labour 
organisations and the intellectual freedom in Turkey and, if not the confrontation is 
proceeded, even though the artieles banning these activities in the Penal Law are 
dissolved, still "they would continue to live in the subconscious of the left and the left 
parties fortifying the habits of single party periixl."^^ After these claims, Cem comes 
to a very important point and argues that Turkish social democracy is totally different 
than the Western models. The difference between the two versions, according to Cem
7f>lbicl., 13.S.
77Italics in the original. 
78lbid., 43.
79|bid., 43.
80|bid., 44.
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is that while the Western social democracy has derived from the transformation of 
Marxist movements and has always been dependent of this basis, Turkish models 
neither have emanated from the parties choosing the 'pluralist democracy' nor 
originating from a Marxist point. Rather, they are parlies generating from an "over- 
ccntraliscd, bureaucratic, elitist ideology and dcrivalcd from the tradition of 'single 
party', 'slate p a rty .F u rth e r, Cem, definitely denies the Kemalist roots when he 
clearly rejects the coexistence of such concepts as 'slatism' and 'nationalism.'^^
On (he other hand, rMlugrul Glinay, now in opposition to Cetn, once an 
ideological ally, was taking a different posilion*^ .^ He emphasised two conditions 
concerning the Six Arrows they, it both constructs the historical past of the social 
democracy in Turkey and, it has been modified, improved, developed and enriched in 
lime by the inculcation of some new concepts to the parly programmes like, liberty, 
equality, solidarity, etc. According to GUnay, Six Arrows is neither a taboo nor needs 
completely to be icjcctcd.^’ On the t)thcr hand, I’aha l^arla, who has clcvclo|X'd an 
earlier criticism of Kemalism takes a similar position by stressing that not all 
components of Six Arrows should be rejected and a more preci.se criticism should be 
dcvcloped.^^ Interesting is that, the Yenilikçiler, in a sense the former supporters of
«« Ibid., 42.
^^ismail Cem, "STIF'de 'Yeni .Sol'un lurkiye Programı", in SUF’dc Ycni 
Sol’un 'lurkiye Programı, Mimeograph, Deniz Baykal, Ismail Cem ( I'he 
manifesto pre.sented to the Third (>)ngress, 1991), 5.
8-^Krlugrul (iünay, "Halka ragmen halk hareketi değiliz," in Resmi Tarih 
ed., Ruşen Çakır, İlidir Göktaş, 187-204.
«^İbid., 190.
'Paha Parla, "Asıl hayret edilecek şey yetmiş yıl sürebilmiş olması," in 
Resmi Tarih, ed., Ruşen Çakır, İlidir Göktaş, 48-49.
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(he similar ideas, in this debate and in the congresses, pref'erred to act together witii 
1п()11(1 group winch was against (he argnmenis pmposed by New I ,еГ( and showed an 
adherence to Kemalist tenets and to the RPP origins®  ^to capture the intra-party |юwer. 
Another critical point here is that, even Erdal İnönti, Гог the sake оГ compromise, 
argued that. Six Arrows did not take place in the programme of SDP and in the 1985 
Programme of the SDPP. There are found tenets other than the Six Arrows, like 
liberty, equality to construct similarities with Western social democratic parties. İnönü 
also stresses that the delegates of the party do not anymore compiehend the classical 
tenets in their meanings of the 1930s and 1940s.^^
7.J.2.2. Repercussions o f  ihc Debate
These theses, which were refused and criticised by Baykal in the party when 
first raised by Yenilikçiler in a very modest way, cs|x;cially by Asaf Savaş Akat^^,
8^ ’Another interesting thing observed during this process, showing the 
ideological confusion,was that, in the Third Congress, even though Deniz 
Baykal was defending the ideas of Asaf Savaş Akat, by referring to him in 
his speech he delivered in the congress, Akat, together with the other 
members of Yenilikçiler, supported lirdal İnönü who was, to repeat once 
more, backing the traditional past values. .See, Asaf Savaş Akat, "Kongre 
İzlenimleri", hürriyet, (July 26 1991), 1. Akat was also contributing to the 
highly popular daily. Hürriyet, by writing articles that were pubyished in 
the first page of the newspaper, supporting İnönü, later, he, told the 
author that his position was wrong and was astonished to see that his ideas 
found echo among the Baykal supporters.
^^firdal İnönü, 27-28 Temmuz 1991, 3. Olağan Kurultay Açı.ş Konuşması, 
Mimeograph, 16.
^^ rhis eriticisin, at the beginning is more concentrating on the critic of 
the Party Programme, which is nothing but the references to the Six 
Arrows. I'or this see, Asaf Savaş Akat, Sosyal Demokrasi Gündemi, 22-32.
I'he criticism directed to Kemalisin is in the .second period and for this see, 
l.cvcnl Cinemre, Ruşen Çakır, Sol Kemalizme Bakıyor (Istanbul: Metis 
Yayınları, 1991) and, for the criticism of social democracy originating 
from Kcmalism see, Hasan Bülent Kahraman, Yeni Bir Sosyal Demokrasi 
İçin (Ankara: İmge Yayınevi, 1993), 23-81.
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have provoked severe erilicism not only in the SDPP but also outside the party. The 
debate in SDPP started spreading out and effecting the Turkish intelligentsia. The 
Cumhuriyel, a Kemalist daily, who used to have an important effect on the giassrools 
o( (he ccnirc-lcft parties in Turkey bcaiusc of its past,^  ^has undergone a severe unrest 
and a group has left the newspaper and resigned from the administration by 
November, 6, 1991.'^ *^ 'fhe group embodied some of the prominent names on the 
Kcmalist-lcft intelligentsia like tlhan Selçuk, and the unrest, defined as the 'putch of 
Uberals against (he Kemalists,'*-^ ' continued up until April 23, 1992 as the 'liberals' 
left the administration, resigned from Cumhuriyet and the 'Kemalisis' moved back to 
power defeating the previous cadre^2. The come-back first declared by April 10, 
1992, and İlhan Selçuk started again writing his column by April 11 ,1192.‘^  ^The 
difference between the groups have been explained in various articles appearing both 
in Cumhuriyet in the other newspapers. Although it has never been put
succinctly what the differences arc, still it was clear (hat, the 'new' group, as 
explained by Hasan Cemal^^, the editor, was more liberal with respect to (he others'
^‘^ Cumhuriyet was founded by Yunus Nadi a journalist and a member of 
Union and Progress was one of Atalürk's dose friends and started the 
newspaper during the Independence War in Ankara. Гог the history of 
the newspaper see, Emin Karaca, Cumhuriyet Olayı (Istanbul: Altın 
Kitaplar, 1996).
^^^hiumhuhyct, (November 6, 1991).
Mimin Karaca, Cumhuriyet, 199-234.
Cumhuriyet, (10 April, 1992).
Cumhuriyel, (1 1 April, 1992).
‘^ 4okay (îönensin, in his weekly articles, usually tried to deliniate the basic 
issues concerning the clash. İlhan Selçuk replied some of these arguments 
in Hürriyet.
‘^■‘^ llasan Cemal, "Nadir Nadi’ye Mektuplar-1, 2, 3, 4", Cumhuriyel, 7-8-9-10 
Kasim, 1991.
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conservative approaches. The new writers, in the daily articles, have taken a position 
imicli ciitical alxnit the traditional left in 1’urkey, as well as Kemalisin, and pio|xised a 
more liberal left model, at least by arguing the recent developments and concepts that 
have appeared in the post-communist era.^^
One of the most challenging djmamics behind this debate is not directly linked 
with .social democracy. As has already been noted, in the debate .some intellectuals 
have insisted on the point that Kemalisin, especially with its progressive and relormist 
character and its mcxlcrnist epistemology,^^ could be taken as an epiphenomenon in 
the consiruclion ol s(K;ial dcm(x;racy if (he latter is conceived as a movement attached 
to the Enlightenment tradition as well as an attempt to gain and reinforce the basic 
liberal r ig h ts .T h e  ambiguous point which triggered the debate is whether social 
democracy might be a dependent variable of Kemalism or not. Against the argument 
of Kemalist writers, gathered in Cumhuriyet, purporting that a left in Turkey can not 
be conceptuali.sed and coneeived unless this condition is satisfied'^^, this point has 
been rejected by the others considering the militarist, centralist, |X)si(ivist but mainly 
the Jacobinist aspects of Kemalisin.
'^ ’^’I'he new columnists included such names as, Jjahin Alpay, liter I'uran, 
Seyfettin r.ür.sel, İlkay Sunar, Murat Belge, Çağlar Keyder, ali prominent 
intellectuals and academics.
‘^ '^I his context is especially anaİ3^ sed in Hasan Bülent Kahraman, Yeni, 55- 
80.
‘^ ^'I'his notion of social democracy is analysed before with reference to jan 
Otto Andersson, "Fundamental Values for a Third l.eft", New Left Review, 
no. 2 If), (March-April 19%), 66-78.
‘^ ^Ahmet laner Kışlalı, Atatürk'ü ¡ilcşürmcnin Dayanılmaz Hafifliği 
(Ankara: İmge Kilabevi, 1993).
Ahmet Insel, "Sosyalist Olduğum için Anti-Kemalistim," in Fevent 
Cinemre, Ruşen Çakır, Sol Kemalizme Ihtkıyor, 194-207.
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İn lime, the debate has turned to encompass the argument more probing the 
slruclural aspects of 'the Icl'l.' Here, Kemalisin and a le(i generating (rom it is 
criticised because of its structural similarities with Leninism, a model which has also 
aimed at the modernist ambitions. It is underlined that after the fall of the Leninist slate 
and parly model, it is difficult to support and defend the Kemalist model, both 
'sharing the .same fatc.'**^ ’^ Inscl also says that "the space filled by Bolshevism in 
Russia is filled by Kemalisin in Turkey which relics on a notion that the development 
of Kemalisin will convey to the development of the Icft."^ ^^  ^ Further, it has been 
emphasised that, while social democracy might be encircling Kemalisin, because of its 
republican epistemology, its will to transite the society from a community based 
structure to nation-stale, and it has endured the construction of a modernist 
understanding of citizenship.'^^ the reverse would never be possible.'^*"'
The numerous factors stimulating this debate and forcing Turkish social 
democracy to search for a new ideological basis can easily be counted but, the
IrilMelin Çulhaoğlu, "Kemalizm ve Sosyalizm Yıllar Sonra Aynı Kaderi 
l’aylaşıyor," in levent Cinemre, Ruşen Çakır, Sol, 157-17d.
Iri^Alıınel İnsel, "Sosyalist", in Levent Cinemre, Ruşen Çakır (ed), 197.
lOTi’here is a vast literature at this point usually relying on more a 
polemicist rhetoric. One interesting example is developed by Attila İlhan 
who considers himself a Marxist and tries to identify Kemalisin with its 
connections with linlightenment ideology and concepts. Attila İlhan, 
Hangi Atatürk (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 2. basım, 1982).
p îs also interesting that Attila İlhan, although a devoted Kemalist, 
declines the idea that there is a uncompromivsed and natural connection 
between Turkish social democracy and the former whereas the others 
underline the togetherness. Attila İlhan, Sosyalizm Asıl Şimdi (İstanbul: 
BDS Yayınları, 1991).
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common denominator of these variables might be epitomised as the debate of 
modernisation. Modernisation debate here, is ambitiously bound to the concept of the 
state, d'he modern state, taken together with such phenomenon as 'the nation' and in 
geneial, vvitli the 'project of modernisation' run by the nation-state, in a period of 
globalisation which di.splays all these issues to discussion and criticism, inevitably and 
iiulitcctly is also ex|)o.sed to c r i t ic is m .In  this sense, Kemalism is also ciitici.sed 
because of its coexistenee with the state, for as it is suggested by an author, in Turkey 
it is more a 'state-nation' rather than a 'nation-state.'^*^
In odu'i wolds, the criti< ism of Keinalisin is the icas.srssmrnl o( the sl.itc and 
the i.ssucs of modernism. 'I’his very condition is akso satisfied when the debate enrols 
into the debate of democracy at large. Here the concept of democracy is more related to 
such notions as identity, the issues of elassical democracy and in this context, 
especially two i.ssucs, the Islamic fundamentalism and Kurdish question, have a 
massive effect on the debate for, it is believed that, especially the Kurdish matter 
brought the early ruptures in the Kcmalist structure.’^  ^ That is why Kcmalism-social 
democracy interrelation should be analysed first on the basis of modernisation, than 
the Islamic fundamcnUilism and Kurdish question to understand its position and crisis 
in the 1990s. Ncvcilhclcss as this will be analysed further in the next chapter here it is 
more convenient to discuss the rc-establishmcnt of the RPP and the situation of SDPP.
a theoretical framework see, Johann Arnason, " The 'I'heory of 
Modernity and the Problematic of Democracy", in P Peilharz, G. Robinson 
and ). Rundell, liclwccn, 32-53 and Peter Murphy, "Socialism and 
Democracy", in, op. cit, 12-31.
10f)j(ürşat Rumin, "Yalnız başına bağımsızlıkla demokrasi kurulamaz," in, 
hevent Cinemre, Ru,şen Çakır (cd.), 66.
107/\ydın Çubukçu, " Türk solu kendi kimliğiyle Kemalizmle asla 
hesaplaşmadı", in l.event Cinemre, Ruşen Çakır (ed). Sol, 216.
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7.4. The Rc-establishiiient of the RPP
7.4.1. The 1991 lilections and  the lAist Coiif>rcxx o f  (-laxh
I'lic clash bclwccn Baykal and İnönü has ended when Ihe group left the parly 
after the third defeat in the Congress held in January 1992. The third confrontation of 
the groups was just after the October 20,1991 elections. SDPP in the elections has 
come up as the third party after Süleyman Demirel's TPP (27.0%) and MP (24.0%) 
by getting the 20.8 % of the votes.*^  ^This was another fall in the vote, volume in Ihe 
post 198.1 era. In comparison with the 33.2% of the I983''>'^  and 24.7% of the 1987, 
this result was alarming a drastic decline.
The 1991 election, if the post 1983 circumstances are remembered, was an 
interesting one. J’hc crux of the election was the clash tetween TPP and the MP on the 
right. The gist of the debate was the concern about the position of the President of 
Turkey. Both 'I’PP and SDPP declared that depending on the election results, the 
Constitution would be amended and the President would be re-6lccted"^l Beyond 
this, TPP run in the elections to gain once more the votes of the suburban area, which 
meant an opposition to the 'liberal-urban based' policies of the MP, holding to a 
relatively con.scrvalivc economic |X)licy. Together with SDPP, TPP in this election 
also run for a demand 'for more democracy'. Süleyman Demirel, all through the
108 Devlet Islalislik linstitüsü (îcnci Müdürlüğü: Rc.smi Seçim Sonııçinn, 
(Ankara: Başbakanlık Basımevi, 1992).
l'he total votes of Populist Party and Social Democratic Party,
no, ■or this hefty debate see, Metin Ileper, " furgut Özal's Presidency: (h isis 
and the Glimmerings of Consensus," in Politics in the Third '¡'urkish 
Republic, eds.. Metin Heper, Ahmet Evin (Boulder, San Erancisco, Oxford: 
Westview Press, 1994), 187-198.
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campaign insisted on a condition that Turkey should have "police stations with glass 
walls."
In this context, SDPP prepared for the elections dwelling its campaign on two 
issues, dcmociatisalion and a new economic policy."' B ut, it is diliicult lo find any 
concrete policy declaration concerning both issues in the Manifesto published at the 
beginning of the canipaign."^ While on the ideological level, social dcmcx^racy is 
explained going all the way back to the National Independence War days and cadres, 
there is a tacit nationalist accentuation in the Manifesto as well."3 The Manifesto, 
apart from this, without going deep and detailed analysis of the social strata and 
leaving ambiguous to which .social classes the call is addies.scd, due to the lack ol 
bringing a new conceptualisation of the social democracy in accordance with a new 
policy understanding, consists of two main parts.
On the first part, it is said that the party, in the future will construct 'a 
respected, healthy, wealthy Turkey.'""* In the second part, the targets arc set and 
described and these are the construction of
'liberal, laic, pluralist, democratic Turkey to bring love and peace to the 
country; a respected Turkey which has opened itself lo the world but has 
not left its development, security and defence to other nations; of a 
rapidly developing economy, being able to open itself lo competition by 
using high technology and operating in scx;ial market rules; that would
l '  Ksill’, Yeni Bir Türkiye İçin İlk Uedeller: SHP Seçim Bildirgesi 1991 
(Ankara (7): n.p., n.d.).
I 3-38.
’ ’ •^İbid., -S.
H"*lbid., 4-13.
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come over the sickness found in the social life by realistic, consistent 
social policies.''^!^
The social classes that SDPP directly addresses in this context are, the workers, 
larmeis, women and the youth.
Even though the whole campaign is focused and concentrated on the 
démocratisation in Turkey, interestingly, in the Manifesto, the main concern of the 
pel itxl, the South East question is only mentioned in two simple paragraphs which do 
not declare a specific policy. It is vsaid that "the state will be send to the region not only 
as a security force but also as a power creating employment and bringing welfare and 
wealth.""^ In this paragraph, contrary to the ongoing arguments, it is accepted that 
the state acts in the region with a human face, without differentiating people according 
to their languages, races, religious s e c ts .T h e  second paragraph deals with a more 
unrealistic and utopie approach saying that in the region the emergency rule 
(()l(if>anii.\(ii Hal) will be ended, the village guards troops (Ki'ly Koniriilari) will be 
dissolved and the security tasks will be allocated in the suburbia to new and 
professionally educated troops. In the Manifesto there is no further discussion of 
the regional conditions.
I Ibid., 15-20. 
lE^»lbid., 28-36. 
llTjbid., 12. 
ll«Ibid., 12.
1 E)ibid., 13.
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On the other hand, the 1991 elections is remarkable for SDPP because it 
entered the contest forming a coalition with Democracy Party’ (DP-Deinokrasi 
Pariisi)·, a party, running mainly in the South-East region of Turkey and lor the 
Kurdish votes. The result obtained caused severe criticism and unrest in the party. 
The early reaction was the demand of an extraordinary congress by the iiaykalcilar. 
On the other hand, the important development just after the elections was the decision 
reached between Süleyman Demirel and Erdal İnönü to form a coalition government. 
The three factors effecting the construction of the decision was i) the debates 
concerning (he condition of Tiirgiil Ö/al as the president for, the lw(i pailics had 
already decided (hat he should be replaced by someone else arguing that his election 
was not deniocratic;'^’ ii) the will of Erdal İnönü to reinforce his position in the party 
as the Baykal group was already moved for an extraordinary congress and iii) to 
resti uclure the democracy formed first by the military coup of 1980 and then by the 
MP governments’“^ .
'I’his framework, though helpful in the construction of the coalition 
government, was not able to settle the unrest in the parly and the third clash between 
incMiii and Baykal bursled out in the extraordinary congress of January 24-25, 1992. 
Both groups supported their previous positions and the familiar arguments. Baykal 
analysed the election results depending on the conclusions reached by a report
’ ^^ ’l)liP was the only parly running in the elections for the South-liasl 
voles. 1 he problems between this parly and SDPP, as well as the history of 
the party is to be discussed in the next chapter.
121 Hürriyet, "Demirel-Inönü Anlaştı", (November 4, 1991); 49. Cumhuriyci 
Hükümeti Prognwv (Ankara: Başbakanlık Basımevi, 1991), 26.
’ 22<;()jjyaldemokrat Halkçı Parti, Dördüncü Ohığan Knrultuy: Pıırti Meclisi 
Çıüışımı Raporu, 11-12 Hylül 1993 (Ankara(?): n.p., n.d), 25.
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prepared and already published by his g r o u p . Arguing that SDPP is in a decline, 
lie, as has been stated in the report, constructed his analysis on i) the lack of ideology; 
ii) SDPP appearing as a party of the past; iii) not reconstructing the parly identity on 
the new concepts.'2^The future programme proposed by Baykal was insisting on the 
ideological renewal which depends on certain issues as, i) transition from the state 
parly to a social parly; ii) transition from the ideology of poverty to the ideology of 
welfare'2-“'; iii) looking for a wide and participatory democracy; iv) to pul the 
individual at the centre of the political life.'26
To achieve these goals, Baykal also developed a programmatic model which 
rested on, "i) the reconstruction of the politics; ii) the reconstruction of the 
administrative structure'27; ¡¡j) a radical legal reformation; iv) re-programming the 
cijuality; v) re-programming the economic development; vi) programming the social 
pcacc'2^; vii) restructuring the party o r g a n is a t io n .A n o th e r  interesting point in 
this di.scussion is the approach concerning the concept of left. Here, two points are
 ^^'^'hkcimw Piirli ve Çtkış Yolu: 20 Ekim 1991 Seçiminin Değerlendirilmesi 
ve Geleceğe Dönük Öneriler (İstanbul: Filiz Yayıncdık, 1991).
'-^‘'ibid., 7-dZ.
1 2.Sinicrestingly this wording is changed when the programme is re­
published as a part of the hook by Baykal and ('em, as, "Aiming at the 
Welfare Society." Deniz Baykal, Ismail Cem, Yeni Sol, 221.
'^i^-lbid., 34-30.
^^^In the book, there is a new paragraphe added, as 'New Order for 
Municipalities.' Deniz Baykal, Ismail Cem, Yeni Sol, 223-224.
3'his part is totally omitted in the above mentioned book.
1 ‘^^ lbid., 37-45.
1-^ ^^  rhis part is totally omitted in the above mentioned book.
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stressed; "i) to get rid of the bureueratic understanding; ii) getting rid of the 'centralist 
state leftism.'" In this context the report underlines two strategic issues, under the 
heading of 'protecting our party against right and left deviations.' These are "i) the 
ideological ground of political struggle; ii) new social democratic synthesis."'·^' 
Nevertheless, although İnönü and his group did not suggest any programmatic or 
ideological model and only accentuated that carrying the party to the government is a 
successful achievementi32^ in the eleetions for the party leadership Baykal lost the 
contest with 24 vote.s.
7.4.2. Looking for a New Politics: The Coalition
Government and SDPP
It is clear that these concepts have been formed under the inllucnce of recent 
developments observed in the international political scene. Even though in the intra- 
party politics these arguments have been turned over and refused, yet in the 
Programme of the 49th Republican Government, an inspiration emanating from the 
international political scene is obvious. The programme rests on the notion of 
democracy with a reference to Paris Charter, the Maastrieh Treaty and the Process of 
European Security and CcK)pcration C onference.In  this context the rcmini.sccnt of 
the legal structure constructed by the 1980 military regime is aimed to be totally 
changed and the necessity for a new constitution is stressed.'^'· Especially in the
1-^Mbid., 44.
1-^^lirdal İnönü, "SUF 7. Olağanüstü Kurultayı Açış Konuşması", in Kurultay 
Konuşımüan (İstanbul: Bojmt Kitapları, 1998), 3.53-374.
* ^^49. Cumhuriyet Hükümeti Programı (Ankara: başbakanlık basımevi, 
1991).
1-^^lbid., 11.
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Ap|)ciKİi\ I lo Ihc Government Programme, il is slated that "Turkey even (hough has 
foreseen the construction of the contemporary state as a target is very retarded in the 
process for the achievements of the task."i35
This rationale conveys lo the critique of the different dimensions of '12 
September legime' encompassing a whole framework stretching Irom L.aw of 
Elections and Political Parties to other 19 laws each one clearly counted in the 
program m e.A nother important point in the programme is the Appendix 3 which 
conccniratcs on the 'South East' which has been a problem all through (he 1980s. The 
progiamme, when taken together with the concepts developed in the section devoted (o 
Culture, foresees a more multicultural structure and a pluralistic society, refers to the 
notion of 'democratic law state' and accepts that the language, culture, origin, belief 
differences are natural and, for a unitary state, these are not a condition of weakness, 
liven in a unitaiy slate, it is argued (hat, various ethnic, cultural, linguistic dilTcrcnccs 
might freely be expressed and this would fortify the unification of stale and s(x:iely.’·^  ^
fhese issues are also expressed in the second coalition government programme 
formed in June 24, 1993 with a similar verbatim.
'fhe other principle on which (he government was ct)nslrucled rellecled a 
specific understanding that has occurred after the fall of the Berlin Wall, which might
IJ·''Ibid., 2().
Ublbicl., 28-31.
• 41.
l38].or an overview of these coalition governments, see, Kemali Saybaşılı, 
DYP-SllP K o ix lisyom tin tn  Üç yi//(Istanbul: bağlam Yayınlan, 1995).
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be clcrincd as the 'end of the ideologies.' It was believed that by the end of the Cold 
War the shaip distinctions between centre left and right reached an end. Actually this 
has been one of the main arguments put forward in the Özal era to construct and 
reinforce the hegemonic discourse of the New Right. The formation of the coalition 
government tacitly referred to this argument stre.ssing such notions as 'democratic 
maturity' and 'tolerance.' This is clear in Inonll's explanations. ’^ 9 This argument has 
provoked various debates for it is believed that the coming together of the two parties 
in a coalition government would help to accelerate the development of the radical 
p o liM cs .O n  the other hand this notion of politics is even charactcri.scd by some 
scholars as the end of p o litics .S D P P , in the first half of the 1990s, especially 
timing (he clash between İnönü and Baykal, even though (ended to take this 
understanding into considcialion, due to the pragmatic accounts, lost the chance of 
renewing its ideological structure and underttx)k the resjxmsibility of a coalition with a 
ccntic-right party lor more pragmalie rca.sons.
It could be said that, the procc.ss of renewal of the existing ideological 
structure' '^  was actually an answer to such undcr.standings as 'the end of ideologies is 
reached'. I wcn aflcr the last clash and when the Baykal group was out of SDPP for
■-^ ‘^ So.syaldemokrat Halkçı Parti, Dördüncü , 5.
get the theoretical background of this argument as well as the 
mechanism see, Chantal Mouffee, "The End of Politics and the Rise of the 
Radical Right," Dissent, Fall 1995, 498-502.
'4İG eof Mulligan,Po/itics'in an Antipolitical Age (Cambridge: Polity Pre.ss, 
1994), 124-129.
' ^ I'o r a debate relying on the notion of 'ideology after the colap.se of 
communism' started first by Kenneth Minogue and followed by Alex 
Callinicos .see, Alek.sandras Sthromas, The End o f 'isms’? (Cambridge: 
Blackwell, 1994).
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llu y movfcl (o (he rc-cs(ablislied RPP, in (lie Parly ('oiincil lieport sul)ini((ecl (o (he 
P'orn ih Congicss, the section on the 'Evaluation of the International Situation' includes 
such concepts as 'getting out of the Cold War, The Deposition of USSR to the 
History, New World Order and the Developments in the International Milieu, 
Fragmentation, Régionalisation, Micro Nationalism, Transgression of the Nation-State 
and Integration, New Dimensions of Imperialism, The Rise of Fascism, The Problems 
of Democratic Socialism, Rising International Law D e b a te .W h e n  the positions 
taken by the party administration controlled by Inonli, during the 1990-1992 period, 
all through the congresses, is remembered, this might easily be considered as a 
relatively radical step taken by the SDPR
This position has two important openings. The first one is that it conduces to 
the intra-party developments as the resignation of Erdal İnönü from leadership and 
Murat Karayalçm's election as the chairperson of the SDPP, and, second, the 
iccstablishmcnt of (he RPP. This has akso two more imixntant openings; i) RPP re­
established with an ambiguous and more blurred ideological position swinging 
between the abandonment of the traditional ideology and the reinvigoration of it. 
Nevertheless, after the assassination of Uğur Mumcu in January 24, 1993 due to the 
upsurge of the traditional Kemalist ideology any slightest ctinccrn for a bieak with the 
tiaditional past is completely under estimated; ii) merging of SDPP with RPP and 
party's taking a pro-state-ideology position after the general elections of 1995 
cs|x;cially in response to such piobicms of fundamentalism and Kurdish i.ssues'"·^ . *·
14.3j;osyaldcmokrat Halkçı Parti, Parti Meclisi, 13-23.
· ’ l lic discussion and analysis of these issues are al.so left to the next
chapter.
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7.5. Between Past and Present: The New RPP
7.5.1. The Re-established RPP
Accouling k) llic Law regulating the conditions ol tlie parties dissolved by the 
military junta after 1980 coupe, the general congresses of the parties had to be held to 
decide whether tliey would get reformed or would once more dissolved.''^·'' In the 
Congress September 9, 1992 the RPP delegates voted for the reestablishment of the 
party.* '·^ ’ As the last chairperson of RPP, Bülent Ecevit, had already resigned from the 
leadership of the party after the military coup, there was the need of electing a new 
chairperson and there were two names in the contest, Erol Tuncer and Deni/. Baykal 
They were taking two different positions. Tuneer was already involved in the 
reestablishment process of RPP with the other members of the last General 
Administrative Board {Genel İdare Kurulu) and had published a declaration.*"*  ^The 
opinions later supported by Tuncer was first publicised in this document lie was 
insistent on two points that i) RPP should be rc-cstablishcd; ii) then SDPP would 
merge with RPP under the name of the latter and then the parly would be the shelter 
for the unification of the other ccnlrc-lcfl parlies, specifically Dl.P. '"***
This was also the plan and the intention of SDPP and İnönü. As Bülent Ecevit 
was pulling forward approaches totally different than Tuncer and his friends, the 
debate in time turned to the unification of SDPP and reformed RPP. Deniz Baykal, as 
the second candidate and rejecting this tendency ambitiously defended another
145, AW was issued in June 19, 1992, Liw number 3821 especially by the 
efforts of SDl’F parliamentary group. Resmi Gazele, (July 3, 1992).
^‘^ ^HAtmhuriyet, (September 10, 1992).
Milliyet, (May 4, 1992).
*4«lbid., 11.
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posilion. According to him 'historical RPP should be re-formed, become a strong 
party by creating its parliamentary group and form a focus of attraction for the other 
rn ilro  k 'll p;u(ics icjecliiig beforehand (he itlea of merging o f SDI^I’ aiul Rl ’ l ’. I n  
llic eongn'ss Itaykal was clecled as (he (builli chairperson of RPPaller Aladlik, InCaid 
and Ecevit. Just after the re-formation Baykal and his 22 Iriends resigned from SDPP 
and formed the parliamentary group of RPP.
7.5.2. The New RPP and Its Search for an Ideology
The 'new' RPP from the very first day of its re-establishment was under the 
control of Baykal and his friends who had previously defended the renewal of the 
traditional ideological stnicture of Turkish social democracy. In this sense, they were, 
iis analysed before, critical of the epistemology that has constructed it. Not only the 
methcxJology that has created the republican modernist movement was under attack but 
(he hcrmcnciilic di.scour.se of the traditional RPP was also crihcised. The Six Arrows, 
with its symbolic and cultural content, was the focus of this criticism. It was a 
dilemma that the .same group was ambitious in re-establishing and getting the control 
()l (he party once they were di.sapproving, 'fhe publicum and the interested reference 
groups were inquisitive on the.se grounds. This expectations could not be satisfied by 
cITacing the symbols, discourse and the party structure of RPF’ for, the strategy in the 
whole process ol rccstablislmicnt was dwelled on the accentuation and emphasis put 
on the importance and meaning of RPP. This eclectic structure was easily observable 
in the 1976 Programme, the 'valid' programme when the party was re-established for 
it was (he existing programme before the di.s.soivcmcnt and came once more to (he fore 
when the piogramme tended to be changed and renewed.
(September K), 1992).
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The programme submitted to the ratification of the Congress of September 9, 
1994 was prepared by Ismail Cem and it reflects some of the ideas previously 
advocated by Baykal and his friends^^. It, inevitably refers both the historical and 
(radilional past and the recent changes both lived in the world and found an echo in 
rurkey.'·''' The first part of the programme, more reflecting an emotional rhetoric 
bears the heading as "Our Ideological Essence and Basic C h o i c e s . T h e  
Programme, defining RPP as "change in continuity" and "the power of the change"'·“'^  
gives a brief historical background of the transformations in RPP programmes, It is 
interesting that there is a twofold contradiction at this point. On the one hand 
immediately reflecting on the "new conditions-renovated RPP" with a tacit intention 
of getting out of the traditional framework, on the other hand, even when the 
programmatic changes are analysed there is no critique of the past which was one of 
the main arguments of the Yetii Sol who re-established the RPP. On the contrary the 
Six Arrows one by one explained.
'I'he four of the Six Arrows, usually considered the most ciucial ones, namely, 
'nationalism, populism, statism, laicisin' arc explained by trying to be filled a 
contcm[X)iary content yet perpetuating the already mentioned eclectic discourse. Here, 
the 'nationalism' tenet is explained by reminding the 'process of nationalisation' and
15^^CIIP, Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi Programı: Yeni Hedefler Yeni Türkiye, 
15 Aralık 1993 tarihinde Parti Meclisince Benimsenen Tasarı.
ISlIbid., 19-24.
I^^lbid., 11.
153lbid., 20.
'■^ ^Mbid., 15. 
l-'^ -' l^bid., 19.
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saying that the meaning of this concept does not have a racial connotation and it is not 
a movement for separation but for unification.*^ Populism, is explained with a more 
rhetorical a|)proach rather than taking cither a pragmatic or an ideological |X)sition. 7’hc 
crucial approach here is that, the Programme, with an implicit recalling for 
'corporatism' confirms that, "populism is the transgression of individuality to reach 
the wholeness when necessary .S ta tism , gives a bizarre definition of state as " a 
security brought for the healthy construction of the balance between the private 
interests and social interests."*^® In this context, the Programme, takes a diffident 
position between privatisation and Statism referring to the principles of Socialist 
International.''’'^
This framework encompasses an interesting definition brought for social 
democracy. Identified with democratic socialism'^’" this notion is defined as "the 
indivisibility of the ideals of equality and liberty."'^' Inferred from this approach is 
the implicit reference to the ex-Soviet system with an emphasis that what has been 
proven in the dawn of the 21st century is the reality and the rightfuincss of this 
understanding. Continuing, the programme reflects on two points, first, RPP is "a 
party situated on the left", and although it declares a prel'crcnce for the labour sector, it 
sets the social democracy for the entire society. Second, it emphasises the connection
'•'^ i’lbicl., 16.
I'i^ibid., 16.
'•‘>*^ lbid., 17.
I5‘)|bid., 17.
’ i><)lbid., 12.
161 Ibid., 12.
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between the will for modernisation in the society and These last two points
needs a brief ideological analysis on two basis. The first is even though the 
programme mentions the importance of the 'new times', still it docs not bring any 
radical approach to cither the iK)tion of labour or the already established framework of 
social democracy. Second, it, in the same chapter, immediately and once more, starts 
to elaborate on the importance of the coexistence of the labour and capital, insisting 
that the party does not set an agenda for an antagonism between these two sectors.
Here, it can be said that the two points together delineates a party 
understanding which is more a reflection of the traditional RPP with an epistemology 
consli uclcd on a political cultural basis having a hcrnicnculically and ideologically .set 
discourse. This is, indeed, to say it with Kitschelt a "semantic universe" which sets 
the limits and boundaries of the epistemology encompassing even the ideology which 
is in this context unsurpassable.*^>4 7'hc definitions given here embed both a traditional 
clitist-ccntralist party notion integrated with the will for modernisation and 
transformation, which is the main characteristic of the traditional F^ PP, and outlining a 
concentric and convoluted party and .society notion which means a society for the
IWibid., 13.
The (omicction and the relationship between language, discourse and 
ideology is much a matter of deliberation and an enormous literature. In 
this context, especially in outlining the integrity between the constituting 
epistemology of Kemalism which is embedded in the ideology of Rl’P I 
more draw on lirnesto laclau and Chantal Mouffe, Ucgcmouy imd Socialist 
Stratgey (London and New York: Verso, 1991) and see, both for an 
interesting analysis of this work as well as for a different approach to the 
notion of ideology see, Slavoj Zizek, "Beyond Discourse Analysis", in 
lirnesto liiclau. New Renccliom on (he Revolution o f Our lim e  (London, 
New York: Verso, 1990).
 ^ ’^"^llerbert Kitschelt, The Transformation o f Uuropean Social Democracy 
(Cambridge, UK, Cambridge University Press), 260.
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party and an undifferentiated society continuing with the parallelism of interests which 
recalls an implicit corporatism.*^^ This is also clear in the two follo\ying .sections of 
(he I’logrammc as it is argued that the aim of RPP is (he iranslbiination ol (he .society 
in the direction of the 'tradition of transformation' and the history of the RPP and the 
Republic of Turkey are common.*^^
The last point to be mentioned in this process of renewal is that there are two 
missing points in the Programme. The first is, although the text ref lects on (he recent 
developments of the social, economic and political fields in the decade of 1980 with a 
confirmative and affirmative discourse*<^  ^ there is no reference to liberalism and no 
attempt of renewal of the traditional ideology on this basis which has been one of the 
main components in the same procedure observed in the West European socialist 
p a r t ie s .T h e  second point might be extrapolated after Kitschclt's analysis of the 
.social democracy.
* ’^‘'10  argue the residue of corporatism in the latest development observed 
in the socialist parties see,Wilde, lawrence. Modern European Socialism 
(Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1994), 54-69.
*W>lbid., 13.
20.
lf)8l.'()r various different analysis of the relationship between left and 
liberalism on a more abstract level see, Peter Osborne, Liberalism and the 
Limits o f Socialism for the attempts on the party basis see. Perry 
Anderson and Patric Camiller, Mapping the West European Left (London, 
New York: Verso, 1994). On the other hand the main discussion on this 
subject matter emanates from the situation and the ideological 
transformation of the British labour Party. In this context see, Martin J. 
Smith, "Continuity and Change in labour Party", in Martin J. Smith and 
Joanna Spear, The Changing Labour Party (London and New York: 
Routledge, 1992), 217-229.
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In discussing the pattern of development and change in the European social 
democracy Kitschelt touches three mainstream and after setting the first two periods 
as i) transformation of a minority communitarian strand into anarcho-syndicalist 
ideology "that stressed direct industrial action and workers' self-organisation without 
the intermediating role of parties and state b u re a u c ra c ie s , i i )  a Marxist 
understanding, on the contrary, emphasising the importance and the role of 
hierarchically organised agents like state and party in the rcgulalion of the 
icdisliihiilion of scarce g(M)ds, he comes to the third period.'^*’ It is (he "third social 
democratic variant of the labour movement" that has "diluted scxialist thinking by 
accepting elements of political and economic liberalism and calls for a combination of 
centralised coordination and markets."'^' Here, there arc two fx>in(s to be discussed 
taking RPP into consideration. First, RPP, once more it is obvious that, as a social 
democratic party, has got nothing in common with the univcisal .social democratic 
basis, roots and ideology as long as the lirst two pcritxls is concerned. Second, the 
third period is also disclusivc in the search purported by the reformed RPP even 
though it could have been a chance to be used.^^^ Interestingly, RPP in its 'new' 
programme mentions neither the first two pericxls nor the third and, in this context, 
situates itself on a more regional and local basis, abstracting itself from the univcr.sal 
context and it is clear (hat (his movement would necessarily and naturally conducive to 
the further crisis.
'^’‘^ Kitschclt, Trunsi'ormation, 259.
170ibid., 259.
’7l|bid., 259.
'I'he transition to a new understanding of party politics is analysed in 
Saran Benton, "'I'he Decline of the Party," in Stuart Hall and Martin 
Jacques, New limes: llie  Changing Pace o f Politics in me 1990s (l.ondon: 
Ixtwrence and Wishart, reprinted 1990), 333-346.
290
Неге, it should not be remembered tliat, the 1993 Programme of SDPP, as has 
been analysed in the previous chapter, is a reaction to RPP programme and a lost 
clianc (· <>l irnovalion of (lie itieology. Heeause it was obvious that RPI* was the 
'genuine' owner of the traditional social democratic heritage in Turkey with all its 
symbolic and semantic cult leaving that traditional accumulation out and renovating the 
party ideology could be a movement beyond a mere speculation.!^-^ Instead what has 
been adopted by the SDPP administration was going back to Kcmalism even moving 
away from the previous programme. Second, when the programmes of the two parties 
are compared, the SDPP programme seems to be the imitation of the RPP programme 
even in the structuring and the outlines.! '^* This is more obvious when the second part 
of the programme called 'Priority Targets' is r e v i e w e d . I t  is a reference to the 
second and the third parts of the RPP programme giving out the contours of the 
economic and social policies. This framework, which figures out the lost chances of 
ideological renewal, embedding the two parties, bring out the necessary rea.sons 
behind the crisis of the two parties faced in the second half of the 199()s.
7.6. Second Urge for Renewal in SDPP: The Karayalçın
l*eriod
7.6.1. The 'Social Transformation Project'
Manifesto published in the journal So.syni Demokrat and signed by 
a group of intellectuals and polilicans who were active in the SDl’P shows 
that there was already a tendency and accumulation in the party that 
would support such a movement. "Yeniden Sosyal Demokrasi l(,'in Çağrı," 
Sosyal Demokrat, no. 74 (June 1994), 4-7.
*^"!siir, Program, (April 1973).
!^-‘'Sosyaldemokrat Halkçı Parti, Öncelikli Hedefler.
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After Erdal İnönU's declaration that in the fourth congress he would not run for 
tlic leadership of SDPP^^^ there were two candidates, Murat Karayalçın and Aydın 
Güven Gtirkan. Murat Karayalçın, Mayor of Greater Ankara Municipality was a 
prestigious figure in the centre left politics as well as GUrkan being one of the most 
prominent politicians in SDPP, was the first leader of Populist Party who endeavoured 
the merging of it with SDP and then became the first chairperson of SDPP. GUrkan 
was considered to hold a more conservative position in the contest being backed 
mostly by the Kurdish and Alevite delegates.
On the other hand Karayalçın in order to prove his position as someone who is 
open to the new developments on the universal social democratic realm started to work 
on a Manilesto tliat would be presented to the congtc.ss.''^‘'The Manifesto carried the 
name 'Social Transformation Project' with the subtitle 'Agenda total democracy; 
solution social d e m o c r a c y . f h e  reference to the concepts of 'total democracy' and 
'social democracy', also a consequence of working together with a group including 
names critical about the traditional roots of social dcm(x;racy in Turkey, created the 
impression that, the Manifesto is a document for setting the effects of globalization and 
the residues of the searches for a new definition of social democracy in the SDPP.
lT6//ijrriyei, "lirdal İnönü Çekiliyor," (June 7, 1993), 11-18.
'^^riie  manifesto was prepared by a group. At the beginning the group 
iiK'luded Karayalçın's advisors in the Ankara Municipality. I’liese were 
some prominent academics, bureaucrats and inlellecluals.llhan lekeli. 
Yiğit (îülöksü/,, lirol I'uncer, Necat firder. Mürşit Güneş, Yakup Kepenek, 
A)'dm Köymen and the present author was in the core team, la ter the 
matiilesto written by Necat lirder, Kürşat lUimin, Aydiii Kiiymen atul the 
present author.
l^^Mural Karaj'alçın, Toplumsui Dönüşüm Projesi. Mimeograph.
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Indeed, the published Manifesto is a signifier of this approach as it starts with a 
remark that social democracy should carry out an auto critique.
The Manifesto is rather a detailed programme proposed for Turkey rather than 
being merely a social democracy debate. In this context it emphasises that the need in 
'I'lirkcy is not a 'change' but a 'transformation,' recalling and referring to the famous 
mono ol rurgul O /al’^^ ’ but with a keen intention that, it could only be grasped 
through the renovated social democratic policies if the traditional understanding is left 
ou t., Taken together, both issues open the Manifesto towards a positivistic and better 
a (cchnologisl-posilivist as well as a progressive-modernist undcrslaiuling of social 
dcmociacy. I'o gel rid ol this constraint, the Manifesto goes back to the notions ol 
'democracy, liberty, localisation, peace', saying that, after the fall of the Berlin Wall 
even though the world has not been successful in achieving these goals, still they have 
developed a potential of ideology. With a notion of social democracy relying on 
these concepts, the Manifesto announces three targets as, "démocratisation of the 
society and implementation of a total democracy, economic growth, just income 
distribution."
The Manifesto in this context first refers to 1989 SUx:khoIm Manifesto of 
Principles of the Socialist International. The Stockholm Manifesto clearly slates that 
neither the private ownership nor the state ownership has an isolated and self
1^9(v4ural Karayalçin, Toplumsal, n.p.
^^< l^bid., 1.
'« 'Ib id ., 2 .
l«2|bid., 5.
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(Jcrivating meaning as long as the prcxluctivily and social justiee is concerned. Starting 
IVoin this statement, The Social Transformation Project foresees a National Planning 
Institution, which would coincide the state and the s o c i e t y . the Manifesto, as the 
notion of democracy is taken as the primordial concept, the administrative pr<x:cdurc is 
also seen through this concept and localisation is raised as one of the most important 
concepts. 'I’hc two reasons backing this arc rcinvigoralion of the lost efficiency of the 
central administration through a renovation process and the démocratisation of the 
administration in general.Related with this is the proposal for a new legal system.
This part, tacitly brings a deep critique of the legal system of the Republican 
period. It lirst delineates that a legal .system trusted by the citi/ens has not yet been 
established in the Republican era for it has always been controlled by the political, 
realm bccau.se, as a consequence of positivist approach, law and legal structure has 
been taken as one and the same tiling.'*^“' One another reason is that, none of the 
Constitutions has been developed by a social reconciliation and the Constitutions have 
always been made to secure the power and the existence of the state. The social 
demtx;ratic mission in this context should be the liberation of the legal system from the 
domination of the s t a t e . T h i s  understanding of the legal system conduces to the 
notion of civil society or in general civility which is cmphasi.scd in the Manifesto.'*^^ 
This notion of civility has an impact on two different but important issues, which have
IS-'^Ibid., 12.
16.
18‘5|bid., 17.
>8('lbid., 18.
<«7|bid., 28, 40.
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always been a problem in the social democratic ideology in Turkey: laicism and the 
Kurdish problem, especially when its traditional past and origins are considered. In 
the approach developed for these issues the Manifesto foresees a pluralistic social 
model. I .aieism is considered a concept rcinlbtcing (he pluialislic dimension fouiul 
in the democracy whereas pluralism is comprehended as the vital component in the 
solution of the Kurdish question together with recognition of the difference.'^^
In the Manifesto, a special importance is given to two more concepts; the 
necessity for the ideological framework and the 'new' understanding of politics.'^^^’ 
Unlike the New Right approach trying to detach politics from the soc i a l i t y t h i s  
consideration proposes a return to the politics with the decision that the society could 
only be changed if the political realm is given a p r i v i l e g e . Also, the 
'transformation' is linked to the transformation reached in the |X)litical arena. This is 
dclinitcly an ideological deliberation and as long as social democracy is regarded the 
Mani(esU) draws the attention to the changing nature of the working class and going 
beyond the Programmes prepared by the RPP and SDPP.*'^  ^n (or tfic (irst time the 
Manifesto reveals in Turkey hat, those who vote for the social democratic parties 
should be reelaborated and reconsidered due to two reasons; first, the shifts observed 
in the nature of the working class and in the s(x;ial stratification, as well as in the urban
>8«lbid., 20-21.
•«'^Ibid., 21-22.
36.
l ‘^  ijohn Gray, Beyond the New Right (London: Routledge, 1994), 94. 
>‘^ 2Ibid., 36. 
l ‘^ 3(bid., 40.
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liCc, has been expected to bring new emerging social groups to social democracy but 
this did not work because the parties situated on this ideological map did not perceive 
the new movements and only developed strategies for the 'old' labour related classes; 
second, as the ideology of the party is not clear and dcx;s not encompass the new 
developments the voter has difficulty in defining himself and situating his political 
behavi our . As  a consequence the Manifesto states that the soeial democratic parties 
should refrain from constructing unbroken and unchangeable relations with social 
reference groups. The Manifesto ends by going back to the concept of 
(ranslormation, describing it on four levels a.s, world, 'I’urkcy, party leadership and 
individual.
7.6.2 Giirkan and the Reaction to Transformation
On the other hand, Giirkan, also submitted a Manifesto to the Congress 
delegates which is more a humble declaration relying on the tacit critique of the 
Karayalçın's Manifesto and approach. GUrkan, although at the beginning of his 
dcclaiaiion stales (hat Turkey is pa.ssing through the most severe conditions ever laced 
in its history, he suggests that the only way out to this circumstance is the construction 
of a 'clean society.'*^® This notion, though loose and ambiguous in the text, conveys 
more to a utopic reconstruction of the s(x;icty mainly by amending the Constitution.'*^^
194ibid., 40.
‘^^ ^İbid., 44.
•‘>('lbid., 45.
*^^ l^’rof. Dr. Aydın Güven Gürkan, Temiz Siyaset Temiz Parti Temiz Toplum, 
Mimeo.
l*'>«lbid., 17-18.
•‘^ ‘^ İbid., 19-20.
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I Ic'io (oiiiul is (l)c CH)iilimliclion t)( Ihc tU-cliiiiKiou Ibr, CUrkiin, scvcic'ly Init widunil 
mciilioiiing liny name, criliciscs Karayal^in's approach by saying that it is not 
convenient and democratic to propose a new programme that would go beyond the 
existing party programme. Rather he purports that tiie strategy should be activating the 
principles set in the programme.^®® GUrkan's point is that the programmes prepared 
by teams leads the party to a 'managerial party' structure which is contradictory with 
the social democratic comprehension of participation.201 After .setting this as a 
primordial principle, GUrkan, taking a more conservative position, says that such 
concepts as 'change' and 'transformation' would conduce the party to 'mutation' and
'alienation.'202
'fhe purpose behind the calls for transformation, according to GUrkan is, "to 
create a mind and value confusion in the society" when the society is in need of a 
'mind integrity.'202 if (his is lost, to Giirkan this is the second step in the set up ol 
prt)posing a change, the sex i^ety, namely 'I'urkcy, would be prepared and ready to fall 
into the lap of 'the new world order.' He states this understanding clearly: "The 'new 
world order' looks for the weakening of the national and social wills and it is not 
based on the reconciliation and adjustment reached between dif ferent and free national 
wills but is raised on the single, powerful and dominating will basc."2o· In this 
condition, by the process of change Turkey would be weakened and put under the
200ibid., I 3.
201 Ibid., IZ-I4.
202ibid., 10.
20;-5|bid., I 1.
204ibid., I 2.
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conlrol of the domineering power. GUrkan, at the end of his declaration claims that the 
tiansibrmation is indeed a muUUion and if this (ask is achieved, in a period when the 
s(x;ial democracy has already been pulled away from ils rcx)ts, the scx:iety would loose 
its basic resistance against the ill-drives.^ ®-''
On the contrary, a policy should be constructed on such concepts as 'moral 
principles, coherency and consistency, integrity and p e r m a n e n c y .The last point 
that sliould be discussed considering the declaration is that, even though GUrkan slates 
that social democrat parties are the political structures and a kind of sheltering for the 
minorities of a sex^ iety^ ®^  and, in the contest he was the candidate more backed by the 
Kurdish and Aleviate delegations® ,^ the text does not account any specific and overt 
consideration of either the Kurdish or the South East issue.S®®
^< -^''lbid., 24.
200]bid., 12.
here is a critical and crucial point in this context. Both Rl'l’ and the 
S'Dl’l’ traditionally have been the parties backed by the Alevis in I'urkey.
In the process of controlling the power of this group among the delegates, 
Karayalçın, before the congress gained the support of MUvStafa Timisi, a 
renowned politician who was in the 1970s the chairperson of the Türkiye 
Birlik Partisi ( fhe Unity Party of Turkey) which was clearly a party 
rested on the Alevis in Turkey. Nevertheless, when, after the Congress 
Council's decision that only one delegate should speak from each camp, 
'I'imisi delivered a speech as the representative of the Karayalçın group, 
he attracked the fury of the Alevi delegates. He later explained his 
behaviour to the present author as an attempt to fetter the polarization of 
the party. He states that he was already conscious that it was a move with 
much of trouble for him and his political life, knowing that a majority of 
Alevis were together with Giirkan. For Unity Party and I'imisi see.
Political Parties o f the Middle East, 603-604.
a wider scope to understand this traditional tendency among the 
Kurds and Alevis in a 'globalizing period' see, Günter Seufert, "Between 
Religion and lithnicity: a Kurdish-Alevi Tribe in Globalizing. Istanbul", in 
Politics in the Third Turkish Republic Ayşe Öncü and Petra Weyland (ed).
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Regarding GUrkan's approach it can be said that Karayalçm's Manifesto even 
though has provoked a debate and been criticised by various groups as a sliii t towards 
right in the party, doubtless, goes beyond the existing party programme, especially 
with its first pai t, accepted and ratified in the Extraordinary Congress held in April, 3- 
4, 1993.2'<’ As this first part analysed and discussed deeply in the previous chapter 
here suffice is to say that it tries to move the party back to its origins and link it with its 
Iraditioiial epistemology. On the other hand, the Karayalçm Manifesto shows a will, as 
has been mentioned before, under the influence of globalisation, of shift to a new 
basis on which social democracy, as an ideology is situated with a more liberal 
mentality, together with the ambition of breaking iLs bureaucratic, centralist, cliti.st and 
statist structural aspects. It should also be stated that this Manifesto might be taken as 
the second step, after Baykal's movement in the party, in the line of renovating the 
ideology. Nevertheless, the two developments, reestablishment of RPP and the nco- 
nalionalist movement seen both on the centre right and left politics in the 1993 
elections, have brought this opening to a halt with the coupe de grace : the merging of 
SDPP with RPP, which will be analysed in the next chapter.
7.6.3 Aftermath of the Congress and transition to 1995- 
¡998 Period
Although in the election Karayalçm became the chairperson of SDPP defeating 
Giirkan, his position was far from a comfort in the party. As he was not a member of 
the parliamentary, after being elected as the chairperson he could not become the head
Space, Culture and Power: New Identities in Globalizing Cities (l,ondon: Zed 
Books, 1997), 157-176.
Program- Nisan 1993 (Ankara: n.p., 1993).
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of the parliament group of the party. Gtirkan, his rival was elected to this post for, 
also in the party council the pro-GUrkan members were enrolled to a signil'icant 
mimbcr.2" On the other hand, the centre-left was occupied by three parties, the DLl  ^
of Ecevit, the re-established RPP and SDPP. This condition, creating a kind of 
distrust and ambiguity among the electorates gave birth to a devastating consequence 
in the local elections of 1994. In the elections held by October 27, 1994, SDPP got 
only the 13.6% of the votes which showed a sharp decline even when comjxircd to the 
already declined 20.8% of the 1991 general elections.2'2
The explanations to this negative condition arc, i) the existence of three 
dil fcrcnt parties addressing the same group of electorates, ii) the corruption problem 
(hat had been raised esjjccially in the Uxal administrations controlled by the SDPP 
politicians. This condition was of a vital importance for the SDPP candidates. In 
Istanbul, the candidate for the Greater Municipality of Istanbul, ZUlftl Livancli, a 
renown pop music singer, even asked the resignation of the Istanbul Town 
Chairperson of SDPP, with the allegation that his name is involved in the corruption 
debate, which caused much of a trouble in the party.2i3 Especially in Istanbul this 
circumstance clearly helped the WP candidate to win the elections which, together with
Jo Karayalçın's decision to make the I’arly Council list 
together with Cürkan, in the .second day of the Congress. As a result some 
supporters of Giirkan, were elected as the members of the Party Council. 
This has been considered, since the beginning, as a leading mistake. For a 
severe critique see, Cezmi Kartay, Siyusal, 374.
212i)evlet İstatistik Enstitüsü, 27 İlkim 1994 Yerel Seçim Sonuçlan (Ankara: 
Başbakanlık Basımevi, 1995).
21 A lthough the Chairperson, Yüksel Çengel first resisted to this demand, 
and than took a leave of absance, in the end, resigned from his post, 
"/.ülfü'nün Dediği Oldu", Milliyet, (March 14, 1993), 14.
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the similar result obtained in Ankara, brought a new dimension to the Turkish political 
life.
Merc, especially corniption could be taken as one of the most intriguing issues 
giving another descriptive charaeteristic of Turkish social dcmcxracy. The basic reason 
behind the condition is usually determined as the elientalistic structure of the party 
politics.214 Beyond the other phenomenal reasons, it eould be said that the main 
condition feeding the eorruptive structure of politics in the SDPP in the 1989-1994 
period depends on a few constitutive elements which might also be taken as the issues 
both determining the macro policies of this political wing as well as imposing the 
necessary preconditions of failure in the process of ideological renewal.
The reasons might be presented as i) the centre-periphery relations,2>5 ii) the 
development of the scx:iological structure in the urban space,2'^> iii) the strength and 
power o( the central government in Turkey, iv) the structural aspects o( the party 
politics in Turkey. These eonditions in the first half of the 1990s has a twofold effect 
on SDPP. 1'he first shows the new structural peculiarities of the party, shifting from 
an elitist model to an uncontrolled grassroots dominance usually backed by the 
delegate system used in the intra-party conflicts; second, the inadequacy of the party in 
reshaping and controlling this evolution which is also another indicator ol how the
214y\yşg Güneş-Ayata, "Roots and Trends of Clientelism in 'I'urkey," in I,uis 
Roniger and Ay.şe Güneş-Ayata (ed). Democracy, CUentclism, and Civil 
Society (Rouldcr, London: Lynne Rienncr Publishers, 1994), 00,
21‘^ lbid., 49 -.S2.
^'^’ Lhis condition is of importance not only for the ignorance of the social 
democratic parties but also in discussing the development of the political 
Islam in I'urkey. Among the vast literature sec, »Sema Lrder, Ümraniye: 
isianhul'a liir Kent Kondu (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınlan, 1997).
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parly politics failed in perceiving the social transformation. With all these features the 
aflcrinalh of the \994 elections is the dissolving of the SDPP and merging with RPP. 
The results obtained in the 1995 elections shows both the end of the process of 
ideological renovation and, the end of the first period of the impact of globalization in 
Turkey. This second condition is identified by the reaction of social democracy in 
Turkey to the concepts raised by the parties of the periphery at large.
Conclusion
As might have been observed from the analysis of the three different 
approaches there was a keen tendency in the first half of the 1990s for the 
reconstruction ol a new scx:ial democratic framework and agenda and this was due to 
nothing but the transformation that was lived in the late 1990s. However the effort did 
not surpass the given limits, boundaries and constraints of existing social democratic 
epistemology in Turkey. This might be followed from the decline in the vole 
percentages obtained in the elections which was another raison d'être for the initiation 
of this unachieved search. In this context the problem turns to the questioning of the 
inadequacy and the shortcomings of these approaches.
One of the basic assumptions related with this negative condition has already 
been .set as all programmes' attachment to Kemalism as an ideal. 7'his is a boundary 
which encompasses various different concepts none of them enabling Turkish social 
democracy to draw out a transformation profile for it immediately recalls for a 
cognitive structure based on tradition, idealism and a notion of transformative
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politics.217 xhe intrinsic line of transformative politics stretching between Marx and 
Weber not only intervene and demarcate the limits of politics of modernity but also 
bring out the necessary conditions for transformative politics. This notion, as Butler 
argues, stems basically from the tension that comes out as a consequence of 
deliberation on the condition of human kind situated between the notions of causality 
and ncccssity.2'^ As a matter of fact, one another consequence of this circumstance is 
the unilateral human condition as being the object of the external world. Human being 
as an object of transformation, i.e. object of the external world recognises him as a 
dependent variable on condition that the transformation of the outer world is capable of 
liansibrniing the human being. A belief embedded in mcxlernity of which socialism is 
a part.2i‘^
Butler, making an important remark suggests that ".scx^ ialist practice...has most 
commonly been characterised by transformative politics, taking both external and 
internal subjective perspectives to their limits and then juxtaposing thcm.''22t> But he 
al.so affirms that "socialism is just one kind of transformative politics."22i in this 
context, Butler proposes that.
a discu.ssion of transformative politics in general Craig Calhoun, 
Criliciil Sochil Theory: Culture, History and the Challenge oT DHTerence 
(Oxford UK, Cambridge USA: Blackwell, 1995).
Anthony Butler, Transformative Politics: The Future o f Socialism in 
Western Furope (London: St. Martin's Press, 1995), 6-15.
219i>ctcr Murphy, "Socialism and Democracy", in P. Beilharz, G. Robinson 
and J. Rundall, Between, 12-31; Peter Beilharz, "The life and 'limes of 
Social Democracy", in op. cit., 54-68.
^^^^Butler, Transformative, 9.
^^'ibid., 9.
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a conception of transformative agency involves at least the following 
features. Firstly, it requires a deliberative depiction of our present scx^ ial 
setting in a detached and distanced manner: it claims 'objectivity' in its 
portrayal of the social order as a state of affairs or course of 
events...Secondly, transformative agency implies acting to change this 
pre-existing state of affairs or course of events.222
This foundation hides two important aspects of the transformative politics. The 
first one is the importance of ideology in its most wide abstract meaning, more attuned 
to a Marxist discourse and the second, the agents of transformation whether it be the 
state, the classes and the objective conditions at largc.223 11 is at this intersection that 
appears the constraints of the Turkish social democracy. It is possible to say that there 
arc a few basic conditions paving the way to this end. The first one is, as both 
Karayalçm approach and RPP intention delimits, the mcxlcrnist understanding of 
politics per se. This is reducing politics to a kind of functionalism, which is nothing 
but the instrumentalisation of the politics. This condition disables the Turkish social 
democracy to develop an ideological framework for when politics is instrumentaliscd 
the necessity of surpassing the given boundaries of the existing ideology is not 
conceived. The .second, even though there is still the loose-knitted will of a 
transformative politics as long as the construction of the policies is considered yet an 
important component of this understanding is lacking, i. e the social agents to be relied 
upon. The third, none of the programmes acclaim an identified ideological framework 
other than the mainstream approach of modernity indirectly imposing both the 
epistemological and the methodological limits of sœial demœratic politics.
222|1-,k 1., 9 -10.
223i(enneth Minogue, "Ideology After the Collapse of Communism," in 
Aleksandras Shtromas, The End, 10.
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This very last point together with tlie first one might be taken as the basie 
element in discussing the crisis of Turkish social democracy for, it, priinordially, 
starts by the acceptance of the existing conditions in the Turkish political realm, to 
state a few, the centralisation of the state and the objeclivization of the individual in an 
age when the globalization and the post-modernist calls for fragmentation and the 
redefinition of the identity.224 This eondition is an outcome of the contrary position 
taken against the hypothesis supplemented by Butler. According to him "the relation 
between a posited position agent and its setting is a cognitive and cultural construction, 
not a given ontological fact."225 Whereas all shortcomings of Turkish social 
democracy originates from the precondition .set by the existing tradition which is also 
as an ontological fact which fetters going further, as long as Turkish .social democracy 
is considered.
224jonathan Friedman, "Global Systems, Globalization and the Parameters 
of Modernity", in Mike Featherstone, Scott la.sh, and Roland Robert.son 
(ed), Glohiil Modernities (London: Sage Publications, 199.S), 69-90.
2253ut)er, I'ransformative, 143.
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CHAPTER VIII
RETURNING TO THE ORIGINS 
SOCIAL DEMOCRACY IN THE 1994-1998 PERIOD
8.1. The Practice of the Late 1990s
8 .7.7 The Foundation of the Crisis
The late 1990s is the period in which the crisis of Turkish social democracy 
has reached its peak. In the 1995 general elections the re-established RPP after its 
merging a short while ago with SDPP was able to get only 10. 7 % of (he voles. This 
was a result which gave the RPP the narrow chance of passing the national threshold 
of 10 %, being the worst result ever achieved in the history of any party identifying 
itself with social democracy.* This result was also of a considerable importance 
because it had been achieved after SDPP's merging with the RPP and RPP going back 
to its traditional ideology with its discourse and syml^ls. In a scn.se it was the reaction 
of the electorate to the ideology.
İDLP of Bülent Pcevit had obtained worse results before. Nevertheless 
licevit dearly  defined his party as a 'democratic left' party, divStincialing 
and isolating it from social democracy.
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The reestablishment of the RPP, the dissolving of SDPP and the merger with 
RI’P, llic rejuvenation of the traditional origins clearly demarcates a break with the 
attempts of renovating the existing social democratic ideology under the influence of 
developments such as post modernism and globaliziUion. Whereas the gist of these 
new developments lies on the problematization of the relationship between the subject, 
the society and the state, with a specific reflection on the conditions of the loaxl and the 
international, with a keen consideration on capital and technology, on the contrary, in 
Turkey, the time pericxl under discussion is characterised with an emphasis put on the 
'strong state', the refusal of the demands raised as a consequence ol' new politics of 
identity, ethnicity and diversity. Indeed this framework might be conceived as the 
ignoiancc ol the new comprehension of dcmocicxcy build up on the concept of 
dilTercncc at large and, it is at this point that the Turkish sœial democracy takes once 
more a sui generis position before the new advancements.
The Turkish stKial democracy, when its origins and its initial intuition is 
remembered might be taken as the constitutive incentive of modernisation. In this 
context, the Turkish social democratic crisis which reached an upheaval in the late 
lS)9()s could also be conceived as a clash between the insistence on the conservation of 
the structured aspects of modernisation, specifically together with its national, statist 
and secular components and the deconstruction of this framework. Included in this 
process is the notion of republic. Republic, in Turkey could be defined as the 
sovcicignty of the state over the .society. In a period when endeavours are directed 
toward the reconstitution of a civil .society and governance, the surpassing of the 
organi.sed centralist state, this very notion and practice of republic.has also been 
exposed to criticism. In this procedure included is the call for demcx:racy which 
intends to embed the liberalisation of the republican epistemology as well. No doubt
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that this frame of reference is backed by the new developments observed in the s(x;ial 
and economic structure of Turkey. I ’his new foundation has initialed new social 
reference groups if not new serial classes and, both the traditional understanding atid 
configuration of the labour class has undergone a deep transformation.
'I'urkisit social democracy, not aware of these new elements of change, has 
entered the second half of the 1990s with the dissolving of SDPP in RPP and the 1995 
general election has been the significant indicator displaying the disconnection between 
the 'new limes', 'new politics' and the social democracy. This outline is also 
connected with another specificity of Turkish social democracy which might be 
lomnilalcd as the tii.sjuncluic. Turkish s(K:ial democracy, mainly Ix'causc of not having 
been emanated from the tradition of West European socialism, has always been a self- 
closed system and has never been aware of the changes coming out in that realm. In 
this conlexl the current movements came fore in the European .social democracy aflci 
1968, the formation of New Left and Eurocommunism, has completely no effect on 
the 'rurkish .social democracy either as an ontological reality or an epistemological- 
ideological opening.
In the same line with the previous experience, it eould be said that, this |X)lilical 
movement, as could be deduced from the analysis of the results obtained in the 
elections, has lost the chance of ideological renovation founded on the new 
understanding of politics as a consequence of globalisation in the 1990s. The 1995 
election shows clearly the unresponsivene.ss of RPP to the new expectations. This is 
mainly the epistemological constraint of social democracy in Turkey crysUilliscd in the 
politics of RPP. With this regard two points might be accentuated; the first, the 
dissolving of SDPP in the RPP is due to the domineering pt)wer of the constitutive
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ideology of republicanism convoluted with the nation state, as the foundation of 
'I'liikish political modernity, second, the crisis of the RPP in the 1995 cicelions is 
actually the crisis of the state-ideology, i.e. the crisis of Turkish modernity, whose 
ramifications arc still observable.
Under these assumptions the paralysing crisis of the 1990s is the legitimacy 
crisis ol the nation-state in which social democracy was a dependent variable but could 
not get out ol it due to its ideological inadequacy as well as its symbotic relationship 
with the state. This framework needs a further analysis focused on the nation-state 
problem. The other components but especially tho.se identified with the upsurge of 
political Islam should also be aniysed with a specific attempt. However, in order to 
understand the aspects and the structure of the crisis first a brief survey of the merging 
of the two parties is neee.ssary. This should be taken as a basis that would enable us to 
concentrate on the issues qualitatively coexisting with what has been eharacterised as 
the crisis of the nation-state.
8.2. Merger of SDPP and RPP
The process of the merging of the SDPP and the RPP has been a long and 
tiresome process. The will to unite the parties involved in the social democratic politics 
has been one of the leading issues observed on all platforms in the early 1990s. 
During the process of restablishment of the RPP the basic argument of both sides were 
nothing but to unite all parties situated on the left wing politics. Nevertheless the 
model proposed by Baykal and Tiincer, as has been discussed in the previous chapter, 
was different from each other. Baykal's insistance was to have a "strong and powerful 
RPP" that would create a center of attraction whereas the other camp was suggesting 
that RPP should dissolve itself in the SDPP but the latter get the name of the I'irst.
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In llic pcricxl when Baykal gained the leadership of the RPP, the loaded agenda 
of Turkey's political life, including the death of Özal and Demirel's election as the 
president of Turkey, TPP's choosing Tansu Çiller as the chairperson, İnönü's 
declaration of not going to be a candidate for the leadership of the SDPP and, last, 
Kaıayalçın's becoming the head of the SDPP, did not let any one of the parties to raise 
and discuss the issue in depth. Immediately after Karayalçm's election, SDPP Party 
Council declared that it has reached the final decision of 'unification on the le ft.T h is  
was followed by Baykal's letter to Karayalçm defining the necessary conditions and 
criteria for the merger.^ Karayalçm's answer to this letter was more concentrating on 
(Ik· l('cliMÍ< al aspeéis of (he |)roeess. ’^
When this process and other declarations of the spokesmen of the two parlies 
aie considered, it might be concluded that SDPP was moie reluctant for the merger or 
unification. Nevertheless two significant issues have forced the SDPP to move 
towards the RPP. The first reason behind this development is the economic policy 
package that was first inlrixluccd by the April 5. 1994.  ^After the corruption problems 
that were faced by the party, this policy package, because of its hard to digest content, 
especially for the lower income groups that were believed traditionally supporting the 
left-wing parlies, pushed the SDPP to corner and the parly grassroots started fccliiíg 
itself weakened. The second reason was the approaching interim elections. As 
Karayalçm was not a member of the parliament and, because this condition was a
2patin Dağıstanlı, Sosyal Demokratlar {Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1998), 249. 
3por a complete text of this letter, see Fatin Dağıstanlı, Sosyal, 253-257. 
^»Ibkl., 257-258.
‘'l or the details of this economic crisis see, Korkut Boratav, "İktisat 
Politikaları: 1980-1994", Yüzyıl Biterken Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türkiye 
Ansiklopedisi, V. 13, 684-685.
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matter of consequiative problems, he decided to enter the elections from Adıyaman, 
thinking that the only condition of being elected is an RPP not entering the elections 
l)iil backing (lie SDPP. 'I'hc process of merger was the best possibility for (liis plan. In 
this framework, the two parties by September 30, 1994 signed the Preliminary 
Unification Prot(x;ol.^The Final Piotocol is signed by the November 6, 1994.^
When the accelerator in the process, the partial elections, was cancelled by the 
Supreme Com I the second phase of the merger started to display an unrest between the 
parties. In this regard it was once more the SDPP that started to express an 
unwillingness. It is doubtless that this aversion was due to the already felt power of 
Baykal. According to the Protocol the two parties would, first, .separately held their 
congresses and ratify the conditions of merger and then, the delegates of lx)th parties 
coming together, would decide for the party that would di.s.solvc the other. In this 
regard it was sensed by the SDPP that due to Karayaçın's intra party weak condition 
some delegates were about to vole for the RPP. With this assumption and fear, by the 
.lanuary 28, 1995, the SDPP held its congress according to the protocol but did not 
participate in the assumed unified congress of the two parties, creating a political 
scandal. It should be mentioned here that, before the congress day, both Karayalçm 
and Baykal had declared themselves as the candidates for the leadership. The next day 
the two leaders coming together decided to postpone the process to February 18, 1995 
and select Hikmet Çetin, a prominent political!, to be the chairman of the united party 
and run for the contest in the next congress of the party.
’^Dağıstanlı, Sosyal, 271. 
7lbid., 272.
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During the process of merger, former chairman of SDPP, Erdal İnönü, 
surprisingly vvitli a cicclaralion called llie delegates to vole for the RPP; saying that his 
party, SDPP, in the post-1980 period was formed on the heritage of the RPP with the 
basic intention of reestablishing the dissolved party. İnönü also emphasised that "all 
history of the RPP with its unique summits and inevitable sufferings has been 
appropriated by the SDPP"^ and, if RPP is to become the domineering party this 
would reflect the achievement of the SDPP in its efforts. This keen devotion to the 
RPP is similarly aceentuated by Baykal as well. It was only Karayalçm to say that 
"RPP has completed its historical process"^. However, Karayalçm did not reinforce 
his argument. Besides, he felt overwhelmed before his publicum and did not resist the 
populist upsurge that backed the RPP.
As a consequenee, in the eongress held by February 18, 1995 as 1003 
delegates voted for the RPP, SDPP was supported by only 635 votes. Hikmet Çetin 
was elected as the chairperson of the RPP. In the September 9, 1995 congress Deni/, 
Baykal has once more been elected as the leader of the RPP defeating Karayalçm. In 
the his congress speech Baykal displayed a deep devotion to the historical cult of the 
RPP, whereas Karayalçm repeated^^ jjjg former 'Social Transformation Program' 
prepared for his campaign for the leadership of the SDPP in 1993. After the merger 
process is completed Baykal became the Deputy Prime minister but soon after by the 
September 20, 1995 dissolved the eoalition government. The new government was 
formed as a TPP-RPP coalition which decided to renew the general elections by the
«Ibid., 285.
‘^ Ibid., 284.
i^^llasan lîülent Kahraman, "Kurultay Konuşmalarının Çözümlemesi", Yeni 
Yüzyıl, 10 September, 1995, 1.
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December 24, 1995 which has started a totally new pericxl in Turkey's political life. 
But before discussing it, the above mentioned issues should briefly be analysed.
The first of these is the problem of corruption that had captivated the SDPP, 
wliit li has alioady been analysed in the picvious .section. Beyond (liis, the allegations 
of the SDPP leadership, significantly Karayalçm's approcali, just after being elected as 
the leader of the party that he "inherited a perfectly clean and shining party"’* was 
enhancing the already fragile and even debilitated position of the SDPP. In a period 
when the society was protesting the corruption with a call for "clean society", Baykal 
sharply rejected the SDPP past due to its dirtiness and in his congress speech asked 
lor the plea of the society’ .^ Second issue has been the nco-nationalist wave that 
started effecting the society after Tansu Çiller's election as the chairperson of the True 
Path P a rty .T h is  condition is further bolstered by the security forccs-burcaucracy 
coalition that was supported by Çiller, whose prominent names were carried to the 
parliamentary as the deputies of'fPP. The reason why Çiller backed such a coalition 
was the anti-PKK movement and the belief that only a provoked nco-nationalist 
approach would hinder the development of the Kurdish ethnic nationalist advance.
This understanding has definctely developed a nationalist sensitivity in the 
.society and the RPP as a symbol has been used wisely to match with this 
responsiveness by Baykal and his team. The last issue is that, even though the SDPP
11 "Mural Karayalçın: pırıl pırıl bir parti devraldım", Milliyet, 15 liylül
1993,1.
12'1'his was much of a reason for the discomfort of the RPP cadres. Ertuğrul 
Günay, the Secretary General of the RPP resigned from his RPP posts and 
membership after the merger of the two parlies saying that unification 
with such a 'dirty party' cannot be accepted.
13por exactly this determination Ümit Cizre Sakalhoğlu, "Doğru Yol 
partisi", Yüzyıt Biterken Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türkiye Ansiklopedisi, v. 15, 
1263.
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has qiianlilalivcly pnx:ccdcd in the prcx;ess of ideological renovation, yet the character 
of tlie program developed was ecclectic with references to the founding ideology. The 
reason feeding this condition was the reestablishment of the RPR The belief that if the 
ideological roots are emphasised the grassroots of the RPP could be motivated for 
shil ling toward SDPP did not allow the party to construct a completely new political 
ideology and culture, totally detached from the existing structure, on the reverse, 
prepared a fertile soil for the rejuvenation of the RPP discourse.
8.3. The 1995 General Elections
8.3.1. Review of the elections
Soon after Baykal dissolved the coalition government, by November 15, 1995 
the sccx)iid Çiller cabinet, the coalition between the SDPP and the TPP, is formed and 
decided to have the general elections by December 2d, 1995. 'I'he one enfolded in 1995 
has been one of the most important elections in the Republican era for a variety of 
reasons. The basic factor in this context is that, for the first time in the mentioned 
period, an Islamic party, namely Welfare Party (Refah Partisi), has come up the first 
in the ranking which has been percieved as a radical threat to one of the constitutive 
factors of the Republican ideology, secularism, which will specifically be analysed 
later. Second, the 1995 elections shows an extremely scatteied voting (xittern*'* when 
the vote percentages recieved by the parties are analysed.
Table 7; 1995 General Election Results
^^Yavuz Sabunru, Murat Şeker, "Seçimler", in Yüzyıl biterken, 1IG3.
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WP
TPP
MP
DLP
RPP
I’DI"
LP
NAP
NDM
Party
6.012.450 
5.396.009 
5.527.288 
4.118.025 
3.011.076 
1.171.623 
61.428 
2.301.343 
133.889
Vote (quantity)
(percentage)
21.4
19.2
19.6
14.6
10.7
4.2
0.2
8.2 
0.5
Vote
158
135
132
76
49
Number o f Seats
Source, Sabuncu and Şeker, 1145.
The third is.suc emanating from the election results is, as it could be seen, 
among the parties who did not pass the threshold, two of them are extremely 
important. 'I'he first one is the radical right-wing nationalist National Action Party. 
Second, even though PDP (Peoples' Democracy Parly-Halkın Demokrasi Partisi- 
HADFP), a (juasi-Kurdish parly which was the most powerful |X)lilical organi.sation in 
the South-East region of Turkey, did not pass the Ireshold, got well approximately 
27% o( the voles in the region.'-^ The figure for voles gained by this parly in the "18 
provence where more than 15 % of the population declared their mother tongue as 
Kurdish during the 1965 National Census"'^’ amounts to 19.5 %. The other parties' 
condition in the region is as followcs. •
• Sabuncu, M. Şeker, "Seçimler", 1145
1^ ’Kemal Kirişçi and Gareth M. Winrow, The Kurdish Question and Turkey: 
An Txample o f Trans-Slate Hthnic Conflict (London, Portland, Or: Irank 
Cass, 1997), 142.
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Table 8: Vole distribution in the 18 provinces and in the South Ei
Turkey
Parties Turkey 18 P r o v i n c e s  S.E.l
(%) (%)
MP 19.7 16.3 16.0
RPP 10.7 5.7 4.4
DLP 14.6 3.2 2.3
Fpp 19.2 16.2 18.3
PDF 4.2 19.5 27.0
NAP 8.2 5.8 3.8
WP 21.4 27.2 23.0
ollıeıs 1.6 2.6
independent 0.5 3.4
Source: The first two rows are adapted from Kirişçi and Winrow, the last column 
is after Sabuncu and Şeker.
One impoilant conclusion reached by the analysis of the table is that, both in 
(he 18 provinces and in the region the most |K)\vcrful party was WP, even surpassing 
the PDF'”^ and, second, the left, both DLP and RPP, was extremely weak, which is 
another indicator of the crisis faced in the 1995 elections. The issues mentioned are 
subject to further discussion below. Another issue, among the others, is the condition 
of NDM (New Democracy Movement- D e w o k r a s i  Harekeli). The party which 
was first Ibrmcd as apolitical-intellectual civilian movement, in time transformed iLsclf
•TpDP's condition is also dissected in Ümit Cizre Sakalboğlu, "24 Aralık 1995 
Alacakaranlık Kuşağı Seçimleri", in Birikim, Ocak 1996, no. 81, 26-30.
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to a party and even though it run for a 'landslide' due to its new cadres and specifically 
its liberal discourse and arguments, yet could only got 0.3% of the votes and 
dissolved itself after the elections. On the other hand, on the right, the differentiation 
of the two big parties had a serious effect on the elections. On the national level the 
voles o( the two parlies amount approximately to well 40 % which, for many, was the 
reason behind the political instability in Turkey.'^
8 .3 .2 . S oc ia l D em ocracy  an d  th e  1995 E le c tio n s
8.3.2.1 General Assumptions
After these analyses concerning the parties relying on ideologies other than 
social democracy, when referred to the two parlies, RPP and Dl.P, having 
traditionally the similar grassroots the results show remarkable changes. To 
understand the change it is conveninent to start by comparing the percentage of votes 
rccicvcd by the RPP and DLP in the last elections, namely the 1991 general, 1994 
kx;al and 1995 general elections.
Table 9: 1991- 1994-1995 Election results compared
P a r tie s 1991 (% ) 1994 (%) 1 9 9 5 (% )
R PP/SD PP 20.8* 18.2** 10.7
DM* 10.8 8.8 14.6
T o ta l 31.6 27.0 25.3
* SDPP's vote
* 'I hc total voles of SDPP( 13.6 %) and RPP (4.6 %)
Source: Official results of elections, State Institute of Statistics.
f^i-or a discuvssion of this argument see, Ibid., 26-28.
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To start with, it is necessary to focus on an issue I'irst raised by Kardam and 
'rti/iin to discuss the point whether it is meaningful and correct to comprehend llic two 
parties resting on the same ideological basis. Kardam and Tiiziin clearly bring a point 
into consideration saying that after SDPP's coalition with TPP in 1991 it is not 
meaningful to think that the traditional center right (symbolised as the Dcimx;rat Parti 
tradition) and center left (the RPP tradition) distinctions are valid and of significant 
importance. One indicator demarcating the end of this traditional polarization is that, 
according to the authors, the SDPP has come up in 1991 the third, in 1994 the fourth, 
in 1995 the fifth party in the ranking as the DLP was the fifth, the fifth and the fourth 
pai ty in the same pcricxl.^ ^^  Mote imfx)rtant than these is the ideological structure of the 
giassioots supporting the both parties. A field survey carried out in 1995 shows that 
in the period 1989-1994, 49 % of the voters turned away from the SDPP has moved 
to center right parties and this ratio is 81 % among the former DLP voters.^'
For the other part, the voters who shifted to the SDPP in the same period from 
MP, TPP, WP, NAPcumilate to7,5 % and the number rolls on to 12-13% when DLP 
is considered. In another survey, as among the RPP voters, those who prefer DLP as 
the second choice is the 41 % of the whole body and, on the other hand, the number 
among the DLP voters for those who consider RPP as the second choice is 13 
The most striking conclusion is that, for the 45 % of the DLP voters, the second 
choice is the parties such as MP, TPP, RP or NAP, as a loose knitted common
1‘M hmel Kardam, Sezgin I’üzün, Türkiye'de Siyasi Kutuplaşmalar ve 
Seçmen ¡davranışları (Ankara: Veri Araştırma, 1998), 57-59.
^dibitl., 58.
rÜSliS', lürkiyc'üc Siyasi Tarlilerin Seçmenleri ve Sosyal Demokrasi 
Tabanı (Ankara: TÜSHS, 1995), 32-34; Ibid., 58
^^ rOSIİS, lürkiyc'de Siyasi Parti Seçmenlerinin Nitelikleri, Kimlikleri ve 
liğilimleri (Ankara: luses, 1996), 166; Ibid., 58.
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denominator, the parties of the right. 3^ This data shows that although the RPP 
chaiaclcriscs itself as a social democratic party, and considers the DLP as a tacit and 
distant ally on the same political wing, still, proven empirically that, the latter is totally 
different than the first one. This is consistent with Ecevit's arguments that DLP is a 
party which is not a 'social democratic' but a 'democratic left' one, having its origins 
found not in the universal social democracy but in the national past, as analysed 
previously. This condition might also be understood when (he manifesto of the RPP is 
criticised.
8.3.2.2. The Ideological Approach of the RPP in the
¡995 Elections
Bcibre the elections, the RPP published two documents declaring its luturc 
policies and giving an overall view of its ideological standing. The first of these is the 
'oliicial' Manifesto“'* and the second one is a brochure named, "New Lcit in the 
World, New RPP in Turkey."25 Whereas the first one is a more policy decleration the 
second one is an attempt to ground the concept of 'new left' and in this context it is 
more an ideological document. In both of the dcx;uments the emphasis is put on the 
concept of transformation, i.e. change. Especially in the first document there are 20 
goals .set by the party to desgnate the axis of transforming the .society.
The rhetoric encapsulating the concrete goals is in coherence with the 
traditional and nuxJcrnist notion ol change which has been accentuated by the RPP all 
through its history. In this context there is a continious reference to its past and what
23|bid., 1 Of).
^"*Cumhuriyet llalk Partisi, 1995 Seçim Bildirgesi: Türkiye’y i Çağdaş 
Dünyaya Biz Taşıyacağız, (Ankara (?), n.p., 1995).
Dünyada Yeni Sol, Türkiye’de Yeni СИР. Pamphlete with n.p, n.d.
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il lı.ıs Insloı ically aclıicvcd, i.c. Ihc cslablishnıcnl of Ihc Republic, İliç luılionalisl will 
behind il, the process of catching the age, in short situating the RPP as the "pioneer of 
the c h a n g e .S o o n  the policy declaration document turns to be a speculation on the 
differences between the right and the RPP and basically two issues arc di.scusscd.
The first one is the fundamentalism, clearly connected with violcnce^^ and the 
second is the concept of 'dirty society,' the corruption p ro b le m .T h e  last 
introductory argument of the document is the 'rightist' policies, without going deep 
into the details and without purporting a concrete evidence for the criticism 
dcvclopcd.29 The goals inserted into this framework might be categorised in two main 
groups; Ihc first is those issues related with the restructuring of the stale and the new 
understanding of dcm(X)racy and those issues related with the concept of rights. The 
second category encircles more practical matters, including the welfare stale. Those 
fall ink) the first part of the first category have been identified as, Ihc 
"institutionalization of the democracy and the stale of law^^, secularism,3i the 
ciadicalion of Ihc dirtiness in politics and adminslralion"^“. 'fhe second part holding 
on the rights adresses to equality of men and women^^ and also argues that the party 
"will bring a democratic solution to ethnic sensibilities and will solve the Kurdish 
question."’ ' 'I’hc welfare stale question is debated by .saying that it "will be
2f»/99.5, p.4, .5, 6. 
27ibid., 4, 7, 8. 
2«2, .S.
2‘)|bid., 7. 
30ibid., 11, 
^'ibid., K).
■Î2 Ibid., 18. 
- -^^ Ibid., 23. 
■^ I^bid., 17.
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realised"·^ ·'’, "Ihc work life will be democratized''^^» and "everybody will be supplied 
by a qiilificd health service."37 The policy matters are explained by saying "an active 
econotnic substructure which will produce stability and bring the justice of sharing 
will be prcpared"3iî. The other issues related with the economic life arc more 
demagwial rather than resting on concrete and detailed basis.3‘^
The second document, more an effort of constructing an ideological 
framework, seems to be inspired by the developments occured in various social 
democratic parties of Western Europe and this point is emphasised by Baykal himself, 
in the brochure, saying that he personally has observed t h e m. Th e  pamphlet frames 
these developments with technological revolution and according to Baykal, the 
repercussion of this phenomenon is the contradiction between the right and the left. 
I'or the led "what is to be done is trying to understand what is hap|x;ning, trying to 
control them if not trying to find ways of living with them.""’· However, as long as 
the necessity for the restructuring of the state is considered, there is no contradiction 
between the wings, i.e. the left and the right. The clash is on the methodology for, the 
tree market economy is clearly accepted with some minor modifications. They arc "i) 
the democratic state and ii) the active s t a t e . T h e  democratization of the state in 
Turkey necessitates the protection of the achievements of the Republic and the
;^5ibid., 25-20 
3h|bid., 19-20 
■^ 7ibid., 27-28.
-^«Ibid., 31.
'^9'rhese include the "restructuring of the industr)» and technology", "the 
realisation of the substructure taht will carry Turkey to the 2000s", and 
the "dissolving of the unequality between the regions."
40ounyac/a, 2.
^l|bid., 3.
^^Ibid., 4.
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ticmocrncy sİKMilcl rely on "pluralism, participalioii, accountability."^’^  In this context 
llic aclministralion as a mechanism needs to be reconsidered and the consct|Ucnce 
should be the restructuring from the bottom not from the above which would be 
conducive to decentralization and the improvement of the local administrations.^’^’
This point is of pai licular importance lor, the brochuic argues that (his (ype ol 
organisation would solve the basic problems and shortcomings of the demcx:racy. In 
this context what is emphasised is the polarization provoked in the .society between 
such opposing groups as Turkish-Kurdish, Alevi-Sunni, Muslims-Seculars.^-''If a 
more democratic and participative mcxiel is established this would stop the shedding of 
blood in the South East region of Turkey and fulfill the ex|x;ctations and demands of 
the Alevis."’'’ It is interesting that, in the brochure this part seems to be argued by Seyfi 
Oktay, an Alevi leader and who was involved long time in the center left politics. In 
the same line the localization of democracy and the relations with the civil .society 
organisations is encouraged in the document.
On the other hand, in the .second part of this dœument, which tries to deliniate 
the contours of a new state understanding, the 'active state' concept is aigued and it is 
confirmed that it is not a 'minimal state' but a 'prcxluctivc and efficient one.*'”’ On this 
basis it is cmphasi.scd for many times that the RPP is not against the piivatisalion but it 
runs for the reconceptuali.sation of it which concentrates on such points as, investing 
on the sectors producing high technology which can not be achieved through private
43ibid., 5. 
44ibid., 6-7. 
’^'’Ibicl., «. 
^f'lbid., 8.
47 Ibid., 9. 
48|bid., I 1.
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sector, securing the social rights of the workers, not leaving the health and education 
facilites to private sector.'*^ In this context the social security system should be 
perpetuated atid the crisis the system faces should be solved.·*’^’The most important 
pai t of the dœumentis the comparison between the Welfare Party and the RPP.
After restating that the idiosyncrasy of the RPP which brings out its distinction 
iioiTi the other parties is the 'new social model' it proposes it is emphasised that in this 
line only WP is comparible to the RPP for, even though there are inadequacies found, 
yet it is only this party that offers a social model as 'Just Order.'-'’' In this context RPP 
replaces itself as diametrically opposite to the WP presenting itself as the only 
alternative to their mcxlel, which, the brochure implicitly expresses that, the society 
would move towards it due to the lack of any reliable and concrete mode l . Th i s  
framework which brings out the necessary conditions to make a further analysis on i) 
the correlation between the arguments defended in the documents regarding especially 
the social grassroots basis of the RPP and the concrete results achieved and, ii) the 
assumptions regarding the new ideological aspects and their impact on the s(x;icty.
8.3.2.3. The Structural Aspects of the Elections for the Social 
D e m o c r a c y
When the documents published before the elections are analysed a point related 
with the expectations of the RPP is precisely observed: the RPP has believed that its 
traditional support groups, mainly the Alevis, the Kurds and the low income gioups 
would support the party. This supposition is further backed and eiihenccd by the
^f'>lbid., 12. 
•‘^ 'Mbid., 12. 
i’ I Ibid., 13. 
-“^ ^ibid., 13.
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expectations directed to youth and the women. Nevertheless the results and post- 
clcclioii analysis concerning tlic RPP grassroots and substruclnrc sometimes show 
dilTcrcnccs with these assumptions which might be taken as one of the leading reasons 
and the signifiers of the crisis that RPP has faced. This is the question of the changing 
structure and characteristics of the grassroots politics in Turkey, linked with the 
emergence of tiew social groups and the demands bound to them. It is not only the 
RPP bill all eenlei-parties have been effeeleil by these new developments (oi it 
provokes the raising of new political practices, such as the politieization of Islam or in 
general the shift towards radical politics.^^
The main rca.son of the failure then turns to be the inadequacy of the RPF’ to 
observe and receive the massive change and to satifsy the needs of the new emerging 
groups. Wheieas the 1977 succ-sess of the democratic left politics have been ba,scd on 
the coalc.scence of the party and the radical expectations in the srx i^ety crystallised with 
the motto of 'toward bright days'^^ together with the call for a 'system's change'-'’-“’, 
the 1S>95 elections is marked by the above mentioned condition-'*^ ’, i.e. paralyses. Also, 
as will be shown below, the RPP in the late 1990s turned out to be a marginalised 
party rather than a mass party rallying to encompass the possible largest segment of 
the electorates. The question is definately related with the changing structure of the 
politics and the .social conditions and, has not only been significant for Tui kcy. The
 ^file coiKİitioııs of the radicalization of the politics have already been 
mentioned in the previous chapter.
has already been anal}cscd in the previous chapters this motto has 
also been carried out as the name of the 1973 lilection Manifesto of the 
RPl’: Ak Günlere: CUP 1973 Seçim Bildirgesi (Ankara: Ajans Türk 
Matbaacılık Sanayii, 1973).
This is also the name of the book by Bülent Pcevit, Bu IXiycn Değişmelidir 
(Ankara; Ulusal Basımevi, 1968),
-'’ ’^brdoğan Yıldız, "CHP ve DSP: Sosyal Demokrasinin 'Belirsizlik' Sorunu", 
in Birikim, Ocak 1996, no. 81, 43-45.
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changing nature of the social democratic parties and the process of adjustment to the 
special needs ol' tlic |x;riod which emerged in the post-CoId-War era lias been one of 
the main issues in the current debates.-“’^  The specific conditions of Turkey is lurlher 
analysed below. But it should be noted that as the first party in the ranking in the 1995 
elections has been the WP, the analysis takes this condition into consideration and 
comparisons are made between these two parties, i.e. RPP and the WP.
According to a survey carried out in the year 1996, the RPP comes the last in 
the ranking as it has the least amount of suburban based supporters.-“'^ The age 
average of the supporters is 37 and the RPP is again the last in the ranking as the 21- 
2d age giouj) is considered 'I'his is a diametrically op|)osilc condition with rcs|)ect to 
NAP. RPP, having the majority of its supporters on the 25-39 age group is similar to 
DLP.“'  ^As education is considered the WP comes the last according to the pcritxl of 
education as the RPP comes second in the ranking after, interestingly, NAP including 
the supporters having the longest period of education. Also RPP is the party having 
the majoi ity of lho.se who has a higher education graduat ion.One of the left wing 
parties, DLP, comes second, after the first ranked NAP by having the least womens' 
representation (19%) as RPP has only 43.5 % women supporters after the first Anap 
(59.9% ).^ >' A more important issue, the ranking of the supporters according to their 
job groups is given in the below table.
57|'or details of different approaches see Gavin Bowd, '"C’est la lutte 
initiale': Steps in the Realignment of the French Left", in New ¡.eft 
Review, no. 206, 1994, 71-85; Jane Jenson, Rianne Mahon, "Representing 
Solidarity: Class, Gender and the Crisis in Social Democratic Sweden", in 
New Left Review, no. 201, 1993, 76-100.
fiises, Türkiye'de Siyasi Parti Seçmenlerinin Nitelikleri, Kimlikleri ve 
/;g///nı/en (Ankara: n.p., 1996), 106.
-‘59ibid., 108. 
h O l b i d . ,  1 1 0 .  
hllbid., 110-111.
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Table 10: Party supporters according to their job groups
n i n e w h i l e traclesnie s m a l l b u s i n e s s h o u s e n i im .  o f  
s i ih j c e l
I ’a i l y coll .-n c o l l a r n farmer m e n w i f e O th er l o l . i l
WP 18.8 2.4 16.4 37.4 2.1 19.9 3.0 1(X) 532
MP 15.1 6.1 12.0 29.8 2.8 31.4 2.8 100 392
TPP 12.1 6.3 9.8 35.2 4.1 30.2 2.2. 100 315
DLP 24.4 5.1 14.4 18.6 6.7 29.2 1.6 100 312
RPP 22.1 10.7 16.8 18.3 6.9 23.7 1.5 100 131
NAP 28.7 4.1 23.0 23.8 5.7 7.4 7.4 100 122
PDP 20.4 2.0 10.2 38.8 8.2 14.3 6.1 1(X) 49
other 18.6 4.7 32.6 18.6 11.6 4.7 9.3 l(X) 43
none 14.9 6.1 19.5 21.3 5.5 30.9 1.7 l(X) 343
n o 15.3 2.5 8.3 41.4 3.2 26.8 2.5 100 157
a n s w e r
total 17.9 5.0 15.0 29.3 4.4 25.5 2.8 100 2396
Source, TUSES, 1996.
The analysis of this table brings some interesting conclusions out. As has 
already been indicated in the previous chapters RPP comes as the party of white 
collars, small tradesmen and the businessmen. On the other hand DLP is significantly 
the party of white collars and small farmers together with the housewives, whereas the 
WP is also dominated by the small farmers. I'he second important indicator is the 
social slralification in the urban space and the table is below.
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Table 11: Urban Party Siipportors According to Social Stratification
number of
upper lower subjects
parties middle middle middle lower toUil
WP 5.0 22.5 43.8 28.8 l(X) 240
MP 10.8 27.4 40.1 21.7 100 212
TPP 14.1 25.6 41.7 18.6 100 156
DLP 9.4 26.4 42.0 22.2 100 212
RPP 18.4 21.1 38.2 22.4 100 76
NAP 7.9 34.9 39.7 17.5 100 63
PDP - 38.1 33.3 28.6 l(X) 21
ariiE R 27.6 34.5 34.5 3.4 100 29
NONL 17.8 18.3 41.6 22.4 100 219
NO
ANSWliR 5.7 18.6 42.9 32.9 1(X) 70
TOTAL 11.3 24.4 41.3 23.0 l(X) 1298
Source, TUSES, 1996
The interpretation of this table also presents interesting results and the RPP 
appears as the party of upper middle classes with least representation of the lower 
middle and middle classes whereas WP is significantly the party of lower classes 
together with the DLP. The last issue that would be analysed is the structure of the 
supporters on the ethnic-religious identities base and only five parties will be taken 
into consideration for the others do not vary significantly on this condition.
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Parlies 
WP 
Dl .1’ 
KM’
Alevi 
3.2 
11.« 
.VI. 1^
PDP 3.2
Source, TÜSrS, 1996, 117.
(Ihi^  to their ethnic-religions iden tit ie.s
Kurdish Other Total
28.8 22.3 22.2
6.8 13.8 13.0
d.2 d..t s .s
17.4 0.2 1.8
It is clear from the above table that RPP comes out as an Alevi party and one 
interesting condition is that they arc not represented remarkably in the PDP; which is 
an answer to usually alleged condition that some major Kurdish tribes have Alevi 
origins and show different social behaviour than the o t h e r s . Second but most 
significant point is that WP comes out as the party having the leading majority of the 
Kurds even surpassing the PDP.^ -^  From the view point of RPP the interesting issue is 
the rcprcscnlalion ratio of Kurds in this party which is apparently small, even falling 
behind the center right parlies, as this figure rolls on to 9.7% for MP and 9.3% for 
TPP.
3'his is one of the most important condition that determines the result that RPP 
obtained in the South East region of Turkey and is further analysed below. It should 
be noted that DLP rcprc.scnts both of the groups with lower rates as compared to the 
three parlies. This framework conveys us to conclude that the profile of RPP, 
according to the results, is that, it is the party, of i) upper middle class and middle
Heysanoglu, Kürt Aşircücn Ihikkindii Sosyolojik Tetkikler (l.stanbul: 
Sosyal Yayınları, 1992).
’^3 I bis conclition needs analysis which is left to the following sections.
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class; ii) urban space; iii) white collars, iv) Alevis and v) middle aged groups. On the 
other hand the other democratic left party is a party for i) lower middle class; ii) urban 
space iii) blue collars and housewives; iv) middle age and upper middle age groups. 
'I’hc ideological structure of the sœial demœracy is dwelled on these catcgi)i ics.
8.3.2.4. Some More Ideological Aspects of Social
Democracy around the 1995 Elections
The ideological aspects that determine the grassroots behaviour have also been 
analysed in various surveys and one of the most interesting results obtained is that in 
both of the center-left parties a well percentage of the sympathisers (in RPP 22.1% 
and in DLP 29.8%) define themselves neither leftist nor rightist which might be 
conceived as an ideological ambiguity if not an ideological vacuum.<>4 On the other 
hand in RPP 62.6 % qualifies themselves as leftist but in DLP this figure drops to 
47.4% and approximately 10 % of the grassioots define themselves as rightist. One 
another indicator which links especially the serial democratic party supporters to their 
parties is the notion of 'exploitation and oppression' which is believed a ccMiccpt 
having a traditional function and articulation power for the centre-left parties. On this 
basis the survey determines interesting results as below.
Tnble 13: Who nre the exploited and oppressed?
wage earners 62.2 %
woikcrs 52.3
state officers 30.6
other 7.1
64TÜS11S, Türkiye'de, 118.
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peasants
poors,middle elass, people
unemployed
small tradesmen
kurds
women
Alevis
other
total
lunnher t)l subjects 
Source, TUSES, ¡996, 63.
23.8 
22.0
6.0
5.7
0.9
0.6
0.1
3.5
124.8 
2164
The table clarifies that the exploited and oppressed sectors aie identified with 
wage earners and peasants but women, Kurds and Alevis do not bring out a figure 
which is worth di.scussing. This is a situation negating the belief of the social 
deinociatic parties. One another question which tries to understand who sees whom as 
(he op|uesscd and exploited gives out a meaningful result, 'fhose who define 
themselves as 'leltist' with 74.2% considers that this group includes the wage earners. 
But this figure is 57.7 % among the 'rightists', which is a condition showing that 
workers and state officers has a gravity on the grassroots of all parties. On the other 
hand, when surveyed, it becomes clear that supporters of a good number of parties do 
not believe that there are parties to solve the problems of 'exploited and oppressed.'
Tabic 14: Are there any parties to defend the rights of exploited and oppressed?
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WP 
l>l P  
Kl'l>
PDP
Source, TUSES, 199«, 127
Sii|)|)oi(r(l I ’¡lilies
Yes No No idea
41 41.8 17.2
43.4 41.8 14.8
d.L4 47..3
77.3 22.7
From Ihe answers given lo another question it is understood that the leftist 
parly grassroots have more faitli in tlicir parties in the prewess of solving Ihc problems 
of the above mentioned group. 47.3% of the subjccLs identified left more prone to the 
achievement of the task with respeet to 11.6 % of tho.se on (he right. Those who 
presume left would defend the rights show an intersting outcome when the group is 
dissected in itself. Only 12.5 % determines the RPP while DLP is nominated by 3 3 .1 
% of the subjects.
One of the questions tries to determine the most important public problem. The 
answers given to this question have changed over years. When in Ihe survey of 
199366 ihc subjects are asked a question on how do they see Turkey's position with 
respect to three year ago an overwhelming majority of the SDPP (59.0 %), DLP 
(74.1%) and RPP (67.3) gave negative answers clarifying that it is wor.se. In this 
context, in the same survey, the most impt)rtant problem is ciualified as the South-Bist 
issue and terrorism again by (he overwhelming majority of SDPP (44.8%), DLP
i>5lbid., 129. 
f’CntiSIS, 1995 62
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(41.7%), and RPP (3 8 .0 % ) .The second issue is determined as inflation and the 
(|ucs(ion of democratic rights and liberties arc issued about I to 1.5% by the 
subjeets.^*  ^Yet, the origin of South-East issue is absolutely determined as terrorism 
between 50-65% of the subjects. ^^Thc last interesting issue is that as only the 29.4% 
of the all SDPP supporters believed their party could solve this problem this figure is 
24.7% for the RPP nominating RPP and 35.3% for DLP whereas 57.8% of WP have 
faith in their parties.’^ ’^
In the 1996 survey the figures are slightly changed.’^ ' Still 82.4% of the RPP, 
83.3% of the DLP believed that Turkey's conditions are worse in the last years. This 
answer is critical, for, the survey is realised in the March 1996, just after the long 
lasting DYP-SDPP/RPP coalition governments. It reflects that the party supporters' 
impression about the government in which their party involved for a long pcriixl of 
time, rhe most important problem is issued as inflation by 82.9% of the subjects and, 
in this survey, second comes the stale administration by 20.2% whereas terrorism is in 
the fourth rank by 11.0%.^  ^When the subjects arc interviewed whether they believe 
their parties could solve Turkey's problems, it is only the RPP that has been supported 
by the mitK)iily ol the supporlcrs.^^ The interesting }X)inl is that tho.se subjects who 
think that these problems are unsolvable are qualitatively high on the center-left in 
compari.sion to ccntrc-righl. '^^
f>7lbid., 04. 
f’^ lbid., 04.
<’‘>Ibid., 05 
70]bid., 71. 
■ I^'llISl'S, 1990, 122. 
72|bid., 123.
73ibid., 125-120.
^^Ibid., 120.
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One another issue that might be helpful in determining the ideological situation 
of the ccniic-lcri is how swial democratic grassroots conceive the sta te .W licn  the 
subjects arc asked the question whether they .sec if the stale can do anything about the 
unemployment, 68% of the workers, 80% of the state officers, 74% of the small 
tradesman who identify themselves as social democrat answered positively. When the 
melhcxlolgy is asked the below results are achieved.
1 ]il>lr 15: 1 lie precıııılİoııs (liiil llie sliile should lake
Precaution Worker Stale officials small tradesman
interventionist 66.2 70.6 67.6
private sector 5.1 9.4 10.8
rcgulatoiy 23.5 17.5 ,16.9
Source: TÜSES, 1995, 111
As it is clear from the table a majority of the grassroots prefer the 
interventionist approach with a small minority taking a regulatory position. This 
idiosyncrasy illiuminates a characteristic that, the social dcmœracy in Turkey have 
lailh in statism and this is clear when approximately the whole of the subjects 
acclaimed that stale should find and create jobs for the unemployed."^  ^This ( igure is 
repealed by those who slate that tuition fees in education créais iincqualiliy.^^
These results might be interpreted on two levels. The first one defines the 
structural and ideological aspects and contours of the social dcm(x:ratic parlies in
75'|'0Sli>', 1995, ] 10-114, 
76ibid., 1 13.
77lbid., 1 14.
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Turkey and, with implicit and explicit answers given to questions, a 'new' conclusion 
might be proceeded. In this respect it is clear that social democracy in dTirkcy, in the 
late 1990s have not yet surpassed the statist position and epistemology and, it still 
relics on a cosmopolitan grassrcx)ts. Taking these points into consideration it might be 
argued that especially the RPP by concentrating on the issues of democracy and not 
being concrete on the economic mattei:s falls short of satisfying the cx|Xîctations of the 
voters. One another but very im[K)rtant conclusion is that especially RPP is a kind of 
Alevi party whereas it is totally abondoned by the Kurds.
On the other hand this brings out another inconsistency for, the majority of the 
subjects have identified wage earners as exploited and oppressed but such a small 
percentage included Alevis and Kurds in this category. The last issues that are worth 
discussing arc that even though there is a common critical approach and disbelief in the 
politics, still this is devestating as long as the RPP is considered. Under these 
assumptions and emprieial conclusions, the second issue that emanates fixan this 
survey is that the result RPP achieved in the 1995 elections is not strange and 
surprising and is in consistence with the profile dissected above. One last assumption 
in this context is again related with the ideological allegations of the RPP.
RPP, especially in the 1995 elections have tried to attract the voters who would 
vote for a party other than the WP with the claim that, RPP is the only party that could 
fetter the upsurge of fundcmentalism in Turkey. But when the voter behaviour is 
analysed it seems that only 0.07% of the voters decided on the RPP sustaining this 
assumptions^ which shows a major defect in the ideological configuration of the party. 
On the other hand when a sui vcy is realised after the 1995 elections to figure out the
78-rÜSlS, 19%, 147.
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voting behaviour, it becomes clear that, even though the RPP seems more stronger in 
the urban space yet those who would vote for DLP is 15.8% whereas the RPP is the 
cluucc of 63 % in the same space. The figures for the suburban is 9.0% Ibr DLP and 
d. \ "/o lor llic RPP^ '^ , showing that (here is a major change in ll\c stiucUire of social 
democracy in Turkey that should be carefully analysed because, as has already been 
mentioned, Ibr the 41 % of the RPP voters the second choice is DLP but this ration 
drops lo 1.3.5 when DLP's approach to the RPP is considered.
riic scctMid choice of tlic DLP is absolutely (34%) tlic centre-right pai lies. On 
the other hand, the last issue is that, 40.7% of those who characterise thamsclves as 
'leftist' vote for DLP and only 22.6% of this group votes for RPP^* which means i) it 
is not any more the RPP representing the social democracy in Turkey on an empirical 
level but it is Dl.P and ii) this party d(x;s consider itself not a social democrat but a 
democratic left party meaning that the classical understanding of the scx:ial dem(x:racy 
in Turkey adhering to traditional RPP ideology finds a problematic reflection in the 
political realm. This contradiction is also clear in the debates developed in the second 
half of the I99()s in Turkey which arc also an indicator of how RPP is drifting away 
from both the ideological and pragmatic realm.
Conclusion
In this chapter the condition of the serial dcmcwratic parties in Turkey in the 
late 1995 is analysed. The analysis is carried out on two levels. On the ideological 
level the major developments regarding the SDPP and RPP is dissected and on the 
practical level the 1995 general elections is concerned. The 1995 general elections is
79ibid., 152.
«Olbid., 1(>6.
81lbid., 161.
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important for two reasons. The first is, when the pre and the post election periods are 
empirically analysed the ci isis that Turkish s(>:ial dcnux;racy but especially SDPI’ and 
later RPP faced is clearly understood. Second this empirical date gives out the basic 
clues and the insight into the ideological shortcomings and constraints of the same 
|M>lilical piactice.
The late 1990s in Turkey, as long as the social democratic politics is 
concerned, gives birth to a major change which is the unification of the SDPP and the 
RPP. This is an important as well as a problematic decision. It has some major 
contradictions in itself. First of all, as has been shown in the chapter, the decision is a 
direct rellection of the basic and defining epistemological structure of Tutkish social 
democracy. It is the RPP tradition much attached to the Republican values; i.e. the 
secularism, nationalism and statisin. After a long process of trying to surpass this 
determining ideology, in the end, due to the nco-nationalisl movement rcvivaled in 
turkey, SDPP grassroots decided to merge with the RPP. 'fhe RPP, with its new 
administration, did not hesitate in reinvigorating the traditional notion and ideology of 
RPP in rurkey. In a period when globalisation has reached to its peak, a process 
questioning the existence and domination of the centralised nation-state this process, 
as a consequence of its contradiction with the existing situation, has been defeated in 
the 1995 elections.
As, in the late 1990s, in the Wcst-Europcan countries the socialist and social 
democratic parties have gone through a drastic transformation the approach has found 
an echo on one specific wing of Turkish social democracy, namely the RPP. Although 
in the Manifesto published just before the 1995 elections RPP argued that the issues
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a)nducing lo (ransformalion spoiild be carried and incorporaled into Turkish social 
democracy, titis iiUciUion has never been realised by a pracUcai approach.
The main argument of the chapter is that, all of these constraints arc due to the 
changing grassnxits structure of the Turkish social dcm(x:racy. When cmprical data is 
analysed it become clear that the traditional supporters of the RPP has moved away 
from this party. On the other hand, it is more the DLP, representing the Turkish s(x:ial 
democracy. Nevertheless the basic arguments and ideological fromework of the DLP 
is as problematic as RPP. DLP, although, surpassed the RPP, in the 1995 elections 
when the structure of giassnxHs is dissected, it is undcrskxxl that, this party is backed 
by a group which is more prone to centre-right. This very point, the condition of DLP, 
being the major party on the Turkish social democratic politics shows that this 
ideology is still in need of a acute change and the possibilities of such an attempt is 
analysed in the folk)wing chapter.
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CHAPTER IX
rilE IDEOLOGICAI. FRAMEWORK OE THE I.ATE
1990s AND SOCIAL DEMOCRACY CRISIS
9.1 The Framework
111 Ihc previous cluiplcr we argued lhal the late 1990s has witnessed tlie draslie 
erisis of social deiiKXMaey in Turkey. Thic crisis is demarcated by llie results achieved 
in the 1995 general elections. This very concrete condition and conclusion is an 
outcome of various dilTerent rea.sons. One of them is that, in the late 1990s 'Furkey, 
when taken as a whole regarding its soeial, cultural and economic conditions has 
developed a new structure. This new formation has paved the way for the new social 
interest groups. This might be interpreted as a consequence of a process that has 
started by the early 1980s. From the view point of scx^ ial democratic fxilitics, the 
importance of this formation is that, the traditional support groups, due to their 
structural transformations, started moving away from thes ideology. Actually this has 
been a case faced by socialism in the West-European political arena in the same time 
period aiul the mentioned political practice has regained power by getting adopted to 
the situation after a long and hardsome process. Turkish social democracy, not
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realising the depth of the crisis, has continued with the traditional ideological and 
practical aprioach. The reinvigoration of the RPP in the late 1990s and its attachment 
lo ils liadilional ideology has been answered back by the ciccloralcs.
In this conlext, in the previous chapicr, after a long and detailed empiical 
analysis it has been argued that in Turkey, along with the shift of the interest groups 
which have traditionally backed social democratic politics, there is a new development. 
It is the situation of the DLP of Bülent Ecevit. According to the 1995 results it is more 
this party representing the traditional social democratic grassroots but however, DLP 
refrains frenn declaring itself as a swial democratic party. It calls itself a democratic 
siKİalist party and totally rejects the universal values and history of sœial democracy. 
In this sense it is more a conservative party as well as being a parochial one. 
Interestingly, it should be noted here that, DLP, although it stays respectful to 
Kemalisin and the constitutive ideology, nevertheless, refrains also from accentuating 
it. It situates itself in a context where it runs for the traditional and popular interests 
and values of the electorate.
The third point when the late 1990s is considered is the role played by the WP 
in the political scene. WP with its main arguments which bring a radical critique of the 
establishment has had a great impact on the Turkish political life in the late 1990s. At 
the beginning, it was believed that, the criticism developed by the WP covers the basic 
ideological discourse and brings an assesment of the demœratic understanding in 
Turkey. It is al.so believed that, as a part and parcel of the search in Turkey, 
considering the development of the civil society, the réévaluation of the public sphere, 
(he |)()si(ion of WP would sustain an opening in the democratization procc.ss in 
Turkey. I'his dual approach, both by the one formulated by the WP and its reception
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by the inlcllcclual publicum, was not distant to the criticism of Kcmalism in Turkey as 
the constilulivc ideology. However, in the relatively long run, as will be argued in this 
chapter, not only the ideology of WP perceived as a discourse attached to Kemalisin 
but also the ideological approach of the party started to display itself as a counter 
position against the established basics of demcx r^acy.
This framework, from both the view point of social demcKracy and WP, in 
general the apprrx:ah developed by the representation of the Islamic fundamentalism in 
Turkey needs a revisting of Kcmalism in Turkey for two rca.sons. First of all, the late 
1990s has definetely been marked by this debate and, second, in the relevant and 
recent literature, the links established between WP and Kcmalism display two 
important results. First, the relationship between Islamic fundamentalism and 
Kcmalism brings out .some important conclu.sions which arc important in the 
reevaluation of Kcmalism, second the crisis of .social democracy in Turkey in the 
mentioned time pericxl is considered to be an outcome of the crisis of Kcmalism as a 
project of modernity. Especially from this angle and both Kcmalism's and Islamic 
fundamentalism's approach to mcxicrnity gives the basic clues that could be used in the 
revisting of the .s(x:ial dcm(x:ratic crisis in Turkey in the late 1990s.' If modernity is 
taken as a concept convoluted with secularism, mainly, the criticism of Kcmali.sm and 
the debate concerning secularism becomes highly important. Because, this is not only 
related with such new concepts, as identity, pluralism, privite-public contradiction, but 
also shows, to some authors the problematic situation of Kemalisin in the late 1990s,
1 fhe notion of 'Islamic fundamentalism' has been a m atter of discussion in 
I'urkey. For an analysis of a more abstract notion of fundamentalism see, 
llhikhu Parckh, "The Concept of Fundamentalism", in Aleksandras 
Sthromas (ed.), The End o f 'Isms?’ Reflections on the Fate o f Ideological 
Politics A fter Communism's Collapse (Oxford, Uk and Cambridge, USA: 
Blackwell, 1994), 106-125; and Carla Pasquinelli, "Fundamentalisms", 
Constellations (1998), v.5, no. 1, 17.
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which is another indicator and reason, which needs an analysis, for the critical 
position of (he social demcx;racy attached to the>se values. The last |»inl is that, beyond 
Olliers, il in Ihc late 1990s a political position which is critical of Kcnialism gains 
power in the political arena and one another, the significant conjugate of that ideology, 
since the beginning, looses power this point dobutless needs an evaluation. This 
chapter will focus on these issues and this will also be a complementary part of the 
analysis started in the previous chapter concentrating on the ideological elements.
9.2 Kemalism in the 1990s
9.2.1 Kemalism as a Modernity Project
The late 1990s in Turkey is dominated with debates concentrated mainly on 
two subject-matters, i) Kemalism, and ii) fundamentalism which is mainly an outcome 
of the concept of identity. In this sense, identity should be considered as a concept 
encompassing pluralism and, the search for a new dclinition and stiuctuiing of the 
public-private contradiction by asking the question whether it is possible to reach a 
more liberal stale by transforming the existing one. This framework is delinetely 
related with the réévaluation of the existing state of democracy in Turkey and an 
outcome of results of the 1995 elections. This is, to a certain extent, natural. Because, 
the Welfare Parly was the first party in the ranking which was comprehended as the 
most concrete threat and menace for the Republican system. On the other hand the 
arguments pul forward by this party were rather for a new .stx;ial order and the critique 
of Turkish modernity which was symbolised and represented by secularism. In this 
context the debate on secularism has been a questioning of Turkish modernity 
stretching to those concepts such as identity, the restructuring of the order with the 
speedic accentuation of the notion of subject, a new understanding of ethics, the 
formation of a new coneept of private space. The analysis of this approach and rc-
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placing of Turkish social democracy in Turkish political realm needs a brief and 
overall view of Welfare Party and Islamic upsurge by reconsidering the crisis of 
Turkish mtxlcrnity.
I iiikish modernity by many sludcms of Tiiikish pt>li!ics has been ddined as a 
project which has four unseperable components; secularism, nationalism , 
modcrni/.alion, wcslcrni/ation.^ With this understanding, Said claims that (his 
framework is what should be conceived as Kemalism. More interestingly, for the first 
time, the author makes an attempt to carry Kemalism out of its boundaries. It is not 
any more, according to Said, a mcxlel of rntxlernisation for a s|x:cific country but an 
epistemology and accepted by various countries and cultures as a model in their 
modernisation processes. In this context what makes the crux of Kemalism and brings 
it to the fore as a model for other countries, namely the former Islamic stales of the 
Middle Hast, is its relation to Islam. Said explains this by saying
when I use the term Kemalism I refer not to the specific discursive 
practices of Mustafa Kcmal, but rather to a more general discourse 
founded upon the perspective opened by Kemal and sharing many of 
Kemal's key assumptions. In other words, Kemalism describes a 
hegemonic political discourse in the muslim world, within which Islam 
was no longer a master signifier of the political order.^
Said, at this point, makes another attempt and coalasces Kemalism with its 
approach to Islam; in other words, the Kemalist project of modernisation, for him, 
comes as a 'geneological and teleologicaltrial to surpass Islam with Westernisation.
^Bobby S Said, The Tundamental Tear: IJurocentrism ami the Emergence o f  
Islamism (London and New York, 1997), 63-69.
3jbid, 70.
" i^bid, 66.
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Modernisation, is not any more a technique, as in the case of late Ollonuin modernisers 
but a project, "from being just a means to an end to bring an end in itself."-  ^ This 
project, according to Keyman is a "will to civilization."^This will is realised through 
nationalism whose aim was again modernization, in the name of people.^ What 
Keyman suggest is that, in the implementation of the project two main methods are 
used, the lirst one 'from the above imposition' and the incentive of the elites.^ More 
important than these, as is indicated clearly by Keyman, is the role played by 
economy; a concept into which Kemalist elite's political power was not reducible but 
interrelated with it and .second, the articulation of Reason with capital(ism) and 
economy at large.^
This framework enables us to conceptualize the Kcmalist mcxlcrnisation project 
as a Durkheiniian construction of an 'organic state.' This state model, is itttcrrclatcd 
with one of the most important concepts in the construction of Kcmalism, the 
'sovereignty.' Even though on the rhetorical level it is acclaimed that '.sovereignty 
belongs to the people', it is evident that, Kemalism is the "reconstruction of the idea of 
sovereignty as a national, rather than popular"*® concept. Keyman, from this 
extrapolates that, "the state was not the liberal but the organic state acting in the name
•“^ ibid, C)7.
I'uat Keyman, "On the Relation Relween Global Modernity and 
Nationalism: The Crisis of Hegemony and the Rise of (Islamic) Identity in 
Turke}'," New Perspectives on Turkey, Fall 1995, no. 13, 93-120.
^ibid, 103.
^ibid, 104.
•ÎAli Yaşar Sanbay, "Kemalist İdeolojide Modernleşmenin Anlamı: So.syo- 
likonomik Bir Ç(V/ümleme Denemesi", in lirsin Kalaycıoğln, Ali Yaşar 
Sarıbay (eds.) (İstanbul: Beta Basın Yayım Dağılım Aş, 1986), 189-204.
l*M^ id, 103.
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of the people, insofar as its funclions, while independent of the general will, were 
assumed to correspond to that will"i* and, "what the organic stale did was (o create 
and activate the general will in a way to present itself as a cohesive factor of social 
formation."’2
What might be referred as the national identity in Turkey is again the re­
construction of Kcmalism, a concept "to concretize populism and its apjxial to organic 
unity into the identitiy of the individual subject."'-^ Here, it should be noted that, as a 
nationalist movement, Kemalism's appeal to the construction of an identity is not 
gencological, (or, as has been slated by Anderson, all identity construction is a matter 
of 'imagination.Nevertheless what gains the legitimacy to this formation process 
is the negation and subjugation of the Islamic identity which was dominant in the 
Ottoman society. In other words, the mcxlernisation process of Kcmalism is by all 
means the continious struggle with the Islam as an epistemology and a social and 
political order, the way of living generated by Islam and the identity imposed by 
Islam. In this scn.se, Islam plays a dual role in the construction of the nalional- 
Kcmalist identity. First, as both Kcyman and Said suggests, it is, to say it with a 
Derridaen concept, the 'constitutive outside' of Kemalism; second, in a mutual 
intciaclion lioth Kcmalism has developed its rhetoric and epistemology through Islam 
and vice versa. Said explains this process as below:
1 'ibid, 103-104.
12ibid, 104. 
i^ibid, 105.
^^Bcncdict Anderson, Imagined Comnn/nit/cs(l,ontIon, New York: Verso, 
seventh impression, 1996).
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The Kcmalisl drive to seculari/alien followed a number of siralegics 
with regard lo Islam. First il adv(x:aled that Islam shouhl be simply a 
code of private ethics. Undciiyin this was a second strategy which tried 
lo reslricl the significance of Islam by actively adopting a hostile policy 
towards it...The third strategy was the policy of trying lo use Islam as 
the antagonistic other o f Kemalisni. Islam was continually being 
described in terms which made it the 'constitutive outside' o f the 
discourse ofKemalism}^
'I’hc national identity, on the one hand, is a radical break with the Islamic 
identity, and, second, a step in the construction of a Westernised self. This procedure, 
not only constitutes the second component of the Kemalisl identity but also brings out 
the second idiosyncrasy of Kemalism, namely its problematic relationship with 
'Orientalism.' This concept, defined in depth by Edward Said in his influential 
book*^’, focuses on the conceiving of the Orient by the West as a matter of 
foimdalionalism and cssentialism. The groundbreaking importance of the concept is 
that, as Said shows, the production of the Orient is West's attempt to legitimise itself 
by defining its Other.
Orientalism can thus be regarded as a manner of regularised (or 
Orientali/.ed) writing, vision and study, dominated by imperatives, 
pcrs{x;ctives, and ideological biases ostensibly suited to the Orient...The 
Orient that appears in Orientalism, then, is a system of representations 
framed by a whole set of forces that brought the Orient into Western 
learning. Western consciousness, and later. Western empire.'^
When Said analysis how Kemalism tacitly used OrienUilisni to construct its 
identity he refers lo Westernisation, saying that
15Said, Fundam ental, 65; italics not in the originial. 
I^Miclward Said, Orientalism  (New York: Vintage Hooks, 1979). 
l^ibid, 202-203.
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"the very nature of westernization implied the neceSvSity of orientali/nlion 
since you can only westernize what is not western, that is what is 
oriental. Thus to westernize you had first to orientalize: one had to 
represent the oriental, before one could postulate westernization as an 
antidote."
Depending on this explanation, the tacit Orientalisation logic of Kcmalism 
could be issued here^^, for Said defines two forms of Orientalism, the manifest and 
latent^o. In this context, using Westernisation, nationalism and .secularism, Kcmalism 
has ctcalcd an identity as a consequence of nuKicrnistaion project but the critical |)oinl 
is that Kcmalism has developed two more characteristics depending on the.se issues, 
riic liist one is (hat, Kcmalisin, even when taken as a ladical attempt for the 
construction of anew epistemology, still, lies within the epistemological limits of the 
previously existing system, namely the Ottoman-Islamic discour.se; .second, Kcmalism 
has tiansloi lucd itself into a culture, rather than into a |x>litical ideology, as has already 
been argued in the thesis, by constructing a hegemonic identity. To understand the 
crisis of Kcmalist project of mrxlernisation one has to focus briefly on these two 
points.
According to Oktay, there is an implicit relationship between the Tuikish 
political tradition of "unified power pmcticc" and the Islamist political pmcticc which 
culminates in the 'non-appearance' of the civil society. This model is further 
characterised by the missionary position of the political center and the inadequacy of
J^Said, fundamental 68.
^‘^ I'or a discu.ssion of the relationship between Kemalism and Orientalism 
.see Hasan Bülent Kahraman and II I'uat Keyman, "Kemalizm, Oryantalizm 
ve Modernite."Dogu Batı. 2(1998), 63-77.
2^Said, Orientalism, 206.
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the will to limit the political power.^i This structure, is a consequence of political 
rlicloric of the Islam and this might be epitomised by various different outcomes, the 
most important ones being, first, the configuration of the ideal state which is described 
by Arkoun in a laconic way by saying that it is interrelated with the idea of 'order' 
which denotes not the way conducive to that but more the idea itself.22 Second, the 
fundamental axis that enables the organization of the political rhetoric of Islam around 
the idea of perfect order is the understanding of monism which is nothing but the 
notion ol umma. In this context. Oktay, confirms that umma is not only a religious 
unity but a umty (italics added) having political, social and economic dimensions. It is 
clear that this notion might be taken as the preliminary sketch of the notion of an 
organic society.
'I’hc third idiosyncrasy of this structure is related to the conditit>n of authority 
and, in this sense, legal authority in Islam is unified and undivisible.23 Oktay 
accentuates that a notion of authoritated intermediary power is alien to Islam. Another 
important fact in this structure is that, in a notion of 'ideal cite', which is not 
conducive to the differentiation of civil and the political, the political realm will not 
create its own legal system. The problem of legitimacy will be solved through the 
notion of 'science' which also brings fore the transition from power-power to 
authority-power.2"t The last concept in this framework is the condition of the
^k>cnıil Oktay, "Yargı Açısından Kuvvetler Ayrılığı ve vSiya.sal Kültür", in 
lirsin Kalaycıoğlu, Ali Yaşar vSarıbay (eds.), Türkiye'de Siyaset: Süreklilik 
ve Değişim (İstanbul: Der Yayınları, n.y.), 413-434.
22jbid, 425.
23jbid, 426.
2"*ibid, 427.
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individual. In Islamic polilical rhetoric, the individual gains both its legitimacy and 
lionour as being a member of the im m unity not in an attempt to deliniate a civil and 
private boundary for itself. 5^ Depending on these remarks, Oktay, concludes tliat, it is 
this epistemology and structural characteristics that shapes the existing political-social 
structure and in this sense, the Republican period can not be considered as an attempt 
successful! in eliminating the existing culture and implementing a new one.^6
In fact this apporoach should be accepted if Partha Chatterjee's concept of 
'derivative discourse' is recalled. Chattarjee, in developing his concept draws on the 
notion of Orientalism and suggests that the resistance to colonialism, in other words, 
nationalism, is a reversed Orientalism and has its roots in the intellectual epistemology 
of it.27 j,| ihjg context, according to Chatterjee, the nationalist upheaval, on the one 
hand inherits the discourse of the former socio-political condition and on the other 
hand incorporates the nation into the state in the pixKess of nation-building.^^ In this 
context, it might be argued that, in Turkey, as there has never been a pericxl of 
colonialism, when the Kemalist attempt starts to construct a nationalist discourse it 
also starts to become the post-colonial period by acclaiming the former sti ucture as the 
colonialist one.25 This means, as Oktay argues, Kemalist nationalist discourse has 
inherited the discourse of the former social-political structure as a cultural txxic.
25jbi<j, 428.
^f'ibid, 429-430.
^^Partha Chatlerjee, Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World : A 
Derivative Discourse (London, New York: Zed Books, 1986).
28ibid, 160-170.
^9'rhc details of this formation is argued in Hasan Bülent Kahraman, Yeni 
Bir Sosyal Demokrasi İçin (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, 1991).
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'I’lic importance of this articulation is that, when the crisis of the Kemalist 
modernization project comes to the fore, the filling of the gap by the political or the 
politici/alion of Islam should not be seen as a surprise. On the contrary as an outcome 
of the same logic it might be argued that both Islamic discourse inherits the Kemalist 
discourse and vice versa , each one being the derivative discourse of the other and also 
each one being the constitutive outside of the other. Behind this, it is also possible to 
see that the incorporation of the other as a constitutive outside has been a more simple 
procedure as long as Kcmalism is taken as a hegemonic discourse by forming a 
tradition as Keyman argues.K eym an, after discussing the three 'meanings' of 
Kcmalism as a nation-building project, a mcxlcrnity project and a social engineering 
project, 31 proposes two hypotheses as nation-state being the domineering subject of 
the modernity project and the creation of an organic society as the objective of the 
Kemalist clilcs’2.
Keyman, at this point in an attempt to answer the question what gives the 
ability to Kemalism to re-produce itself as a hegemonic discourse proposes that the 
key notion is the 'tradition' and the Kemalism-tradition relationship.^^ According to 
Keyman, Kemalist tradition, as all traditions have, has four different levels; the 
hermeneutic, the normatic, the legitimacy and identity Icveks.^“* Kcynian, further.
^^I'ual Keyman, "Kemalizm, Modernlik ve Gelenek", l'opium vc Bilim 72, 
bahar 1997, 84-101.
■ '^ibid, 87.
^^2ibid, 89.
^■^ ibid, 89.
3^bid, 90-91.
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argues that, in contrast with its appearance as a tradition-breaking moment, Kemalism 
is not against it, yet itself is a tradition on the hermenautic level.
"The active domineering subject of this political understanding is state, 
its object but at the same time its peer the citizenship 'which is defined as 
a cultural identity and limited with the national identity' and its discourse 
realm is the sovereignity discourse that activates the 'self-other
relationship. "36
'flic importance of this framework is Keyman's argument that, the Islamic 
modernity understanding luus never produced an alternative to Kcmalist tradition on the 
normative and identity levels; Islamic modernity is the re-production of the Kemalist 
discourse with a rhetoric whose terminolgy is different.37 This argument acts as a 
point of articulation between the crisis of Kemalist hegemonic mexJernity discourse 
and the birth of political Islam as an alternative to it.
9.2.2. The Crisis of Kemalist Certainty: From Unity to 
Differentiation
The crisis of Kemalist modernity project is a widely accepted condition. 
According to Kcydcr, what I'ccds this outcome is the fall of the notion ol national 
development understand!ng.38 On the other hand Keyder argues that the impression 
that Turkish modernity is facing a crisis which cmcnates from the identification o( 
modernity with Westernisation and as the former runs a crisis it is believed that the
-^-“^ ibid, 91.
;^ f>ibid, 92.
37ibid, 95.
'^Sçağlar Keyder, Ulusal Kalkmmacıhğm İflası (Istanbul: Metis Yayınları,
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project ill Turkey also runs a bankruptcy.39 Likewise, Kasaba also draws the attention 
to the new circumstances that 'Kemalist certainty' has started to face 'modern 
ambiguities.'^^ What is worth mentioning in this context is that, Kasaba puts Kemalist 
certainties, which is considered to be a consequence of nuxlemity, into a contradiction 
with modern ambiguities.
Even he himself in his article continues with explaining the details of this 
'modernization' and the methodology of it.·^ ! What makes the Kemalist condition 
interesting in this sense, according to Kasaba is that, after the process Turkey has not 
come up with a "rational and universally progressive middle-class society.""'^ On the 
contrary, what modernity has produced in Turkey is "an economically polarized, 
politically contentious, and ethnically divided pepople.""*  ^Kasaba demarcates this 
context as the climate of the 1980s and 1990s, a lime periixl, which, according to 
Koker, brings out the 'transition from identitiy crisis to legitmation crisis.'^ What 
causes this transition and the new situation, Levent Koker argues, is the birth of a new 
political agenda in Turkey resting on the notion of 'reactionaiy modernism.'^-''
39çağlar Keyder, "Whiter the Project of Modernity? Turkey in the 1990s", 
in Sibel Bozdoğan and Reşat Kasaba (eds.), Rethinking Modernity and 
National Jdentitiy in turkey  (Seattle and London: University of 
Washington Press, 1997), 37-51.
^^^Reşat Kasaba, "Kemalist Certainties and Modern Ambiguities", 
S.Bozdoğan and R. Kasaba (eds.). Rethinking, 15-36.
^^ibid, 23-30.
42ibid, 31.
43ibid, 31.
"^ “^ Levent Koker, "Kimlik Krizinden Meşruluk Krizine: Kemalizm ve 
Sonrası",
in Toplum ve Bilim 71, Kış 1997, 150-165.
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Kc)kcr, claims Ihat, Kemalism, since Ihe beginning, with its lacil and hidden 
references to the I9th eentury modernisation processes has developed an identity 
whicli already embodies certian paradoxes. The most intriguing one among them is 
Kcmalism's problematic relationship with nationalism and religion. Kemalism, while 
constructing the new social being has excluded the religion as a component of the 
(national) identity but on the other hand it did not reject the religion as a social 
ph en o m en o n .T h e  clash between Kemalism and Islam was more attuned to a 
specific practice of the Islam and, as Islam, a religion which has never seperated the 
sacred and the secular from each other*^, is not kept out of the structure this very 
condition caused the contradiction of Kemalist secularisin'^^. Kemalism, in time, has 
become a religion in itself^  ^both to fill the gap created by the exclusion of Islam from 
the public domain and through the cult(ure) it has created developing and using, to say 
it with Featherstone, symbolic hierarchies.-^ ’^ This is in a way inevitable for,
national cultures have usually emerged alongside state formation 
processes in which cultural specialists reinvented traditions and reshaped
45ibid, 160.
46'rhe basis for this condition is found in Ataturk's approach to Islam. For 
a brief review of his ideas see Hugh Poulton, Top Hat, Grey Wolf and 
Crescent: '¡'urkish Nationalism and the Turkish Republic (London: Hurst 
and Company, 1997), 97-100, 169-170.
47por the various dimensions of this much referred condition see Aziz AI- 
Azmeh, Islams and Modernities (London, New York: Verso, second edition, 
1996)
4fiKbker, "Kirnlik", 160.
49i;niest (lellner, hncouniers with Nationalism (Oxford: Blackwell 
Publishers,
1996), 81-91.
-‘’^Vlike Featherstone, Undoing Culture: Globalism, Postmodernism and 
Identity  (London, New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1995), 88.
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and iclurnislicd the ethnic core of llie people. As nation-states became 
incrca.singly drawn together in a tighter riguration of coni|x;ting nations, 
tlicy faced strong pressures to develop a coherent cultural identity. The 
process of homogenization of culture, the project of creating a common 
culture, must be understood as a proeess in the unification of culture of 
the need to ignore, or at best refine, synthesize and blend, local 
differences.
The new condition defined for Islam, which is giving it the secondary 
imporUmce in the formation of the new social and politiail system, might be taken as a 
step in the context of creating a homogenized culture.'’2This is, to some authors is the 
process of the "Turkification of Islam"^·^ derivated from the understanding of 
secularism, which is usually defined as the state control over the religious affairs.-''' '^ 
'I’his was a part of creating a discourse relying absolutely on the Western ideals as 
Serif Mardin puts it; but, on the other hand, the symbolism of the Republican culture 
was "too shallow and lacking in acsthtctic richness to 'l a k e .T h e  rest was a sheer 
dependence on the Western and, namely, the Enlightenment ideals and filling the gap 
considciing and purpt)rling Kemalism as the one and the only |x>ssibility to gel rid of
•■^ libid, 89.
the other hand, culture itself, for some authors, is a product of 
Western modernity. Jonathan Friedman, "Cultural Logics of the Global 
System", Theory, Culture & Society, 5 (2/3), 447-460.
53According to Poulton this is a perpetuating process observed even in the 
late 1970s and early 1980s, in the post-coup period through the furkish- 
Islamic Synthesis. Hugh Poulton, Top Hat, 179-180.
•‘’‘^ Ibr a surve}' of the process of the construction of an identity which also 
encompasses the Islam see, Ayşe Saktanber, "Muslim Identitiy in 
Children's Picture-Rooks", in Richard Tapper, Islam in Modern 
I'urkey (Ix)iidon: 1. R. lauris, 1993), 171-188.
55şerif Mardin, 'Religion in Modern Turkey', International Social Science 
Journal, 19, 2, 1977, 279.
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every absence.^ This is a circumstance once more introducing the definitive paradox 
of Kcmalism: taking Western ideals as the possibility ol defeating the Western insult 
on the country and using the nationalist identity emanating from the Kemalist 
discourse with an absolutist and religious accentuation to surpass the religious 
consciousness.-'’^  In this context Kcmalism is the reformulation and the rcutilization of 
the existing different hegemonic discourses and in time itself becoming a hegemonic 
discourse.
'I’liis very characteristic of the Kemalist discourse has a dual contradiction. On 
the one hand it used the 'other' discourses as a 'constitutive outside' with which it was 
having a contradictory relation and synchronically Kcmalism itself was used as the 
'constitutive outside' of the other opposing discourses, political Islam being the most 
important onc.-'*^  This might be considered, in a way, an attempt in the construction of 
'civil religion' in the Rousseauian sense of the concept, that is as Wilson sugests, "a 
belief in a higher abstract principle of justice transcending the moral claims and ethical 
particularities of each seperate religious denomination.
This state of affairs might be elaborated once more going back to the crisis of 
Kemalist modernity in Turkey and briefly two remarks might be mentioned here. The
5^>rhis paradigm is more related with a Third-World developmantalism, as 
Gülalp correctly points, llalduii Giilalp, 'Modernization Policies and 
Islamist Politics in Turkey', in S.Bozdogan and R. Kasaba, Rethinking, 61.
S^Bryan S. Turner, Orientalism, Postmodernism and Globalism (London and 
New York: Routledge, 1994), 87.
'’^Itoby S Said, l ï i n d a m c n t a i ,  72-73; li. I'uat Kcyman, "Kemalizm", 9.S.
•‘>9Bryan Wilson, "Religious Poleration, Pluralism, and Privatization", in Pal 
Repstad (ed.). Religion and Modernity (Oslo, Stockholm, Copenhagen, 
Oxford, Boston: Scandinavian University Press, 1996), 19.
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(irsl one is, as has already been acknowledged, the legitimacy crisis, which is more 
prone to the democratic-political dimensions of the Kemalist discourse.*^o Second is
J
more cultural and is more focused on the world-view of Kcmalism, including 
especially the identity question. Doubtless, the two realms are not water-tight. On the 
contrary, the political and cultural arc intertwined and this framework conceals the 
issues OÍ citizenship, difference and, in general, the problem of public and private and 
it should be taken as an issue of interconnectedness.^^ This notion, in the nationalist- 
modemist sense, biings the transíormalion of the dilTcicncc into essence* ’^^  which is 
also referred as subjectivization.*^  ^The notion of subjectivization is more related with 
the concept of citizenship. It is possible to say that not only in Turkey, but also in the 
West, during the 1990s, as a consequence of the developments related with 
globalisation and the search for a new structure for democracy, the question of 
citizenship lies been one of the most referred debates.
This debate immediatly encircles the notion of subjectivization, which is 
underslood as a concept which is indifferent to the dillcrcncc in the .socicly^’^ '. The
bOtevent Koker's analysis is more related with this framework, discussing 
the legitimacy crisis together with the non-existing conditions of a liberal 
democratic structure.
blpor the discussion of the concept see Anthony D. King, 'The Times and 
Spaces of Modernity (Or Who Needs Postmodernism?)", in M.Featherstone,
S.I.ash and R. Robertson (eds.). Global Modernities (London, New Delhi:
Sage Publications, 1995), 118.
b^ Jonathan Friedman, "Global System, Globalization and the Parameters of 
Modernity", in M.Featherstone, S. Lash and R. Robertson (eds.), Global, 80.
b'^Jacques Ranciere, "Politics, Identification and Subjectivization', in John 
Rajchrnan (ed.), I'he Idenliliy in Question (New York and London:
Routledge, 199.5), G3-72.
b^Por a radical discussion of this relationship see William Connolly, 
Identity/Difference  (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991)
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siibjeclivization, in this sense, as Ranciere puts it, is related with a tacit notion of 
'equality'.<^‘’ From this Ranciere moves to a more concrete definition and discusses 
subjcctivi/ation as below: "It is the formation of a one thet is not a self but is Ihe 
relation of a self to an o th e r .O n e  last concern about subjectivization, again brought 
by Rancicre, is that "(political subjectivization)...is a crossing of identities, relying on 
a crossing of names"^^ and the nationalisation, on this ground, is considered as a 
system construction contrary to multiculturalism.<^  ^It is also a 'tradition' started by the 
colonial pericxl which also has links with the modernization proccss.^^
In Turkey, within the boundaries of modernization project, nationalism 
constructed an identitiy not only trying to surpass all differences but also in such a 
way that the citizen must have a a sheer loyalty to the state, through the notions of 
'equality' which denied every condition of difference, by referring to corporatism, 
where the dissent to that is considered as a threat to the unity of the state.^^’ On the 
other hand, Turkish understanding of citizenship, excludes the differentiation of the 
public-private realms, including the latter in the former. The third phenomenon is that, 
in the national citizenship understanding, the Kantian notion of Enlightmcnt and the 
concept of subject emanating from that situation is both degraded and exagerrated and
f>5jacques Ranciere, "Politics", 66.
^^bid, 66.
’^' i^bid, ()7.
68charles Taylor, Multiculturalism and 'The Politics o f Recognition' 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), 66-67.
f’^irantz Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks, tr. Charles Lamb Markmann, 
(New York: Grou Wiedenfeld, 1967), 121-122.
^^Ayşe Kadioglu, "Milletini Arayan Devlet: Türk Milliyetçiliğinin 
Açmazları", Türkiye Günlüğü, 33, Mart-Nisan 1995, 91-101
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in the meantime merged and replaced with the Platonic state considerations.^' The 
structure constructed, in the final analysis, is a republicanist irKxlel more attuned to the 
French model, in w'hich the system is developed on the dominant existence of the 
public realm and with a 'from the above' understanding bringing the passivity of the 
subjcct.^2 Nevertheless, Kadioglu argues that Turkish citizenship is a delicate blend of 
French and German models on the basis of having cultural and civilization 
dimensions'^, which in the long run ends up with the 'confiation of state and 
nation'.^'*
This is what Alfonsi calls the dualism contained in the civic and the 
gcncological or ethnic models of nation."^  ^ In this regard, the question turns into 
another one, such as, whether the modernist attempt to construct a national identity has 
reached its limits. The answer to this question, as has been rightly observed by 
Alfonsi, confronts Smith and Habermas, whereas the former believes that the 
unification model is the only condition that would be vital for the old Continent 
whereas the latter stresses that "the national identity in not yet completely absorbed ar
^Iflasan Bülent Kahraman, "Sorunlu Zorunluluk: Kemalist 
Cumhuriyetçilik, Yurttaşlık ve Demokrasi İlişkisi Üstüne", Varlık, 1069, 
likim 1996, Z-8.
^^Bryan S. Turner, "Contemporary Problems in the Theory of Citizenship", 
in Bryan S. Turner (ed.). Citizenship and Social Theory (London, New 
Delhi: Sage Publications, 1993), 55.
Z3Kadıoğlu, "Milletini", 98.
K. Oomen, "Conceptualizing the Linkage Between Citizenship and 
National Identity", in T. K. Oomen (ed.). Citizenship and National Identitiy: 
ITom Colonialism to Globalism (New Delhi, London: Sage Publications, 
1997), 13.
^^Alfonso Alfonsi, "The Citizenship and National Identitiy: The Emerging 
Stirrings in Western Europe", in T. K. Oomen (ed.). Citizenship, 71.
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overcome by citizenship and thus is still intrinsically present in the ethnic 
consciousness."^^ This contradiction is thought to be surpassed by the development of 
a new undcislanding of democracy, which is flexible enough to include the differences 
to appear on the public realm, together with underlining their idiosyncrises, namely the 
radical dcmocracy^^, a further project of liberal dcmocracy.^^ In this context it could 
be said that starting by the question of ctizenship, the notion of identitiy and the 
subjcctivizalion of the self created the first step in the problematic condition of (he 
Turkish modernity project and from this emerges the politiail Islam.
9.3. Political Islam in the 1990s
9.3.1. PoUiical Islam: A Component o f  Kemolism?
Behind the development of political Islam in Turkey, which is taken as an 
indicator of the crisis of Kemalist project of modernity to which Turkish social 
democracy is bound, also found its problematic relation with Kemalisin as a 
hegemonic discourse. As Kemalism relies both on the Western epistemology and 
Islam as its constitutive outside, here, it might be argued that, with a reference to the 
relevant literature, the discourse of political Islam in Turkey is a consequence of 
Kemalism and, in this case Kemalism has been taken as the constitutive outside.
■76ibid, 70.
^^li. l ual Koyman, Radikul Demokrasi Kuramları ve Türkiye (İstanbul: 
Bağlam yayınevi, 1998).
^^Chantal Mouffe, "Democratic politics and the (Question of Identity", in 
John Rajchman (ed.), Identitiy, 33-46.
^‘^ Boby S Said, not only accepts this view as special to 'I’urkey but develops 
this notion and enlarges it to all countries who tried to develop a 
modernity project after the Second World War. Boby S Said, ITimdamental, 
73-85.
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This point is also underlined by Keyman and others.^® The interesting point here is 
that, tlie discourse and the epistemology of politieal Islam not only has intricate 
relations with Kemalism but has two specific amditions as well.
The lirsl is, even (hough politicization of Islam observed in (he 1980s and 
especially in the 1990s acts as a new model for modernization, it is considered as a 
process which has its roots in the process of postmodernity^^ and globalization. 
Second, as long as Turkey is considered, the political Islam has two major 
shortcomings; i) as Keyman observes, although it takes off from Kemalisin and uses 
its constraints, yet, for many reasons, it is arguable to say that, it has developed an 
alternative to it^ ,^ ii) although it seems to be a radical movement in Turkish political 
realm still it is debated that the political instrument of this epistemology, the fortner 
Welfare Party, is not detachable from the establishment. ^
This argument places the former Welfare Party ideology within the context of 
iTKKlernity. In fact, the relationship between the resurgence of religion in the late 1970s 
has been analysed on the grounds of globalization and postmodernity, as has been 
already nientioned. But, on the other hand, there is a vast literature situating this 
development within the boundaries of modernity, where Ernest Oclinci has been one
I'uat Keyman, "Kemalizm", 95. For many other articles drawing on the 
same understanding see Birikim 91, Kasim 1996.
^'Akbar Ahmed, Postmodernism nnd Islam (London and New York: 
Routledge, 1992).
^^Akbar S. Ahmed and Hastings Donnaii (eds.), Islam, Globalization and 
Postmodernity (London and New York: Routledge, 1994).
^■^Keyman, 'Kemalizm', 95.
^^Ahmet Insel, "Refah Partisi ve kemalizm". Birikim, 91, Kasım 1996, 29-31.
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of the leading theoreticians.^^ Gellner, more than focusing on the notion of religion, 
preiers dwelling on the notion of fundamentalism.^^'rurner, on the other lumd in a 
dual effort, to confront Gellner and to explain what he understands from the concept, 
gives a more interesting definition, reviewing fundamentalism in relation to modernity 
and poslmcxlerniy:
In political terms fundamentalism attempts to create a set of boundaries 
which will contain political pluralism and the abstract generalization of 
(he citizen on a global scale, but in terms of some notion of community 
or household. In the cultural arena, fundamentalism is an attempt to 
impose certain boundaries on modernization, and more particularly on 
postmodernism and postmodernity. It attempts to reverse the historical 
process towards a hyper-secular consumerism and pluralism by 
providing paradoxically a traditional defence of modemity.^^
Turner, with this approach sees Islamization as "a political movement to 
combat Westernization using the methods oi Western culture, namely a form of 
Protestantism within Islam itself" and "within this perspective Islamic fundamentalism 
is a defence of modernization against postm odern ism .Although this approach 
places Turner in a diametrically opposite position with Aqbar who argues that Islam 
has links with postmodernity, yet it takes Islam as a reforming power in the society 
and it is related with the two segments of Islam, as Gellner suggests, the High Islam 
and the Low or Folk 1 si am. Turner, insists that.
-^'’For a discussion of this context with references to postmodernity see 
Ernest Gellner, Postmodernism, Reason and Religion (London and New 
York: Routledge, 1992). A critique of his views is found in Turner, 15-17.
8f>ibid, 2-22.
^an S. I'urner, Orientalism, 84.
8«ibid, 93.
^^Gellner, Postmodernism, 19-22.
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the central theme of modernization was, however, legitimized in terms of 
a return to classical Islam, that is the Islam of ascetic, lilcraiy 
monotheism. Once Islam was liberated from its folk traditions and Irom 
foreign aerretions, Islam could emerge as a dynamic and progressive 
component of the reform of society.^
This is a critical point; because, the conceptualization of Islam as a modernising 
process has two dimensions. The first is what has been suggested by Turner as the 
powci of Islam to propose an alternative to the existing modes of modernity and its 
strength in organizing the daily life,^  ^ second, it is again a matter of discourse. Aziz 
Al-Azmeh, in his b(X)k, clearly and in detail supplies the historical turning points of 
reinterpreting the Islamic texts through the lenses of modernist epistemology.^2 Al- 
A/.meh shows how the original script, namely Koran, is read with an effort of finding 
the institutions of modernity and even nationalism in it, in short with a conscious or 
even unconscious reference to Enlightenment epistemology.'''^
Al-Azmeh, in the end, to a certain extent tacitly, argues that the positivistic, 
naturalist, realist dimensions found in the Islamic discorse, is again a construction 
realised under the influence of the West and is a matter of semantics and con- 
tcxtuality.'-''  ^This paradigm is true as long as the Islamic intellectuals in Turkey and
Turner, Orientalism, 87; italics added.
'^'ibid, 8‘).
'^^Aziz Al-Azmeh, "Muslim Modernism and the Canonical Text", in Islams, 
101-  
127.
^^^Aziz, Al-Azmeh, "Islamic Studies and the European Imagination", in 
¡shims, 184.
94ibid, 175.
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ihcir sUriiglc for the construction of a 'modernist' reading and understanding of Islam 
is considered, even though they sometimes reflect a problematic relationship.^^ This 
condition is also analysed by Toprak from various angles. '^^
The relationship between the modern epistemology and its connections with 
religion has been a concern for Mardin who tackles with this question in various 
works and discusses that the secularization process of Kemalism has a past and that 
segment is found in the late Ottoman Empire. The bureaucratic and educational 
reforms in the Ottoman period, especially with the positivist teaching practice 
flourished in the Medical School and School of Engineering, both belonging to the 
army, has introduced the notion of science to those who had no problem with 
internalizing and practicing Islam.^^ The specific condition that Mardin draws attention 
is that, he defines the Kemalist laicist process as the first trial in the construction 
process of individuality^® but he concludes that in the meantime, this attempt is also 
limited by the reconstruction of a community spirit, the notion of This
concept is important for Mardin, for he stresses that Islam in Turkey is divided into 
two categories, the categories of High and Folk Islam .S tarting  with this seperation
‘Z-'>Michacl li. Meeker, " I hc New Muslim Inlellecluals in the Republic of 
I'urkey", ill Richard Tapper (ed.), Islam, 189-222.
‘^ ^Mlinnaz Toprak, "Islamist Intellectuals of the 1980s in Turkey", Current 
Turkish Thought, 62, 1987, 1-19.
‘^ ^Şerif Mardin, "Religion and Secularism in I'urkey", in Ali Kazancigil and 
Frgun Özbudun (eds.), Atatürk: Founder o f a Modern State (London: Hurst 
and Company, second impression, 1997), 191-220.
98ibid, 212-217.
'>' i^bid, 214-215.
l^^^^Şerif Mardin, Din ve İdeoloji, (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 4. baskı, 
1990), 107-116.
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Mardin argues that. Kemalisin, in its ideological construction, did not carry the new 
ideological schemas deep into the villages in opposition to religious believes and the 
reason and the constraint for this is the notion of communitiy found hidden in the 
Republican period.
The consciousness of unity, according to Mardin, a concept that Kemalisin 
spend a great cITort to keep alive, contributed to the continuation and dcvclo|?ment of 
religion at the 'Ibik' level with its symbols and discourse in an intertwined way with 
the new form of l i v i n g . I n  this context, Islam, not only acted as a modernizing 
agent but also an agent for opposing the establishment as well as mediating in the 
pr<x:ess of reality construction .It is at this veiy point that Mardin accentuates i) the 
crisis of Kemalisin emphasising its inadequacies and ii) the importance of folk Islam 
as a m<Hl('ini/.ing agent, especially reminding Nurcu movement in 'Puikcy. The 
question why Islam lived a resurgence and presented itself as an alternative to the 
existing modes of modernity might be extrapolated from here onwards.
9.3.2. Islam as an Agent o f  Modernity and the Establishm ent
On elaborating why Islam came out as a motivating political force in Turkey 
begining by the 1970s’^ ’'^ , the basic reasons might be divided into two groups; tho.se
lO'ibid, I 11.
U)2i.'or the discussion of how Islamic discourse with its .symbols continue 
living in the modernizing discourse see Şerif Mardin, "A Note on the 
rransformation of Religious Symbols in Turkey", I'urcicu, V. 16, 1984, 115- 
127.
'^ •^■^ Şerif Mardin, "Religion and Politics in Modern 'I’urkcy", in James P. 
Piscaton (ed.), Iskim in the Politiciil Process (Cambridge: (-ambridge 
University Pre.s.s, 1986), 138-156.
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which are related with Kemalism as a modernizing process and the internal problem of 
modernity. Giddens, focusing on the latter issue, clearly indicates that conlraty to the 
prediction of Durkheim and Weber, religion continued to play a leading role in the 
modernized societies and in this context "not only religion failed to disappear we see 
all around us the creation of new forms of religious sensibility and spiritual 
endeavour."Continuing, Giddens tries to bring a generalised explanation for this 
condition.
The reasons for this concern quite fundamental features of late 
modernity. What was due to become social and physical universe 
subject to increasingly certain knowledge and control instead creates a 
system in which areas of relative security interlace with radical doubt 
atid with disquieting scenarios of risk. Religion in sone part generates 
the conviction which adherence to tenets of modernity must necessarily 
suspend: in this regard it is easy to see why religious fundamentalism 
has a special appeal. But this is not all. New form of religion and 
spirituality represent in a more basic sense a return to repressed, since 
they directly address issues of the moral meaning of existence which 
modern institutions so thoroughly tend to dissolve.
This framework tends to suit the case in Turkey as long as above mentioned 
identity and culture concerns are taken into elaboration. But, on the other hand, as 
surveys show, the only radical and major difference between the centre-left-right and 
radical light (lundamcntalist) parties appear on the point of culture, concretely the 
Westernisation.^®^ Other than that, there is a coherence and reconcilliation between the 
groups as long as the 'problems of Turkey' are questioned. Beyond this, the
104pQj- the early emergence of political Islam see Ali Yaşar Saribay, 
Türkiye’de modernleşme, Din ve parti Politikası: MSP Örnek Olayı 
(İstanbul, Alan Yayıncılık, 1985).
lOSAnthony Giddens, Modernity and Self-ldentitiy: Self and Society in the 
hue  Modern Age (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991), 207.
'<)(>ibid, 207.
107 'itJSbS, 1995, 1996.
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liincIamciUalisl pailics appear on the political scene as the parties to establish a 'just 
order' to regulate the income distribution, through a community spirit, created by 
Islam and 'making Turkey again strong.'^'’^
With this aim the i'ormer WPof the 1995 elections have become the only party 
emphasising the economic matters on a basis of devclopmcntalism.*®® Also, the 
former parly leader Necmettin Erbakan has been known with his insistance on the 
development and the establishment of heavy industry.’ In this context, RP has 
developed a cerlain mcxlel for the regulation of the economy which triggered much of a 
debate. This framework cannot be said to exclude a modernist understanding on the 
economic level and might be taken as one of the most important factors affecting the 
development of the fundamentalism in Turkey, for in the post-1980 period when the 
regulation policies arc abandoned and a sheer market economy is established, giving 
birth to a devastating income distribution, the WP has been the only political agent, 
taking an oppositionary position to this condition.’
Other than this, the real condition in Turkey that determines the development of 
fundamentalism might be extrapolated on various levels. Keyman, on this basis
’’^ ^ihsan n. Oagi, Kimlik, Söylem vc Siyaset (Ankara: İmge Yayınevi, 1998), 
26-31.
Refah Partisi, 2 4  A r a l ık  1 9 9 5  S e ç im le r i  S e ç im  l i c y a n n a m c s i ,  (Ankara:, 
n.|)., I99.S).
1 lallaşan Hüseyin Ceylan (ed.), Erbakan ve Türkiye'nin Temel Meseleleri 
(Ankara: Rehber Yayıncılık, 1996).
^ ' '/.iya Öniş, " l’he Political liconomy of Islamic Resurgence in I'urkey: l'he 
Rise of Welfare Parly in Perspective", Third World Quarterly, V.18, no. 4, 
1997, 743-766.
ll^ibid, 751.
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argues that il is the continuing hegemony of Kernalist nationalism that induces the 
fundamentalist development and there arc certain reasons for this;
First, neither liberal nor New I^ft discourses constituted an alternative 
to the essentialist posture of Kemalist nationalism towards secular 
national identity...Second, both liberal and New Left discourses were 
intrinsically bound with modernity, and in this respect they were by no 
means a challenge to the Kcmalist will to civili/.{Uion. Both accepted the 
validity of the Kemalist notion of the state as the privileged agent ol 
rationality...The liberal critique of Kemalism was only partial...Thirdly, 
although etatism was subjected to serious criticism, import-substituting 
industrialization remained the motor of industrialization after the 
transition to multi-party system.ii^
Oi course, a forth condition might be suggested here, which is the 
indoctrination of the masses with the Kemalist discourse, especially through the well 
organized national education sy s tem .T h is  is to say that, the alternative to Kemalist 
discourse has not come out of the probable alternatives and in this regard, it is possible 
(o propose that only a new di.scoursc, deviating from the existing one, using the 
parameters of the establishment would be a quasi-alternative and it is only the Islamic 
discourse attacking the inadequacies of Kemalism and the ambiguities of modernity. 
This has given the Islamic discourse the chance of being an alternative to the existing 
cslablishmcnt for all other political parties and ideologies have been a derivation of 
Kemalisin. "·'" Şerif Mardin, together with his already mentioned sugge.sslion that *•
■ I ^lil uat Keyinan, "On the Relation", 108-110.
• an example, how this system runs for the reinforemenet of the cult 
of establishment, see Foti Benlisoy, '"Milli I ’arih, 'Milli Çizgi Roman; 
"Savulun Bre Palikaryalar!"", Virgül, no. 12, Ekim 1998, 2-5.
i ' ^'l'o see how even the radical left movemnets have been influenced and 
attached to Kemalism see Hasan Bülent Kahraman, "1960 Türk Solunda 
Kemalist Söylem Sorunsalı", Unpublished Paper Submitted to the 
International Conference Organised by TÜBA.
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Kemalisin has iailed in constructing a deep culture, argues that it has dependend on 
Ihrcc |xcis in Ihc construction of a new ideology.
Thc.se arc, i) the heerschaft direction; ii) the values of a society of status; iii) 
the separation of the intellectual culture and the popular culture. Mardin, arguing that 
these factors have also been eminent in the Ottoman structure, includes to this frame 
the continuation with the culture of umma on the level of elites. Beyond this, 
Mardin argues that Kemalism did not penriit the development of ideologies challenging 
the religioni^^ and in this context, the 'small' culture, in the long run has started to 
scavange the 'big' culture and placed itself into the 'big' one which means the high 
culture continuing with the symbols and discourse of the low culture.'^^
This framework proposes that the Islamic discourse in Turkey is a product of 
Kemalist discourse, relying on the parameters of the latter if the 'derivative discourse' 
concept is remembered. Here, the nationalist notion of unification, the total rejection of 
the past, the dependence on the binary dichatomies arc all inherited from Kemalisin. 
Further, the fundamentalist search for a new status for Turkey also draws on the 'anti­
imperialist' discourse, similar to the one existing in the Kemalist discounse.*!^ In this 
regard it is possible to argue that fundamentalism, or better, the politicization of Islam 
in Turkey is determined by Kcmalism and Toprak rcllects on this point as.
* 'b'^erif inardin, Din ve İdeoloji, 107.
111.
llSibid, 115.
' •‘^ Menderes Çınar, "Türkiye'yi Refahlaştırmak: Postmodern Zamanların 
Kemalist Projesi", Birikim, 91, Kasım 1996, 32-38.
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Keinalism not only made a differentiation between state and society but 
also reversed the order of importance between the sacred and the political 
realms. Secularization as state policy, therefore, has built-in tendency to 
envisage op|X)sitional politicization of Islam.
In this context the main conditions that enhance the resurgence of political 
Islam in Turkey might be epitomized as the Kemalist epistemology, mainly its 
notionalist and secularist components. While the secularist understanding develops the 
positivist dimension in the Islamic discourse, the nationalist approach fortifies the 
'unity' I actor, that plays one of the key roles in the reformulation of the social order 
from the Islamic view point. Kemalism, acting as the constitutive outside of Islamic 
discourse, in the final instance, influences Islam not as an ideological element but 
rather situating it on a cultural basis,
In this regard, Islam, like Kemalism, has tended to develop a 'grand narrative' 
encompassing various contradictory factors but, on the other hand, formulating a 
totalistic world view. This condition enables Islam to act as a modernising as well as 
counter modernising political view. The modernisation process that started by 
Kcmalism, in the late 1980s and in the early 1990s has ended up with a new phase. 
Islam, with this assumption might be taken as an element that contributes to the
l^^^Hinnaz 'I'oprak, "Politicization of Islam in a Secular State: The National 
Salvation I’arly in Turkey", in Said Amir Arjomand (ed.), Irani Nnlioniilisni 
to Revolutimiry Islam (London: Macmillan, 1982), 121.
Not necessarily in this sense but for the relation between Islam, 
modernity and democracy with a reference to turkey see, Jean-Prançois 
Bayart, "Republican Trajectories in Iran and Turkey: a 'focquevillian 
Reading," in Ghassam Salame, Democracy Without Democrats (London and 
New York: 1994), 282-299.
368
modcrnizalion process, especially to its secular-individualist dimension. This is more 
related with the pluralist and identity issues of the republican ideology.
At this point walks into the stage the 'veil' issue that has caused much debate 
and trouble in Turkey, in the last ten years. The republican understanding strictly bans 
the use of veils and Islam, with this symbol is considered to be a challenge to the 
secular state. Nevertheless various analysis have shown that the similar demands 
might take a different stance for, it is the first time that on the public domain some 
expectations come out as an indicator of individuality and even secularization. '^2 
gist of the debate is that, the emancipation of women through Kemalism in the early 
Republican period, in the second step, brought the enslaving of them through the 
understanding of devoted citizenship. This is a notion of citizenship which does not 
argue the state and the given conditions. In this context the Islamic sacred is 
(ranslormcd into another one, namely the secular slate defined as a sacred and 
tran.sccndcntal enti tiy.'
In fact, this has been considered as one of the shortcomings and the 
contradictions of the republican pixx:csses started under the inilucncc of Enlightenment 
philosophy.’^'•islam, with its new discourse and especially its opposition to the 
establishment, even though does not bring a radical break with the existing modernist.
122/\yçe Kadioglu, "Woman's Subordination in Turkey: Is Islam Really the 
Vein", Middle Bist Journal, 48/4, Tall 1994, 645-660.
123Deniz Kandiyoti, "Emancipated but Unliberated? Reflections on Turkish 
Case", Feminist Studies, 13/2, Summer 1987, 317-339.
l^'^Joan B. landes, " I he Performance of Citizenship: Democracy, Gender 
and Difference in the French Revolution", in Seyla Benhabib (ed.). 
Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries o f the Political 
(Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1996), 295-313.
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centralist structure, still might contribute to the 'real' secularization of the system, 
calling loi (he iclentity and dilTerencc issues.’^ -'’ Islamic revival in d’urkcy, especially 
relening to very this condition, in the 1980s and 1990s, in some ciicles, has been 
taken as a step in the transition to a (more) liberal status. Keyman, for example, argues 
that "Islam appeared to be one of the (indeed significant) articulating elements of 
difference by which to construct an alternative subjectivity to the unifying vision of 
national identity."’ 6^ Nevertheless, even though the subjectivity concept is accepted, 
the assumption that this criteria might be conducive to liberalism is severly 
criticised.
After situating Islamic revival within a cultural context rather than into an 
ideological one, arguing that it shares the same political discourse with Kemalism, 
claming that it acts as a mediator between the modernity and the post-mcxlcrn 
condition, having no problem in adopting the vocabulary of modernity the question 
than becomes why in the 1995 elections not the other parties but the WP came out the 
first. The answer to this question might be found in the previous explanations 
emphasising the continuing importance and influence of Islam among the 'folk.' In 
other words, the traditional contradiction between the center and periphery in Turkey, 
once more, beyond other reasons, such as the ambiguity of the identity, the existential 
problems of self due to the mass immigration from the rural to the urban environment, 
the search for a new and more egalitarian economic system, has played an important
^ '^“’Nilüfer Göle, Modern Mahrem (Istanbul: Mites Yayınları, 1992). 
1^ ’^li. I'uai Keyinan, "On the Relation", 113.
l^^Levent Köker, "Hangi Demokrasi, hangi Refah?", Birikim 91, Kasım 
1996, 48-53.
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role in the oulcome.i^s jt might be argued that, the continious back and forth 
contradiction between the center and periphery in Turkey, since 1950 once more 
culminated in the victory of the periphery. This is an important point which needs a 
( ill 1(1 daboialion on a more emprical level. Here one another point might be addctl. 
That is, it is possible to argue that, Kemalism, if taken as the constitutive outside of 
the political Islam, has also found a response among the 'folk.' This is mainly due to 
its attachment to techonological and economic modernization. On this ground it is 
possible to say that, likewise Islam has continued among the folk with a specific 
content and deliberation, Kemalism has also turned out to develop its folk version as a 
cultural component. Now, it is both a high culture version as well as a (blk version 
and in this context it is convoluted with Islam as long as the modernist common 
denominator is concerned. Now, the centre-periphery condition might further be 
argued.
The Kardam-TlizUn survey has shown that it is the 'right' block backing up 
WP in the 1995 elections, as well as in the post-election period, and it is more a 
lelative gain that the WP reached in the elections rather than an absolute one due to the 
opposition votes of those who do not go to voting. 2^9 Besides, the shift to the 
segment who are against the WP from that group of voters who were formerly 
indilTercnt to WP is more found in the urban s e c t o r . i n  this sense those who belong 
to the RPP tradition is not affected by the RP uprise in the positive sense. But the DP
see how religion in two levels continue functioning in the rural 
area see Richard Tapper and Nancy Tapper, "Religion, Education and 
Continuity in a Provincial Town", in idehard Tapper, Islam, 56-83.
'^ ‘^ Ahmel Kardam, .Sezgin füzün, " Türkiye’de'', 61-75.
' ibid, 69
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Imclilion is clircclly olfcclcci by llial anti RP gains voles from (he grassroots of (he 
eenlre-righl |)arties.'3i 'I'hc support supplied for this parly in the rural and urban area 
is clearly seen in Ihe survey covering the June 1995-April 1996 period. As those who 
are shifted to support the WP from the center right segment is 15.3 % in the rural area 
and 5.4% in the urban area, in the same lime period the shill from the RPP tradition is, 
in the rural area - 0.3 % and in the urban area only 0.6 %M'^This is, according to 
Kardam and 'I'li/.iin due to the ambigious position of the ccnlrc-righl parlies befoie the 
W P.n^
I ’his very last point is important as long as the stale's condition is concerned. 
In the post 1995 period, after the coalition government is formed between the WP and 
the TPP, during the February 28, 1997, meeting, the government is severly criticised 
by the National Security Concil and this started a new process which ended by the 
resignation of the government. This period is backed by the RPP with the argument 
that the secularization is under attack. The following events arc considered as a hidden 
military intervention. Kardam and TUzUn, depending on the data achieved, argues that 
(his stale intervention is a con,sequence of the ambiguity created by the DP tradition 
parlies, namely TPP and MP.^^  ^The researchers also claim that the polarization 
between DP and WP is not ascertained. As long as there is no evident opix)silion liom 
the slate, the shift might continue to develop, but whenever there is a criticism the 
support will be kx)sened.i35
ibid, 71.
71.
*-^ '^ ibid, 73.
'•^'ibid, 73.
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This framework shows that, in Turkey, in the late 1990s, the crisis of 
Kemal ism has reached a peak. Neverthele.ss it should not be taken as a superficial and 
simple crisis. It is rather a complicated one and more intertwined with the hidden 
agenda of democracy and convoluted with the need for the liberalisation of the state, 
reflecting on the citizenship condition, at large. The notion of citizenship in Turkey is 
strictly bound with the nationalist and secularist tenets of Kemalism. A demand for a 
new s(x;ial contract foreseeing the restructuring of the public domain which hâs a more 
liberal appoiach to dilfercnces and being less ambitious in the supressing of the selves 
has helped the rise of political Islam. However, the upsurge of the fundamentalist 
movement in Turkey is not yet an alternative to the Kemalist hegemonic discourse; 
rather it is effected by it.
Also, it could be noted that, it is not the political Islam that caused the crisis of 
Kemalisin but the political Islam emerges from the crisis of Kemalism. In this sense, 
|x>litical Islam may not be a radical alternative to Kemalism but it could only implement 
itself in the political consciousness as long as it uses the componenets of the Kemalist 
discourse. This prediction is to suggest that in Turkey still the political realm is 
captured by the process of modernity and not only the shortcomings of the Turkish 
social democracy but also the constraints of the Turkish political agenda is effected 
from this stance. In this sense, any political ideology or discourse which is prone to 
Ihc ulili/ation of this crisis and trying to enlarge the limits of the hegemonic discourse 
is apt to gain a potential as well as acceleration.
>-^ -'>ibid, 73.
'^^ f’fhis point is discussed tacitly in a recent book Andrew Davison, 
Secuhirisw and Revivalism in Turkey (Yale University Press, 1998), 194- 
211.
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This is a condition which has been proved in the post 1995 elections period 
due to the political events which is explained below. The real weakness and defect of 
Turkish social democracy is its insistence on a more traditional, generic Kemalist, 
modernist hegemonic discourse and its inadequacy in comprehending the essence of 
the condition. This is in a way inevitable because the origins of Turkish social 
democracy, as suggested and argued before, is rooted to say it with Rawls, not in the 
|X)litical but in the metaphyscial.
9.4. Islam in Power and its Aftermath
As WP was the first party in the ranking of votes recieved in the 1995 
elections, the mission of constincting the government was picsented to the chairperson 
of the party, Necmettin Erbakan, January 9, 1996.^37 Because the first party in the 
ranking did not gain the majority in the parliament Erbakan could only form a 
coalition government with one of the centre-right parties, either MP or TPP. In the 
pre-election period the TPP and Tansu Çiller, the chairperson, had constructed the 
whole campaign on two issues; first, secularism defined as the most vital issue for 
Turkey and second, integration of Turkey with Europe. Çiller framed the first issue, 
secularism, with the concept of women and she continiously underlined what they 
have achieved from secularism. The second issue, Europe and Turkey's relations 
with it, was a confused argument, the Westernisation-modernization concepts forming 
the weak point of the debate, when TPP grassroots is considered.
The ambiguity of the concept was due to the condition that, TPP was not only 
slicssing the Europanization of Turkey but also trying to merge it with conservatism
"Cıörcv firbakan'da", Cumhuriyet,, 10 Ocak 1996.
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{'muhafazokarlik') by mentioning that to be European does not neeessitate to break up 
with tradition.138 jn this eontext the 'tradition' eneircles the 'unity and togetherness of 
llie society', the nationalism, the paternalist state understanding formulated as 'father 
state' {'devlet haha').^^^ This framework has been interwoven with the personality of 
Çiller, who has declared herself as the 'daughter of the Republic' {'cumhuriyet 
recalling the secularity. Besides, when Erbakan was given the task Çiller 
immedaiately declared that it was impossible to have a coalition between the two 
parlies lor they arc completely different.!^· With this sheer attack against the WP, 
Erbakan could envisage no chance but trying to search the possibilities of forming a 
coalition with MP. Soon after seeing that it is impossible to find any possibilty of 
government formation with any one of the parties, Erbakan returned the task to the 
President, January 19, 1996.
fhe interpretation concerning this first attempt of carrying the political Islam 
into power in Turkey is proved to be correct when the second step taken in the process 
is analysed. The comments regarding the failure of the trial have stressed that the 
monopolistic capital concentrated in the metropolitan area would not give the
l^^lt is interesting that this approach has also been observed in Murat 
Karayalcm's rhetoric for he has continuiously stressed, especially in the 
period when Turkey was proceeding with the Customs Union process by 
saying that "1 will enter the Europion Union with my mustaches.'
’■PJl or an analysis of the relationship between the centre-right and TI’P 
see Yetvart Danzikyan, "Merkez Sağ-Devlet ve I'ansu Çiller", Birikim, Ocak- 
Şubat 1997, 102-108.
^40Umit Cizre Sakallığoğlu, "24 Aralık 1995 Alacakaranlık Kuşağı 
Seçimleri", Birikim, Ocak 1996, no.81, 27.
141"çiiier: Uzlaşmamız İmkansız", Milliyet, 11 Ocak 1996.
142"pı-bakan Görevi İade Etti", Milliyet, 20 Ocak, 1996.
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provincial capital, which has usually been controlled by the jx)lilical Islam, the chance 
of holding the political power.^^^ n ¡g believed that the provincial capital is 
traditionally divided between the TPP and WP and the urban capital would intervene to 
(cllcr i) the shift of political power to WP and ii) unite the center- right. The coalition 
government between the TPP and MP is taken as an outcome of this endeavour.*“^  
I'hc happily welcomed coalition protocol, for it was assumed as the will of unification 
of tlic ccnlrc-right,·^-'’ has foreseen the prime ministry first to be given to MP for a 
period of six months and than to be transferred to TPP. Nevertheless, before the 
completion of the process coalition was dissolved, June 6, 19961^^ and in the third
 ^ deputy chairperson of WP Abdullah Gül has emphasised this point
before Lirbakan's returning the task, saying that the business circles are 
trying to coalesce 7'PP and MP. Milliyet, 15 Ocak, 1996.
*^" l^n the following period after lirbakan's returning the task, the mission 
is directed to Çiller, January 19, 1996. When she, without any achievment 
returned it back to the President, Yılmaz was called for the same duty, 
Pebruary 3, 1996. Might be as a matter of political tactic, the long 
discussions between MP and WP was about to bring out a coalition 
government but in the final instance it could not be realized. In this 
process, more to the impression that the government would be constructed 
between MP and WP, TPP started to proclaim that they could come together 
with MP even though there was a sheer contradiction and clash between 
the chairpeople of the two parties. After the discussions, the government 
is realized and approved by the President, March 6, 1996. 'I'he government 
recieved the vote of confidence in the parliamentary by March 12, 1996 as 
DLP stayed abstaining.
1^'^As an example for the insistance for the major unifications on the 
right and left wing politics see Hasan Cemal, "Hayırlı Olsun Ama...", Sabah, 
31 Temmuz 1998, 25.
14G'i'he dissolving of the government was due to a very harsh debate about 
Çiller's spending from the hidden treasury when she was the prime 
minister. Çiller argued that the documents related with this debate has 
been publicized by Yılmaz. Besides, a long time m atter of question Çiller's 
wealth was once more brought to the investigation of the parliamentar}' 
and in the related commision MP members would vote against Çiller for 
her to be investigated. Nevertheless the dissolving was due to another and 
legal condition for the Constitutional Court annuled the vote of 
confidence.
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round of a government formation process, to the surprise of many, a conciliation was 
reached between the WP and the TPP, as Erbakan was once more the lesponsible 
chairperson for the construction of the government, The government approved by 
the President June 28, 1996 and received the vote of confidence July, 8, 1996.
This configuration has received severe reactions and criticism. The suspicion 
directed to the government is reflected through the anxiety and the nerveousness of the 
hidden coalition between the intclligcntisia, media and army all through the 
government period. Scxjii after the takeover of the government, the Chief of Staff has 
declared that the power groups in Turkey should not be silent as it happened in Iran 
before the fundamentalist period started.*^ Beginning with this declaration all through 
the period, which finally brought the end of the government in June 18, 1997 by the 
resignation of Erbakan, the tension between the ccxilition of army and the bureaucracy 
and the government never ceased. On the contrary, the stress escalated by various 
declarations''*'^ and finally with the procision of the army tanks in the streets of 
Sincan, a town of Ankara, after a stage play organized by the municipality where the 
audience has called for the holy war {'cihai') and a female journalist has been 
prosecuted by a WP sympathiser, February 1, 1997.*^ o
' cv lirbakan'da", Milliyet, 7 Haziran 1996.
I'^^l-atih Çekirge, "Ordu, İran Ordusu Olmayacak", Sabah, 31 Ağustos 1996.
 ^"^ ‘^  Г11еге are some specific events that provoked this escalation. The major 
ones might be counted as, i) the Libya visit of Erbakan, where President 
Quaddafi explicitly criticised Turkey before the media as Erbakan stayed 
silent (Hürriyet, October 6, 1996); li) the speech delivered by Mayor of 
Sivas İh which he declared that the resentment of the Muslims should 
never suspensed (Hürriyet, November 10, 1996).
ISOi or the complete chronology of the events see Başbakanlık Basin- 
Yaym ve Enformasyon Genel Müdürlüğü, Аут Tarihi: Ocak, Şubat, Mart 
1997 (Ankara: Ümit Yayıncılık Basımevi, 1996).
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'I’lic last phase of the developments is the National Security Council meeting of 
February 28, 1997. In the meeting the army has apparently criticised the WP, as well 
as the government, and accentuated the 'danger of sharia''-'’  ^ In the following days the 
media has started backing the army manifestly. The army, proclaiming the 'danger of 
sharia' as number one priority problem, started to organise a series of meetings with 
various interest groups such as media, the judges, the university rectors, to create a 
common ideological support basis. Meantime, the government escalated the tension 
with insisting on the veil issue, the mosques to be constructed in Ankara and Istanbul, 
provoking the fear of fundamentalism.Not being able to overwhelm the opposition 
in the society coalition government resigned, June 18, 1997, and the chairperson of 
MP has been nominated as the prime minister for a new coalition government., which 
was formed by June 30, 1997 and received the confidence vote by July 10, 1997. 
The last matter of debate has been the stretching of the primary education to eight years 
(rom five years. The government has reacted to the demand which has been araised in 
the declaration of NSC meeting of February 28, 1997, thinking that this would cause 
the detorioration of the hmm-Hatip IJseleri, the sccondaiy education schools designed 
for the education of future religious practitioners. -^ 3^
 ^■'’ h 'or a discussion of the role of National Security Council in the furkish 
politics starting by Pebruary 18, 1997 meeting and the content of the 
declaration submitted to the government see Bülent Tanör, "MGK'mn İlgi 
Alanları", Milliyet, 13 Temmuz 1998, 20.
' I hcrc is a vast 'litarature' concentrated on this ivssue reflecting the 
'war of positions' between the government and army, presidenc}' and the 
opposition. See "Demirel: Türban konusu gündemden çıkarılmalıdır". 
Sabah, G Şubat 1998, 1; "Yılmaz: RP tabanı militanlaşma ve silahlanma 
dönemine girmiştir.". Hürriyet, 8 Şubat, 1998; "Demirel'in 
değerlendirmeleri", Yeni Yüzyıl, 25 Şubat 1998,1.
l.S3"i:rbakan: 8 Yıllık Eğitim Mümkün Değildir", Sabah, 1 Nisan, 1997, 1.
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The l'cbiuary 28, 1997 meeting and ils aftermath has been interpreted by 
many as a 'post-modern coup'.^^ The feeling that the position of the army staying in 
(lie middle ol tlie political life has not reversed after the government change. In this 
context the bureaucracy should also be analysed. The declarations made by the army in 
this pcricxl is of importance for it continues concerning the new government period. In 
this sense, not only as a political position taken related with the WP-TPP coalition but 
also a will continued to be declared in the MP-TPP coalition by the army is a matter of 
cur i os i t y .Yet ,  after Karadayi's above mentioned August 30, 1996 explanation the 
process has continued and another one is heard in the late September of the same 
ycai On another basis the Ministry of National Defence, as a member of the 
cabinet has been obliged to explain that the ministry of Justice has been close to the 
demands of the General Staff
Still, after the February 28 declarations HUsamettin Cindoruk, a prestigious 
politican and a close friend of SUleyman Demircl, the president has not refrained from 
saying that the declaration is an ultimatom.^^® and before the meeting of NSC Ecevit 
clearly indicated that an intervention would be wrong. On the other hand according
’ ■‘^ ^Öıner Laçiner, "Geçen Ayın Birikimi: lurkiye", Birikim, Ocak/Şubat 
1998, no. 105,106, 3.
 ^ Tansu Çiller has expressed in a subtle way that army has not been 
affective in the construction of the government; see, Aym Tarihi: Ocak, 
Şubat, Mart (Ankara: Başbakanlık Basın-Yayın ve Enformasyon Genel 
Müdürlüğü, 1996), 165.
156"Karadayı: İşler Kötüye Gidiyor", Sabah, 1 Ekim, 1996, 1.
157"'i ayan'ın değerlendirmeleri". Zaman, 2 Şubat 1997.
' ‘’^"Cindoruk: Bildiri Muhtıradır", Milliyet, 1 Mart 1998, 1.
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lo Abdullah GUI after the declaration there occured the impression of a military 
regime.*^’^’ General Staff immeadiately reacted to these notices and when a general, in 
a way violating tlie rules that army members can not make fx)litical comments, clearly 
criticised the government, he has stayed immune to any civil investigation and there 
has lx;cn no rcaclion from the army. In one another occasion the army has diicclly and 
inslantly reacted against Çiller's explanations concerning the above mentioned 
condition and the eight years secondary education.'^*'
It is possible but not sufficient to say that in the post-1980 era, the relations 
between the civil governments and army has reached the most interesting and complex 
condition s (X )ii after the WP-TPP coalition government. The reason behind this is that 
the Yılmaz government has not been immune to this tension emanating from the 
criticism directed to it from the army. Even though it is alleged that this cabinet is 
tacitly supported by the army and the raison d'etre of it has been the realization of the 
conditions set by the NSC decleration^^^, still the army did not refrain from criticising 
the government by announcing that the 'battle against the fundamentalism' is not 
satisfactory.
Under this condition, the Prime Minister has felt the need to stress that in the 
struggle against the fundamentali.sm the right and priority belongs to the govcrnmncl,
159"i;( (3vit: 'Darbe Yanlış olur', Cumhuriyet, 'Ll Şubat 1998.
1 ()0 "(;ü1 ; Askeri Rejim görüntüsü doğmuştur", MiUiyet, 6 Mart 1998.
Ibb'Genel Kurmay: Çiller'in açıklamaları yanlış". Cumhuriyet, 1 mayıs
1997,1.
most striking one among them is the implementaion of the eight 
years secondary education. Although the substructural conditions were 
not adequate still with an irreversible will the necessary laws have been 
issued and the condition is .satisfied.
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indirectly reminding the borders between the civils and the soldiers, more
striking point in this debate is the 'West Work Group' {'Bah Çalışma Grubu'). The 
Group starling its inisson during the WP-TPP government, mainly controlled the 
s(x;ial and political life, as well as setting the basic criteria for the indcx;trination of the 
society and other interest gorups by the secular norms. Resisting the demands that 
it should be demolished it continued operating in the following political period . Not 
only these demands have been refused it is later understood that the Group has even 
intervened the privacies of the various people by following their phone calls.
Under these conditions, the post 1995 period, especially after the 1996 WP- 
TPP government has been an era which is open to the debate of dcm(x:racy or, in other 
words, an era in search of a democratic opening. The debate, whether a political 
ideology which has gained power and backed by a certain group in the democratic 
sti ucturc should stay in the system has been one of the main arguments in the debate in 
the related time period. This is more related with the earlyi<^ 5 debates concerning the 
WP and its perception as a political oganization and ideology. At the beginning it was 
believed that thip political organisation and ideology would help the development ol' 
democracy in Turkeyi^’^>. It also provoked the arguments concerning both the
16.1"Y,|i-pj,z'dan askere ikaz", Radikal, 5 'femmuz 1998, 6.
^^ ’^ rıüvcn lirkaya, then the Chief of Navy, in June 9, 1997 has explained 
that, the misson of the Group is to make clear the appearance of the 
fundamentalist menace in Turkey and to make actual the security and 
order plans against it. Ayın Tarihi: Haziran-Temmuz-Ağustos 1997 , 136.
1^ ’^Mesut Yılmaz once indicated that the democratic system might be 
changed in a radical way by the political organizations came into power 
through the system and WP is an example for that. "Yılmaz: Demokratik 
3^oldan gelen partiler rejim için tehlike oluşturabilirler". Cumhuriyet, 8 
Şubat 1997, 1.
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structiinvl issues of democracy, related with the above argument, and the other analysis 
about the crisis of political life in Turkey. The reaction against the WP-TPP 
government and the incapability of a long waited coalition government, which united 
the centre right and left, staying immune to the criticisms emanated from the army 
shows that in Turkey the crisis is more deep. The ambiguity whether the side 
supporting the WP or the other side which is against it by moving together with the 
army is more 'democratic' has been a vital issue in the 1996-1998 period. Every step 
put forward in this process has helped the escalation of the debate.*^’^
Legal 7’urkish left in this period has prefered to c<mlimic with the mainstream 
discourse. The democratic left DLP has been a member of the government and the 
social democratic RPP, although stayed outside the government, has followed the 
dominant rhetoric attached to secularism, i.e. the symbol of the statist approach. Its 
distance to the new demands and expectations and its refrainment from the 
implementation of the new concepts in the political agenda has deepened the political 
crisis in Turkey, pushing the social democracy into a corner as well. Although the 
central cadres and administration has called for a renewal the last congress of the RPP, 
in September 1998, has been a focus of criticism for its symbolism which has recalled 
the authoritcrian discourse. The dramatic clogging of Turkish social democracy might 
be uiKler stood tetter as the crisis of Turkish socio-jx)litical life is analy.scd further for 
if under such a fecund condition this very political practice stays inactive than it might 
be because it is a part of it, which might be true because the crisis could be taken as the
166por the background and analysis of this debate see Hasan Bülent 
Kahraman, Yeni Bir Sosyal Demokrasi İçin (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, 1991), 
68 -  
84.
167'1'he final point is the dissolving of the WP by the Constitutional Court 
and condemning Tayyip Erdoğan, Mayor of Istanbul to imprisonment.
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crisis of Ihe establishment in Turkey. This part will briefly be discussed in the 
Conclusion chapter.
Conclus ion
In this chapter, the thesis argued that the crisis faced by social democracy in the 
late 1990s, whose analytical and emprical dimensions were shown in the previous 
chapter, is an outcome of the political, social and cultural developments reached a peak 
in Turkey in the mentioned time period but whose roots are found in the post-1980 
periexJ. Among others, the 1990s is demarcated by a very concrete debate, politically, 
f(x:using on the rise of the political Islam and the Islamic revivalism in Turkey. In fact, 
tins is not a situation pertaining to the late 1990s. Its origins are found in the 1970s. 
The early movements of political Islam has been subject of the military coups of 1971 
and 1980. Nevertheless, as has been discussed in the chapter, the emergence of new 
political, social and economic conditions, which might be epitomised as the outcome 
of post-modernism first, then globalization, has been effective on the upsurge of this 
movement. In this context, political Islam should not be conceived as a subject-matter 
having an 'end in itself but it is rather a more complicated one, convoluted with the 
general framework of concepts such as, identity, pluralism, radical democracy, 
multiculturalism, etc. In this sense, political Islam should be thought together with the 
crisis of modernity. At least, this crisis should not be isolated from the criticisim o f ' 
iwxlernity, which has started in the 1980s as a part and parcel of postmodernity.
The chapter also argues that, this formation is observed in the West European 
and North American political and social life but whose precipitation is drastically lived 
in the former Eiustern Block and Soviets has been incorporated by the Turkish politics. 
WP by subjecting a radical criticism to social, political and cultural establishment in
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Turkey has brought the first radical réévaluation of the constitutive ideology reigning 
in Till key, which is Kemalisin. Being backed by the new stx i^al formation came fore 
in Turkey beginning by the 1980s, WP has played a dual role in the political theorj' in 
d urkey after gaining power in the 1995 national elections. On the one hand, the 
criticism of the establishment on the social and political level has helped the 
reassessment of the modernity in Turkey. Nevertheless, on the other hand, WPand its 
political discourse has appeared to be a radically mcxlcrnist one. In this context, the 
discourse of the political Islam has also contributed to understand the complex and 
problematic structure of Kemalism.
In the chapter it has been attempted to show that both Kemalism and political 
Islam, as a discourse and epistemology, has mutually affected each other. Although, 
in the early Republican pcricxl Kemalisin has established itself with a sheer criticism of 
the Islamic epistemology, yet, various analysis have shown that, hidden in the 
construction of the disœurse is the Islamic world view and its political practice. In the 
same line, the discourse of the political Islam, observed in the 1990s, has also been 
deeply imprcs,scd by the Kemalist approach. This binary formation is explained in the 
chapter by referring to the concept of 'constitutive outside.' Nevertheless, the chapter 
aigucs that, contrary to a many interpretations and comment.s, the constitutive ideology 
continues dominating the political realm in Turkey. This is due to the complicated 
structure of Kemalism and in this sense it could be said that it has now developed a 
'problematic-productive' position. This is a condition especially emanating from its 
attributions to modernity.
On this basis, as another argument of the thesis, it has been assumed that the 
crisis of Turkish social democracy in the 1990s has a two-tier structure. First of all.
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'I’liikish social democracy, as lias empirically been shown in the previous chapter, is 
not any more represented uniquely by the RPR On the contraray DLP has gained 
enough power to come lore and be taken as the lepiesentetive o( this political 
ideology. However, there is a problematical situation there for, DLP has never- 
declared itseir as a s(x;ial democratic party. This condition is a consequence ol the new 
social iorniations in Turkey and DLP's attachment to them with an eclectic ideology 
which is not social democracy. Second, the party accentuating its social democratic 
ideology, RPP, has weakened due to the specific condition that it did not receive, 
perceive and develop the new structure. It has continued with the traditional 
ideological understanding, defending the 'genuine' Kemalist values and a notion of 
modernity. This approach has reached its peak when after the 1995 elections a 
coalition government is formed between WP and TPP and when a new political pcritxJ 
is started in Turkey by the NSC meeting of February 28, 1997, which has been 
analysed in te chapter. In this sense, it has closed itself to the new interpretations of 
those concepts such as identity, pluralism, multiculturalism, new forms and trends of 
democracy, in general. This framework, as has been argued in the chapter·, has not 
only subjected RPP to a stagnation but also has also annuled the chance of renovating 
itself and its ideology. This condition will be analysed in the Conclusion chapter.
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CHAPTER X
CONCLUSION
PROSPECTS FOR TURKISH SOCIAL DEMOCRACY
I'hc crisis that Turkish social democracy has been facing since the 1980s, 
according to the argument put forward in this thesis, is a complicated and multi­
dimensional one. It has historical, structural and ideological roots and, above all, it is 
strictly interrelated with the conjuncture. The thesis has argued that, in Turkey, there 
has never been a 'real' social democracy attached to the genuine social democratic 
ideals and ideology, whose roots are found in the Western Europe socialist, social 
democratic and Marxist tradition. Instead, .social democracy in Turkey, is a notion, 
pronounced first both epistemologically and politically, in the early 1980s, after the 
foi niation of Social Democratic Party, to replace the former Republican Peoples' Party 
which was dis.solved by the military Junta, in the post-1980 military coup period, 
which has had a veiy short life, and then within the Social Democratic Populist Party, 
by certain, specific intra-party factions. Nevertheless, after the re-establishment of 
RPP and the merger of this party with SDPP, all attempts and intra-party factions in 
the struggle of convincing the party grassroots to realise a social democratic
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transíotmalion have been isolated. RPP has once more attuned itself to its traditional 
discourse and tenets. In this sense, social democracy is considered to be a sub­
category of the main discourse generated by the history of RPP, making the primary 
cause of (he crisis cpi.slcinologiad.
As a consequence of this understanding, social democracy, in Turkey, as has 
been shown in the thesis, should be considered to be a new phase in the process of the 
inner transformations of RPP ideology, that is, Kcmalism, which is, in fact, the 
founding ideology of the state. This structural idiosyncrasy of social dcm(x;racy in 
Tin key connects it, organically, to the state and, in this regard, the thesis argued that 
the fiist basic condition that causes the crisis is this symbiotic relationship between the 
social democracy and the state. This is to suggest that in order to understand the crisis 
it is necessary to analyse the formative and (he structural aspects of (his founding 
epistemology and this is what the thesis has attempted to do.
The basic conclusion which comes out of that procedure is that the crisis of 
social dcmcx^racy in Turkey is convoluted with the crisis of modernity in the Western 
social structure for, the traditional reason of being of both RPP and its ideology is the 
implementation of 'modernity project.' This notion includes both the 'will to 
modernisation' and the method and the epistemology of modernisation. In this regard, 
modernisation in Turkey has foreseen the transformation of the existing Ottoman 
society toward the nation-state founded on Western ideals by the vanguard parly 
which should be under the central control of the political elites. On the other hand, as a 
part of the long-term mcxlcrnisation tradition in Turkey, which has started by the late 
nineteenth century, this ideology, for its specific structural conditions, has been 
backed by the army and, this brings out the second pillar of the moderni.sation
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process. The third is the stale elites and the bureaucrats. This 'modernising body' 
which is also the carrier of the will of modernisation, has chosen 'from the above' 
reformation approach as a methodology. Here, it could be staled that, this is not only 
a choose by Ihc free will but a natural consequence of the model, binally, Ihe RPP has 
been, as argued in the thesis, in the first period, the founding parly of the nation-state 
and, in the second phase, it has been the carrier, the conveying band of the stale 
ideology.
The political economy of RPP has been technologist and developmcntalisl, in 
the first period, 1923-1950. Sialism, in this sense is the basis ol both the economy 
and ideology. The body of the modernisation is completed with a strict devotion to 
Enlightenment tenets, primarily to secularism, which is a part and parcel of positivism, 
a concept which has been the pillar of Turkish modernity since the beginning*. 
Although there are attempts to change this structure, yet all of them, namely, 'left-of 
centre' and 'democratic left' openings, are the two significant openings to be 
mentioned among the others, are linked to this epistemological and methodological 
framework. In other words, this structure as a whole might be conceptualised as the 
'authoritarian nKxJcrni.salion', which has acted as a hegemonic di.scoursc. All attempts 
in the process of transforming this structure have paid keen attention to reject any 
'outsider' effect, namely ideology, but stayed loyal to the constitutive structure. In this 
sense, even the terminology has been changed and instead of 'social democracy', 
'democratic left' is accepted, saying that the first concept is by definition goes to the 
Marxist tradition but the second one is something which is specific for Turkey. In this
•in a recent book this notion is analysed and defined as a concept which is 
anti-hermeneutical and which conveys itself to a closure not letting to 
understand the other probable and evident developments in the society. 
Andrew Davison, Secularism and Revivalism in Turkey (New Haven and 
London: Yale University Press, 1998).
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sense, as noted above, Turkish social democracy, as a parochial approach, dial 
einatialcs liom Rl’l^ has one evident epistemological constraint. This constraint is the 
inner shortcoming of the founding ideology and behind that it is possible to find the 
perception of the of the abstract notion of the state. This point might be taken as the 
most important aspect of both the structural idio.syncracy o f ’I'urkish social democracy 
and the crisis. Even though this aspect of Turkish social democracy has always been a 
fetter for this political ideology to adopt itself to the universal norms of social 
democracy, the major .shortcoming has been faced in the late 199()s, which is marked 
as the period of globalisation. If globalisation, as will be analysed comprehensively 
below, is taken as the whole sum of new developments occurred on the social, 
political and international relations realm, as a con.sequcncc of various different 
technological changes, who.se repercussions are evident on the politiatl economy field, 
Turkish social democracy, as a parochial and national ideology has lived its dramatic 
failure in this period of totally being immune from the new developments. The 
determining factor in this process is the problematic situation of the notion of nation­
state to which Turkish social dcmœracy is attached.
Globalization might be taken as the main framework that has dissolved the 
dominance of the nation-states in the international realm, together with the postmodern 
approaches that questioned the centrality of the state. The socio-political crisis 
occurred in the late 1980s and in the 1990s might be put as a crisis of transition from 
an established order to a new one due to a set of 'global flows'.^ Linked with this
^This notion of flow and its effect on the global developments is analysed 
on three levels as, 'flovys of capital; Hows of people; Hows of images, signs 
and symbols' in Ayşe Öncü and I’ctra Wcyland, "Introduction: struggles 
over lebensraum  and social identitiy in globalizing cities", in Ayşe Öncü 
and I’etra Wcyland, eds., Space, Culture and Power: New Identities in 
Globali/.ina C7(/e.s (l.ondon and New Jersey: Zed llooLs, 1997), 1-20.
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development it could be argued that the 1980s and 1990s has been a period of crisis at 
large in (he West European political world. This crisis is interwoven with the new 
understandings and conceptualisations of democracy. On this ground, mainly, the 
condition and concept of citizenship, together with civil society, and 'self as an 
object', has become the problematic argument of the period. As the transition from the 
nation-state model to a transnational structure, the citizen that has been formed as a 
consequence of the will of the nationalism, which rests on the homogcni.sation of the 
differences, the subordination of the self, is about to be replaced with a new 
understanding of democracy which relies on the notion of identity^ and the difference 
by way of a new understanding of 'contract.*^
The crisis prc.scntcd above is felt in Turkey by scx;ial dcmocmtic politics due to 
the similar reasons. Here, it should be noted that, in the 1980s, the emergence of the 
nco-libcral and New Right policies have enhanced and deepened the inner 
shortcomings of social democracy. This is due to a clash between the two opfK>sing 
iticologies. As (he New Right in 'I'urkcy, in the 1980s run for tlic minimal state and (he 
integration of Turkey with the outer world via technological developments, social 
democracy, in the same period, contested for the strong and the central state. 
Nevertheless, in Turkey, the roots of the crisis are more linked to a contradiction 
between the interest groups, kx)scly defined as civil .society elements and a state model 
which insists on preserving its established condition in the social artd political realm.
-^I'or a discussion how left has approached to this concept and the 
understanding of the notion itself see Rric Ilobsbawm, "Identity Politics 
and the l eft", New Left Review (May-June 1996), no, 217, 38-47.
"^ I or a discussion of the relationship between pluralism and social 
democracy, as a new emerging concept see, Michael Walzer, "Pluralism 
and Social Democracy", D/s.sent (Winter 1998), 47-53.
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gaining its power irom the alliance and cohabitation between the state elites , 
bureaucracy and military, whose formative basis is argued in chapters 1 and 2. This 
tension is considered to happen traditionally between , Yet, it is possible to say that, 
what is dclnied as the crisis of the politics and the state is organically the crisis of the 
ccniic and (he peri|)hcry, in Turkey. Nevertheless, thcccntrc-pcriphcry contradiction 
is not immune to the politics-state tension. On the state level, the basic shortcoming is 
related with what is called the legitimacy crisis braid with govern mentality. Because 
the levels are not watertight but interrelated, the political level of crisis encompasses 
those issues related with the crisis of representation, which might be considered as an 
outcome of legitimacy crisis, that intends to underline the distxjlicf in |X)litics and calls 
the end of politics. The crisis of the political level, on the other hand, is correlated and 
associated with secularism and citizenship. The 1995-1998 period in Turkey, with 
these assumptions, could be taken as a case to analyse the crisis and the inadequacy of 
the social dcm(x:racy to respond to that condition.
'I’hc two main turning points in the post 1995 elections period .shows the depth 
and the sti uclural aspects of the crisis. First of all, with (he failure of the coalition 
between MP and TPP, a much expected and accepted government model in the public 
opinion, it has become ob.servable that, the so called dis|X!ision of the politics, the 
scattering of the parties located in the same political wing, is not the reason of the 
crisis. On the other hand, through the same process, it has once more become 
perceptible that, the representation erisis, as an interrelated component of legitimacy 
crisis, in Tui kish political life has reached its crux, because, behind the dissolving of 
the coalition government, and the construction of the new one between WP and TPP, 
the major issues that functioned was the personal problems of the chairpersons of the 
both pailies. In the second period of the era, the WP-TPP government has once more
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created the stage for all the issues considered above. This period has witnessed, even 
though in an indirect way and tacitly, the emergence of the 'established centre' in 
Turkish politics, namely the military and the bureaucratic elite coalition. This coalition 
has intervened the political .scene and has brought the government change. During this 
process, the concept of demœracy has once more been discussed with reference to its 
essential concepts.
7’his di.scussion has proved that in Turkey, the constitutive modernist approach 
to politics is still powerful enough to .shape the political life. This understanding might 
be defined as the Jacobean way of solving the problems but doubtle.ss, in the late 
twentieth century, it could be argued that, the same methodology might be the basic 
condition from which the problems emerge. In this sen.se, Jacobini.sm in Turkey refers 
to the '(rom the above' revolution that transformed the country and intrcxluccd the 
modernist identity which surrounds the .seculari.sm and citizenship. The legitimi/ntion 
of the suite Jacobinism in Turkey has usually been via secularism. The Jacobin notion 
of secularism is basically the dominance of the state on the private realm and, in this 
regard, .secularism in Turkey should be comprehended as a concept which is 
interrelated uniquely with the state. The state controls the whole structure through 
seculari.sm, where the national identity is a defined and given conditionality as well as 
the notion of citizenship. Turkish official citizenship, as has been analy.sed broadly in 
the thesis, and di.scusscd in the conditional literature, is a subject who is loyal to the 
state and who, by accepting the already defined identity, helping the state in the 
eradication ol the dilTcrcnces in the s(x;ial body^. On the other hand, secularism, taken 
as a Constitutional obligation is imposed on the citizen as a duly. 'I'liis framework
·‘^ l·ot· the early formation of this identity see Hasan Bülent Kahraman, 
Yahya Kemal Rimheaud'yu Okudu mu? (İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 
1997).
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encompasses the citizen and the limits of the concept is demarcated by the 
Constitution.
The demands arisen during the WP-TPP government indicates that a new 
pericxl is about to start in Turkey which is related basically with the notion of 
citizenship. Although it is redueed to the debate revolving around the 'problem of 
veiling' yet, even that discussion well underline a new understanding of politics, 
which is expected to rely on the intersection of the new understanding of the private 
realm and self. This is also closely related with the new conceptualisation of the 
citizenship, far away from the given and existing definition, which runs for the 
homogenisation and effacing of the differences. On the contrary, in this period, the 
concept of difference is not only a matter of the private realm, but something which is 
demanded to be disclosed and even 'performed' in the public realm. No doubt that this 
process is backed by the feminist movement and, to a certain extent, with the 
challenges emanated from the ethnic developments, especially through the demands 
raised by the Kurds, as being the most powerful group among the different ethnies in 
Turkey.^
riiis framework of crisis is directly related with the condition that I'urkish 
social democracy faces in Turkey. Here, it is necessary to point out that, as has 
already been mentioned, in the West-European countries, the left in general, but 
significanlly Ihe .social democracy, beginning by the laic 1980s, has been in the 
process of transformation and getting adopted to the new demands of the 'new
new analysis of this notion is in Michael M. Gunter, The Kurds and the 
Future o f Turkey {New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997).
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t i me s . Th i s  transformation period consists of a series of radical changes, British 
Labour Party being the most radical example involved in this process.^ The sharp but 
long transition^ to the new structure has been the subject matter of a vast literature and, 
in tins context, not only the excision of the Clause IV*^ ’ but also the implementation of 
the new concepts of democracy has been considered ground breaking.'* Even though 
this transition is deliberated in various circles as a shift towards 'revisionism' and 
Ihcic arc, in the late 1990s after the electoral victories for the left parties in France'^, 
and Germany'^ following Britain, significant differences between various sexiial
^I'or an overall analysis of the transformation and the development of the 
now tredn .see, llorinan Schwartz, "Social Democracj' (ioing Down or Down 
DiKler", Conipnintivc Politics (April 1998), 253-272.
8For an early discussion of this transformation see, Conrad Russell, "New 
labour: Old Гогу Writ large?", New Left Review, (November-l)ecember 
1996), no. 219,78-88.
^ rhis concept is refered by some scholars as 'labour's  long-term 
m odernization.' See Martin J. Smith, "Л Return to Revisionism? The labour 
Party's Policy Review", in Martin J. Smith and Joanna Spear, eds.. The 
Changing Labour Party (London and New York: Routledge, 1992), 17.
" 'I 'o r this very much debated issue see, Leo Panitch and Colin Leys, The 
liiul oL Parliamentary Socialism: Prom New Left to New Labour (London and 
New York: Verso, 1998).
' '  David Marquand, "llalf-Way to Citizenship? 'Lhe Libour Party and 
Constitutional Reform", in M.j. Smith and j. Spear, eds.. The Changing, 44- 
58.
'^Francois I linker, "I'he French Socialist: Towards post-republican 
values?", in Donald Sasoon, ed.. Looking Left: European Socialism A fter the 
Cold W ar(london, New York: 1. IL Fauris, 1997), 109-123.
131'homas Meyer, "The Transformation of German Social Democracy", in D. 
Sasoon, Looking I.eft, 124-141.
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democratic parlies'^, yet in all above mentioned political organisations in the 1990s 
observable is an overwhelming renewal.’·'’
This process is defined by some scholars as the 'Third Way.’’  ^The concept 
has arisen a considerable debate.’  ^The basic arguments of the concept will be given 
briefly below but, suffice is to say here is that, the Third Way is a generic concept 
used to indicate a revision oi the basic policies of the social dcmociatic parties and, in 
this context, the policies formed by the different social democratic parlies, even if 
there is no direct reference to the concept, and there is no similarity among themselves, 
is considered to be a derivation of Third Way politics.'’  ^In fact the differences and 
discrepancies between German, French, and British social democracy is a shared and *
I'^As ail example see David Marsh, "A Very German Model of Blairism", New 
Stcitcsnuin, f) March 1998, 14-15.
* -‘^ John l.yod, "Utility Wear for Europe's Socialists", New Staiesman, 1 May 
1998, 26-27.
’^Not the founder but the scholar who reinvigorated the concept,
Anthony Giddens has published his book bearing the same name after a 
long debate perpetuated in the various journals. See, Anthony Giddens,
I he I hird Way: '¡'he Renewal o f Social Democracy (Cambridge: Polity, 1998). 
l or an early critic of the book see, Steven Lukes, "Left Down the Middle", 
Times literary Supplement, September 25, 1998, n. 4982, 3-4.
l^Por a more populistic one see, "Is there such a thing as a Third Way in 
politics? Yes: Anthony Giddens. No: Hillary Wainwright", Guardian, Maj^
23, 1998. Nevertheless, this debate is after Giddens' publication of an early 
version of his book. See, Anthony Giddens, "After the Left's Paralysis",
New Statesman, 1 May 1998, 18-21.
l^The early dissent to this approach came from the intellectuals who have 
taken place in the renewal of the British labour Party; sec, Simon Buckby 
and Neal lawscm, "'Ihird Way? No Way Pony", New Statesman, 13 March 
1998, 16-18. Phis debate is further perpetuated by Steve Richards,
"Interview: Jack Straw", New Statesman, 3 April 1998, 14-16. Straw then 
was the shadow Home Secretary and the answers to his views might be 
found in, I ranck Vandenbrouckc, "liqualily Remains a Key Value", New 
Statesman, 24 April 1998, 30; and, Michael Howard, "labour's Assault on 
Preedom", New Statesman, 24 April 1998, 31.
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reconciled r e a l i ty .I n  this context, Third Way is understood as a concept which 
loiesec'.s (he adaplalion ol’.social democracy to the globali/alion oi' the global era or 
vice verso?'^ In Lafonlaine's words, it is a merging of "putting politics back in ils 
rightful placc"2i and, tackling with the economic issues on the first hand. This view 
point is indirectly related with, as Giddens put is, the transgression between the "old 
style social democracy" and the "neo-liberal outlook"^^ which brings fore the core 
discussion whether 'new scHaal democracy' is a version (T nco-liljeralism.-^ Here, 
two reasons loicc us to analyse the 'Fhird Way |x)lilics. 'I'hc first is, the RPP, in ils last 
congress has announced that it is under a transformation proccss^^· which has been 
interpreted as a proccvss of gelling adopted to the Third Way polilics^^. Second, 
because (he Third Way politics itself has come out as a policy formulation "after the
discrcpencics have not come out only from the relations between 
the social democracies of different countries but also among the leaders of 
the speciFor tic parties where German Social Democratic Party is a good 
example. I'he differences between I.afontaine and Scliroeder who ran for 
the chairpersonship of the party see Ian Treynor, "Moderniser issues 
though plan for power", Guardian, December 5, 1997, 5.
*^^ ln this regard the former chairperson of German Social Democratic 
Party makes interesting remarks; see, Oskar Lafontaine, " Phe Future of 
German Social Democracy", New Left Review, March -April 1997, 72-87.
21 Ibid., 74.
22(;iddens, Third, 8-13.
23For an approach in this context, framing the British labour Party see, 
David Coates, "labour Governments: Old Constraints and New Parameleres," 
New Left Review (November-December 1996), no. 219, (T l-ll.
24c//P Genel Başkam Deniz Baykal'ın 28. Olağan Kurultay Konuşma Metni 
(Ankara: N.p., 1998).
2-‘'I'or a very conservative elaboration .see, Ilayri Ko/.anoğlu, "Ocüncü Yol: 
Sosyal Demokrasi için tek }'ol mu, son yol mu?". Birikim, liylül 1998, no.
113, 25-32.
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Icii's panilysis^^’" and as a concept "beyond left and right^^·', ji conld force the RPP lo 
icalise a transformation in the global era. With this regard now the basics of the I ’liird 
Way politics can be analysed.
Giddens, in the process of constructing a new framework for a new politics, 
starts by demarcating five dilemmas. These are "i) globalization; ii) individualism; iii) 
left and right; iv) political agency; v) ecological ivssues^ .^” This framework is strictly 
correlated with what Giddens calls the Third Way Politics.' Giddens, suggests that 
the "major revolutions of our time" is "globalization, transformations in personal life 
and our relations to nature.2^ " This also proposes to take all five elements counted 
above as interrelated but not as isolated elements. If 'new social democracy' is thought 
to be interrelated with the Third Way politics, than what is defined for the Third Way 
might be taken as the milestones of this new model and in this frame Giddens clearly 
purpoi ts that
third way politics should take a positive attitude towards 
globaliz.ation...should preserve a core concern with social Justice, 
while accepting that the range of questions which escape the 
left/right divide is greater before. Equality and individual freedom 
may conflict but egalitarian measures also often increase the range 
of freedoms open to individuals. Freedom to social democrats 
should mean autonomy of action, which in turn demands the 
involvement of wider social community- o^ Having abandoned
^^ ’Amhony (iiddens, "After", 19.
^^Anthony Giddens, Beyond Left and Right: Tile Tuluve o f Radical Politics" 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998).
-^«Ibid., 27 54.
^'^Ihid., ()4.
lb<‘ ch'bales in the lale 1990s, especially in the circles and politics of  
Ihitish l.aboiir Party, communitarianism has played an enournious role 
and Tony Blair has declared that especially Amitai Etzioni has had a great 
effect on shaping his ideas. For these remarks and his views, strecthed on
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collcclivism. Third Way politics look for a new relationship 
between the individual and the community, a new definition of 
rights and obligations...One might suggest as a prime motto for the 
new politics, no rights without responsibilities. Old-style .social 
dcmcxjracy, however, was inclined to treat right as unconditional 
claims. With expanding individualism should come an extension of 
individual obligations.^!
This framework, brings us to the basic problem that both social democracy in 
general and Turkish social democracy as a case faces. It is the relationship between the 
stale, society, democracy ami social democracy. As has been argued in the thesis, the 
ciisis of Turkish social democracy is due to the symbiotic relationship between the 
state and the constitutive ideology that social democracy in Turkey internalises and 
develops. The 'Third Way politics' or the 'new social democracy', in the process of 
bringing a new solution to the existing problems that emanates from the problematic 
interaction between the mentioned concepts, suggests that
in today's society should be no authority without democracy...The 
right has always looked to traditional symbols as the prime means of 
justifying authority, whether in the nation, government or other 
institutions...Consequently, democracy can never be more than 
partial. Social democrats should oppose this view. In a society where 
tradition and custom are loosing their hold, the only route to the 
establishing of authority is via democracy.-^ 2
This is what Giddens calls "democratising democracy" and this is the 
reconstruction of the state, in opposition to the views of right that wants to shrink and
a rather broader perspective see, Tony Blair, New Britain: My Vision o f a 
Young Country (London: Fourth Fstate, 1996).
Giddens, Beyond, 64-65.
32ibid., 66.
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traditional social democracy to expand it.33 In this process, the third way politics 
emphasises various points
1) 'I’lic slate must rcs|X)nd strucniially to globali'/alion ImiI no! as one­
way process. 'ГІ1С dcnuK'rati.sation of democracy Ciist oí all implies 
decentralisation. Globalization creates a strong impetus and logic to 
the downward devolution of power, but also to upward devolution.
2) The state should expand the role of the public sphere, which means 
constitutional reform directed towards greater transparency and 
openness, as well as the introduction of new safeguards against 
corniption.34 3) To retain or regain legitimacy, states without enemies 
have to elevate their administrative efficiency. 4) The downward 
pressure of globalization^^ introduces not only the possibility but the 
necessity of forms of democracy other than the orthodox voting 
process. Government can re-establish more direct contact with 
citizens, and citizens with government, through 'experiments with 
democracy' -local direct democracy, electronic referenda, citizens' 
juries and other possibilities...5) The demœratisation of democracy 
cannot be only кюаі or national- the state must have a cosmopolitan 
outlook, while upward démocratisation should not stop at the regional 
level. Downward démocratisation presumes the renewal of civil 
society. The.se points taken together define of form of government 
which it should be the aim of .social democrats lo promolc: the new 
democratic state.3<>
This 'dcmocratisation of democracy' and the re-establishment of the new 
demcx^ratic state .should be via civil society, which constitutes the la.st dimension of the 
Third Way politics. The renewal of civil society needs the refurbishment of the 
following points, even though it includes such crucial propo.sals as community 
renewal through harnessing local initiative: "the partnership of government and civil
33ibid., 70.
34 | his point in the text deals specifically with the British context.
33This concept should not be confused with another one developed as 
'globalization from the above' and 'globalization from the below.' For 
details .see, Richard Falk, " I'he Making of Global Citizenship", in Jeremy 
Rercher, el. al, eds., Global Visions: Beyond the New World Order (Boston: 
South lind l’re,s.s, 1992), 190-192.
3bGiddens, Ihird, 72-78.
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society, involvement of the third sector^^, protection of the local public sphere, 
community- based crime prevention, the demcx^ratic fam ily .F inally , the new scx^ ial 
democracy should rely on "the cosmopolitan nation and nationalism."39 This notion 
embraces the di.ssolving of the con.scrvativc understanding and m<xlcl of nationalism 
but the "special group affiliations that necessarily prejudice national identity" which 
conveys to "the radical multicultunilism of the libertarians."'*9 To achieve this task, the 
concept that should start functioning is the 'cultural pluralism.'^! Nevertheless, "the 
cosmopolitan nation implies cosmopolitan democracy, operating on a globalizing 
scale."*2" jg indeed, the acceptance of heterogeneity found in a s(x:icty, which
means the existence of different ethnicities, and the concept of 'global govcrnancc^· '^ 
However, it is not the global governance that would construct the globalized 
democracy but it is a two-way interaction and "cosmopolitan democracy is not only 
about the movement of governance towards a world level but about its diffusion 
downwards to local regions."*"·"
The notion of the 'I'hird Sector' encompasses the 'voluntary work.' In 
this sense it is far away from what has been formulated as 'the public 
sector' (balk sektörü) by Bülent Ecevit in Turkey, as discussed in the 
fourth chapter of this thesis.
'^^Giddens, 'I'hird, 79.
39ibid., 130-132 and 137.
"**>lbid., 132.
"^•ibid, 133-138.
"^2|bid., 133.
"^^ibid., 144-147.
"•"^ Ibid., 14().
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After this brief analysis it could now be argued once niore whether it is 
possil)lc lor Turkish s(x;ial dcnux^racy to have such a tninsfornmtion. Taking tlic 'fliiid 
Way politics as a datum, because of its attachment to the global politics, and 
elaborating on the probable new ways of implementing such a concept, it could be 
pro|>osc(l that, the chainclcrislic of Turkish social democracy is nol enabling enough to 
operate such a transformation for two reasons: i) it proves once more where the 
discussed ideology has its constraints and shortcomings ii) it demands an overall 
transformation of the structure, i.e. the notion of the stale, and to a certain extent, 
detachment from the existing notion of modernisation. Here, it should be noted that, 
this is nol a significant rupture or break but rather it is a gradual process of moving 
away from the stale. Behind this, found is two other idiosyncrasies of Turkish social 
democracy, as has been analysed in the thesis: i) The social democracy in Turkey does 
not rest on such a gradual detachment but rather it is, in every step, it emphasises and 
rcinfoiccs the power of the slate. This inlixxluces the basic epistemological inadequacy 
of social democratic parlies in Turkey. The social democratic party in Turkey, i.e. the 
RPP, has never lived a real transformation that would enable it to move away from its 
rtx)ts, namely the stale and constitutive ideology as European social dcmcxiratic parlies 
have lived in their histories, beginning by the Bad Godesberg Programme or the 
liansformalion of the communist parlies with the emergence of the Mediterranean 
Scx^ialism. This is not a vSearch for an exact corresponding similarity but rather 
referring to an epistemological concern; the practice and 'ideology' of change, lacking 
this capability, 1’urkish social dcmœracy, as it faces the necessity to satisfy the need 
lor gelling adopted to the continuous How of change, gets stuck more and more to its 
already existing discourse, ii) Turkish social democracy, on the legal left wing 
politics, is characterised with its affiliation to Kemalism, which brings the similarity 
between the various political parties located on this wing. This point has been the
401
cliaraciciislic dial lias determined the likeness of the SDPP, DLP and RPP in (lie left 
political wing, as has been discussed at length in the thesis.
1'herc arc two more points which have been elaborated in the thesis that 
underline the crisis of Turkish social democracy. The first is, in Turkish left wing 
politics, as well as in the mainstream political agenda, the inexistence of the liberal 
thought, if not the liberalism."*^ This condition has two consequences. First, as 
discussed in the thesis, Turkish .social democracy, following the pattern of radical 
project of modernisation, has been attached to the first two periods of the lef t; the left 
progressivily started by the French Revolution, the emergence of the Republican 
values and the statist mcxicis developed after the Second World War among the left 
parlies of the West Europe. The first left wave, in a similar way in France, is more 
attuned to Republican values. Nevertheless, the contrast between the Republicanism 
and the liberal state is a matter of discussion in Turkey. This debate questions, on the 
one hand, the constitutionalism together with nationalism and national identity issues 
and, on the other hand, reflects on the possibilities of a liberal state"*^ ’. Although it has 
started as an economic model in the West, especially after the Second World War, in 
the .second left wave, stiilism, in Turkey has a more radical and different characteristics
The main structure of Turkish liberalism is analysed in Ayşe Kadıoğlu, 
"Laiklik ve lürkiye'de Liberalizmin Kökenleri", Defter, Bahar 1998, no.
11/33, 41-03. Kadıoğlu, interestingly shows that two liberal interventions 
in furkey. Prince Sabahattin's and Ahmet Agaoglu's, have not been 
suc.sessfull. Sabahattin's approach has not gained power becau.se of the 
radical wing of the Community for Union and Progress's was controlling 
the party and Ağaoğlu was not able to radicalize his views, for he 'became 
liberal(ist)' after being a member of CUP and the RPP.
L'uat Keyman, '"Cumhuriyetçi liberalizm ' Olasılığı", Varlık, Ekim 1998, 
n. 1093, 14-16; Ayşe Kadıoğlu, "Soruşturmaya Yanıt", Varlık, EKim 1998, n. 
1093, 19-20; lla.san Bülent Kahraman, "Cumhuriyet ve Demokrasi", Varlık, 
IMm 1998, n. 1093, 11-13.
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and content. Statism, an inseparable component of the constitutive ideology, has 
emerged as an economic concept and model but it should be comprehended as a 
political and ideological element. In this sense, not only Turkish social democracy but 
also Turkish right has never been critical of a statist undemtanding.
This is to suggest that, i) the relationship between Turkish social democracy 
and the constitutive ideology in Turkey is a problematic one. Turkish social dcmix:racy 
is a concept emerged rather lately, in the 1980s. The epistemological origins of this 
political concept is Kemalism. The way that convened to social demcx^racy passes 
through, first, the 'left of centre' process and second, the democratic left, both having 
a paiochial meaning. Social democracy has been developed as a concept in the early 
1980s but, in time, once more it is convoluted and merged with Kcmalism, through 
the rc-cstablishmcnt of the RPP, which is a clear rejection of social democracy and 
social democratic tenets even though the existing party pronounce the concept. As a 
constitutive ideology, especially in the 1923-1945 period, Kemalism has been the 
origin of a progrc.ssivc political movement. In the 1970s, it has helped the 
conceptualisation of the political change in Turkey but, because of its epistemological 
roots and discourse that it is attached, and due to such concepts as populism and the 
socio-economic model it purports, it has not found the chance of having a total 
renewal and transformation. Nevertheless, in this pericxl, although there are icfcrcnccs 
to the original ideology, yet there is a tacit shift from the Six Arrows model of 
Kcmalism. The structural determinant of this model is |X)pulism and parochialism. 
Due to these two concepts, even the basic constitutional component of the constitutive 
ideology, secularism, has been reinterpreted. Social democracy, in this context, as has 
been analy.scd at length in the thesis, is a hybrid political concept still in the process of 
getting adopted to the universal values of the mentioned ideology.
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ii) Being the determining power behind modernisation, Turkish Kemalist social 
democracy is more a cultural element rather than being an ideology. 'Phis very 
condition has played the most leading role in the determination of the conservative 
backbone of Turkish s(x;ial democracy. As analysed in the relevant chapter, because 
culture is by definition related with tradition and through the linkage between tradition 
and conservatism, it could be further argued that, the conservatism in Turkish social 
tlciiKHriacy is backed by this very idiosyncracy. Mere, it could be argued dial the 
dilTicully of transforming Turkish social democracy is because of its cultural 
character, for it is more difficult to move away from a culture inherited Ihen from an 
ideology. Nevertheless, in the late 1990s, after the loosening of the nation-state 
notion, as a consequence of globaliz-ation process, social demcKiacy in 7'urkey has 
(aced a radical crisis. FJecause all values it incorponilcs are under a sheer attack in the 
international scenery and Turkish scx^ ial democracy has had to fall behind of even the 
centre-right parlies. Today, the renewal is more a matter of deconstructing the 
discourse and epistemology that Turkish social democracy inherits.
On the other hand, it is clear that Turkish stx)ial democracy is a tightly knitted 
ideology. Nevertheless, this ideology of social democracy in Turkey has a specific 
nature. It is possible to argue that, in the Foucaultian sense of the concept, the 
discourse of Kemalism, which has already been referred as 'culture', has been tried to 
be implemented as ideology. As a holistic historical standing, Kemalism, has not 
refrained from defining a condition which does not incorporate the individual but to 
determine it. I ’his is in a way the emergence of a hegemonic discourse. Hegemony in 
this context has a dual function. In this sense it rests on the universal norms and 
conditions and second, the utilisation of universal language, or belter the language of
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universality, helps the hegemony to regenerate itself continuously and yet it helps the 
state to deepen its imposing Structure‘S'^  by equipping itself with a |X)wer of legitimacy 
to impose its discourse on the society and individual. In this context, the 
Westernisation, the seeiilarisni, the strong state, the organic society, the modernisation 
project, inclusive of a cultural transformation, all are the elements of the hegemonic 
discourse in Turkey which Turkish sexial dcmcxracy attaches itself.
If one definitive consequence of the hegemonic discourse of Turkish social 
democracy, because of its epistemologiail constraints and because of the connections, 
ties and links between the organic society and strong state, the vanguard party 
understanding and model, all having their roots in the early construction period of the 
RPP, is the impossibility to renew its ideological structure, the other is its problematic 
relationship with demcxracy and new emerging social conditions.Turkish social 
democracy, even when it has tried to transform itself from single-party notion to 
demcx:ratic left has stayed loyal to its basic epistemological preferences and, this veiy 
eharaclerislie is clear when the RPP of 1970s and the DLPof 1980s, is considered.''*^
^^'I'hese points have already been discussed in the thesis, but the idea is 
originally belongs Cox and elaborated in ti. Puat Keyman, Globalization, 
State, /den iiiy //5 i/7erence (New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1997), 117.
^^Гог an excellent analysis which concentrates on the difficulties of 
surpassing the existing structure with a new approach, b}' discussing the 
origins of the constitutive epistemology see Şerif Mardin, "Some Notes on 
Normative (>)nflicts in Turkey", in Peter L Ilerger (ed.). The Limits o f  
Social Cohesion, (Boulder, Oxford: Westview Press, 1998), 207-232.
^^^This is also a very much debated issues in relation with the last congress 
of RPP held in May 1998. See, Hasan Bülent Kahraman, "8. Kurultay: 
Değişim mi Revizyonizme Yeni Bir Halka mı?", Sosyal Demokrat Değişim, 
98A10, 32-39; and for a variety of different ideas, opininons and criticisms 
directed to the allegations and even the program of RPP, which argued 
that it is renewing itself under the influence of British labour Party, see 
"Clip Değişiyor mu?". Yeni Yüzyıl, 28-29-30 Mayıs, 1998, 19.
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I'his sU uctiiral, ideological and epistemological aspects, especially in the late 199()s, 
has prevented 'rurkish S(x;ial democracy to adopt itself to conceive the multiple 
characteristic of new social structures. The multi-dimensional relations between 
identity-pinver, satc-scx:icty have always been ignored in this epistemology, natuially 
due to the hegemonic discourse, and which is still in favour of a Durkheimian notion 
of organic society.
The last constraint Turkish social demrxiracy faces in the late twentieth century, 
to a certain extent, as a consequence of the above mentioned structural aspects, is its 
affiliation with 'm eta-narrations.This is a condition having two dimensions. The 
l irst is, the afliliation to a meta-narralive is, if the origins of'rurkish serial democracy 
is considered, natural, for this political mcxlcl is derivated as a function of Turkish 
modernisation project and in the second step, it has grounded itself as the constitutive 
clement and power of Turkish political modernisation. In this sense, all other 
components of the mcxlernisation is a part and parcel of this meta-narration and this 
appioach includes the notion of dcmcK'iacy as well.
'flic merging with transcendentalism, yet has two further dimensions. It 
empowers the existence of the hegemonic discourse and is blind to the concrete and 
more functioniU components of the concept under consideration. If social democracy is 
criticised in this thesis due to its indifference to the transformation in the society and its 
symbiosis with the existing constitutive discourse, the rationale behind that could be 
searched on this ground. Through this interrelated and multi-dimensional structure 
comes out the condition that determines the shortcoming of Turkish scx:ial democracy 
and the prerequisite that is needed for a structural renewal. It is the vicious attempt that
term is discussed and developed in, Jean-lrancois I.yolard, I'he 
Postmodern Condition (Minnepolis: The Minnesota University Tress, 1984).
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(Ins political uiidcistanding is carrying forward: trying to transform the crisis of (he 
hegemonic discourse with a reference to itself, which is tlie source of the crisis. 
Unless this condition is changed, it is not possible to transform Turkish social 
democracy. To say that it is not possible to surpass an already existing discourse and 
step into a completely new one, and that the existing epistemology will continue living 
in the new constructed one, should not be taken as the only circumstance in this 
process. Although (his very fact is true, and it underlines one of the basic arguments 
of this thesis, yet it could be put forward that in the history of Turkish social 
democracy, especially in the period of SDPP, as analysed in the text, there have been 
possibilities for such, to say with an Althusserian concept, 'epistemological breaks.' 
In (his sense, here it could be speculated that the formation of a genuine social 
democracy cannot be through RPP and with a reference to its history and tradition but 
thoiough a movement which is external to it. Although the history of Western social 
dcnuKJiacy is a proof of the validity of this approach and process, still for (he Turkish 
social democracy it is an answer to judge which of the statements is (rue; whether "the 
future lasts forever" or "the present lasts a long time."
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